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THE ROLE OF THOMAS C. DAWSON IN UNITED STATESLATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: 1897-1912
By
Glenn J. Kist.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the diplomatic career
of Thomas Cleland Dawson in an attempt to ascertain what influence, if any, he had
in shaping the Latin American policy of the United States during the Roosevelt
and Taft Administrations.

When Dawson entered the diplomatic service in 1897, at

the age of 32, his appointment as secretary to the United States Legation in Brazil, came as the result of political patronage.

However, what was probably con-

sidered originally to be a temporary position led to a distinguished diplomatic
career.

Following the Brazilian assignment, the posts that he held progressively

grew in importance, until he was ultimately one of the chief advisers on Latin
American affairs in the State Department.

In addition to the secretaryship at

the Legation in Brazil, his assignments included the following: Minister Resident
and Consul-General in the Dominican Republic, 1904-1907; Minister to Colombia,
1907-1909; Minister to Chile, 1909; Chief of the Latin American Division and Resident Diplomatic Officer in the State Department, 1909-1910; Minister to Panama,
1910; Special Commissioner to Nicaragua, 1910; Peace Commissioner to Honduras,
1911; Ambassador to the Venezuelan Centennial celebration, 1911; and Resident
Diplomatic Officer in the State Department, 1911-12.
There is no indication that Dawson significantly disagreed with the policies which Washington pursued during the years he was in the diplomatic service.
Although his influence on the formulation of policy was confined largely to advising on certain specific aspects of implementation, rather than in devising
new policies, he had a considerable impact on the Caribbean policy of the United
'
States by skillfully negotiating the agreements implementing the policy of dollar

diplomacy.

Perhaps his most significant contribution was assisting in negotiat-

ing the establishment of the customs receivership in the Dominican Republic.
1

p

2

Both in his dealings with Latin Americans and in his two volume history
of South America published in 1903-04, Dawson demonstrated a genuine liking and
sympathy for the peoples of Hispanic America.

While this favorable disposition

might appear to be contradicted by his acceptance of the policies of the State
Department and his role in implementing these policies, such a contradiction is
more apparent than real.

Dawson considered the extension of United States com-

merce and protection of.legitimate financial investments of United States citizens as completely justified.

Regarding interference in the affairs of the Carib-

bean area, he believed that political stability in the region was contingent upon
the economic stability and prosperity of the various countries.

Since this area

was a special sphere of United States influence, Dawson concluded that it was
the United States' place to offer a helping hand.

Furthermore, United States

interference in the region appeared to produce some beneficial results for these
countries.
Dawson's most glaring deficiency was his inability to recognize and understand the depth and sincerity of the opposition to United States interference
which was present in the various Latin American countries.

Where the United

States could bring pressure to bear on a government, this disregard of popular
opposition made little difference in achieving policy objectives.

Where such

pressure could not be exerted effectively, the failure to account for the opposition could result in failure of the policy.

In either case, increased anti-

Yankee sentiment was likely.
Dawson's death, on May 1, 1912, not only ended a distinguished diplomatic
career which very possibly may have continued to grow in importance, but it also
removed a strong advocate of the policy of dollar diplomacy.
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PREFACE
Much has been written on the Latin American policy
of the United States during the first decade of this century.
In view of their responsibility in shaping United States
foreign policy, the roles of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt
and William H. Taft, and their respective secretaries of
state have received major attention in the study of United
States-Latin American relations during this period.

Indeed,

this has been the case in the monographic literature and in
the biographies of these men. 1 These men, however, necessarily
had to depend on the staff of the Department of State and
the diplomatic officers of the United States who were stationed
in the various Latin American capitals for. information and
advice upon which to formulate and implement policy.

It is

the purpose of this dissertation to investigate the diplomatic
career of one of these men, Thomas Cleland Dawson, in an
attempt to ascertain what influence, if any, he had in
1Tyler Dennet, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New
York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1934). Philip c. Jessup, Elihu Root
(2 vols.; New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938). Henry Pringle,
Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York: Frarrar and Rinehart,
Inc., 1931). Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William
Howard Taft (2 vols.; New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939).
James Brown Scott, Robert Bacon Life and Letters (London: William
Heineman Ltd., 1924 •
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shaping the Latin American policy of the United States during
th.e Roosevelt and Taft Administrations.
Thomas

c.

Dawson's diplomatic career in Latin America

and the State Department", from the time he arrived at his
first post in January, 1898, until his death on May 1, 1912,
stretched over a period of a little more than fourteen years.
His importance, however, is not to be found merely in the
length of his service, but rather in the importance of his
assignments.

This is clearly demonstrated by a very brief

review of his career in the foreign service and the State
Department.

Until 1904, he served in the relatively insig-

nificant post of Secretary of the United States Legation in
Brazil.

In April of that year, he was assigned to the newly

created post of Resident Minister and Consul General in the
turbulent Dominican Republic.

In the next three years he

would help to neg'otiate and implement a customs receivership in that Caribbean republic.

Following his term in

Santo Domingo City, Dawson served as United States Minister
to Colombia, where relations with the United States had not
yet recovered from the Panamanian revolution of 1903.
1909, he was sent as Minister to Chile.

In

There he briefly

handled the negotiations concerning the settlement of the
Alsop claim.

By late 1909, he was called back to Washington

to serve in the State Department as the Cheif of the newly
created Division of Latin American Affairs.
ment was Minister to Panama.

His next assign-

He was in Panama City less than

iv

a month when he was ordered to Nicaragua to negotiate a
settlement with the new provisional Government of that
country.

In early 1911, he was again in Central America;

this time he had been instructed to attempt to restore peace
in Honduras.

Completing his Honduran mission, he returned

to Washington where he remained as Resident Diplomatic
Officer in the State Department until his death in 1912.
In determining the extent of Dawson's influence on
the Roosevelt and Taft Administrations, it is necessary to
investigate his attitudes toward the Latin American nations,
their politicians and people, in order to see how his attitudes differed from or were similar to those prevailing in
the State Department.

In this regard, Dawson seems to stand

in contrast to some of his superiors.

The Secretaries of

State under whom he served, with the exception of Elihu Root,
did not exhibit either much sympathy or unaerstanding towards
the Latin Americans. 2 Dawson, however, became a student of
the Latin American nations and produced a sympathetic study
of the historical development of the South American countries.
Finally, an effort will be made, where possible, to ascertain
the attitude of the Latin Americans themselves towards Dawson
and his work.
Since Dawson played a prominent role in United StatesLatin American affairs, he naturally receives some mention in
2
Jessup, ~· cit., I, 468-69. Dana G. Munro, Intervention
and Dollar Di lomac in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, New
.,.-~~~~-.-~........~~----~---~~~~~-------~~~Jersey: Princeton University Press, 964 , pp. 160-61.
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most works which cover United States diplomacy in Latin
.America for the period 1898-1912.

Most frequently his name

appears in reference to his work in the Dominican Republic
and Central America.

Of those historians who touch upon

Dawson's career, only Dana G. Munro in Intervention and Dollar
Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 makes any attempt to
indicate his influence or his attitudes. 3

Here as elsewhere,

only a small fraction of Dawson's career is treated.
In discussing works which treat Dawson's career, two
others should be noted.

John E. Briggs, in an article entitled

"Iowa and the Diplomatic Service," devotes a few pages to out4
lining Dawson's assignments in the diplomatic service.
Calvin J. Billman in his doctoral dissertation, "Backgrounds
and Policies of Selected United States Diplomats to Latin
America, 1898-1938," expends four pages on Dawson. 5

There is

no indication of the use of any archival sources in this
section, although mention is made of the Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States for 1904 and 1906.
On the basis of this rather cursory research Billman concludes
that Dawson was a hinderance to the improvement of United
States-Latin American relations. 6 This present study shall
differ from the above mentioned works in that it will
3M

unro,

4

~·

•t

~·,

.
passim.

Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XIX (July, 1921),

360-64.
5 unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University,
1955, pp. 207-211.
6
Ibid., p. 211.
vi

concentrate on Dawson as the focus of attention while still
attempting to keep him and his work in proper historical perspective.

Furthermore, whenever possible manuscript and

archival collections have been used.
As in all works of this nature, the author has become
indebted to numerous individuals in the course of his research
and writing.

Above all he wishes to express his profound

gratitude to his adviser, Dr. Joseph A. Gagliano of the History
Department, Loyola University, who not only introduced him
to the importance of Dawson's diplomatic career, but also
patiently offered advice, constructive criticism and encouragement as the research and writing progressed.

The author is

also indebted for the helpful advice and criticism given by
Dr. Ralph E. Minger and the Reverend Charles E. Ronan,

s.

J.,

both of the History Department of Loyola University, who read
and criticised the manuscript.

The conclusions reached in

this dissertation and any faults that may still be present,
however, remain the author's responsibility.

In the mechanics

of searching out documents, the author was greatly assisted
by the staffs of the National Archives, the Manuscript
Division of the Library of Congress, the Special Collections
Department of the Deering Library, Northwestern University,
and the E.M. Cudahy Memorial Library, Loyola University.

A

special thanks is to be extended to Messrs. Karl Grisso, Reference Librarian of the Hanover College Library, Robert

w.

McClew, Registrar of Hanover College, and Harley P. Holden,
vii

Assistant in the Harvard University Archives, for forwarding
materials relating to Dawson in the Hanover College Library
and Archives and the Harvard University Archives respectively.
Finally, the author wishes to express his gratitude to the
Arthur J. Schmitt Foundation whose generosity enabled him to
devote a full year to the research and writing of this dissertation.
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· CHAPTER I
I
FORMATIVE YEARS: 1865-1897
When Thomas Cleland Dawson was born on July 30, 1865,
his parents were residing in the small northern Wisconsin
town of Hudson, located on the Mississippi River.

On both

sides of his family, he was of Scotish ancestery.

His father,
Allan Dawson, was a native of county Clackmannan, Scotland. 1
The elder Dawson had come to the United States with his
parents twenty years earlier and had worked on his father's
farm prior to moving to Milwaukee in order to study law.
After being admitted to the bar, he had gained some prominence
in his chosen profession. 2 The family of Anna Cleland Dawson,
Thomas' mother, were descendants of Scotisli immigrants who
had settled in northern Ireland around 1610. 3
1 The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography Being
the History of the United States: As Illustrated in the Lives
of the Founders, Builders, and Defenders of the Republic, and
of the Men and Women Who are Doing the Work and Moulding the
Thought of the Present, hereafter cited as The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. XIII {New York: James T.
White and Company, 1906-), p. 512.
2a. F. Gue and Benjamine F. Shambaugh, Biographies and
Portraits of the Progressive Men of Iowa Leaders in Business,
Politics and the Professions, Vol. II: A Western Commonwealth
(Des Moines: Conaway and Shaw, Publishers, 1899), p. 103.
3The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol.
XIII, p. 512.
1

2

Although a native of Wisconsin, Thomas
not spend much of his life there.
birth, his father died.

c.

Dawson would

Within three years of his

Apparently, Anna Dawson remained in

Hudson for a few years with her two.sons--Allan, Thomas'
younger brother, had been born on October 7, 1866. 4 Whatever
the duration of his residence in the Badger State, it would
seem that while there the young Dawson did receive a brief
introduction to formal education.

Shortly, however, Mrs.

Dawson moved with her sons to the small settlement of Enterprise, in Volusia County, Florida.

Owing to the paucity of

schools in their new location, the remainder of his elementary
education was left to his mother's instruction. 5
In 1878, at the age of thirteen, Thomas was enrolled
in the senior preparatory program of Hanover College, a small
institution of higher learning located not" far from the city
of Madison in southeastern Indiana.

After completing this

final year of the preparatory program, which provided for
instruction in algebra, geometry, English grammar, Latin
(Vergil's Aeneid, Cicero's Orations, and prose compositions),
geography, and physiology, he progressed to the Freshman year

4who Was Who in America: A Com anion Volume to Who's
Who in America, Vol. I, 1897- 942 Chicago: The A. N. Marquis
Co. , 19 4 3) , p • 3 0 5 •
5The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol.
XIII, p. 512. Gue and Shambaugh, £E.· cit., II, 102.

3

of the College program. 6
The curriculum of the College at that time was divided
into two basic courses, the classic and scientific, which
differed little from one another.

Pursuing the classics course,

Dawson received an education which the college administration
described as directed "to develop and discipline the mind, and
to furnish that mental and moral outfit, which will best prepare men and women to take up their special work in life. 117
In fact, the College provided a rather broad liberal education.
There was, as one might suspect, a heavy stress on the classics.
However, courses in English, German, mathematics, physical
science, history, geography, political science and "mental
sciences"--psychology and philosophy--were required. 8
In addition, a significant portion of the curriculum
·was directed towards inculcating the students with religious
and moral principles.

Although the pamphlet describing the

course of instruction at Hanover for the year 1880-81 main6

.
Robert w. McClew, Registrar, Hanover College, letter
to the author, September 30, 1969.
For the information regarding Dawson's matriculation
at Hanover College and for the description of the College's
curriculum at the time Dawson enrolled, I am indebted to Mr.
Karl Grisso the reference librarian at the College, Mr. Robert
w. McClew the Registrar, and Professor Bowers the Custodian
of the College's Archives. These gentlemen kindly forwarded
to me copies of the material concerning Dawson presently in
the Archives and Library of the College.
7 circular of Hanover College, 1880, p. 18.

81bid., pp. 18-19.

4

tained that the College was "a Christian, though not a sectarian
institution of learning, 119 it would seem that it was closely
.
10
affiliated with the Presbyterian Church.
Sunday mornings
were devoted to classroom study of the Bible and attendance
in chapel was required in the afternoon.

Additional religious
instruction was provided throughout the week. 11
Dawson was to have graduated with the class of 1883.
However, during the winter term of his junior year, he had a
disagreement with no less a personage than the president of
'

the College.

The outcome of this dispute led him to withdraw

from the school and to return to his home in Florida.

The

/ '
incident evidently became something of a cause celebre.

Dawson's side of the story received prominence in the college
newspaper, The Hanoverian.

In the course of the winter term,

as a result of illness, he had asked for,

~d

had received,

a four week extension of the deadline for his class essay.
However, after two weeks had passed, Dr. Fisher, the President
of the College, informed him that in view of the approaching
end of the term the essay must be submitted immediately or a
zero would be given for the assignment.

This in turn would

lower Dawson's grade in Constitutional Law by two per cent.
9 Ibid.
lOThe tenth edition of American Universities and
Colleges lists Hanover as being affiliated with the united
Presbyterian Church. Otis A. Singletary and Jane P. Newman
(eds.), American Universities and Colleges (10th edition;
Washington, D. c.: American Council on Education, 1968), p. 457.
11
circular of Hanover College, 1880, p. 18.

5

Dawson, in what was perhaps an outburst of adolescent self.righteousness, did not fail to inform the President that he
considered this treatment unfair, especially since he had
originally been given four weeks grace and had, in fact, been
ill during the past two weeks.

Furthermore, he made it known

that if he could not receive justice at Hanover, he would go
where he could obtain it. 12
While the transcripts of Dawson's grades at Hanover
appear to be no longer extant, he apparently had a more than
credible record. 13 The editors of the college journal, The
Hanoverian, noted in May, 1882, that given "a fair show,"
Dawson would "carry off class honors wherever he goes."

More-

over, he enjoyed considerable popularity among his peers.

The

same editors reported that "Tom had more friends, perhaps,
than any student 'in the College."

His popularity is further

attested to by the support given on his behalf in the argument
with President Fisher by The Hanoverian and the editors'
12 The Hanoverian, II (May, 1882), 177. In spite of
the fact that Dawson withdrew from Hanover in 1882, the College
still awarded him a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1886. It would
appear that Dawson was neither registered nor attended Hanover
in the academic year 1885-86. Robert w. McClew, Registrar,
Hanover College, letters to the author, September 30, 1969,
and October 9, 1969.
13Mr. Robert w. McClew, Registrar of the College states
that at the time of Dawson's attendance "no one took very
serious the filing or completion of student's personal records."
Robert W. McClew, letter to the author, September 30, 1969.

6

subsequent refusal to withdraw their criticism of the President's
handling of the matter. 14
Returning to Enterprise, he joined with his brother
Allan in publishing a weekly country newspaper called the
Enterprise Herald. 15 As a result of this undertaking he was
able, after two years, to accumulate enough money to return to
16
college.
At the time of his withdrawal from Hanover, he
may have considered completing his college career at Yale. 17
In the end, however, he chose Harvard.
October 21, 1884, Dawson was admitted as a sophomore
in the Harvard class of 1887. 18 While at Cambridge, he lived
alone in room 70 of College Hall. 19 At the end of the year,
On

he again withdrew from college.

It is difficult to determine

14The Hanoverian, II (May, 1882), 177. Hanover Col. lege Triangle, May 9, 1912, pp. 1, 4.
15 The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography,
Vol. XIII, p. 512.
16
Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102.
17The Hanoverian, II (May, 1882), 177.
18
c1ass of 1887, Record of T. C. Dawson, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
For Dawson's transcript of grades, attendance record
while at Harvard, and other materials regarding him in the
Harvard University Archives, I am indebted to Mr. Harley P.
Holden, Assistant in the Harvard University Archives, who kindly sent xerox copies of these documents.
19aarvard University, College Directory 1884-85: A
Full List of the Names and Addresses of the Students of Harvard university (Cambridge, Massachusetts: n.p., 1884), p. 28.
The Directory incorrectly lists Dawson as a member of
the freshman class. This book is to be found in the Library
of Congress, Washington, D. c.

7

the primary motive for his action.

In part, it was perhaps
· may h ave b een
·
·
con d"ition
o f h"is f"inances. 20 or, it
th e s t rigent
academic.

His transcripts and attendance records indicate
i

that he was an adequate if not spectacular student.

While his

grade average for the year was 84, he, nevertheless, had what
would seem to have been a rather extensive absence and tardy
record. 21 Furthermore, it would seem unlikely that his background would have enabled him to fit well into the Harvard
social milieu.
The termination of Dawson's studies at Harvard did
not mark the end of his formal academic career.

On October 15,

1885, he enrolled as a member of the senior class of the
. .
. Law S c h oo 1 , c·incinna
. t"i, Oh"io. 22 At the time of
Cincinnati
Dawson's matriculation, the Law School provided two years of
instruction, the junior and senior years, culminating in the
awarding of the degree of bachelor of laws.

Applicants for

admission to the senior class, who had not taken the junior
year at the college, were required to pass an examination
covering the courses of the junior year and to present either
20

Gue and Shambaugh,

~·

cit., II, 102.

21
c1ass of 1887, Record of T. c. Dawson and Record of
Absences from and tardiness at recitations and lectures, 18841885, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
22
while studying at the Law School Dawson resided at
280 Race Street, Cincinnati, Ohio. William's Cincinnati Directof¥ Embracing a Full Alphabetical Record of the Names of the Inhabitants of Cincinnati, A Business Directory, Street Directory,
Munici al Record, united States Post Office Director , Etc.
Cincinnati: Cincinnati Directory O fice, 1886 , p. 341.

8

a certificate of attendance at another law school or a letter
from an attorney stating that the applicant had studied law
.·
23
for a year under his guidance.
Since there is no evidence
that oawson ever studied law either in college or in a law
office prior to his arrival in Cincinnati, it seems likely
that these rules were applied rather flexibly.
however, that this deficiency was made up later.

It is possible,
While in

Cincinnati, he worked in the law offices of Thornton M. Hinkle,
24
a prominent Cincinnati lawyer.
Apparently any deficiencies were easily made up, for
Dawson graduated on schedule with his class in June, 1886.
While the Law School's records for this period do not seem to
25
be extant,
nevertheless, he did display some degree of
23 catalogue of the Officers and Students of the Law
School of the Cincinnati College for the Fifty-Fourth
Academical Year, 1886-1887 with a Statement of the Course
of Instruction (Cincinnati: n.p., 1887), pp. 14-15. [Hereafter cited as Catalogue of the Law School 1886-1887.]
24 Thornton M. Hinkle to John Sherman, January 29, 1897.
Thomas C. Dawson's Application and Reconnnendation File.
Files of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National
Archives, Washington, D. c. [Hereafter cited as Dawson's
Application and Recommendation File.]
25
This statement is based upon replies made to inquiries
to the Office of the Dean, College of Law, University of Cincinnati and to the Director of the Archives of the University of
Cincinnati. Letter of the author to the Office of the Registrar,
College of Law, University of Cincinnati, August 28, 1969.
Samuel s. Wilson, Acting Dean, College of Law, University of
Cincinnati, letter to the author, September 3, 1969. Letter
of the author to Samuel s. Wilson, September 9, 1969. Samuel
S. Wilson, letter to the author, September 13, 1969. Letter
of.the author to Peter R. Thoms, University Legal Officer,
University of Cincinnati, September 19, 1969. Peter R. Thoms,

9

brilliance as is indicated by the fact that he was awarded a
$75 prize for the best essay on a designated topic for the
class of 1886. 26
Following his graduation from the Law School, Dawson
headed for Iowa, arriving at Des Moines on his twenty first
birthday, July 30, 1886.

It is again difficult to determine

exactly what prompted him to make this move.

In part, it was

perhaps the belief that opportunities would be more abundant
in Iowa.

There is also the likelihood that family connections

helped to determine his action.

In 1884, a cousin of his,

J.C. Hurne, had settled in the Iowa capital.

Upon arriving in

Des Moines, Dawson joined with Hurne to form a law partnership,
which was to last until the end of 1889.

In January, 1890,

the law partnership having been dissolved, Dawson turned his
attention to journalism.

He took a position on the Iowa State

Register as legislative reporter, but quickly advanced to
assistant city editor and finally in August, 1890, to the
position of city editor. 27
letter to the author, October 28, 1969.
The Register of the Department of State, September 20,
1911 (Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 63,
states that Dawson received an M.A. degree from the Cincinnati
Law School in 1898. From the information received in the above
mentioned replies and from a search of various lists of the
graduates of the Law School (Law Dept. of the University of
Cincinnati, A List of Graduates of the Cincinnati Law Department
of the University of Cincinnati From the Time of its Establishment 1833 to 1904 [n.p., n.d.}), it would seem that this statement is incorrect.
26
catalogue of the Law School 1886-1887, pp. 18, 20.
27
Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102.

10
Evidently the three years of practicing law in Des· Moines
and the time spent working on the Register opened new opportunities for Dawson: opportunities which could lead to political
I

office.

In the winter of 1890, he served as clerk of the

Appropriations Committee of the Iowa House of Representatives. 28
In February, 1891, he resigned his position with the newspaper
and moved to Council Bluffs in order to form a law partnership with John Y. Stone of that city, who was then Attorney
General of Iowa.

At the same time, Dawson became Assistant

to the Attorney General, a position which was apparently
appointive and which he held until the expiration of Stone's
term in office in 1895. 29
The period of four years during which he served as
assistant to the Attorney General gave him adequate means to
gain a degree of prominence in state politics and in the
Republican Party organization.

By 1893, he had risen to the

chairmanship of the Party's central committee in Pottawattamie
County (Council Bluffs), a position he held until 1897.
28
A. J. Chentry to A. L. Hager, January 25, 1897,
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
29 Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102. Dawson to
Bacon, July 23, 1906, Despatches from United States Consuls in
Santo Domingo 1837-1906, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. T.-56 (Washington, D. c.: National Archives,
1962), vol. 19, roll 19.
Gue and Shambaugh and the other biographical works cited
above incorrectly refer to Dawson's position as Assistant
Attorney General. In his letter to Bacon on July 23, 1906,
Dawson explicitly states that he "was.for four years Assistant
to the Attorney General of Iowa."

11

Popularity among fellow Republicans was not, however, confined
to the environs of Council Bluffs, but spread throughout the
state. 30 Undoubtedly Dawson's part in prosecuting various
cases against the railroads and his appointment as special
commissioner for Iowa in that State's boundary dispute with
Nebraska, added to his reputation.

Furthennore, the law finn
.
d a 1 arge an d prosperous prac t'ice. 31
o f Stone an d Dawson en)oye
Dawson's efforts on behalf of the success of the Republican Party in Pottawattami county bore fruit.

During the

three years of his leadership the control of the county govern32 p h
.
t h e h an d s o f th e Rep ubl'icans.
er aps, h owmen t came into
ever, the most difficult task confronting the young Republican
leader was to deliver his county for McKinley in the 1896
Presidential election.

The Presidential campaign in Iowa

was not easy for the Republican Party.
certainty until the end.

Nor was the outcome a

Many of the Iowa fanners were lured

to the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, by his
stand on the free coinage of silver.

The chainnan of the

state central committee_reported that "in many counties the
30 H. w. Byers, Speaker of the Iowa State House of
Representatives, 26th General Assembly, to the Iowa Delegation
in Congress, January 19, 1897, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
31
Gue and Shambaugh, ~· cit., II, 102-103.
32
J. D. Edmunds, President, The Citizens State Bank,
Council Bluffs to A. L. Hager, January 3, 1897; M. McDonald,
Iowa State Representative 35th District, to Members of the
Iowa Delegation in Congress, February 5, 1897; et passim,
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
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free silver craze had taken the form of an epidemic. 1133
However,, the Republican party organization was well developed
within the state and with a concerted effort 34 by party officials
and workers, Iowa

was kept in the Republican column in the

November election.

In Pottawattami County, the Republican

victory was largely attributed to the untiring efforts of
Thomas Dawson. 35
McKinley's election opened still further avenues of
advancement.

Dawson's work in the Iowa Republican Party had

gained for him the respect of many local politicians, many
of whom agreed that he was deserving of some reward for his
services to the party in the form of a political patronage
posi' t 'ion. 36

In addition, Dawson had an important connection

in the national Republican Party.

Since the days when they

were classmates at the Cincinnati Law School, Thomas
and Charles G. Dawes had been close friends.
prominence in the party had been meteoric.

c.

Dawson

Dawes' rise to
At the age of

33a. G. McMillan, Chairman Republican State Central
Committee (Iowa) to James s. Clarkson, September 5, 1896.
James s. Clarkson Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript
Division, General Correspondence, Box 2, File 1896, Sept-Dec.
34 Ibid. H. G. McMillan to A. B. Cummins, August 20,
1896. Charles G. Dawes Collection, Deering Library, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, [hereafter cited as
Dawes Collection] , filed in an unmarked box in file folder
marked 1896; most of the documents in this box pertain to
political affairs.
·
35 J. D. Edmunds to A. L. Hager, January 13, 1897; et
passim, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
36 oawson's Application and Recommendation File, passim.
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thirty-one, in 1896, he was a confident of President-elect
McKinley and it was rumored that he was being considered for a
cabinet post.

There is no indication that the relationship

between Dawson and Dawes became parasitic, with the former
using it merely as a means to further his own career.

This

friendship, nevertheless, could not but be advantageous to
Dawson when he sought political preferment from the McKinley
. . t ra t•ion. 37
a dm1n1s

Shortly after the election, Dawson evidently decided to
take advantage of this new opportunity and seek a place in the
diplomatic service.

It is possible, however, that Dawson

had been giving some thought to entering the diplomatic service prior to the election of McKinley.

In his letter of

recommendation fqr Dawson, Judge w. I. Smith, Judge of the
District Court Pottawattamie County, states that he had frequently urged Dawson to seek a position in the diplomatic
service. 38

At this time it was his hope to gain an appoint-

ment as secretary to one of the United States legations in
Europe, preferably Constantinople. 39

There can be no question

37 charles G. Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years,

edited and with a forward by Bascom N. Timmons (Chicago: The
Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1950), pp. ixxiii. Charles G. Dawes to Fred w. Upham, March 25, 1909,
Dawes Collection, Press Letter Books, October 9, 1908 to May 22,
1909, pp. 826-827. Dawson to Dawes, May 3, 1897, Dawes Collection, File D, 1896-1897.
38

wallis I. Smith to the President, March 21, 1897,
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
39

Dawson to the President, March 18, 1897, Dawson's
Application and Recommendation File.
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that Dawson was taking advantage of the system of political
patronage which was then prevailing for the appointment of
diplomatic officers.

But, he was not without qualifications

for the position he sought.

His linguistic accomplishments

were of some note.

He claimed to be able to speak and read
French and to read German, Spanish, and Italian. 40 He was

well educated and possessed some knowledge of United States
diplomatic history and international law.

Moreover, if the

writers of his letters of recommendation can be taken at their
word, "his address" was "wholly pleasing and attractive and
.
41
his character and conduct • • • upright and manly."
The position of secretary of legation which Dawson was
seeking was neither very prestigious nor lucrative.

One

man's opinion of the position is indicated in a letter from
the United States Ambassador to Mexico, D.·E. Thompson to
Charles G. Dawes, dated December 13, 1907.

Dawes had tele-

graphed Thompson asking advice on aiding a young friend of
independent wealth who wanted to enter the diplomatic service.
This letter does not apply to Dawson; nevertheless, Thompson's
remarks are interesting in view of the fact that prior to
his appointment to Mexico, he had been United States Minister
to Brazil, and Dawson had served under him as secretary of
legation from the time of Thompson's appointment to Petropolis
40 Ibid.
41J. Y. Stone to the Iowa Delegation in Congress,
January 23, 1897; et passim, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
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in 1902 until Dawson left to become United States Minister
in Santo Domingo City, in 1904.
Thompson advised that if the young man had money and
did not mind devoting himself to social affairs it might not
be a mistake to enter the diplomatic service.

Personally,

however, Thompson could only see this type of life leading to
the ruination of the young man.

He furthermore doubted the

likelihood of any advancement.

If Dawes were determined to

have his young friend placed in the diplomatic service,
Thompson was sure that Dawes' political influence and connections
would make this an easy task.

Nevertheless, Thompson con-

eluded: "First and last, however, I will say very frankly
that if your young friend has brains and something to help
himself with, he can do much better than to enter the Diplomatic
. Service." 42
Sometime in the spring of 1897, Dawson changed his
mind about applying for the secretaryship of the legation in
Constantinople and instead put his name forward for the same
post in Petropolis, Brazil.
this change in plans.

Several factors may have determined

In the first place, the legation in

Constantinople was probably out of the reach of the Iowa
politicians in Congress, upon whose support Dawson ultimately
had to depend.

The political patronage allotted to them.in

42 Thompson to Dawes, December 13, 1907, Dawes Collection, 1906-1914 Name File, s-u, File T-General.
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the diplomatic service probably was relegated to less prominent
posts.

Furthermore, the position of Minister to Brazil had

recently been filled by the appointment of Edwin H. Conger,
I

a long time acquaintance of Dawson.

It is not unlikely that

the new Minister prevailed upon his young friend to join him
43
• n Brazi' l •
1

Finally, after several months of waiting, Dawson's
efforts to receive his desired appointment were rewarded.

In

June, 1897, President McKinley submitted the,young Iowan's
name to the Senate for approval as secretary to the legation
in Brazi1. 44 By the first of July the necessary approval had
been conferred by the Senate and Dawson informed of his appointment. 45
Shortly thereafter, it would seem that the new secretary
traveled to Washington for a brief period Of instruction in
his new duties and at that time conferred with the Third
43 E. H. Conger to the President, June 3, 1897, Dawson's
Application and Recommendation File. E. H. Conger to Secretary
of State John Sherman, January 18, 1898, Despatches from the
United States Minister to Brazil, 1809-1906, National Archives
Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 121 (Washington, D. C.:
National Archives, 1947) [hereafter cited as Despatches from
Brazil], vol. 61, roll 63.
44 John Addison Porter (President McKinley's Secretary)
to John Sherman, Secretary of State, June 23, 1897, Dawson's
Application and Recommendation File.
45 sherman to Dawson, July 1, 1897; Thomas w. Cridler
(3rd Assistant Secretary of State) to Dawson, July 1, 1897;
Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State: Brazil,
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 77
(Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1947) [hereafter cited
as Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil], vol. 18, pp. 294-95, roll 26.
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Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas W. Cridler, on the possibility of delaying his departure for Brazil until September or
October.

The delay would provide more time to conclude personal

and business affairs and would also enable him to escort
Minister Conger's family on the journey to Brazil.

The

officials in the Deaprtment of State had no objection to the
delay. 46 In spite of his original plans to set out for his
new post in the early fall of 1897, Dawson did not depart from
his home in Council Bluffs until November 11, finally leaving
the United States around the twentieth of the month.

Two

months later, on January 18, 1898, he arrived in Petropolis. 47
Thus, in 1898, just as the United States was about to
embark on the course of empire building, Thomas

c.

Dawson,

then in his thirty-second year, began the career in the diplomatic service which was to occupy him for the remaining fourteen years of his life.

The path which had lead to his

appointment was not much different from that which lead
many other men into the diplomatic service.

Political

patronage based on connections and faithful service to the
party controlling the federal executive was the surest, if
not the only, way to obtain an appointment as the representative
46
Dawson to Sherman, August 2, 1897, Despatches from
Brazil, vol. 61, roll 63. Sherman to Dawson, August 10, 1897,
Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 260-61, roll 26.
47 Dawson to Sherman, November 15, 1897, Despatches from
Brazil, vol. 61, roll 63. Conger to Sherman, January 18, 1898,

~-
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of washington in some foreign capital.

Nevertheless, Dawson

was not bereft of qualities which would recommend him for
•

hiS new position.

i

The appointment as secretary of legation

was rather low on the diplomatic concursus honorum, and lurking
in the back of Dawson's mind there was probably little intention of spending the rest of his life in diplomacy.

More

likely he hoped to use the appointment as a starting point
for further political advancement.

However, as time passed

he would begin to look upon himself as a professional in his
chosen career and to seek advancement therein.

CHAPTER II
I

BRAZILIAN APPRENTICESHIP:

1898-1904

Arriving at the harbor of Rio de Janeiro around
January 18, 1898, on board the French ship the Chili, Dawson
was immediately impressed by the scenic beauty of the Brazilian
capital.

As the ship entered the harbor, the waters sparkled

in the bright summer sun; off to the left lay the city with
its suburbs partially obscured by the thick tropical fullage
but still discernible as they stretched between the mountains.
The deep clear blue sky reminded him of those he had seen as
a boy in Florida.

Once on shore he found the crowded streets
of the business district of the city less attractive. 1 It is
unlikely that he spent much time in Rio before going to
Petropolis, where the legations were located, to assume his
new duties.
The position of a secretary of legation was varied.
The primary duty, of course, was to attend to the routine
office affairs of the legation: transcribing official communications, maintaining the archives, and taking charge of the
record books, seal and cipher of the legation.

In addition,

whenever either the office of minister fell vacant or the
1

T.C. Dawson, "A Hanover Boy in Brazil," The Journal
of Hanover College, V (October, 1898) ~ 98-99.
19

r
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minister was absent from his post, the secretary was to act
as charg~ d'affaires ad interim. 2 Within three weeks of his
arrival, barely having gained an acquaintance with the affairs
of the legation, Dawson found himself acting in this latter
capacity. On February 6, Minister Edwin H. Conger left 3 to
assume his new post as United States Minister to China.
Since the newly appointed Minister to Brazil, Charles Page
Bryan, did not arrive and assume his official duties until
April 11, 1898, Dawson was in charge for a little over two
months. 4
In spite of his relative lack of experience, Dawson
I

does not seem to have had any difficulty as charge.

As a

I

matter of fact, the six years which Dawson spent in Brazil
coincided with a growing cordiality which had been evident
in the relations between the two countries· ever since the
formal recognition of the Brazilian Republic by the United
States in 1890.

The result of this friendship became partic-

ularly apparent in 1898, when Brazil alone among the Latin
American nations remained sympathetic towards its northern
neighbor during the Spanish-American War. 5 An early
2

Sherman to Dawson, July 1, 1897, unnumbered, Diplomatic
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 249, roll 26.
3oawson to Sherman, February 7, 1898, No. 105, Despatches
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64.
4Bryan to Sherman, April 12, 1898, No. 4, ibid.
5E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco
and Brazilian-American Relations (New York: Columbia university
Press , 19 6 6 ) , p • 6 •
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indication of this sympathy was given shortly after Dawson·•s
.

I

assumption of the post of charge.

u.s.s.

On February 15, the

Maine blew up and sank in the harbor at Havana.

As

soon as news of the tragedy reached the Brazilian Foreign
office condolences were sent to the United States Legation. 6
There can be no doubt that this expression of sorrow
was in part perfunctory and dictated by diplomatic etiquette.
Within two weeks, however, the Brazilian Government gave a
more concrete demonstration of its friendship.

On Wednesday,

March 2, Foreign Minister Dionisio E. de Castro Cerqueira
requested that Charg( Dawson call upon him the next day.

In

the course of the interview on the third, Dawson was informed
that about two weeks earlier the Brazilian Government, through
its minister in London, had been approached by an agent of
. the Spanish Government with a proposal to purchase two
Brazilian cruisers then under construction in the British
shipyard of Armstrong.
near completion.

One of these ships, the Amaznas, was

Cerqueira stated that when news of this

contact reached Rio, President Prudente de Moraes Barros and
he had discussed it, and the President had instructed him to
inform Dawson confidentially of the proposition.

Furthermore,

the Foreign Minister was to ascertain if the current status
of United States-Spanish relations were such that the sale of
6Dawson to Sherman, February 17, 1898, No. 109,
Despatches from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64.

~
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the vessels to Spain would be construed as unfriendly to the

united States.

Cerqueira hastened to explain that he had been

instructed to assure Dawson that the Brazilian Government had
I

only the friendliest sentiments towards the United States and
did not intend to do anything inimical to the latter's interests. 7
Dawson thanked Cerqueira for the expression and
demonstration of friendship, and replied that insofar as he
had been informed, United States-Spanish relations were still
cordial.

He promised, nevertheless, to telegraph the Foreign

Minister's revelation to Washington.

However, he realized

that in addition to its friendly sentiments towards the United
States, the Brazilian Government was anxious to sell these
ships in order to obtain cash to help meet a debt installment
due April 1.

His interview with the Foreign Minister further-

more left him with the impression that the.Government was in
fact anxious to sell the ships to its northern neighbor.
Conflicting newspaper stories had already appeared reporting
that the vessels had been sold to Argentina or Spain and that
their purchase had been discussed with the German Minister
in Rio. 8
Foreign Minister Cequeira's gesture of friendship was
welcomed in Washington.

Dawson was instructed to seek per-

mission for the United States Ambassador in London to open
7Dawson to Sherman, March 7, 1898, No. 116, ibid.
81bid.

i I
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negotiations with the Brazilian Minister there, in order to
obtain an option on the two ships. 9 Upon receipt of these
i

instructions, Dawson immediately contacted the Foreign Minister,
and within a few hours the necessary consent had been obtained.IO
On the twelfth, Dawson was further instructed to urge the
Brazilian Government to take speedy and favorable action on
the sale of the ships.

Again the Brazilian Foreign Office

readily complied.

By the latter part of the month the trans~
11
action had been completed.
Although most of these negotiations were handled in London, Dawson played a minor role,
and sharing in the success of the negotiations must have been
a pleasant initiation into the diplomatic profession.
One of the major policy objectives of the United
States with regard to Brazil during Dawson's tenure as
·Secretary of Legation in Petropolis was to.increase the
amount of United States exports to Brazil.

In fact this had

been an objective of North American diplomacy since 1890, and
was to remain so long after Dawson had been promoted.
Brazilian exports to the United States had long enjoyed a
favorable balance.

From the end of the North American Civil

9oay to Dawson, March 4, 1898, telegram, Diplomatic
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 363, roll 26.
10 Dawson to Sherman, March 7, 1898, No. 116, Despatches
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64.
11oawson to Sherman, March 22, 1898, No. 122, Despatches
from Brazil, ibid.
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war, the United States had consumed the largest portion of
Brazil's coffee crop, and, after 1870, this conunodity was
admitted duty free into the United States.

Brazil's other

major exports, rubber and cocoa also found a ready market in
the north. 12 According to the State Department's calculation,
in the fiscal year 1898 the value of Brazilian exports to
the United States amounted to $61,750,000, of which over ninetyfive per cent were admitted duty free.

During the same period,

however, the value of United States exports to Brazil amounted
only to $13,300,000.

A little more than thirteen per cent of

this total had been admitted duty free; but even part of
this small amount had been subjected to clearance charges.

13

Within the next four years this situation was in no way bet14
tered from the United States viewpoint.
In order to remedy this discrepancy the State Department under the leadership of James G. Blaine and his Republican
successors during the McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt !\dministrations attempted to increase United States exports either
by obtaining preferential treatment for United States goods
or by means of reciprocity agreements.

The latter had ini-

tially been accomplished under the McKinley tariff of 1890
12

Burns, ~· cit., p. 63.
13Hay to Bryan, March 4, 1899, No. 115, Diplomatic
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 420, roll 26.
14
Burns, ~· cit., p. 63.
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and an agreement with the Brazilian Government formulated in

1891.

In spite of its unp<Jl>ularity in Brazil, this arrangement

endured until the passage of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894,
which, while maintaining pxotectionism, eliminated reciprocity.
aowever, with the enactment of the Dingley Tariff in 1897,
reciprocity was restored to the diplomatic arsenal of the State
oepartment in its efforts to secure a favored market for
15
united States goods.
Naturally, most of the negotiations

~oncerning

com-

mercial concessions were conducted by the United States
Ministers: Charles Page Bryan 1898-1902, and David E. Thompson
1902-1906.

Nevertheless, daring the various periods when

Dawson was serving as charg!, approximately fifteen months in
all, he frequently had to conduct the negotiations on this
topic.

Whenever. he did handle these negotiations, he always
energetically pressed his Government's point of view. 16
In addition, he did not hesitate to suggest alternate
means of exerting pressure to achieve the desired end.

Inform-

ing the State Department of the Brazilian Government's refusal
to enter into negotiations on a treaty of commercial reciprocity
15 Lawrence F. Hill, "The United States," Brazil, ed.
Lawrence F. Hill (Berkely, California: University of California
Press, 1947), pp. 350, 357.
16 Dawson to Sherman, March 25, 1898, No. 123, enclosure
2: Dawson to Cerqueira, Ma:r:ch 25, 1898, Despatches from Brazil,
vol. 62, roll 64. Dawson to Hay, September 30, 1899, No. 188,
Despatches from Brazil, vol. 64, roll.66. Dawson to Hay,
December 31, 1899, No. 214, and enclosure 5: Memorandum, ibid.
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in March, 1898, Dawson noted that the incumbent Government had
iess than eight months left in office and was desperately trying
to avoid national bankruptcy.

Therefore, the President and

his cabinet were reluctant to disturb the existing financial
situation.

To a large extent, Dawson reported, the financial

difficulties confronting the Brazilian Government came from
the fall in the rate of exchange.

Since the revenues were

collected in the depreciating currency and the debts had to be
paid in gold, he noted that it was understandable that the
Government was reluctant to reduce the revenues by any tariff
concessions.

In spite of this apparent appreciation of the

Brazilian Government's problem, Dawson went on to report
that the daily exchange rate was largely dependent on the
amount of coffee sold, since that export was the principal
source of foreign exchange.

Moreover, he maintained that the

imposition of the import tax on coffee as provided by the 1897
tariff would probably have an adverse effect on that commodity's price because the United States was its largest market.
This fall in price, Dawson thought, would result in a decline
in exchange and thus would not only harm the producers but
also the Government who would be embarrassed by the further
depreciation of its currency.

He suspected that this as an

aspect of the problem might not have occurred to the Brazilian
Government and if Washington was determined to continue pressing for a reciprocity agreement this point might be profitably

,........-
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brought to the attention of the Brazilian Foreign Office. 1.7
-The Department of State, however, decided to terminate negotiations on a reciprocity agreement until the new Brazilian
president was installed in mid-November. 18
A similar suggestion was included in a despatch dated
pecember 31, 1899.

After discussing possible concessions to

united States commerce with the new Foreign Minister, Olyntho
de Maglhaes, Dawson reported that he believed the Brazilian
Foreign Office had not yet seriously studied the question and
that the Government was not demonstrating any genuine willingness to assist in elevating the loopsided trade balance.

In

view of this Dawson thought that it was time to present the
Brazilian Government with "a frankly stated request" for
preferential treatment of certain articles rather than to
continue to ask what the Government was willing to do.

He

further implied that the threat of the imposition of the three
cents per pound import tax on coffee under the 1897 tariff
bill, might have a salutary effect on the Brazilian executive
. securing
.
th ese concessions.
.
19
in
About two years later Dawson again had an opportunity
to advise on policy.

In 1900 the Department of State had

instructed Minister Bryan to urge preferential treatment for
17 Dawson to Sherman, March 25, 1898, No. 123, Despatches
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64.
18J.B. Moore to Bryan, April 30, 1898, No. 13, Diplomatic
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 362, roll 26.
19 Dawson to Hay, December 31, 1899, No. 214, Despatches
from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66.
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flour coming from the United States was in barrels while that
imported from its chief competitor in Brazil, Argentina, came
in sacks. 20 Finally in the fall of 1901, in an attempt to
I

I

grant some concession to United States conunerce, the Brazilian
Government attempted to increase the duty on flour in sacks,
thereby making flour in barrels more competitive.

However,

during the year and a half which had transpired since the
original request had been made, Yankee flour exporters had
also switched over to the use of sacks.

While he was apparently
I

not initially aware of the changed practices of the United
states exporters, as soon as this matter was made known to
him, Dawson urged the State Department to send him new instructions which would permit him to continue to seek the best
interests of the flour exporters by opposing the new duties. 21
Much to Dawson's pleasure, the State Department was aware of
the changing conditions and wired him to urge the Brazilian
. 22
Government not to impose the additional duty on flour in sacks.
In addition to energetically pushing the negotiations
for conunercial reciprocity and offering suggestions for

July
vol.
Hay,
vol.

20 Hay to Bryan, March 30, 1900, No. 179; Hay to Bryan,
27, 1900, No. 207, Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil,
18, pp. 475, 483, roll 26.
21 Dawson to Hay, November 1, 1901, No. 368; Dawson to
November 12, 1901, No. 371, Despatches from Brazil,
67, roll 69.
22 Dawson to Hay, November 13, 1901, No. 372, ibid.
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alternate action, Dawson also possessed a detailed understanding
of both the financial situation in Brazil and the impact of
the Rio Government's policies on United States· exports to
that country.

This understanding was clearly illustrated in

two despatches he sent to Washington while acting as charge
in 1899.

In late September, 1899, the Brazilian Chamber of

oeputies considered a tariff bill which would have provided
for a maximum schedule applicable to countries which taxed
Brazilian exports and a minimum schedule which would be applied
to those nations granting free enterance to Brazilian products.
Dawson reported to the Department of State and to the Brazilian
Foreign Minister that the new plan would not materially aid
United States exports.

Moreover, he pointed out that the

application of the maximua schedule against France and Italy,
the countries against whoa the new law was· primarily directed,
would not benefit the United States, since French and Italian
qoods were mainly in competition with British and German
products. 23 In October, 1899, he sent the State Department a
report on the domestic and foreign flour and grain business in
Brazil.

His conclusion was that under the existing tariff

regulations the prospect for United States
bleak. 24

flour~xports

was

23 Dawson to Hay, September 30, 1899, No. 188, Despatches
from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66.
24
Dawson to Hay, October 20, 1899, No. 194, ibid.
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Both of these reports were apparently well received in
25
washington.
In referring to Dawson's report on the proposed

aew maximum and minimum tariff schedules, Secretary of State
say noted:

The Department observes with satisfaction your careful
examination of the proposed action of the Brazilian Government, and its probable effect upon our commerce with that
country. An intelligent appreciation by your Legation of
the entire question is of special importance in view of
the long delay incident to correspondence between the two
capitals.26
In addition to reciprocity and preferential treatment

of Yankee exports, the Department of State also

so~ght

to

extend United States commerce in Brazil by instructing its
consular agents and diplomatic representatives to gather and
:
27
report information on potential markets.
The diplomatic
representatives could not, of course, personally present
_petitions on behalf of individuals seeking.concessions or
business opportunities; but, they were to see that United
States citizens had equal opportunities with other foreigners
in having their case heard. 28 As a result of his travels in
25 Hay to
Dawson, November
Brazil, vol. 18,
Dawson, November
26 Hay to
p. 452.

Dawson, November 3, 1899, No. 155; Hay to
23, 1899, No. 158, Diplomatic Instructions to
pp. 452, 455-56, roll 26. See also, Hay to
2, 1899, No. 154, ibid., pp. 451-52.
Dawson, November 3, 1899, No. 155, ibid.,

27 Hay to Bryan, October 26, 1898, No. 88, ibid.,·p. 406.
28Hay to Bryan, October 12, 1898, No. 81, ibid.,
pp. 401-402.

31

Brazil and detailed study of various aspects of the Brazilian
economy and industry, Dawson was also able to assist along
these lines.

I

I

In mid-March, 1899, after a trip through the state of
Minas Gerais, he submitted a lengthy report to the Department
of State.

From his observations, he concluded that the conserv-

ative characteristics of the inhabitants of that state would
result in slow modernization of "their industrial habits and
organizations.

...

n

Nevertheless, in spite of what might

have been considered unfavorable conditions, Dawson reported
that the population and wealth of the state were rapidly
increasing and that there was an opportunity for United States
trade which was "well worth cultivating."

He thought that

there was a possibility of establishing or increasing the
market for numerous products of United States manufacture,
ranging from mining machinery and farm tools to toilet soap
29
. .
an d pat en t me d 1c1nes.

Three years later while traveling in the State of Rio
Grande do Sul, Dawson visited the construction site of the New
Hamburg and Taquara Railroad.

He immediately saw an opportunity

for North American manufacturers to furnish some of the
material required in the construction of this railroad and
others that were to be built in the State.

He suggested that

29 Bryan to Hay, March 15, 1899, No. 135, enclosure 1:
Dawson to Bryan, March 12, 1899, Despatches from Brazil, vol.

63, roll 65.

·
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the local importing firms contact firms in the United States,
but discovered that they found it more convenient to deal with
European firms.

In his report to Minister Bryan in Rio,

Dawson noted that the lack both of an United States business
house and a consular representative in Porto Alegre made it
difficult for United States commercial interests to obtain
any consideration.

He further recommended that the matter

of the railroad construction be brought to the attention of
United States firms in Rio de Janeiro in order that an agent
could be sent forthwith in the hope of. gaining some share in
supplying the necessary material and equipment. 30
The possibility of securing a share of the Brazilian
railroad construction for United States manufacturers and
investors had actually been present in Dawson's mind long
before his trip to southern Brazil.

In late 1899 he had sub-

mitted to Washington a detailed report on the various Brazilian
railroad routes.

In it he covered the history of Brazilian

railroad construction, the cost of operation, yearly profits
and governmental control.

He thought that such information

might "be useful to manufacturers producing material used in
railroad construction and management, and to capitalists
contemplating investments in them. 1131
30

.
Bryan to Hay, May 23, 1902, No. 418, enclosure 1:
Dawson to Bryan, May 16, 1902, Despatches from Brazil, vol. 67,
roll 69.
31 oawson to Hay, December 26, 1899, No. 212 and enclosure,
Despatches from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66.
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In early 1904, while acting as charge, Dawson found
another opportunity to assist North American commerical penetration of Brazil.

The Brazilian Government was about to let

a contract for the construction of a smokeless powder factory.
The United States chemical company of Dupont was interested in
obtaining this contract.

When the company's representative,

Colonel J. B. Burbank, arrived in Rio, Dawson personally introduced him to the minister of war.

Dawson obviously thought

that this was necessary to obtain an equal hearing for the
North .American concern since the German Minister had introduced
German manufacturers.
was more encompassing

In this instance, Dawson's purpose
~han

single chemical company.

merely gaining a contract for a
He thought that if Dupont won the

contract, other United States commerical interests would
. indirectly benefit.

The use of North .American material and

plans in the construction of the powder plant would give
concrete evidence of Yankee mechanical progress.

Brazilians

were vaguely aware of this progress, he conceded, but were
' 1 an d mach'inery. 32
more f ami'l'iar wi'th European mat eria
Neither Dawson's energetic pressing for commercial
reciprocity and preferential treatment of United States
products nor his efforts on behalf of securing new markets for
North American manufacturers made him unique.
certainly he was right in line with the tho
32
Dawson to Hay, February 9, 1904,
from Brazil, vol. 69, roll 71.

To the contrary,
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Department of State and with those of his immediate superiors,
MinistersCharles Page Bryan and David E. Thompson.

However,

the manner in which Dawson conducted the negotiations on
I

commercial issues and his actions on behalf of United States
producers clearly illustrates his acceptance of the importance
of increasing United States trade in Brazil and the extent to
which he, as a diplomatic representative, was involved in this
effort.

That his actions on behalf of North American exporters

and manufacturers were appreciated is duely

~ttested

to by

the numerous letters included in his Application and Recommendation file from manufacturers urging his appointment as United
States ambassador to Brazil in 1911. 33
Dawson's tenure as Secretary of Legation and the periods
I

when he served as charge undoubtedly afforded him adequate
opportunity to perfect his skills as a diplomat.

It would

seem that his competence was well appreciated by his initial
superior, Minister Charles Page Bryan who served in Brazil
from 1898 until his transfer to Switzerland in 1902.

On

several occasions Bryan noted Dawson's competence and ability
in handling the Legation's affairs. 34 While Bryan's successor,
33 James Mitchell to the President, December 6, 1911;
Thomas A. Eddy to Huntington Wilson, December 5, 1911, et passim,
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
34 Bryan to Sherman, April 12, 1898, No. 4, Despatches
from Brazil, vol. 62, roll 64. Bryan to Hay, June 9, 1899, No.
159, Despatches from Brazil, vol. 64, roll 66. Bryan to Hay,
February 1, 1900, No. 220, Despatches .from Brazil, vol. 65,
roll 67.
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David E. Thompson, made no reference to Dawson's ability,
there is no evidence that he felt him incompetent.

Certainly

he did not hesitate to leave Dawson in charge of the Legation.
Moreover, since Dawson had been in Brazil and in the diplomatic
service some five years before Thompson left Lincoln,
Nebraska to assume his first post in Brazil, there can be
little doubt that the former was not only better versed in
Brazilian affairs but also in general diplomacy than the new
Minister.
That Dawson grew in professional competency and learned
from his experience is further evidenced in his response to
a State Department circular in July,: 1904 concerning cooperation between diplomatic and consular officers in collecting
commercial information.

Dawson, at that time Minister Resident

and Consul-General in the Dominican Republic, reported that,
as a result of his experience in Brazil, he believed that the
best commerical reports came from those consuls who worked
under the conviction that the excellence of their work would
be observed by their superiors in the Department of State and
ultimately lead to promotion.

Consequently, he thought that,

while it was necessary for the Legation to watch over commercial matters and to offer guidance in the case of a new or
careless consul, it was desirable that the Minister's control
should not be such as to weaken the consuls conviction that
his work would receive proper evaluation in Washington.

He

further recommended a system of efficiency reports for all

L
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members of the consular and diplomatic services, both by their
"immediate and indirect superiors."

Apparently, he felt

that the overlapping of ·functions and lack of clear lines of
responsibility within the two services at time caused either
unnecessary duplication of work or failures to transmit pertinent information.

Therefore, he suggested that either the

Ministers or Consul-Generals should be held directly responsible for translating and transmitting those decrees of the
Government to which they were accredited which affected com. any way. 35
merce in
Considering Dawson's familiarity with the economic
conditions in Brazil, his comparatively meger salary of $1,800,
I

which was increased when he was serving as charge,

36

and the

length of time he spent in Brazil,, it would not seem out of
place to wonder if his diplomatic record was in any way
besmirched by hints of bribery or gain resulting from his
position or by any other scandal.

This investigation turned

up no evidence to indicate a hint of wrong doing.

Nevertheless,

it is probable that he did use knowledge of conditions in
Brazil to make what he considered to be an auspicious investment
35 Dawson to Hay, August 20, 1904, unnumbered, Despatches
from United States Minister to the Dominican Republic, 1883-1906,
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 93
(Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1966) [hereafter cited as
Despatches from the Dominican Republic], vol. 11, roll 11.
36 sherman to Dawson, July 1, 1897, unnumbered, Diplomatic
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 249-51, roll 26.
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in the Sao Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company. 37

While it

is impossible to say with certainty whether this investment
effected Dawson's future actions, it is to be observed that
the matter was not closed until late March, 1904, only two
months before Dawson left Brazil to accept a new assignment. 38
The files of the State Department indicate that Dawson
was involved in at least one controversy which was undoubtedly
annoying and could also have been an embarrassment to him in
his diplomatic career.

This controversy developed out of an

agreement between Dawson's brother-in-law Fernando Duval, a
Brazilian, and H. Kilburn Scott, a British mining engineer.
Apparently in 1901, Duval, who lived in Rio de Janeiro, had
employed Scott to investigate mining properties in Rio Grande
do Sul.

Since Duval could not speak English, Dawson acted

as intennediary and interpreter.

Duval later claimed that

Scott violated their contract and refused to pay for the
latter's services.
37

Dawson was caught in the middle.

His

.
Dawson to Dawes, February 18, 1904, Dawes Collection,
File D, January-June, 1904. Dawes to Dawson, March 28, 1904,
Dawes Collection, Letter Press Books, Personal Correspondence,
January 26, 1904 to April 30, 1904, p. 297.
38 At the time of Dawson's death in May, 1912, he had
on deposit with the Central Trust Company of Illinois, of which
Charles G. Dawes was president, seventy shares of stock in the
sa'o Paulo Tramway Light and Power Company. These shares had a
total par value of $7,000. "Central Trust Company of Illinois
acting for Chas. G. Dawes, Agent for Luisa Dawson, Executrix of
the Estate of Thomas c. Dawson", Schedule "A", Securities deposited with Central Trust Company of Illinois for Safe Keeping
by Thomas c. Dawson During his Life. Dawes Collection, 19061914 Name File, Dawson-Fai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson File.
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brother-in-law blamed him for Scott's default, and Scott
demanded that Dawson get the money from Duval or in lieu of
that pay it himself.

Dawson refused.

In 1902, Scott turned

the case over to his British attorneys and attempted to get a
judgment against Dawson in a British court.

He did succeed in

securing some sort of judgment and thereupon his lawyers
made the case known to the State Department.
then forwarded to Dawson for reply.

The charges were

Dawson in turn presented

his side of the story, and while denying both liability and
the validity of any judgment in a British court, offered to
submit the entire case to a Brazilian court or to an arbiter
any time Scott desired. 39 Scott apparently did not see fit
to pursue his case in the Brazilian courts as Dawson suggested,
but continued to write directly to Dawson and threatened to

.

unmask him for what he was before his superiors in Washington.
In July, 1903, Dawson again wrote to the Department and laid
Scott's letter and his own reply before Assistant Secretary
. B• Loomis.
. 40
F rancis

Dawson's initial explanation when Scott's

lawyers brought the matter before the State Department had
apparently been satisfactory 41 and the renewal of the issue
39 aay to Dawson, November 25, 1902, unnumbered,
Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 581, roll 26.
Dawson to Hay, November 28, 1902, unnumbered, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
40 Dawson to Loomis, July 3, 1903, unnumbered, and
enclosures: Scott to Dawson, June 12, 1903; Dawson to Scott,
July 3, 1903, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
41 Dawson to Loomis, July 3, 1903, ibid.
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does not seem to have caused any further stir.

Dawson's

willingness to submit to a Brazilian court or arbiter and his
forwarding of Scott's letter to the Department of State would
seem to indicate his desire to have the matter in the open,
and would appear to attest to his innocence of any misconduct.
Although Dawson enjoyed his work and found it interesting42 he evidently hoped the Brazilian assignment would serve
as a stepping stone for advancement.

Certainly the limited

prestige and the meger salary offered little inducement to
stay as Secretary of Legation for any length of time.

As

early as April, 1898, his close friend Charles G. Dawes, who
was then Comptroller of Currency, wrote hopefully that the
future might offer opportunities for Dawson's advancement in
.
43
. 1 oma t"ic service.
th e d ip

Since advancement in the diplomatic service was contingent on political preferment, Dawes and Allan Dawson,
Thomas' younger brother, both strongly urged him to return to
the United States for the 1900 presidential campaign.

Dawes

succinctly put in the following words:
You could not get any more prestige if you stayed there
many years more, and at the same time would lose
42 Dawes to Dawson, April 9, 1898, Dawes Collection,
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, February 21, 1898
to April 28, 1898, p. 391. Dawson to Dawes, November 4,_1901,
Dawes Collection, File D, July-December, 1901.
43 Dawes to Dawson, April 9, 1898, Dawes Collection,
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, February 21, 1898
to April 28, 1898, p. 391.
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valuable years out of your life. If you have any chance
for diplomatic advancement under the next administration,
~ou shouli be here now and stay here until the campaign
is over.
I

In order to facilitate Dawson's obtaining a leave to return
to the United States, Dawes personally wrote to the Department
of State urging that the leave be granted. 45 However, the
Department had already decided to grant Dawson's request before
receiving Dawes' letter. 46
Nevertheless, Dawes continued to watch out for his
friend's benefit.

Once Dawson was back in Washington, Dawes

tried to get him appointed to the vacant off ice of First
Assistant Postmaster General.
Dawson's knowledge.

This was apparently without

He was taken around to see Postmaster

General Smith; but, the conversation was directed to political
topics to keep Dawson from catching wind of what Dawes and
Smith had in mind.
McKinley.

Dawes also discussed the appointment with

He felt that his friend's case was in "pretty good

shape."

Dawson, however, either was not offered or did not
- 't'ion. 47 It is possible, that for political
accept th e posi

reasons, it was thought wiser to offer the post to some one
44 Dawes to Dawson, January 24, 1900, Dawes Collection,
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, November 28, 1899
to January 26, 1900, p. 481.
45 Dawes to Dawson, January 11, 1900; Dawes to J.A.
Kasson, Department of State, January 11, 1900, ibid., pp. 347, 366.
46 Hay to Bryan, January 6, 1900, No. 166, Diplomatic
Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 46~-65, roll 26.
47 Dawes, A Journal of the McKinley Years • • • • , pp.
237-38.
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else.

Or perhaps the position was offered and Dawson turned

it down preferring to remain in the diplomatic service.
Whatever the reason for Dawson's failure to get the
position in the postal department, he did become actively
involved in the 1900 presidential campaign.
probably through the efforts of Dawes.

Again, this was

In July, Dawson

requested and received an extension of his leave of absence. 48
During the late summer and fall he headed one of the executive
bureaus at the Republican Headquarters in Chicago. 49
In spite of his presence in the United States and his
participation in the presidential campaign, no advancement
was still forth coming.

In July, 1901, Dawes, who was about

to leave his post in the Treasury Department, was again writing that it was virtually impossible to obtain a promotion
. without being in Washington.

Pressure was· enormous, he reported.

He further urged Dawson to raise his sights and ask for the
best position available.

Dawes observed, "you are very
worthy, but your modesty handicaps you somewhat. 050
48 Dawson to Hay, July 19, 1900, unnumbered (written on

the stationery of the Comptroller of Currency), Despatches from
Brazil, vol. 65, roll 67. Hay to Dawson, July 21, 1900, unnumbered, Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, pp. 492-93,
roll 26.
49 The National Cyclopaedia of American Biograehy, Vol.

XIII, p. 512. George B. Cortelyou, Secretary to President
McKinley, to Dawson, August 29, 1900, William McKinley Papers,
Microfilm, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, reel 49,
p. 96.

so Dawes to Dawson, July

12, 1901, Dawes Collection,
Letter Press Book, Personal Correspondence, May 14, 1901 to
July 26, 1901, pp. 460-61.
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By November, 1901, Dawson was still hoping for a promotion but had little faith in obtaining one.

He had reached

the point where he considered leaving the diplomatic service
.
b usiness.
.
51 Disappointment over not being proan d en t ering
moted was not the only reason why he was thinking about changing professions.

In part, he was being led in that direction

by financial considerations.

In February, he wrote Dawes that

he could no longer make the financial sacrifice necessary to
remain at his post. 52 However, in spite of little hope of
advancement and the increasing strain on his finances, he
did not resign.

While in the United States on leave in

December, 1902, he again applied for a promotion.

At that

time he requested advancement to First Secretary of Embassy
or to Minister of a "small mission like Uruguay." 53 Advance. ment ultimately would come but it was still sixteen months
away. 54
It is difficult to determine what exactly persuaded
Dawson to stay in Brazil in spite of the indication that he
was planning to resign.

Possibly he determined to remain in

51 Dawson to Dawes, November 4, 1901, Dawes Collection,
File D, July-December, 1901.
52 Dawson to Dawes, February 14, 1902, Dawes Collection,
January-June, 1902, part 1.
53The Assistant Secretary to Mr. Mosher, December 24,
1902, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
54 Loomis to Dawson, April 28, 1904, telegram,
Diplomatic Instructions, Brazil, vol. 18, p. 636, roll 26.
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the diplomatic service and decided that even though advancement
was slow in coming he still might have a chance if he remained
at his post.

However, there are other possibilities.

On

I

April 5, 1900, while in London on his way back to the United
States, Dawson married Luiza Guerra Duval, a Brazilian lady
whose family had banking interests in Rio de Janeiro and Porto
Alegre. 55 Therefore, family ties may have kept him in Brazil.
Moreover, his wife had several business interests of her own
and Dawson was involved in getting these in ~rder. 56
quently, this may also have detained him.

Conse-

At any rate, when

Dawson spoke of the financial sacrifice involved in remaining
55The National C*clopaedia of American Biography, Vol.
XIII, p. 512. Gue and s ambaugh in their article on Dawson in
Biogra~hies and Portraits of the Progressive Men of Iowa Leaders
in Business, Politics, and the Professions, give Mrs. Dawson's
maiden name as Luiz Duval Murray. QE.· cit., II, 103.
Three children were born of this marriage. Allan the
eldest was born in Washington, D. c., on February 16, 1903. He
ultimately went into the diplomatic service and devoted most of
his career to Latin American affairs. {Who Was Who In America:
A Com anion Biogra hical Reference Work to Who's Who in America,
Vo • II: 1943-1950 Chicago: The A. N. Marquis co., 1950 , p.
147). On October 15, 1949, while serving as Counselor at the
Unites States Embassy in Santiago, Chile, Allan apparently committed suicide by jumping from his office window on the eighth
floor of the Embassy. (The Washington Post, October 16, 1949,
p. 1). A daughter, Lilita, was born on July 31, 1905. (Dawson
to Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress [hereafter cited as the Roosevelt Papers],
Series 1, Letters received, August 7-21, 1905, Box 95). It is
possible that she is still alive. A second son, Frederico,
was born in the summer of 1907 and died in August, 1911.
(The Washington Star, May 1, 1912).
56 Dawson to Dawes, February 14, 1902, Dawes Collection,
January-June, 1902, part 1.
'
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secretary of Legation, it is highly doubtful that he referred
to approaching poverty.

Nevertheless, it is likely that he

found it necessary to di°p into his own resources.
In view of the fact that Brazil was but the first
assignment in a fifteen year diplomatic career spent in the
capitals of various Latin American countries and in the Department of State and marked by ever increasing responsibility in
the conduct of inter-American relations, it would seem proper
to conclude this phase of Dawson's career with an examination
of his concepts of the historical and future development of
South America, a major part of the area which would occupy
his attention for the remainder of his life.

Dawson's grasp

of the contemporary Brazilian political and economic developments was more than adequately demonstrated in his despatches
to the State Department.

In addition, he utilized the time

spent in Brazil to read extensively in the history of the
South American nations and to discuss the political developments with scholars and the public men directly involved in
shaping the destinies of these countries. 57 The result of
these readings, discussions, and his own observations was a
two volume history entitled The South American Republics.
The first volume, published in 1903, covered Argentina,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil, with the last country, as might
be expected, receiving the largest portion of the text.
57Thomas c. Dawson, The South American Republics,
Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, l903), p. vi.

The
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second volume, published the following year, dealt with the
nations of the west and northern coasts of the continent,
including the newly established country of Panama.

After an

introductory chapter in volume I covering the discoveries
and conquest, the general format was to handle each country
separately beginning with the colonial period then proceeding
through the wars of independence and concluding with the
political developments of the nineteenth and early years of
the twentieth centuries.

A physical description of each

country was also included.
Dawson found the origins of the problems confronting
the independent South American states, a tendency towards
political disintegration, distrust of rulers and government,
militarism, and economic retardation, in their colonial
. experience and in their fight for independnece.

The tendency

towards localism, which frequently acted as a centrifugal
force in the development of both the Spanish American nations
and Brazil, could be traced, he believed, to the constitutional
forms transplanted from the Iberian peninsula. 58 Distrust of
rulers and governments, which could give a predisposition
towards revolution, resulted, he maintained, from Spanish
and Portuguese tyranny. 59 In addition, he saw the wars of
independnece, which naturally brought the military leader and
adventurer to the fore, as a factor in contributing to
58 Ibid., I, v, 7.

59 Ibid., p. v.
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militarism in the Hispanic nations. 60

The economic retardation

which the Spanish-American republics had experienced, again
was attributed largely to Spanish colonial policy.

This

policy, Dawson argued, "ingrained into South Americans the
belief that industrial and commerical activity exists only by
sufferance of the government. 1161

Moreover, it hampered com-

mercial spirit and deprived business skill of its rewards.
The result was that office holding instead of productive
pursuits "became the most popular of avocations."

This

pernicious effect, he maintained, could still be seen in the
South American countries, and it was only slowly that the
national ideals were becoming industrial. 62 In modern times,
he reported, the geographic isolation of Bolivia, Ecuador,
Peru and the Pacific coast of Colombia added to this economic
retardation. 63 To Dawson there was a close connection between
political advancement and economic advancement, and the
industrial retardation from which the South American nations
suffered also helped to account for their political problems. 64
In spite of the failures of the colonial system and
isolation imposed by geography, Dawson was basically optimistic about the 'general political and economic development
of the continent.

He was convinced that militarism had "already

definitely disappeared from more than half the continent" and
. 61 Ibid., p. 52.
64 Ibid., p. v.
63 Ibid., II, iv-v.

6 0ibid.
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was "slowly becoming less powerful in the remainder. 1165
Politically, he saw an increase in "civic capacity" and the
I

slow evolution of "the best form of government for their
special needs and conditions."

As a United States citizen he
. 11y, h e
. . d th a t th.is f orm was rep ubl.ican. 66 Economica
reJoice

also felt that there was hope. Immigration would raise the
industrial level, 67 and the opening of the Panama Canal would
infuse new life into the commerce of the west coast of the
.
t • 68
con t inen
This general optimism was further reflected in his
treatment of the individual countries.

He foresaw a bright

future for the countries of the Rio de la Plata.

Argentine

, industrial impetus, he believed, had reached the point where
it could surmount all obstacles, and he was certain of Argen. tina's eventual "material greatness" and of its ultimate and
extensive moral and intellectual impact on the rest of the
.
t • 69
con t inen

The little country of Paraguay, which had suf-

fered so heavily in the war with Brazil and Argentina, he
thought would no longer be a threat to any of its neighbors
and that Paraguay now stood open to the world. 70 His optimistic forecast for Uruguay was tempered by his realization
of the historical conflict between Argentina and Brazil over
that small country's territory.

While predicting that the

66 Ibid., pp. v-vi.
67 Ibid., p. v.
69 Ibid., I, 161.
70 Ibid., p. 224.

68 Ibid., II, v.
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country would increase in wealth and population, he also felt
that Uruguay would "continue to be the political storm-center
of the Atlantic coast."

7·1

It was for Brazil that he had the most glowing prediction.

Dawson reported that country was virtually "teeming with

life and full of potential wealth--too much so, perhaps, for
the most wholesome development of the human race." 72

He main-

tained that within the next two centuries Brazil was destined
"to support the largest population of any of the great political
divisions of the globe." 73

In addition to this tremendous

economic potential, Dawson thought that the Brazilian political
situation had improved and that there was little danger of
74 The Brazilian Government had had
· t erna 1 d'1s1ntegrat1on.
·
·
in
a rather difficult time financially during the first decade of
· the republic, but here too Dawson saw an improvement.

Capital

was beginning to accumulate, industrial habits were being
formed, and a tendency toward moderate methods in the exploitation of the natural resources of the country was appearing. 75
Brazil, he contended, was certain to endure.

Immigration from

Western Europe and North America he thought to be inevitable.
The country might be thus transformed economically by this
influx "but the new conditions will have to fit themselves into
the political and social framework already in existence. 1176
71

74

Ibid.

I

Ibid.

I

72
73
pp. 282-83.
Ibid., p. 306.
Ibid., p. 289.
75 Ibid., p. 511.
76 Ibid., p. 512.
p. 510.
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With regard to Peru's political development he reported
most favorably, noting that that country had "long since passed
the stage of pronunciame"ntos and military government. 1177 The
I

i

outlook for the economic development of the country also looked
bright.

A stimulus along this line, Dawson believed, would

be the Peruvian Corporation which had been formed by Peru's
British creditors after the foreign debt had been settled by
the Grace contract of 1889.

"The existence of this gigantic

private enterprise," he wrote, "which will apply the energy
'

and economy characteristic of individual enterprise to undertakings governmental in magnitude" undoubtedly would aid
Peruvian industrial development. 78
In spite of the Civil War of 1891, Chile had been the
most stable of the Spanish American governments.

Dawson attri-

buted this unique phenomenon to several factors: the landed
aristocracy had been interested in cultivating their farms and
in peace rather than in taxing the poverty stricken; the people
were industrious and "naturally inclined toward industrial
progress" and were not easily led into following a revolutionary
chief; finally, the country itself was compact not geographically divided up like Argentina and Colombia. 79 Furthermore,
he foresaw no repetition of the internal strife which had
rocked the country at the beginning of the last decade of the
nineteenth century.
77

Rather, there would be a continuation of

Ibid., II, 132.

78 Ibid., p. 129.

79 Ibid., pp. 189-190.
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the historical political stability. 80

Similar optimistic

predictions were given for the economic and political developments of Bolivia, Ecuador, Venzuela, and Colombia. 81
In addition to the historcial treatment of the countries
of South America and the optimistic prognosis for their future
political and economic development, Dawson at least gives a
hint of his thoughts on United States involvement in Latin
Americao

In view of the concern he showed for the expansion

of United States trade in Brazil while serving as Secretary
of the Legation and the interest he had in the economic development of the South American countries as indicated in his historical treatment of them, it is not surprising that he hoped
,1

to see United States influence and trade expand along the
west coast of the continent once the Panama Canal was opened.
He felt that a predominance of influence and trade was "justly
due the United States' geographical proximity and political
sympathy." 82 Moreover, he felt that "every patriotic American"
must hope to see the strong intellectual, financial, and commerical influence of the European nations "supplemented by
. 83
American schools, money, and commercial enterprise."
In view of Dawson's work during his next assignment
in the Dominican Republic, it is interesting to note his
attitude towards the problem of European intervention to force
SOibid., pp. 228-29.
Slibid., pp. 278, 281, 342-43, 399, 472.
82 Ibid., p. v.
83 rbid.
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a Latin .American nation to pay its foreign debts and claims.
This problem arose in 1902 when the Venezuelan dictator
Cipriano Castro refused to settle foreign claims, and units

of the British and German navies blockaded Venezuelan ports,
bombarded the coast and sank two Venezuelan boats.

While not

giving an all inclusive solution for the problem of default
by a Latin American nation on its foreign obligations in
writing of the Venezuelan crisis, Dawson observed that in this
instance, arbitration was "certainly the best method of adjust84 However, his view on the occupation of territory by
men t • 11
a European power in order to force the Latin American state to
comply was quite clear: he opposed it.

He wrote that such

action "by European powers might give the latter a military
hold in the western continent which would embarrass and corn. plicate more important relations." 85
Probably just about the time he was completing the
second volume of his history, the revolution occurred in
Panama which enabled that former Colombian province to become

an independent state and thus permitted the United States to
undertake the building of the trans-isthmian canal in Panama.
His treatments of the historical development of Colombia and
Panama and of the events surrounding the revolution are clearly
designed to justify the revolution in Panama and the action of
the United States in supporting it.
84

Ibid., p. 398.

85 rbi'd.,

He begins his argument
pp. 398 - 99 •
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by maintaining that geographically and historically Panama was
not part of "Colombia proper. 1186 Moreover, to "Colombia
proper" the building of a trans-isthmian canal was of no
special conunercial interest since it "has its outlet down the
Magdalena to the Caribbean. •

..

Concerning the Hay-

Herran Treaty, Dawson implies that the Colombian Government
was at fault for the Colombian Senate's failure to ratify
the treaty and should have done something to secure ratification. 88

This failure, according to him, blackened Colombia

in the eyes of the civilized world and constituted an injustice
to the people of Panama.

Referring to the Colombian Govern-

ment's attempt to negotiate a new treaty after the rejection
of the Hay-Herran Treaty, he wrote:
The United States, however, absolutely refused to consider any ot:her terms than those already agreed upon, and
the civilized world saw the completion.of an enterprise
promising incalculable benefits to mankind indefinitely
postponed by the opposition of Andean provinces whom the
accidents of war and international politics had given an
arbitrary control over a region with which they had no
natural connection. The situation was particularly hard
for the people of the Isthmus, whose confident hopes were
now disappointed of at last receiving, by the prosperity
which would follow the building of the canal some compensation for the oppression and losses they had suffered during
the eighty years of misrule by the Bogota oligarchies.89
Moreover, he clearly supported the action of the United States
Government in lending its support to the revolutionary forces
and in denying the use of the trans-isthmian railroad to
86 Ibi"d., pp. 405 - 06 •
88

~., p. 486.

89

87 Ibid., p. 470.

~., pp. 486-87.
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Colombian troops in Colon, and thereby preventing them from
reaching the scene of the rebellion in Panama City.

His justi-

fication is based on the assumption that the United States
was authorized to act thusly under the Bidlack Treaty of 1846,
between the United States and Gran Colombia. 90
Dawson's arguments, of course, overlook several equally
important factors.

He makes no mention of the fact that the

Colombian Senate was at complete liberty to reject or ratify
any treaty as it alone saw fit. 91 Moreover, in stressing the
need of the canal he chose to disregard the existence of an
alternate route through Nicaragua which was still available. 92
In maintaining that the action of the United States was.justified under the treaty of 1846, he further overlooked the fact
that while not interpreted as protecting Colombia from Panamanian
. secession, by this treaty Washington did recognize Colombian
sovereignty over the isthmus.

Therefore, it hardly seems

just to interpret the treaty in such a way as to prevent the
93
' 1y dea l ing
'
' h t h e revo 1u t ion.
.
BogotaI Government f rom e ff ective
wit
9 oibid., pp. 487-88.
91J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin
American Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p.
251 •. For a more detailed analysis of this point see, E. Taylor
Parks, Colombia and the United States 1765-1934 (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1935), pp. 406-12.
92 Mecham, 2£· cit., p. 251.
93Parks, ~· cit., p. 406.
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oawson's treatment of the Panamanian episode is probably less
indicative of a conscious distortion of the facts than it is
•

I

of a wholehearted and uncritical acceptance of President
Roosevelt's policy in securing the Panamanian route.
The six years spent in Brazil as Secretary of the
Legation served as an apprenticeship for Dawson's latter diplomatic career.

During this period he had ample opportunity to

develop his skills as a diplomat.

Furthermore, he adequately

demonstrated his ability to grasp the essentials of a situation
and to fulfill effectively his instructions and press his
Government's viewpoint.
In addition, he achieved a more than passing acquaintance
I

with the history of a large part of the area which would occupy
his attention for the remaining years of his life.

While

recognizing the deficiencies of the countries of South America
and the problems confronting them, his general outlook for
their political development was optimistic, perhaps overly so.
And, economically he saw the South American continent as a
virtual storehouse of untouched resources. 94
Concerning his own country's relationship with Latin
America, his ideas were also taking shape during this period.
There can be no doubt that he saw South America as a potential
market for North American goods and a place for the investment
of capital produced by the growing United States economy.
94Thomas C. Dawson, "The Caucasian In Brazil," Popular
Science Monthly, LXIV (April, 1904), 550.
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Moreover, he willing accepted as just the use of high handed
methods by the United States Government in its dealings with
a weaker nation in order to secure what Washington considered
I

to be a righteous cause.

On the question of making the weaker

nations of the area behave and fulfill their international
obligations, he offered no definite solution; but he clearly
opposed European occupation to secure this objective.

Finally,

while not specifically mentioning it, it is likely that
Dawson felt that the tremendous resources of South America
made it imperative that the United States exert a predominant
influence on that continent. 9S
Though Dawson's ability and support of United States
policy would seem to have been adequately demonstrated, promotion was slow in coming.

The failure was in the system

which coupled diplomatic promotion with poiitical patronage,
rather than in the man.

Dawson could either resign in disgust,

or remain at his post, as he apparently chose to do, hoping
that either his political patrons or recognition of his ability,
or perhaps both, would ultimately secure the promotion he
sought.
95 For Dawson's views on the necessity of controlling
trade routes, mineral supplies, and food supplies, see ~·
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. CHAPTER III
ASSIGNMENT TO THE TURBULENT
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: APRIL, 1904
Dawson's patient waiting for an advancement in the
diplomatic service was finally rewarded in late April, 1904.
On the twenty-eighth of the month he received a telegram from

Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis informing him
that he had been appointed by President Roosevelt to the newly
created post of minister to the Dominican Republic, with a
salary of $5,000 a year. 1
The Administration's first choice for this newly
created post apparently was General Edward C. O'Brien, former
'
'
' t 'ion. 2 O'Brien, who turned down the
o f Naviga
Conunissioner
Dominican post, and his brother John F. O'Brien were prominent
figures in the New York Republican Party.

In March, 1904,

the General had sought the position of secretary of the
Isthmian Canal Conunission.

At that time, Roosevelt had refused

1Loomis to Dawson, April 28, 1904, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State 1801-1906: Haiti and Santo
Domingo. Haiti, National Archives Microfilm Publications,
Microcopy No. 77 (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1946)
[hereafter cited as Diplomatic Instructions to Haiti and Santo
Domingo], vol. 4, p. 489, roll 98.
Congress had recessed on April 28, 1904. Consequently,
Dawson's nomination was not sent to the Senate until December 6,
1904. His appointment was confirmed on December 8, 1904.
U.S. Congressional Record, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1904, XXXIX.
Part 1, 26, 65.
2The New York Times, April 29, 1904, p. 5.
56

57
to intervene on his behalf, arguing that the Commission alone
could select its secretary.
Commission's choice.

In the end O'Brien was not the

The O'Briens considered this as a rebuff

by the President and attempted to use it to add further bitterness to an already existing intra-party feud in the state of
New York. 3 Therefore, by tendering the newly created post
in Santo Domingo to General O'Brien, President Roosevelt may
have been attempting to soothe O'Brien's hurt feelings and
thus mend political fences in his home state during the presidential election year.
Although Dawson may have been officially second on the
list to receive the appointment to the Dominican Republic,
there can be little doubt that he was the preferred choice of
the Department of State.

In a memorandum on conditions in

. the Dominican Republic, dated March 19, 1904, Assistant Secretary Loomis, who had recently returned from a trip to the
republic, observed the need for an independent diplomatic
post in Santo Domingo.

Loomis advised the Secretary of State

that the individual placed in charge of the new legation should
be "a discreet, experienced, capable man. 114 Certainly, the
3B. B. Odell to Roosevelt, March 23, 1904, March 30,
1904;.J. B. Bishop to the President, April 4, 1904; Roosevelt
to T. c. Platt, March 16, 1904; Roosevelt to John F. O'Brien,
March 17, 1904. Roosevelt Papers, Series !-Letters received:
March 17-April 8, 1904, Box 71; Series 2-Letter Books, vol. 46,
February 25-April 21, 1904, pp. 180-81.
4

Memorandum For the Secretary of State on the Dominican
Republic. Present Conditions Observed During a Recent Visit-Financial situation--Historical Notes--American Interests--Some

r

l

58

experience which Dawson had gained while serving as Secretary
of Legation in Petropolis and the skill and diligence which
he had demonstrated in filling that post indicate that he pos1

sessed these qualities.
Dawson's appointment as Resident Minister and ConsulGeneral to the Dominican Republic brought him to two posts
which for the previous twenty years had been almost solely
occupied by Negroes. 5 The practice of successive administrations in Washington to use the combined

post~

of Minister to

Haiti-Charge' to the Dominican Republic, and the position of
Consul-General in Santo Domingo City as a source of patronage
for deserving Negroes apparently had led Black politicians
to consider Hispaniola along with Libera 6 as their special
preserves.

To counter any adverse reaction which might be

produced among the Black community in an election year by
the appointment of a white man to the newly created posts, the
Negro educator Booker T. Washington wrote to Roosevelt's
secretary, William Loeb, offering to release the following
statement to the Black press:
Suggestions. Roosevelt Papers, Series I-Letters received:
March 17-April 8, 1904, Box 71. This memorandum was transmitted
to Roosevelt by Secretary Hay on March 25, 1904. Hay to the
President, March 25, 1904, ibid.
SDavid c. MacMichael, "The United States and the Dominican
Republic 1871-1940: A cycle in Caribbean Diplomacy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of
Oregon, 1964), p. 79.
61bid., p. SS.
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The bill making an appropriation for the establishment of
a separate legation for San Domingo has passed Congress,
and it is probable that the President will very soon select
a Minister for that place.
It has been learned on good authority that the President had intended appointing a colored men [sic) to the
ministership, but the Dominicans have diplomatically informed him that they prefer that no Negro be sent to them
as Minister, at least not for the present. It is further
stated that because of the complicated and sensitive conditions existing in San Domingo, the President, however,
may .decide to send a white man to occupy the place temporarily and later on may appoint a colored man to be the
permanent Minister if it should be thought to be desirable. 7
From 1889 until Dawson's appointment, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic had shared the same United States representative.

However, while Port-au-Prince was favored with a lega-

tion and a fully accredited minister, Santo Domingo had to be
content with part-time and less impressive representation.
When circumstances required it, the United States minister in'
the Haitian capital would make the trip to Santo Domingo,
I

where he would assume the character of charge d' affaires.
During his absence, United States representation would be left
in the hands of its consular agents in that republic.
Though the Dominican Government did not consider this
arrangement to be fully in accord with its desired prestige, 8
the United States found it reasonably satisfactory for a number
of years.

In the spring of 1904, however, the Roosevelt

7Booker T. Washington to Wm. Loeb, Jr., April 28, 1904,
Roosevelt Papers, Series !-Letters received, April 9-29, 1904,
Box 72.
8Edgar c. Duin, "Dominican-American Relations, 18951907" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History,
Georgetown, 1955), pp. 17-18.

L

r

60

Administration decided that full time representation was required
in the Dominican capital.

An appropriation for the combined
'

post of Minister Resident and Consul-General in the Dominican
Republic was secured in the Deficiency Appropriations Act of
April 27, 1904. 9
The decision to establish an independent diplomatic
mission in the Dominican Republic doubtless arose from the
desire of the Administration in Washington to be assured of a
steady flow of reliable information at a time when the prospect
of greater United States involvement in the affairs of the
. was b ecoming
.
. .
t • 10 This involvement was
Rep ubl ic
more imminen
believed by some to be necessary in view of the chaotic conditions prevailing in the Caribbean nation.

The Government to

which Dawson was informed he had been accredited was, in the
. spring of 1904, still in the process of attaining control over
the entire country.

Moreover, the Republic was deeply in debt

and on the verge of bankruptcy with its foreign creditors
and their governments clamoring for payment. ·
In 1844, the eastern two-thirds of the island of
Hispaniola emerged as the independent state of the Dominican
Republic.

For the next thirty-eight years the country's

9Hay to Powell, June 14, 1904, No. 250, Diplomatic
Instructions to Haiti and Santo Domingo, Haiti, vol. 4, roll 98.
10Memorandum For the Secretary of State on the Dominican
Republic. Present Conditions Observed During a Recent Visit
• • • • Roosevelt Papers, Series 1-Letters received: March 17April 8, 1904, Box 71.
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history was marked by alternating revolution and strong arm
rule.

The ascension of Ulysses Heureaux to the presidency in

1882 temporarily altered this course by eliminating the kalei1

doscopic changes for the next seventeen years.

Heureaux's

first administration, 1882-1884, lacked the political oppression and financial instability which characterized his later
regime.

In 1886, he was able to secure his reelection to the

presidency.

By means of political preferment, bribery, exile,

imprisonment or assassination, he was able t? retain control
of the government for the next thirteen years. 11
While the respite from internal upheavals provided by
Heureaux's Government brought a degree of prosperity to the
12 a t th e same t'ime h'is inep
.
t f'inancia
. 1
Cari'bbean republ'ic,
. '
1e d to economic
' ins
. tab'l't
po 1 icies
i i y. 13 When h e came t o the
presidency the Dominican Republic already had an outstanding
foreign bonded debt.resulting from a loan made by British
bankers in the 1860's.

This loan, known as the Hartmont loan,

was refunded in 1888, when Heureaux was able to obtain a new
loan from the Dutch firm of Westendrop and Company.

To assure

that the new loan would be paid, the Dominican Government
turned the collection of the custom revenues--the principal
source of the Government's income--over to a board known as
11 sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican
Republic 1844-1924, Vol. I (New York: Payson & Clarke Ltd., 1928),
pp. 449-50, 455-56, 461-62.
12 otto Schoenrich, Santo Domi~go a Country with a
Future (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), pp. 70-71.
13
Wells, 2£· cit., pp. 467-68.
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the Caja de Recaudacicin or simply the regie.

This board,

consisting of representatives of the Dutch banking firm, in
addition to collecting the custom duties deducted the amount
necessary to pay the bondholders and remitted the remainder
to the Government. 14
Two years after the initial bond issue under the
Westendrop agreement, the firm floated another loan for the
Dominican Government, this time to finance a railroad between
the port of Puerto Plata and the major northern inland city of
Santiago.
met.

For several months, the interest on the bonds were

However, before long the Heureaux Administration again

found itself in need of money.
dent devised a new plan.

To meet this need, the Presi-

His scheme consisted of_ granting

local importers exemption from tariff duties in return for
the advancement of a sum of cash.

The natural outcome was

that insufficient funds came ·into the hands of the regie and
the bonds went into default in 1892. 15
When Heureaux sought another loan, the Dutch firm which
had almost been ruined by the recent default was unable to
comply with the request.

Moreover, by now, Westendrop and

Company, eager to divest itself of its Dominican interests,
sought the aid of a group of New York attorneys in negotiating
a transfer of the Company's interests, including the right to
14 1bid., pp. 469-70. Schoenrich, ~· cit., p. 355.
15
Welles,~· cit., p. 494.
Schoenrich, ~· cit.,
pp. 355-56.
L
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collect the customs, to the United States Government.
this scheme failed, Messrs. Smith

w.

When·

Weed, Brown and Wells,

the attorneys involved, organized the San Domingo Improvement
Company of New York, incorporated under the laws of New Jersey.
This new corporation assumed the obligations and rights of the
Westendrop firm.
the regie.

Among these rights, of course, was included

Eventually, the Improvement Company organized two

subsidiary corporations, the San Domingo Finance Company and
the Company of the Central Dominican Railway. 16
The Improvement Company's contribution to the "improvemene' of the country during the next seven years was limited
to completing the Puerto Plata-Santiago railroad, which had
been started under the supervision of Westendrop.

The Company,

however, did serve to tide the Heureaux regime over financially •
. In addition to the original bonds, which were issued in 1893
to serve in the refunding of the Westendrop loans, further
issues were made in 1893, 1894, and 1895.
rates favorable to the Company.

All were issued at

By 1897, as a result of heavy

borrowing for military supplies and deflection of customs
revenues away from the regie, the previously issued bonds were
again in default and the government in dire need of money.
Eventually, the older bonds were refunded; but attempts of
the Improvement Company to float another bond issue proved
futile.

To resolve his financial problems, Heureaux issued
16

schoenrich, ~· cit., pp. 355-56.
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paper currency which depreciated almost as quickly as it was
. t e d • 17
prin

Heureaux's regime came to an end with his assassination
I

in 1899.

I

His financial policies, particularly the issuance of

fiat money, did not ingratiate him to the merchant class within the Republic.
his end.

Undoubtedly, this factor contributed to

Nevertheless, the financial situation was not the

sole cause for the dictator's demise.

Those involved inthe

assass:iration had been plotting his overthrow, for sometime,
and many of the conspirators had suffered personally at the
hands of the President. 18
The revolution, which followed the death of Heureaux,
resulted in the emergence to prominence of two men, Juan
. /
. Vasquez.
/
Isi. d ro Jimenez
an d Horacio

. f o 11 ewers were
Th eir

respectively known as Jimenistas and Horacistas.

The Govern-

.
. I
I
•
ment established with
Jimenez
as presi. d ent and Vasquez
as vice

president ended in revolution in 1902.

A Horacista victory

I
.
p 1 aced Vasquez
in
the presi'dency.

As a result of strong public sentiment against the
Improvement Company at the beginning of his brief administration,
17 Ibid., p. 357.
18welles, ~· cit., pp. 535-537. Dawson to Secretary of
State, October 1B,--r90~enclosure: "Chronology of political
events in Santo Domingo," Papers Relatin7 to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906 Part 1 Washington, D. c.:
Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 591. [Hereafter Papers
Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the United States shall be
cited as FRUS, wi
the appropriate year.
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Jimenez

determined to terminate the realtionship between the

company and the Dominican Government.

Negotiations to achieve

this end were undertaken with Judge John T. Abbott, the vice
president of the Improvement Company.

For its part, the Improve-

ment Company was not averse to withdrawing from the Republic
provided that its original investment could be repaid. 19 These
negotiations came to nothing, since Jim~nez changed his mind
and decided to arrange a new agreement with the Company allowing it to retain the control of the regie.

Jime"nez probably

hoped to use the North American corporation as a counter balance
to other foreign creditors who were beginning to exert considerable pressure on his Government in order to secure payment
of the amounts due them. 20
The new contract between the Company and the Dominican
Republic, signed in March and ratified by the Dominican Congress
on April 18, 1900, was to be valid only if the Company were
able, among other things, to secure the consent of the majority
of the bondholders to suspend payments on the bonds and to
agree to a refunding.

In spite of its contention that the

majority of the foreign bondholders had agreed to this provision, the Company, in fact, did not secure the support of
the French and Belgian creditors.

When the Dominican Govern-

ment learned the truth of the matter, it immediately notified
19

welles, ~· cit., II, 559-60.

20

MacMichael, ~· cit., pp. 148-149.
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the Company that the money collected by the regie was not to be
distributed until it could be definitely ascertained if the
majority of the bondholders agreed with the arrangement.

The

Improvement Company, maintaining that it represented the
majority of the foreign creditors, refused to accept the Government's orders.

The ultimate result of this dispute was the

issuance of a decree by the Government in January, 1901, depriving the Improvement Company of the right to continue its col.
. 21
o f th e cus t om revenues un d er the regie.
l ec t ion
The United States Department of State, since the beginning of the McKinley Administration, had been taking a progressively more active interest in the protection of the burgeoning interest of United States citizens in the Dominican
Republic. 22 However, it was not until early 1901 that the
· Department of State began to take an active interest in the
dispute between the Company and the Dominican Government.
Previously, the Department had merely maintained that in any
settlement the rights of the United States bondholders should
not be prejudiced. 23 But, with the decree depriving the Company
of the right to collect the customs under the regie, Secretary
of State Hay instructed William F. Powell, who represented
the United States at both Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo, to
2

1welles, 22.· cit., II, 560-63.
22
MacMichael, 22.• cit., pp. 120-21, 124-125.
23
welles, 22.· cit., II, 563.

67

of fer the good off ices of the Department on behalf of the
Improvement Company. Powell, always eager to press United
states claims, 24 interpr~ting his instructions somewhat more
1

1

I

strongly than Hay intended, presented the Jimenez Government
with a harshly worded note demanding a settlement favorable to
the Improvement Company.

Although this course of action met

with the Department's disapproval, Powell was instructed to
continue the negotiations. 25
Temporarily interrupted by the Horacista revolution,
the negotiations were eventually resumed and resulted in the
Company agreeing to accept $4,500,000 for its properties in
the Republic.

These consisted of national bonds valued at

$2,000,000, interest in the railroad from Puerto Plata to
Santiago valued at $1,500,000, and interest in the bankrupt
National Bank and other investments valued' at $1,000,000.
However, the inability of the opposing parties to come to an
agreement with regard to inunediate transfer of the Company's
railroad to the Government and governmental inspection of the
Company's records led to a break in the negotiations.

This

impasse was finally resolved when the Department instructed
Powell to suggest arbitration.

On January 31, 1903, a protocol

was signed in which the Dominican Government agrea:lto pay
24 Ibid., p. 559. MacMichael, ~· cit., pp. 144-45.
25 Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in
The Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1964), pp. 82-84.
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$4,500,000 and the Company promised to withdraw after turning
over the railroad and its other properties to the Government.
The rate of payment and the timetable for the transfer of
properties were to be set by a board of arbitration whose membership was to consist of an appointee of the President of the
United States, an appointee of the Dominican President, and
a third member jointly appointed by the two chief executives.
If, however, within sixty days after the signing of the protocol
the third arbitrator had not been named he was to be selected
from among the members of the United States federal judicary. 26
This was the practice ultimately followed.
Within two months of the signing of the arbitration
I

.

I

protocol, the Vasquez Government was overthrown by General Wos

y Gil.

Before the end of the year Wos y Gil himself had been

. forced out by a coalition of Jimenistas and Horacistas.
General Carlos F. Morales emerged from these tumults more or
less victoriously.
his former chief.

Originally a Jimenista, he had deserted
As

soon as his forces controlled a large

portion of the country, Morales established a coalition
cabinet composed of both Horacistas and thoseJimenistas who
supported him.
26welles, ~· cit., II, 585-86. Munro, op. cit., pp.
84-5. Protocol of an agreement between the Unitea States of
America and the Dominican Republic, for the submission to
arbitration of certain questions as to the payment of sum hereinafter agreed to be paid by the Dominican Government to the
Government of the United States on account of the claims of
the San Domingo Improvement Company of New York, a corporation
under the laws of the State of New Jersey and a citizen of the
United States and its allied companies, FRUS, 1904, p. 271.
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On December 3, 1903, Miguel E. Alfau, Morales' foreign
minister, requested recognition by the United States charg/ in
Santo Domingo.

Powell made recognition contingent on the ac-

ceptance of certain provisions.

The new Government would have

to recognize the validity of the Improvement Company's arbitration protocol and several other claims which he had been pressing.
Moreover, Morales would have to promise to send a conunission
I

to Washington to negotiate the transfer of Samana and Manzanillo
Bays to the United

State~

and the introduction of some measure

of North American control of the Dominican finances.

When

Powell received assurance that the revolutionary Government
would accept these provisions, he proceeded to recognize
Morales without awaiting further

in~tructions

from Washington. 27

Powell's recognition of the Morales Government came as
somewhat of a surprise to the State Department.
Washington was clearly one of wait and see.

The policy in

Following the

standard procedure in such cases, recognition was to be withheld until the revolutionary regime indicated that it had control of the country.

Nevertheless, Powell's recognition, once
extended, was not withdrawn. 28
An examination of the State Department's files of the
instructions sent to Powell during the months of December, 1903
27

Munro, ~· cit., pp. 88-89.

FROS, 1904, pp. 262-66.

28 Loomis to Powell, January 9, 1904, January 17, 1904,
FRUS, 1904, p. 265. Hay to Powell, January 20, 1904; Loomis to
Powell, January 27, 1904, Diplomatic Instructions to Haiti and
Santo Domingo, Haiti, vol. 4, roll 98. Munro, ~· cit., p. 89.
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and January, 1904, does not indicate that Powell had been
instructed to demand a treaty between the United States and
2·9
the Dominican Republic.
. It would seem, therefore, that the
I

idea of a treaty was strictly his own.

Nevertheless, the think-

ing in Washington was changing and the suggestion was perhaps
welcomed.

The Dominican Commission submitted its proposals

to the State Department on February 3, 1904.

These included

concession of naval and coaling stations for the United States
I

at Samana and Manzanillo Bays and the right
of
the United States
.
'
to build lighthouses along the Dominican coast in return for
the United States assuming the full domestic and foreign debt
of the Republic, helping to maintain order and assisting in
.
preven t ing
revo 1 u t 'ions. 30

The willingness of Morales to permit his nation's
sovereignty to be violated, as it surely would be if the United
States were to accept the treaty, which was brought to Washington by the new Dominican Foreign Minister, Juan Francisco
I

Sanchez, doubtless came from the President's realization that
his Government was in danger from internal revolution and
external intervention.

His forces had not yet been able to

gain the loyalty of the entire country.

The northern section

of the nation remained especially hard to bring under control.
Furthermore, the possibility of intervention by a European
29 Diplomatic Instructions to Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Haiti, vol. 4, roll 98. Munro, ~· cit., p. 88.
30
Munro, ~· cit., pp. 89-90.
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power in order to secure the payment of debts owed its nationals
appeared likely.

One possible source of this intervention was

a contract signed by the Dominican Government with the French
and Belgian bondholders in 1901.

This contract, which pro-

vided for a reduction in the amount due the bondholders,
stipulated that the custom revenues from the ports of Santo
I

Domingo and San Pedro de Macoris were to represent security
for the payment of the debt.

That the French and Belgian

Governments might demand the revenues from the assigned ports
was not out of the question, since the Governments preceeding
that of Morales had failed to meet payment on the obligations.
In addition, the German, Spanish and Italian Governments had
I

pressured the Dominican Government into signing agreements
in 1903 providing specific payments for the claims of their
·nationals against the Dominican Republic. ·As these had not
been honored, it was possible that these Governments might
begin to bring pressure upon Morales in order to force him to
pay, or suffer the lose of some customhouses.

In May, 1904,

the Italian Government insisted upon the Morales Government
signing a protocol which provided that the revenues from the
/

port o~ Samana would be devoted to the payment of the Italian
. . 31
claims.
If Morales saw greater United States involvement in the
31 Dawson to the President, July 1, 1905, "Memorandum on
the Dominican Modus Vivendi, Its Effects up to the Present Time,
and the Reasons That Ledto its Adoption," FRUS, 1905, pp. 386-87.
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affairs of his country as the solution to pressing internal and
international problems, several United States officials with
interventionist or annexationist tendencies appeared eager to
listen to his plans.

As indicated, William F. Powell, the

I

United States charge in Santo Domingo, was one of these.
ultimate objective was annexation.

His

In mid-March he sent the

Department of State a lenghty despatch containing his thoughts
on that topic.

Rejecting forcible annexation as impractical,

Powell suggested a plan which he hoped would ultimately lead
t

the Republic along the path of voluntary annexation to the
United States.

The first step in his plan was to secure

Morales' consent for the United States to control

all the

I

customhouses.

The funds collected were to be divided between

the Government and its creditors, thus eliminating or diminish. ing foreign dissatisfaction.

Moreover, with United States

control, revolutions would diminish, for insurrgents would be
unable to seize the customhouses.

The United States would

also be in a position, Powell claimed, to influence the government to effect beneficial reforms.

As prosperity came to the

country, the Dominicans would see the advantages of close
association with the United States and voluntarily seek union
.
with th e great North American
rep ubl'ic. 32

Francis B. Loomis, Assistant Secretary of State, was
another official favoring further intervention in Dominican
32 Powell to Hay, March 14, 1904, No. 796, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11.
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affairs.

Desiring more information before making a final
I

decision on the treaty that Sanchez had proposed, President
Roosevelt sent a commission headed by Admiral Dewey to investi1

I

gate conditions in the Dominican Republic.
of this commission, met with Morales.

Loomis, a member

In the course of their

meeting, the question of possible United States control of the
Dominican customhouses was discussed.

The Dominican Government

had originally intended to include this proposition among the
proposals sent to Washington in February, but had dropped it
I

before sending its commission.

By March 16, 1904, however,

Morales was willing to add this provision to his earlier
.
33
suggestion.
When Loomis returned to Washington, he prepared a memorandum on the conditions he had observed.

This document was sub-

mitted to the Secretary of State for his consideration.

The

analysis which the Assistant Secretary presented was pessimistic.

While acknowledging that the Morales Government was

growing stronger, he noted that it still was unable to control
the entire country.

He contended, in fact, that "the Dominican

Republic is approaching--if it has not already reached--a
state of anarchy."

Moreover, as a result of the disorders

that the Republic was experiencing, sugar plantations owned by
United States citizens had suffered considerable damage.

There

can be no doubt that Loomis had little sympathy for the
33Munro, ~· cit., pp. 90-91. Powell to Loomis, March
16, 1904, telegram, Despatches from the Dominican Republic,
vol. 11, roll 11.
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politicians who were formenting incessant civil wars.

He

observed:
The frequent and sometimes bloody civil wars in the
Dominican Republic are not the outgrowth of an honest
difference of opinion or of a conflict of ideas or of
the defense or assertion of some principle of policy of
governmental action, but are shameless sordid struggles
for the privileges of controlling customhouses and disposing of their revenues. The country is largely in the
grasp.of desperately selfish irresponsible political
brigands. Many of these guerrilla leaders are little
better than savages cs far as their ideas of property
rights and the {ights of those weaker than themselves
are concerned. 3
·
Although Loomis remarked that among "the conservative
property-owning and industrious people of the country" annexation to the United States was evidently favored, he himself
did not suggest this alternative.

Instead, he regarded

United States control of the customhouses as the ultimate solution to the incessant revolutions.

By controlling the ports

of entry and collecting the customs, the United States would be
denying this source of revenue to the potential revolutionaries.
Morales, Loomis reported, was in accord with this view of the
situation.

The Assistant Secretary felt certain that the

money collected from the customhouses would be adequate during
the first year to meet both the Dominican
interest on the foreign debts.

bu~get

and the

This last point was worthy of

special consideration, since as a result of heavy foreign
34

Memorandum For the Secretary of State on the Dominican
Republic. Present Conditions Observed During a Recent Visit •• • •
Roosevelt Papers, Series 1-Letters received: March 17-April 8,
1904, Box .71.
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investments and equally heavy debts owed to foreigners,
European Governments were reluctant to refrain from interfer.
'
ring in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. 35
So far as the immediate situation was concerned, Loomis
believed that the status quo could be maintained, "with due
protection to American interest," if Commander Alfred Dillingham, a United States naval officer who had considerable experience in dealing with the chaotic Dominican situation, were
placed in charge of the waters around the Republic and had
three ships at his disposal.

The possibility of United States

control of the customhouses was not rejected but merely put
off for the time

bei~g.

When and if such action were considered

necessary, Loomis thought that this could be achieved without
massive military intervention.

However, a marine guard might

·be needed at every port for several months:

In the meantime,

he suggested that an independent diplomatic post be created in
Santo Domingo.

In transmitting this memorandum to President

Roosevelt, Secretary Hay especially noted the Loomis suggestions
concerning the immediate action to be taken and the possibility of eventual United States control of the customhouses. 36
By March 29, Roosevelt had decided to reject the treaty
I

proposed by Sanchez, including the subsequent addition of
United States control of the Dominican custom revenues.
35

Ibid.

36
rbid. Hay to the President, March 25, 1904, Roosevelt
Papers, serreB 1-Letters received: March 17-April 8, 1904, Box 71.
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Powell's observations on annexation had no effect on the
decision, for his despatch did not arrive in Washington
until April 2.

The Loomis memorandum, however, undoubtedly
i

i

influenced this decision; for, while foreseeing the advantages
of eventual North American control of the Dominican customhouses, the Assistant Secretary had noted that it was possible
for the time being to maintain the status quo.

That the Presi-

dent had determined to do just that, postponing rather than
rejecting a form of United States

interventi~n,

is clearly

demonstrated in the exchange of letters between Roosevelt and
Hay at the time.

Informing Roosevelt that Sanchez had been

notified of the United States' rejection of the idea of a
treaty, Hay wrote:
I saw General scinchez yesterday, and gave him his coul
de grace. He bore his doom like a soldier and a gent eman. He rose and said: "When I came here my hope was in
·the generous good will of the American people. Now my
only hope is in God", which he seemed to regard as an
inadequate compensation.3 7
Roosevelt replied:
I

I am really touched about poor General Sanchez. Do you
think it will restore his trust in Provide~ge if he is
given a hint to come back in eight months.
During the subsequent three months, Morales was able to
consolidate his position.

In April, with only the port of

Monte Cristi and the surrounding area remaining in the hands
of his Jimenista opponents, he believed himself secure enough
37Hay to Roosevelt, March 30, .1904, ibid.
38 Roosevelt to Hay, March 30, 1904, Roosevelt Papers,
Series 4 B-Letters of Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay.
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to issue a decree setting elections for the end of May.
result of these elections, he was chosen constitutional president of the Republic.

The Monte Cristi problem was.partially

resolved when the revolutionary troops, commanded by Generals
I

oesiderio Arias and Demetrio Rodriguez, reached an agreement,
on June 10, with General Cespedes, the representative of the
Morales Government. 39
The agreement between the Jimenistas and the Government
in Santo Domingo had been reached as a result of the mediation
by Commander Alfred Dillingham, the captain of the

u.s.s.

Detroit, which had been stationed in Dominican waters for
sanetime to protect United States citizens and their property
during the disturbances in the Republic.

During his tour of

duty off the coast of Hispaniola, Dillingham had considered
it necessary to intervene several times between the opposing

forces.

Nevertheless, if Powell's word on the matter can be

accepted as true, there was "no officer in the American Navy
more popular with the Dominican people.

...

The agreement which Dillingham presided over in early
June, 1904, did not actually strengthen the Morales Government.

In effect, Monte Cristi province was recognized as a virtually
independent area, with General Arias as governor and responsible
for maintaining order.
39Munro,

Arias, in return, promised to collect

2£· cit., p. 94.

Welles, ~· cit., II, p. 610.

40 Powell to Hay, April 29, 1904, No. 857, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11.
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and turn over to the Government all weapons held by the irisurgents.

This unsatisfactory arrangement failed to resolve the
•

i

basic issues between Arias and Morales.

Arias felt that his

position was in jeopardy, while Morales feared that his opponents would use the province of Monte Cristi as a base to
begin a revolt whenever they believed that the time was
opportune. 41
These long range consequences obviously did not appear
to Dillingham.

In fact, he contended that the liberal terms

granted by the Morales' Government was "a wise policy. • •
and a very excellent stroke by Cespades because it has placed
the insurgents so under obligation to the government, that
they have become ardent supporters of it."

This severe case

of myopia on the part of the Commander is easily understood if
.one realizes that Dillingham was looking at the situation
solely from the vantage point of the United States.

Inter-

vention by the naval forces of the United States in order to
secure peace in the Dominican Republic was, Dillingham maintained, encouraging the Dominicans to believe that the United
States was planning to come to their aid.

This encouragement

would help Morales to stay in power, until the United States
could in fact give that aid.

Evidently, Dillingham believed

that that time would come in December, after the United States
Congress had met.
41

Moreover, North American intervention, the

welles, ~· cit., II, 610-11.
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commander asserted, served to show "foreign powers that the
United States considers it its own affair to look after this
Republic, and so

lo~g

as we continue this policy, there is
I
no danger from any other power in Santo Domingo." 42
Thus by the spring of 1904, the prospect of greater
United States involvement in the Dominican Republic had been
fully considered and rejected, at least temporarily, by the
Roosevelt Administration.

Clearly this rejection was not the

result of any official Dominican opposition

~o

the idea.

To

the contrary, President Morales had indicated that he was most
receptive to the idea.

The decision not to become more involved

in the Dominican Republic was probably the result of two factors.
In the first place with a presidential campaign facing him,
Roosevelt probably was reluctant to offer his political opponents an opportunity to assail him by presuing a too aggressive
policy in the Dominican Republic. 43 Furthermore, from the
reports that the State Department was forwarding to the White
House, it appeared that the situation in that Caribbean
republic were becoming more settled and that immediate intervention was probably necessary neither to preserve order nor to
42 secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, June
24, 1904, transmitting Dillingham to Secretary of Navy, June 510, 1904. Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State,
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 179
(Washington, D._c.: National Archives, 1964) [hereafter cited
as Miscellaneous Letters], June 22-30, 1904, roll 1215.
43 oexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine 1867-1907 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), p. 419.
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thwart European intervention.

For the time being, the Administra-

tion in Washington would content itself with creating an
independent diplomatic post in Santo Domingo, thereby assuring
both an adequate flow of information from Santo Domingo and
proper direction of any future negotiations, and the stationing
of naval vessels off the coast of the Republic.
Dawson arrived in New York, from his Brazilian post, on
June 7, 1904, and remained in the United States about two weeks
before departing for his new assignment.

During his stay in

the United States he spent some time familiarizing himself
with the correspondence between the Department of State and
Washington's previous representatives in Santo Domingo.

In

addition, he doubtless received instructions to make an extensive tour of the Dominican Republic and an intensive study of
the financial situation prevailing in the Republic. 44
44 Hay to Dawson, June 14, 1904, No. 1, Diplomatic
Instructions of the Department of State, Dominican Republic,
National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 77
(Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1946) [hereafter cited
as Diplomatic Instructions to Santo Domingo], vol. 1, pp. 1-3,
roll 98.

· CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMPROVEMENT COMPANY AWARD:
JULY _14, 1904 - DECEMBER 28, 1904
Dawson's arrival in the Dominican Republic was more
like that of a proconsul sent to rule an extra-territorial
possession than that of a diplomat sent to represent one sovereign government before another equally sovereign government.
He arrived at Puerto Plata, situated on the north coast of the
island, on the morning of June 29.

c.

There he found Admiral

D. Sigsbee, Commander-in-Chief of the Caribbean squadron

of the United States Navy, awaiting him with the flagship the

u.s.s.

Newark and other ships of the squadron.

During the next

two weeks Dawson ·accompanied by Admiral Sigsbee and other
naval officers visited the important coastal towns and several
of the major towns of the interior.

·.

-

On July 13, the newly

appointed minister and his naval escort headed for the Haitian
capital.

Arriving there on July 15, Dawson spent sometime

discussing matters in the Dominican Republic with Minister
Powell and in meeting the important figures in Haitian political
and diplomatic circles.

After receiving the Legation's archives

from Powell, Dawson and his companions finally set sail for
Santo Domingo City. 1
1 Dawson to Hay, July 6, 1904, No. 3; July 28, 1904, Nos.
6 and 7, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11.
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The Caribbean squadron conveying Minister Dawson to· his
post arrived off the Dominican caiptal on the twentieth of
July.

Arrangements were quickly made for his formal presentaI

I

tion to President Morales on the twenty-third of the month.

On

the day of his formal presentation, Dawson accompanied by
Sigsbee and all the captains of the ships in the squadron
left the Newark to the salute of the flagship's. guns.

Arriving

at the quay they were met by members of the President's staff
and thence conveyed to the Government Palace for the official
.

ceremonies.

2

Dawson's extended tour had afforded him the opportunity
to meet many of the major political and commerical figures in
the Republic, and undoubtedly he 'had some contact with the
common people.

At any rate his initial impression of the

Dominican people was favorable.

He found them to be "polite,

kind, frank and brave."

Moreover, he believed that "with a
settled government they"would prosper. 3

2 Dawson to Hay, July 28, 1904, No. 8, ibid.
3Dawson to Hay, August 9, 1904, No. 9, enclosure 4:
Dawson to Petit, ibid.
Dawson's favorable impression is in stark contrast to
that of Admiral Sigsbee. The Admiral, strongly influenced by
racial theories, had little hope for the progress of the Dominicans or, as far as he was concerned, for any of the Latin
American Republics. The only hope for these areas, he maintained, was a strong influx of foreign innnigration and foreign
domination. Regarding the Dominican Republic he had the following observations to make:
"The population of San Domingo is wholly of ml.xed blood
--the blood of the crude tropical negro, with the blood of the
retrograde Spaniard. The parent stock in Spain is retrograde, and by reason of life in the tropics, the off-shoot in
San Domingo is still more so, even in its nearest approach to

,...

I:I:
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In spite of his rather unorthodox, if not somewhat menacing, arrival at his new post, Dawson evidently did not make
an unfavorable impression upon those with whom he came into contact.

He and his naval escort were cordially received in all of
the cities where they stopped. 4 However, the reception in Monte
Cristi was perhaps cool. 5 The favorable impression that Dawson
left on the Dominicans was echoed by one of the leading newspapers of Santo Domingo Cith whose editor described Dawson as
"un hombre de aspecto muy simpatico. 116
One of the first problems that confronted Dawson when
he arrived in the Dominican Republic was implementing the
arbitration award settling the claims of the Santo Domingo
purity. The crossing of the tropical Spaniard with the tropical
negro has not served to regenerate the former--indeed, the
contrary is true.· My observations lead me to the conclusion
that there is no pure white blood among native Dominicans • • • •
The Spaniard has intense and agressive pride; the negro is
highly imitative and lacks a sense of proportion. Conjoin
these qualities and we have the Hispano-negro, with his lofty
declarations and his poor performance • • • •
"An official pay roll, and a place thereon is the paramount conception of government to San Domingo. Lofty sentiments
are expressed to the contrary, but the fact remains. Progress
means more revenue in order to provide more and better places.
The local political history of San Domingo bears me out in this
statement. • • • The people are not by nature industrious;
governmental work is light therefore governmental work is eagerly
sought." Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, August 3,
1904, transmitting Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, June 26,
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, August 1-10, 1904, roll 1219.
4Dawson to Hay, July 6, 1904, No. 3 and July 28, 1904,
No. 6, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11.
5secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, September
1, 1904, transmitting Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, August 23,
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, September 1-10, 1904, roll 1222.
6 Dawson to Hay, July, 1904, No. 8, Despatches from the
Dominican Republic, vol. 11, _roll 11 •.
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Improvement Company.

The conunission, which had been appoin.ted

to settle the dispute between the Company and the Dominican
Government, handed down its award ~n July 14, 1904. 7 The Award
p~ovided

for the transfer of the Company's stocks in the National

Bank to be turned over to the Dominican Government within
ninety days.

The railroad would be handed over to the Govern-

ment when it had paid the United States, which was acting as
receiver, $1,500,000 of the debt owed to the Improvement Company.
Other bonds which the Company held would begin to be turned
over to the Republic when the principal on the debt of
$4,500,000 had been reduced to $2,076,635.

Interest on the

I

principal was to be four per cent per annum.
I

The payments under the Award were to be made to a
financial agent appointed by the United States.

These payments

. were to consist of monthly instalments of $37,500 for the first
two years and then to be increased to $41,666.66 per month
thereafter.

The money to meet the monthly payments was to be

secured from the custom revenues and port dues of the ports of
/

I

Puerto Plata, Sanchez, Samana, Monte Cristi, and any other
customhouses north of 18° 45' north latitude and east of the
Haitian border.

Apparently to assure adequate revenues, the

tariff rates in these ports could not be reduced more than
twenty-five per cent without the consent of the United States.
If the Dominican Government should fail to meet the scheduled
7The text of this Award appears in FRUS, 1904, pp.
274-276.
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payments, the financial agent was authorized to demand that the
customhouse of Puerto Plata be turned over to him.

Should

the revenues of this port prove to be insufficient, he could
i

i

then request possession of the other ports, or the Dominican
Government could request that the financial agent take charge
of these ports.

Moreover, in August, 1904, the Dominican

Government was to pay its share of the expenses of the arbitration.

Failure to meet this expense was also recognized as due

cause for the financial agent to demand

poss~ssion

of Puerto

Plata.
In addition to his duties of collecting the monthly
installments on the loans and taking possession of the various
customhouses if the installments were in arrears, the financial
agent appointed by the United States also had other prerogatives.
He could appoint subordinate officials and' employees.

Further-

more, the agent was to act as a financial adviser to the
Dominican Government on all matters affecting its ability to pay.
The entire expense of the collection and the salary of the
financial agent were to be borne by the Dominican Government.
On August 9, 1904, Secretary of State John Hay wrote
Dawson that the State Department had appointed Mr. John T.
Abbott as the financial agent of the United States who was to
receive the installments on the debt of the Improvement Company. 8

As mentioned above, Abbott was the vice president of the
8secretary of State to Dawson, August 9, 1904, FRUS,
1904, p. 279.
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Improvement Company and had previously represented the Company
in its dealings with the Dominican Government.

In appointing

,Abbott to this post the State Depar±ment and President Roosevelt
were merely following the advice of the Improvement Company.
In making the appointment, however, the State Department
attempted to escape any future responsibility for Abbott's
action in collecting and disbursing the funds.

Abbott was

informed that "this appointment. • • is made and is to be
accepted on the understanding that it imposes no responsibility
on the Government of the United States on account of your collection and disbursement of the sums awarded by the Commission,
all such responsibility being specifically disclaimed.u 9
When at the end of August the Dominican Government
received Abbott's letter announcing his appointment as financial agent, the Dominican Finance Minister' agreed to receive
him but only in an unofficial character.

An official reception

was impossible, Velfsquez explained, because the Dominican
Government had not decided whetherto accept or reject the
Award of July 14.

The Finance Minister informed Abbott that

he believed it impossible for the Republic to meet the monthly
payments and that moreover, he felt that the arbitration commission had exceeded its authority in granting the financial
agent excessive powers and had thus violated the Dominican
9
Abbott to Assistant Secretary Loomis, August 4, 1904,
Miscellaneous Letters, August 1-10, 1904, roll 1219.

L

87

cons t i't u t'ion. 10
In spite of Dominican reluctance to accept him officially as the financial agent under the Award, Abbott wasted no
time in making the necessary preparation to put the Award into
effect.

On September 9, he appointed Joseph

c.

Strickland as

Deputy Financial Agent for the port of Puerto Plata, where
the first customhouse was to come under the control of the
Financial Agent in the event the Government failed to meet the
stipulated monthly payments.

Abbott's action was based on the

assumption that the acceptance or non-acceptance of the Award
of July 14 by the Dominican Government had absolutely nothing
to do with the validity of the Award.

He argued that it derived

I

its validity from the original protocol signed by the United
States and the Dominican Republic establishing the arbitral
.
.
11
commission.

On September 15, President Morales returned to the
capital after a month tour of inspection of the northern
provinces. 12

Six days later Abbott met with the President

and discussed the

Aw~rd.

Morales indicated none of his

10

Dawson to Hay, September 10, 1904, No. 35, enclosure 4:
Velasquez to Abbott, August 31, 1904; enclosure 3: Abbott to
Dawson, September 7, 1904, Despatches from the Dominican
Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
11

Dawson to Hay, September 10, 1904, No. 35, enclosure 5:
Abbott to Velasquez, September 2, 1904; enclosure 6: Abbott to
Dawson, September 10, 1904; enclosure 8: Abbott to Strickland,
September 9, 1904, ibid.
12

Dawson to Hay, August 30, 1904, No. 29; September 27,

1904, No. 43, ibid.
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Minister's resistance.

He acknowledgedthat the Govern-

•ent would not be able to make the initial payments due on
october 1.

He intended,· therefore, to fulfill the provisions
I
I

.

I

of the Award by turning the customhouse at Puerto Plata over
to Abbott.

Before a definite commitment on this point could

be made, however, Morales stated that it would be necessary to
consult with his Cabinet.

Nevertheless, he seemed confident

that he could gain his Cabinet's agreement to this plan. 13
Abbott told Morales that he had refrained from demanding the payments due in August and September because of the
President's absence from the capital.

However, he now thought

it time to make the demand for these payments.

In lieu of

receiving these sums he would exercise his right as financial
agent to demand the customhouse at Puerto Plata.

Abbott was

willing to cooperate to the extent of waiting until the President had a chance to break the dire news to his ministers,
if such were Morales' wish.

The President preferred to go to

his Cabinet with the demand already in hand.

Hence, Abbott

drew up the necessary documents and presented the demand to
the Minister of Finance on Spetember 21, the same day as his
interview with Morales. 14
If Dawson and Abbott were now confident that the Award
would be accepted by the Dominican Government without further
13

.

Dawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, enclosure 1:
Abbott to Dawson, September 26, 1904, .~' 1904, p. 281.
14
.!__bi'
d. I pp. 281 - 83 •
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Within a few days, i.t

ado, they were drastically mistaken.

became quite evident that the Government had decided to try to
obtain some modification of the Award, and if that were not
possible, to reject it completely.

On September 23, two days

after Abbott's conversation with President Morales, Foreign
Minister scfuchez requested an immediate interview with Dawson.
Dawson was informed that the Dominican Government, although
not unanimously, had decided to accept the Award.

In spite

of the fact that there were constitutional grounds upon which
the Award could be rejected, it would, S~chez noted, have the
practical res'ul t of removing some of the customhouses from
the grasp of possible revolutionaries.

He further noted that

the revenues from all customhouses in the Republic would not
be adequate to meet both the expenses of the Government and
the amount due the Improvement Company under the Award.

In

order, therefore, to secure sufficient funds for the Government, sixty per cent of the gross revenues would have to be
set aside for its uses before it could agree to the Agent taking
possession of any of the ports.

If this guarantee were not

forthcoming, Dawson was given to understand that Mr. Abbott
would not be placed in charge of the Puerto Plata customhouse
on October 1, and the Dominican Government would inform Washington of the reason why it considered the Award to be unconstitutional and inoperative.

On the twenty-seventh, Finance Minister

Vel~squez visited Dawson, and on the twenty-eighth, Dawson
/

and Sanchez conferred.

Again the topic of discussion was the

,,....i
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~odification

of the Award.

If the Government could not be

assured of sixty per cent of the revenues collected by the
Financial Agent, the Foreign Minister wanted an agreement which
would delay the implementation of the Award for a month or two. 15
On the morning of the twenty-ninth, President Morales
met with Dawson and also attempted to obtain some modification
of the Award.

The President maintained that the execution of

the Award would leave him without the means to pay his officials
and troops and this would inevitably result in a revolution.
Furthermore, Morales had little hope that the Financial Agent
would look with sympathy upon his Government's plight, for,
in the final analysis, the Agent, who also represented the
creditor companies, would be concerned with nothing other than
collecting the amount due the Improvement Company.

Morales

. then stated that he had been advised that the Award violated
the Dominican Constitution and to agree to it would violate
his oath of office and virtually deprive Congress of its constitutional obligation to provide a budget for the country. 16
That the arguments based upon the unconstitutionality
of the Award really were of little concern to the President
can hardly be doubted.

His real fear was not violation of the

Dominican Constitution but fear that his Government would lack
15

.
Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1904,
~' 1904, p. 280.
Dawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, No. 44;
October 6, 1904, No. 51, Despatches from the Dominican Republic,
vol. 12, roll 12.
16 Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51, ibid.
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sufficient funds to meet its daily administrative expenses·.
This point was made clear in the interview with Dawson on
October 29.

While rejecting the supervision of the custom-

houses under the Award, M6ra:les was inore than willing to have
the United States assume the collection of all the custom
revenues of the Republic, provided $1,200,000 were allotted
for the annual expenses of the Dominican Government.

The

remainder could be divided among the Republic's various creditors.
In an interview with Abbott on the same day, Morales reiterated
this proposal adding the provision that all the creditors must
agree t o 1•t • 17
Throughout this time, Dawson refused to enter into any
discussion with the Dominican officials concerning a modification of the Award or to give them any hope that the Government
in Washington
tion.

~ould

be willing to agree to. any such modifica-

He maintained that he had no authorization to discuss

the validity of the Award and that he considered it binding.
In reply to the Dominican contention that the execution of the
Award would leave insufficient funds for the daily operation
of the Government, Dawson merely replied that certainly the
arbitration commission had given adequate consideration to the
ability of the custom receipts to meet both the cost of running
the Government and the installments due the Improvement Company.
Moreover, Dawson regarded it unlikely that the Financial Agent
17 Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51 and enclosure
2: Abbott to Dawson, September 29, 1904, ibid.
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would administer the Award in such a way as to be prejudicial
to the Dominican Government, for the Agent, Dawson asserted,
also had an interest in maintaining peace and order.

if once the Award were in

operati~n

However,

and it became evident that

it was impossible to meet both governmental expenses and the
amount due the Improvement Company, the question of reducing
the payments could be raised. 18
Furthermore, Dawson was not even moved by Morales'
desire to substitute United States control of all the customhouses for

Awa~d.

He replied that he had no instructions to

enter into such a discussion.

Besides, Dominican acquiesence

in the Award would not only provide inunediate assistance in
solving some difficulties.

It would further favorably dispose

the Administration in Washington "in the event that the United
States might

willing to entertain a proposition looking to
a wider responsibility. 1119
b~

In spite of his steadfast refusal to discuss the modification or delay in the execution of the Award, Dawson was not
completely oblivious to the Dominican arguments.

In late

September, he wrote to Secretary of State Hay that he "would
have preferred that the Award had fixed a later date for the
Agent's taking possession" of the customhouses.

Moreover, he

did bring the matter of guarantee of sixty per cent of the
18 Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1904,
FRUS, 1904, pp. 280-81. Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No.
sr;-0espatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
19 Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51, ibid.
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custom revenues for governmental expense to Abbott's attention.
He discussed with Abbott the possibility that the latter might,
in his capacity as repre·sen tati ve of the Improvement Company,
assure the Dominicans that a minimum would be turned over to
the Government out of the revenues collected in the ports under
the control of the Financial Agent.

Abbott, however, rejected

the idea and his reasons for doing so-seemed good to Dawson.
The Minister's acceptance of Abbott's reasons doubtless were
based on the belief "that a firm attitude at the beginning"
was essentia1. 20
Unable to obtain modification or delay of the Award,
and apparently unconvinced by Dawson's arguments, the Morales
Government informed Abbott and Dawson that it would not allow
the Award to gQ into effect on October 1. 21 The State Department was unwilling to tolerate this decisipn.

Dawson was

instructed to inform the Morales Government that the arbitrators
had considered the problem of providing adequate revenues for
all contingencies.

To modify their award would be to reject

their unanimous decision.
the Dominicans.

Some hope, however, was held out to

Their representations could be presented after

20 oawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, No. 42, ibid.
An extract of this document is to be found on pages 280-81 of
~' 1904.
21 Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51, enclosure
2~ Abbott to Dawson, September 29, 1904; enclosure 4:
Sanchez to Dawson, September 29, 1904, Despatches from the
Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
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the Award had been put into effect. 22
That the decision to reject the Award was neither
unanimous among the members of Morales' Cabinet nor final in
I

nature soon became evident.

In an interview with Abbott on

October 8, Foreign Minister S~chez indicated that he disagreed
with his colleagues in the Cabinet in their decision to reject
the Award.

Furthermore, while rejecting the arguments that

the Award violated the Dominican Constitution and that retention of sixty per cent of the revenues was

n~cessary

for the

expenses of the Government, he contended that the Award represented a triumph for Dominican progress. 23
In the face of North American unwillingness to compromise on the point of modification of the Award, it would appear
that if the attitude which scfuchez represented did not gain
sway in the Cabinet, at least the members aecided that it was
futile to resist any further.

In the cabinet meeting held on

October 9, to discuss the United States' attitude toward the
Dominican rejection of the Award, the ministers decided to
reverse the Government's previous position and accepted the
Award.

Obviously, Morales hoped to gain more by accepting the

Award than merely pleasing the United States Government.

When

I

Sanchez informed Dawson of the Cabinet's decision on the tenth,
22 Hay to Dawson, October 4, 1904, FRUS, 1904, p. 283.
23 Dawson to Hay, October 8, 1904, No. 53, enclosure 1:
Abbott to Dawson, October 8, 1904, Despatches from the Dominican
Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
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the Foreign Minister indicated that it was also the intention
of the Government to ask that Monte Cristi be placed under the
control of the Financial Agent and possibly the ports of
I

I

samana and Sanchez also.

The reason for the Government's

decision to place the other ports under the administration of
the Award was simply that Monte Cristi was a particularly sharp
thorn in the side of the Government.

The officials in that

port were virtually independent of the Government's control
and word had been received that merchants were being granted
reductions in the payments due on the customs in order to
encourage them to import through Monte Cristi.

This resulted

in a decline in revenues coming into the hands of General Arias
i
the Jimenista Governor of Monte Cristi. 24
Control of the customhouse at Puerto Plata, which was
. transferred to the Deputy Financial Agent on October 20, was
to be retroactive to the seventeenth of the month.

Prior to

the execution of the Award, both Dawson and Abbott had refused
to make any agreement concerning the possibility of the
Financial Agent providing the Government with any funds to aid
it meet daily needs.

Once the Morales Cabinet agreed to accept

the Award, however, Abbott consented to provide $680 a day to
the Government for one week.

The Government had a critical

need for this sum, since the.funds for the salaries of the
troops and officials at Puerto Plata, Santiago and Moca all
24 Dawson to Hay, October 21, 1904, No. 59, ibid.
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came from the receipts at Puerto Plata's customhouse.

This

temporary payment would at least enable the Government to adjust
.
t o th e new .si•t ua t•ion. 25
ts f inances

i

At this point, Morales again suggested that all four
ports be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Financial
Agent.

This time he qualified his offer by requesting that

$40,000 or $30,000 be allotted each month to the Government
for its budget.

Although Dawson believed that this plan would

be advantageous to both the Improvement Company and the Government, since it would enable the Company to collect the amount
provided for under the Award and assured the Government of
revenue to maintain peace in the northern provinces and thus
i

protect the Agent in the possession of the various ports, he,
nevertheless, refrained from advising Abbottt on the subject. 26
Apparently, Abbott's superiors in the Improvement
Company did not object to the temporary payment being made to
the Dominican Government from the revenues the Agent collected
at Puerto Plata.

Nor did they foresee future difficulty in

arranging for that portion of the budget covered by the revenues
of Puerto Plata.

Abbott, however, notified Morales that he

could give no definite answer to the President's suggestion
until he returned from consultation with the directors in New
York.

In the meantime, the daily subsidy would be terminated
as of October 23. 27
25 Ibid.
27 John B. Moore to Acting Secretary of State Loomis,
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When Morales learned that the $680 a day was to be cut
off, he requested that Dawson help him gain some assistance.
oawson realized that Morales' plight was caused by the lack of
i

I

funds in the Dominican treasury and the semi-independence of
some of the provinces.

Nevertheless, he

ur~ed

the President

to find the funds necessary to pay the troops in the affected
areas, at least until Abbott could arrive in New York or until
the Department of State could reply to a telegram he was sending to Washington. 28
In an interview on October 24, the Finance Minister
and President again stressed their inability to secure sufficient funds from other sources to meet the budget of Puerto
Plata, Santiago and Moca.

Assuring himself by this time that

the position of the Government was virtually impossible,
Dawson agreed to wire Washington reconunending that some temporary assistance be granted to enable Morales meet the expenses
necessary to maintain his Government in power.

On October 29,

the State Department telegraphed permission to instruct the
Deputy Financial Agent at Puerto Plata to pay $680 a day to the
Dominican Government, unless Abbott had made some previous
arrangement. 29
October 27, 1904, Miscellaneous Letters, October 21-31, 1904,
roll 1227.
28 Dawson to Hay, October 21, 1904, No. 59, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
29 Dawson to Secretary of Stat~, October 25, 1904, telegram; Dawson to Hay, November 2, 1904, No. 64 and enclosure 4:
Dawson to Strickland, October 29, 1904, ibid.
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Dawson's efforts on behalf of the Dominican Government
achieved only temporary relief.

On the evening of Saturday,

November 5, a telegram from the State Department countermanding
the instructions of October 29, arrived at the United States
Legation in Santo Domingo.

Although the payment of the $680 to

the Dominican Government was to be suspended until Abbott
returned, it was not the intention of the officials in Washington to indefinitely deny the Morales Government revenue from
the northern ports.

The telegram concluded that when Abbott

returned, he would probably be able to make some arrangement
to pay for the budget in connection with the transfer of the
other three ports to the control of the Financial Agent. 30
I

This unexpected reversal of policy by the United States
was not well received in Santo Domingo.

I

Velasquez, who was

. in Puerto Plata at the time, threatened to· deprive Deputy
Finance Agent Strickland of possession of the customhouse if
Dawson could not do something to resolve the new dilemma.
Back in Santo Domingo City, Dawson attempted to dissuade
Morales from drastic action which would endanger
the satisfactory progress already made toward a definite
settlement of his financial difficulties and a guarantee
of continued exemption from revolts, and especially not
to endanger the bright prospect he now had of securing,
by an arrangement with Mr. Abbott affecting all four
northern ports, the definite guarantee of a reasonable
budget, and the suppression of contraband at Monte Cristi. 31
It was impossible, Dawson pointed out, for the Department of
30 Dawson to Hay, November 6, 1904, No. 66, ibid.
31 Ibid.

~
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state to supply the necessary funds, and it would be unjust for
the Department to require the Improvement Company "to go down
into its pockets."
resources. 32

Morales would have to draw upon his other

Suddenly Morales changed his tone.

He would agree, he

said, to allow Strickland-to retain control of the customhouse at Puerto Plata, provided that the Deputy Agent consented
to complete the payments for the week of October 30 through
November 5.

Dawson decided to interpret liberally his latest

instructions from the Department.

Agreeing to Morales terms,

he reasoned that certainly "the suspension could hardly have
been intended to take effect before the date of the telegram
ordering.it. 1133
Within a few days, Dawson again learned that his efforts
had been only temporarily successful.

This time it was the

Dominican Cabinet's turn to reverse its previous decision.
On Tuesday, November 8, Dawson was asked to attend a cabinet
meeting.

He was informed that the members of the Government

·had decided to comply with Finance Minister Velfsquez's request
that the customhouse at Puerto Plata be returned to Dominican
control if the daily payments were not resumed.

Dawson declined

to make any effort to secure this objective, for his Government
had approved of the interruption of the payments.

Furth~rmore,

the sum already paid by the Deputy Agent to the Dominican
32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.
I

r
f
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Government was considerably in excess of the amount collected

at the port.

After presenting his reasons for refusing to

attempt to re-instate the daily payments, Dawson turned to the
I

I

task of persuading the Dominicans of the inadvisability of fulfilling their treat to eject Strickland.

In the first place,

he argued, such action would "endanger the probability of
making an arrangement for a sure budget based upon the revenues
of all four northern ports."

Secondly, such action would not

only be self defeating but useless, for the first ship scheduled
to land cargo was the one bringing Abbott back to the Dominican
Republic.

Finally, Dawson pointed out that he had complied

with President Morales' request of the previous Sunday and now
he had a right to expect the President's promises to be kept.
Dawson's arguments were evidently convincing, for, on the ninth,
Foreign Minister s£nchez informed him that·the Cabinet, accepting his advice, had decided to await Abbott's return before
any further action would be taken. 34
Abbott returned .to Santo Domingo on the afternoon of
November 17.

Within a day, discussions were begun looking
/

towards the ultimate control of the customhouses at Sanchez,
Monte Cristi, and Samanf in addition to that of Puerto Plata.
Realizing that the authorities at Monte Cristi might prove
difficult to handle, Dawson had determined to lend the Morales
Government every possible moral support in its efforts to turn
34 oawson to Hay, November 17, 1904, No. 70, ibid.
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over control of the customhouse located there to Abbott.

Morales was intending to go personally to that port aboard a
oominican gun-boat.

Simultane·.ously, the

u.s.s.

carry Abbott and Dawson to the same destination.

Detroit would
Washington,

however, was not yet ready to officially interfer so blatantly
in Dominican affairs as to have the United States Minister
present at the actual transfer of control to the Financial
Agent.

There was no objection to the Financial Agent descend-

ing upon Monte Cristi aboard the Detroit.

Dawson, however,
was instructed not to go beyond Puerto Plata. 35
The plans that Dawson, Abbott, and Morales were making
for the transfer of the customhouse at Monte Cristi proved to
be premature.

By November 22, Morales, because of dissension

within the Cabinet and among his supporters, was forced to
withdraw his earlier promise to turn the additional three
customhouses over to the Financial Agent.

Finance Minister

/

Velasquez, a prominent Horacista, threatened to resign if this
plan were carried out • . In fact, all Horacista support, the
main prop for Morales' Administration, would probably have
been withdrawn had these ports been turned over to Abbott.
Devising a plan to provide more revenue for the Government,
/

Velasquez had even obtained an agreement with General Arias to
stop the diverting of goods from Puerto Plata to Monte Cristi. 36
35 Dawson to Hay, November 21, 1904, No. 74, ibid.
Loomis to Dawson, November 21, 1904, telegram, Diplomatic
Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98.
36 Dawson to Hay, November 22, 1904, No. 76, Despatches
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Dawson was "disappointed" over this change of plans.
He anticipated that the Morales Government would again threaten
to deprive the Financial" Agent of his control of the customhouse at Puerto Plata.

If the Government chose to follow this

course, Dawson informed the State Department that he intended
to make a firm protest and hoped that a United States naval
vessel would "be available to give" him "its moral support in
such an effort to maintain American interests secured by the
Protocol and Award. 1137
Dawson also believed that the full implementation of
the Award was essential in order to press other claims of
United States citizens against the Dominican Government.

By

the third week in November, he had become convinced that control
of Monte Cristi under the Award was important.

Without the

control of the customhouse at that port, he reported, it would
be impossible to prevent the shifting of imports from Puerto
Plata to Monte Cristi.
of revenues at the

This situation resulted in a decline

form~r

port and consequently a lose of

large revenues for the Dominican Government.

This lose made

"it a hopeless task to secure a payment of the other American
claims" that the Department had instructed him to press. 38
Dawson envisioned the Award far more broadly than merely

L

from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. Dawson to Hay,
December 3, 1904, No. 80, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
37 Dawson to Hay, November 21, 1904, No. 76, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
38 Dawson to Hay, November 21, 1904, No. 74, ibid.
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as a means of protecting North American business interests·or
merely as a punative measure to be taken against the economically
I

prostrate Dominican Gove·rnment.

He considered the execution

J

!

of the Award as a means of aiding the Dominican Government.
In the first place, the implementation of the Award would
remove one and possibly four ports from the potenetial grasp
of revolutionaries.

Furthermore, it would provide, at least

in part, United States aid in straightening out the financial
morass into which the Republic had fallen. 39 Concerning the
I

manner in which the Award should be administered Dawson wrote
the following to Secretary Hay:
When the Award shall have been put in operation I
believe it should [be] executed in an ungrudgingly
generous and helpful spirit toward this Government and
people, and I hope it can be made a basis for further
arrangements which will extricate them from their difficulties and safeguard them from revolutions and repudiation. But the first step is to put th~ Award into effect,
and sooner or later the Dominicans who are now ~gvocat
ing delay and evasion will see that this is so.
The eventual possibility of the United States giving
assistance to the

Domin~can

Republic must have been apparent

to Dawson before he ever reached his new post; for, certainly
he must have been aware of the proposals for assistance made
by the Morales Government in the late winter of 1904, and of
the not unfriendly disposition with which the Roosevelt Administration had greeted these overtures.

In addition, his own

39 Dawson to Hay, October 6, 1904, No. 51; November 21,
1904, No. 76, ibid.
40 Dawson to Hay, September 27, 1904, ibid.
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independent investigations soon convinced him that the Dominican
Government needed outside assistance.

One of the major tasks

which absorbed Dawson's ·attention during his first few months
among the Dominicans was that of "trying to get some insight
into their horribly confused financial affairs. 1141
In spite of the complexities of the situation, Dawson
could write his superiors in the Department of State on September 12 that his investigation had led him to the conclusion
that the Dominican debt was "approximately $32,280,000."
This figure only gave a small indication of the financial
problem confronting the Morales Government, whose plight became more clearly illustrated when the amounts due creditors
i

and governmental expenses during the next year were compared
with the anticipated revenue for the same period.

It was

estimated that the Government would need $1,300,000 or at the
very least $1,200,000 for its administrative expenses.

In

addition, the obligations due creditors amounted to $1,441,609.26,
excluding both the amounts due the Improvement Company under
the Award of July 14, 1904 and the sums which had fallen into
arrears in the past.

The anticipated revenues, under Dominican

administration, were $1,846,000.

Of course, the Government

intended first to deduct the funds necessary for its operation
before applying anything to the payment of its debts.

Under

these circumstances, about $546,000 would be devoted to paying
41 Dawson to Dawes, September 13, 1904, Dawes Collection,
File D, July-December, 1904.
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the annual debts of over two and a half million dollars.
oawson, therefore, concluded that "the condition is one of
hopeless bankruptcy unless there is a radical change in the
system of collecting revenues, and a great reduction in current
expenditure. 1142
However, his investigations had further convinced him
that the radical changes necessary to assure an improvement
in the collection of the revenues was unlikely to take place.
On the twenty-fourth of September, he wrote to Secretary of
State Hay that
A study of past and present conditions in this country
leaves no reasonable hope that under Dominican management
of the customhouses the four abuses--peculation, contraband, secret rebates, and receiving revenues in paper
obligations previously issued--will cease.
Nor did he consider mere foreign supervision of the custom
. collection adequate.

As long as the collectors remained under

the control of the Dominican Government, the inefficient and
illicit practices would continue. 43
Inefficient and corrupt administration of the customhouses was not the only stream through which much needed revenue
flowed out of the public coffers.

A considerable portion of

the amount collected was expended to prevent the overthrow of
the existing Government.

On this point Dawson's investigation

had led him to conclude "that the present expenses could be
42 Dawson to Hay, September 12, 1904, No. 36, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
43 Dawson to Hay, September 24, 1904, No. 41, ibid.
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largely reduced without depriving the Dominican people of any
benefits they derive from Governmental administration at least
as now conducted."

The '$1, 300, 000 that the finance ministry
I
I
believed necessary for the administration of the government
would probably, in fact, be increased by another $400,000.
out of this sum nothing was allotted for internal improvements,
public education, the paying of the public debt or the improvement of the miserably conducted public services.

Virtually

the entire sum, Dawson reported, would be sent to supress
insurrection and for "salaries paid to officials who have no
other function than to aid in maintaining the present Government in power. 1144
Thus, Dawson was convinced that if left alone, the
Dominican Government could not hope to extricate itself from
a state of financial confusion, exacerbated by the ever present
threat of insurrection.

.

He undoubtedly concluded that the

full implementation of the Award of July 14, 1904--that is,
the placing of the four northern ports of Puerto Plata, Monte
Cristi, S~chez and Saman~ under the administration of the
Financial Agent appointed by the United States--was a possible
means of ameliorating this situation.
Dawson's conviction of the necessity of United States
interference in the financial affairs of the Dominican Republic
was strengthened by his conversations with select elements within the Republic.
44 Ibid.
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that North American intervention was necessary and even welcorned.

On July 6, 1904, in one of his first despatches from

his new post, Dawson reported that
With hardly an exception, the many Dominicans whom I
have met in the last nine days, have told me that a long
continuance of peace cannot be expected, unless the United
States government intervenes. The officials are nearly as
frank on this point, as are the merchants and farmers who
are not in politics. Practically all classes seem to expect and hope for some form of American protection. I feel,
however, that it will be well for me to become better acquainted with the Dominican character before I give full
credence to these expressions. They have, however, been
volunteered every place we have visited, and usually in a
form which wgde it impossible to avoid hearing them had I
so desired.
-Although he does not mention whether his information came from
foreigners with financial interests in the Dominican Republic
or native Dominicans, further investigation did not seem to
contradict this early observation.

In early November, Dawson

wrote the Secretary of State that
Merchants, planters and property holders in general
are in favor of American financial intervention as the
only hope of guaranteeing peace. The more customhouses
we control the more likely they think such a beneficent
result, and the better they would be pleased. But the
office-holding and military classes, even those favoring
the present Government, are as a rule in their hearts
hostile to the execution of the Award. Their real reason
is that they consciously, or unconsciously, recognize
that it will reduce the amount of revenue available to
pay the salaries they are receiving or that they hope to
receive. But many among them realize the resistance would
be fruitless, and a few of the wiser and more patriotic
ones, including President Morales, see in the Award the
means of putting an end to civil wars, to the frauds on
the revenue and the expensive and wasteful system of
military government, with its illegal payments to dangerous
45 Dawson to Hay, July 6, 1904, No. 3, Despatches from
the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11.
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persons. I notice, however, that though this opinion is
frequently sustained in private, no articles in favor of
it have appeared in the press.46
So far as "the illiterate classes, who form ninetenths of the population," were concerned, Dawson believed
they were indifferent to United States intervention, although
those near the towns, he reported, might be in favor of such
intervention.

There was always the possibility that this

class might be incited to revolution on the pretext of defending the national sovereignty against Yankee interference.

He

speculated, however, that the majority of these people would
remain quiet unless the initial efforts of any revolution
were immediately successful. There was "little danger of a
spontaneous popular rising. 1147
The foreign creditors and the diplomatic officials
representing these creditors' respective countries, Dawson
reported, also would not be averse to further intervention
by the United States in the financial affairs of the Dominican
Republic.

This intervention, however, would have to be beyond

the scope envisioned by the Award of July 14, 1904.

The

Spanish charg~, representing Spanish and German claims, and
to a lesser extent the Italian representative objected to the
implementation of the Award on the grounds that it interfered
with either the priority of their claims or the possibility of

l

46 Dawson to Hay, November 2, 1904, No. 64, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll 12.
47 Ibid.
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collecting the amount due these claims.

The Belgian and

trench representatives made no objection to the Award.

The

I

Italian charge, Dawson believed, was actually seeking assistance
i
I
from the United States in securing Italian interests. Furthermore, he had learned that the French representative favored
united States control of all the Dominican customhouses as the
surest means of protecting the interests of the Belgian and
French creditors. 48
Moreover, President Morales himself had indicated that
he favored ultimate United States control of the Dominican
·custom service.

His position had been made quite clear in

March and again after Dawson arrived in the Republic.

The

President reiterated this position shortly after Dawson had
been informed that the Dominican Government had decided not
I

/

to place Monte Cristi, Sanchez, and Samana·under the control
of the Financial Agent appointed under the Award.

On Sunday

morning, November 27, Dawson obtained an interview with Morales.
He was desirous of ascertaining from the President a definite
statement as to whether the decision not to transfer the three
ports was final or if there were a possibility it might be
reversed in the future.

Dawson began the interview by expres-

sing his surprise at the withdrawal of the original proposal
48 Dawson to Hay, August 23, 1904, No. 17, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. Dawson to Hay,
October 3, 1904, No. 47; November 4, 19.04, No. 65; November 16,
1904; November 25, 1904, No. 78, Desp~tches from the Dominican
Republic, vol. 12, roll 12. Dawson to Hay, December 19, 1904,
No. 94, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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to transfer the three additional customhouses to the Financial
Agent's control.

He observed that this decision had been made

only after the Dominican Government had thoroughly considered
it1 once the decision had been made, there had been no indication that it was being reconsidered.

Dawson also stated that

both he and Abbott, accepting the determination of the Dominican
Government on this point, had worked to make the advantages of
this arrangement clear to Washington, and had been able to
secure funds for Morales "for the sole purpose of aiding him
in his immediate financial difficulties pending'' the acceptance
of the proposal by the United States and the Improvement Company.
Had there been any indication that the proposal would eventually
I

be withdrawn these monetary sacrifices would not have been
made. 49
To this charge of misrepresentation, President Morales
replied that he had withdrawn the proposal only in the face of
opposition among his supporters so strong as to leave little
doubt that not to have done so would have lead to inunediate
revolution.

"I remain firm," Morales said, "in my determina-

tion ultimately to carry out the policy outlined by General
/

Sanchez and Mr. Hay and Mr. Loomis last spring--viz., to secure
the effective intervention and protection of the United States
/

by leasing to you Samana and Manzanillo Bays and turning over
to you the control of all our customhouses."

The time had been

49 Dawson to Hay, December 3, 1904, No. 80, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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considered right to implement this plan; but, now it was nee/

essary to let Finance Minister Velasquez try his plan.

As soon

I

as Velasquez met with failure, as he surely would, Morales
told Dawson that he would revert to the original plan.

The

president concluded by saying: "I hope that in the meantime
. the United States will reach an understanding with the other
creditor nations which will make it practicable to extend the
request to include the southern as well as 'khe northern ports. 1150
Dawson indicated gratitude at the President's expression of confidence in the United States.

However, he observed

that he had never mentioned either the possibility of leasing
I

Samana and Manzanillo Bays or the possibility of an arrangement with all the foreign creditors.

His negotiations had been

confined to negotiating the transfer of the four ports to the
. control of the Financial Agent.

Dawson drew up his report of

this interview with the President and sent it to the Department
of State under the date of December 3.

Arriving in Washington

on the sixteenth, it was read by Assistant Secretary Loomis
and Secretary Hay sometime between the seventeenth and the
twenty-third of the month.

The despatch was then forwarded to
the White House for President Roosevelt's consideration. 51
While it is difficult to determine the exact impact
that Dawson's despatches had on the decisions which were.being
SO Ibid.
51 rbid. Across the top of this document is the following hand written notation: "sent copy to President."
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•ade in Washington, it, nevertheless, seems likely that the
one of December 3 and the others containing his evaluation of
the necessity of United States intervention to aid the Dominican
Government in resolving its financial problems must at least
have persuaded the Roosevelt Administration that such intervention would not be opposed but rather welcomed by the more
responsible elements within the Republic and by the foreign
creditors.

Nevertheless, these despatches certainly were not

the only factors which determined the next step towards greater
united States intervention.

The policy of ultimate interven-

tion and control of the Dominican customhouses, it would seem,
had already been determined before Dawson was ever appointed
to the Legation in

Santo~Domingo.

By the presidential election

of November, 1904, Roosevelt was assured of another four years
in office.

And with the presidential campaign behind him, he

undoubtedly felt more free to pursue a more vigorous policy.
Furthermore, if it had been the intention of the President
and Secretary of State to use the Award of July 14, 1904 as a
means of providing some aid to the Dominican Government without more overtly interfering in the affairs of that republic,
as it quite obviously was Dawson's plan, it became apparent by
the end of November, that such a policy was not going to work
very well.

Whatever his motives, President Roosevelt indicated

his intention of following a more determined course of action.
In his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904, he
'

l

noted that

r

i
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chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a
general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may
in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere
the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine
may force the United States, however reluctantly, in
flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impo5ence, to
exercise of an international police power. 2
In pursuance of this new policy Secretary of State Hay
sent the following telegram to Dawson on December 28, 1904:
You will sound the President of Santo Domingo, discreetly but earnestly and in a perfectly friendly spirit,
touching the disquieting situation which is developing
owing to the pressure of other governments having arbitral
awards in their favor and who regard our award as conflicting with their rights. Already one European Government
strongly intimates that it may resort to occupation of
some Dominican customs ports to secure its own payment.
There appears to be a concert among them. You will ascertain whether the Government of Santo Domingo would be
disposed to request the United States to take charge of
the collection of duties and effect an equitable distribution of the assigned quotas among the Dominican Government
and the several claiments. We have grounds to think that
such arrangement would satisfy the other powers, besides
serving as a practical guaranty of peace of Santo Domingo
from external influence or internal disturbance.SJ
Whatever might have been his influence in shaping this
more vigorous policy there can be no doubt that Dawson was in
accord with it.

On December 17, he had written a personal

letter to Assistant Secretary Loomis.

In this letter he gave

his evaluation of the political and financial situation in the
Dominican Republic.

Concerning the course which the United

52

ouoted in H. c. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), p. 157. See also FRUS,
1904, p. xxxiv.
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Hay to Dawson, December 28, 1904, telegram, Diplomatic
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states should follow, he wrote the following:
It is hardly necessary for me to say to you that I
think our only policy for· the present is to let the pressure of increasing financial difficulties bring about the
inevitable result. Without our intervention they cannot
pay, and unless they pay they cannot stay in power.54
In summary, the first six months of Dawson's service in
the Dominican Republic was largely devoted to attempting to
secure the full implementation of the Improvement Company's
Award of July 14, 1904, and studying the fiaancial situation
of the country.

Although strong opposition within the Dominican

Cabinet and among President Morales' supporters prevented the
complete execution of the Award, Dawson was successful at least
in persuading the Morales Government to accept the Award and
I

to allow Puerto "Plata to remain under the Financial Agent's
control.

His study of the financial conditions of the Republic

convinced him that the country could not extract itself from
its financial problems without United States interference.
Furthermore, he concluded that this interference would be beneficial to the Dominican Republic and would not meet with opposition either in the
interest.

Governme~t

or among the monied and propertied

When the Administration in Washington decided the

time was opportune to take a more vigorous stand, a position
perhaps influenced in part by Dawson's reports, Dawson was in
full accord with the decision of his superiors.
54 Dawson to Loomis, December 17, 1904, personal,
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
Quoted in part in Munro, ~· cit., p. 99.
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CHAPTER V
I

DAWSON-DILLINGHAM AGREEMENT:
DECEMBER 30, 1904 - JANUARY 21, 1905
Upon receipt of Secretary Hay's telegram of December 28,
1904, Dawson immediately began the course of negotiations which,
over the next three months, would lead to a North Americansupervision of the Dominican customs.

Dawson's first move

was to seek an interview with President Morales.

Both men

agreed fully that the Dominican Republic could no longer count
on the patience of its foreign creditors and that demands for
payments of these debts would not be far in the offing.

Further-

more, the President acknowledged that the European creditors
would not accept .any guarantee that his Government could offer.
Indeed, he returned to his previous stand that the best solution to the Republic's economic problems lay in United States
control of the customs with a fixed sum being guaranteed to the
Dominican Government for expenses. 1
1
Dawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1905, No~ 100,
FRUS, 1905, p. 298.
The documents included in FRUS, 1905, pp. 298-370, give

a rather detailed picture of the events surrounding the negotiations of the agreement of January 21, 1905, the protocol of
February 7, 1905, and the modus vivendi of April 1, 1905. While
in some instances these documents have been edited, they are
generally accurate reproductions of the originals to be found
in Despatches From United States Ministers To the Dominican
Republic 1883-1906, National Archives Microfilm Publications,
Microcopy No. 93 (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1966),
roll 13, vol. 13 and roll 14, vol. 14: Therefore, most citations
in this chapter and in those dealing with the protocol of
February 7 and the modus vivendi refer to FRUS, 1905. However,
- . . . . r"
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In spite of this consideration, Morales was not yet
quite ready to make a formal proposal that the United States
assume charge of the cus.tomhouses.

Opposition to such a pro-

pasal, while it still existed within the Cabinet and among his
prominent supporters, was weakening.

I

Finance Minister Velasquez

had just about given up on his own plan to provide the Government with more revenues.

Moreover, the arrangement which had

left the Jimenista General Arias as governor of Monte Cristi,
continued to prove unsatisfactory from the Government's point
of view and the possibility of requesting that that port be
taken over under the Improvement Company's Award of July 14,
had again been suggested in the last cabinet meeting. 2
i

Dawson gave the President little hope that the Dominican
I

Government could use the Award solely as an aid in dealing with
Arias.

If it became necessary to request more ports under the
.

I

Award , Dawson told Morales, these would have to include Sanchez,
I

and Samana as well as the Jimenista stronghold.

However,

Dawson noted that he "appreciated how great were the political
difficulties" against which the President was struggling:
"Difficulties which arose from the deeply grounded prejudice
against any sort of American intervention existing among some
of his supporters."

Nevertheless, Morales alone, Dawson

whenever there is a significant difference between the pllblished document and the original, the citation will refer to
the microcopy.
2

~·

Dawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1905, No. 100,
1905, p. 299.
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•aintained, could determine when this prejudice had sufficiently
abated or when it was time to act in spite of the opposition. 3
I

At this point, Morales attempted to ascertain what
portion of the custom revenues the United States would be willing to allot to the Dominican Government.

Dawson refused to

commit himself, undoubtedly realizing that to do so would
result in a lose of flexibility in future negotiations.

Instead,

he suggested that the Dominican President ought to take the
first step by stating what he considered to be a .fair distribution.

Morales responded by suggesting a division of sixty

per cent for the Government and forty per cent for the creditors.
For his part, Dawson felt that such a limited sum might prevent
I

the United States from corning to an agreement with the creditors;
nevertheles~,

he was willing to submit the proposal to Washing-

· ton as soon as Morales was sure that the anti-North American
sentiment in the Cabinet had sufficiently subsided. 4
In order to assist in diminishing the anti-United
States attitude, Morales requested that Dawson meet with
Emilio Joubert, a prominent Horacista and the minister designate
to the United States, and Finance Minister Vel~squez.

It was

the President's hope that this interview would assure Vel~squez
that United States "intervention in the customhouses would be
conducted in a manner that would of fend Dominican pride as
little as possible and not destroy the prerogatives of the office

l

111'·1''!

~ i ''
''111

I
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of minister of finance."

Therefore, between December 31 and

,·,II:
1,11111
I 11•

January 2, Dawson met several times with President Morales,
I

I

Joubert, Velasquez, and Foreign Minister Sanchez.
i

I

5

I

During these discussions, Dawson thought it necessary
to reject three proposals which the Dominicans brought forward.
In the first place, in order to maintain his freedom of action,
he refused to commit himself "either personally or officially"
to the proposed forty per cent - sixty per cent division of
the revenues.

Moreover, the Dominicans sought assurances

that Abbott would not be placed in charge if an agreement were
reached.

Dawson inquired if there were any complaints with

Abbott's administration of Puerto Platai but, he felt that it
was necessary to take a strong stand on this point among
"other considerations" in order to "take the first opportunity
of impressing upon them that we would not take the responsibility involved unless given a free hand to back up our representatives in enforcing a rigidly impartial administration of
the customhouses. 116
Finance Minister.

The final proposal came solely from the
Hoping to ease the humiliation of accepting
/

North American intervention in the customhouses, Velasquez
suggested some form of joint control.

Reluctant to accept this

suggestion, Dawson again based his rejection on the unwillingness of the United States to accept responsibility without
effective control.

Nevertheless, he explained that he personally

61bid., pp. 299-300.

,I

l
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not only willing but anxious to leave the Dominican Govern~ent

with the maximum of administrative freedom consistent with
!

the essential prerequesite."

At last, he agreed to consider a
draft of the Finance Minister's.plan. 7
Sometime during these preliminary negotiations the
question of possible legislative ratification of any agreement
providing for United States intervention probably arose.
~ccording

to Dawson, Morales was unwilling to commit himself

to a definite position on this matter.

His indecision came

from uncertainty regarding his ability to persuade the Dominican Congress to ratify any such proposal immediately.

A long

deliberation in congress might provide the opportunity for the
I

Government's opponents to revolt.
prefe~red

Consequently, the President

to delay discussion on the manner and time of sub-

. mission of any possible agreement to Congress until he was
sure that the substance would be agreeable to the Horacistas.
Thus, negotiation on this point was deferred for the time
being. 8 In spite of divergent viewpoints between himself and
the Dominican officials and continuing reluctance on the part
of certain members of the Government, Dawson felt, by January 2,
that the negotiations had progressed far enough and that opposition had sufficiently abated to wire the Department of State
that Morales was willing to request the United States'
7Ibid., p. 300.
8Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 118,
ibid., p. 351.

~
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intervention in the control of the customs on the basis of
sixty per cent-forty per cent distribution of the revenues. 9
The negotiations were progressing better than Dawson had
hoped for.

Nevertheless, the instability of the political

situation in the Dominican Republic convinced him of the
necessity of progressing with all due speed.

On January 5,

he wrote the following to his friend Charles G. Dawes, then
President of the Central Trust Company of Illinois:
there is always the dread that the men I have been at so
much pains to negotiate with may suddenly be standing up
against a wall instead of sitting in the Minister's arm
chair. It is a good deal like playing a careful game of
whist on the head of a powder keg. Just as you are playing the last card of a grand slam and are reaching for
the stakes, bang! and you are lucky if there is enough
left of you to begin a hunt for a fresh pack.lo
I

The Velasquez plan for joint United States-Dominican
administration of the customhouses, which Dawson had agreed to
consider, was transmitted to the United States Legation on
January 6.

In addition to providing for the United States to

be the creditor for all the foreign and domestic debts of

the Dominican Republic, it stipulated that the Government in
Washington would appoint one employee to each customhouse who
would be on equal footing with the collector of customs appointed by the Dominican Government.

Over all supervision of

the rights acquired by the United States under the agreement
9 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1905, No.
100, ibid., p. 299.
lODawson to Dawes, January 5, 1905, Dawes Collection,
container January-June, 1905, File D.

L
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~as

to be intrusted to a North American financial agent.
I

.Anticipating possible revolution, Velasquez's plan provided
that in case of temporary interruption of the regular collection in any port the United States could "assume the exclusive
direction of one or more customhouses as long as the causes
of the interruption lasts."

The agreement was to remain in

effect until the Republic's debts had been fully paid, and a
monthly report was to be issued over the signatures of both
the Dominican and United States officials. 11
Notwithstanding these provisions, in no way was the
United States to dominate.

The principle of joint control,

if not Dominican dominance, was clearly upheld.

The United

States and Dominican officials would determine which employees
were absolutely necessary in each customhouse.

All, however,

would be appointed and paid by the Dominican Government.

Al-

so, either the Dominican Government or the United States financial agent could demand the dismissal of a lax employee.
Furthermore, a complete adjustment of the Dominican debt was
to be denied the United States officials.

Half of those

revenues which the Dominican Government had earmarked to be
used to pay off the so-called deferred debt, were not to be
included in the amount divided between the creditors and the
Government.

To assure the Dominican administration's freedom
I

to provide for the nation's economic well being, the Government
11Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, enclosure 1, FROS, 1905, p. 310.
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retained the authority to alter its fiscal laws in order to
.
t o f agricu
. lt ure an d d omes t.ic in
. d ustry. 12
promot e the improvemen
i

Surprised that the Finance Minister's proposals offered
as many guarantees as they did, Dawson, nevertheless, was determined to reject them.

In view of the extensive abuses in the

customhouses, the reforms offered were not sufficient.
over, not all of the debts were to be adjusted.

More-

Rather than

break the news of his rejection directly to the Finance Minister,
Dawson decided to inform Foreign Minister sfutchez, thereby
I
'
Ve 1 asquez
a f ew d ays o f me d.ia t 'ion. 13
a 11owing
By Friday, January 6, it had been decided in Washington
to proceed further with the negotiations for United States
I

control of the Dominican finances.

On that day, Acting Secretary

of State Francis B. Loomis sent Dawson a cablegram which

con~

. stituted the Department's instructions to him for future negotiations.

After recounting Dawson's earlier warnings that the

Dominican Government would not be able to meet all its obligations, Loomis noted that some claimants who were United States
citizens were appealing to the Government to take vigorous
action on their

behalf and that some of the Republic's

European creditors were becoming uneasy about the conditions in
the country.

He concluded that "these conditions constitute a

menace to the Republic itself, 11 and then went on to state that
12 Ibid.
13 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, ibid., p. 302.
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the only way these dangerous conditions could be removed was
if peace were maintained and the revenues collected in such a
way as to provide sufficient money to meet both the expenses
of government and the amount due the Republic's creditors.
The United States would aid in obtaining these objectives provided that conditions would assure the success of the undertaking.

To guarantee adequate revenues, government expenditures

had to be limited, tariff schedules maintained at their existing levels unless modified with the United States' approval,
and all the custom revenues collected by the United States.
Forty per cent of the revenues would be turned over to the
Dominican Government for its expenses and the remaining sixty
I

per cent would be used by the United States to pay the principal
and interest on the Dominican debt as they came due, and to
.pay the expenses of carrying out the arrangement.

At the end

of the year, any surplus held by the United States would be
turned over to the Dominican Government.

In addition, the

United States would have to undertake an adjustment of the
amount and terms of the entire Dominican debt and to evaluate
all claims against the Republic.

Dawson was instructed to

"present these considerations" in his own way to the Dominican
.
14
Government.
In presenting the Department's conditions for the
administration of the customs, Dawson decided to work through
Foreign Minister sinchez, whom he knew to be in favor of North

l

14 Ibid.

124

American "intervention on any reasonable terms."

He had
I

decided not to go directly to the President until Velasquez
bad either accepted or

def~nitely

i

customhouses by the United States.

rejected sole control of the
lSi

Dawson's course was pos-

sibly motivated by two considerations.

In the first place, he

probably believed that Morales would not have accepted the plan
I

so long as Velasquez insisted on joint control.

Secondly,

Velisquez's outright refusal to accept the conditions, which
Washington had laid down, could have placed the Morales Government in the dangerous position of losing the support of the
Horacistas.
I

Sanchez apparently did not raise the question of joint
control during his meeting with Dawson on Saturday, January 7.
What really bothered him was the proposed division of the
revenues on the basis of sixty per cent for the creditors and
forty per cent for the Dominican Government.

If the Cabinet

I

accepted this distribution, Sanchez assured Dawson, the President and members of the Government would be forced to resign
and flee the country.

In spite of this dire prediction,

Dawson doubted that the rigid position would be maintained
after the Foreign Minister had time to reflect. 16
In his second conversation with the United States
Minister, s1nchez did not even refer to the planned distribution of the revenues.

However, he informed Dawson that

lSibid., pp. 302-303.

16 Ibid.
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I

velasquez had been notified of the substance of Washington's
position and had received it well and was willing to continue
I

negotiations.
conversations.

I

.

Therefore, Dawson and Velasquez resumed their
From their first meeting it appeared that

oawson's doubts concerning the rigidity of the Dominican stand
on the distribution of funds was not without foundation.
Velasquez informed him that a "new and rigidly economical budget"
was in preparation.

When it was completed, the minimum amount
needed by the Government would be known. 17
I

Velasquez's proposed plan for joint control was discussed on Friday, January 13.

Dawson assured the Finance Minister

that most of the subordinate officials would be Dominicans
I

who would be selected in accordance with the suggestions of
the Dominican Government.

Nevertheless, the United States

.had to have a free hand in employing and discharging.

In view

I

of this position, a detailed examination of Velasquez's plan
made it evident that the plan was unworkable.

A new one would

have to be formulated. · Although not definitely conunitting
I

.

himself to anything, Velasquez suggested that Dawson proceed
to draft a new proposal. 18
In the meantime, President Roosevelt had decided to
facilitate the negotiations by ordering Commander Alfred Dillingham to return to the Dominican Republic.

Dillingham was.chosen

because of his "exceptional knowledge" of the conditions in
17 Ibid., p. 303.

18 Ibid.
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the Dominican Republic.

His instructions were essentially

the same as those sent to Dawson.

In addition, however, DilI

lingham was instructed to remind Morales of their interview
during the spring of 1904, in which the President had voluntarily offered to establish a customs receivership controlled
by the United States in order to provide for the payment of
the "recognized foreign claims", funds for the Government,
and for the establishment of a sinking fund.

To assist in the

negotiations, Dillingham was to confer with the leading men of
the country if the President and he thought that this would
be helpful in gaining support for the proposed customs receivership.

Of course, Commander Dillingham was to "work in harmony
I

with" Dawson, and to keep the Minister informed of the conditions in the areas where he traveled. 19
After his success in securing a truce between the
Jimenista forces in Monte Cristi and the Morales Government,
in June, 1904, Dillingham had not lost interest in events in
the Dominican Republic.

In late August, he wrote to Assistant

Secretary of State Loomis expressing his views on the conditions
in the Caribbean republic.

The Commander expressed the belief

that the younger generation of men, many of whom had been
educated abroad, were sincerely desirous of establishing a
system of good and stable government in their country.

Dilling-

ham was convinced "that any country that sees fit to interfere,
19
Secretary of State to Commander Dillingham, January 5,
1905, ibid., pp. 300-301.
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to create good government in Santo Domingo, will receive a
hearty support of this class of men, and this government intervening, I am sure will have the hearty support of the masses,
I

I

provided the masses are considered and properly treated."
The country which was rightly destined to interfere and thus
introduce good government was the United States.

This duty

accrued to the northern republic "as the great civilizing
power of the world. • • • •

He reported that his conversations

with foreign civilian and military personnelr indicated that
these men believed the conditions in the Dominican Republic
had to be improved and that it was the United States' place
to take the appropriate action.
Do~ingo

"What the people of Santo

need to-day," he repeated, "is to be taught to govern

themselves: they are absolutely ignorant of what good government means, they have never enjoyed the
government.

bl~ssings

of good

...

Dillingham did not envision the interv"ention and subsequent civic education to be easily brought about.

The

"surest and most economical method," he reported, would be the
application of an amended form of the Platt Amendment providing for control of the country's finances, with particular
attention being given to the control of the customhouses.
Once the latter were out of the control of the Dominican politicians, illegal expenditures would stop.

However, this would

20 A. c. Dillingham to Francis ·B. Loomis, August 21,
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, August 21-31, 1904, roll 1221.
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also result in depriving many of the leading politicians and
military figures of their means of support, thereby making them
!

opposed to the reforms.

Consequently, an occupation force of
about 5,000 men was suggested. 21
In December, 1904, Dillingham again wrote to Loomis.
He had recently read a newspaper report which seemed to indicate
an impending revolution in the Dominican Republic.

The Com-

mander urged that action be taken to prevent an uprising
against the Morales Government.
sible to enter

in~o

He asked if it were not pos-

a treaty with the Dominicans; could not

some assurance be given that the United States were interested
in stabilizing conditions in the Republic? 22
I

Conanander Dillingham's views were thus not unlike those
expressed by Dawson in his despatches to the State Department •
. It is not surprising, therefore, that the two men found themselves to be essentially in agreement, when Dillingham arrived
in Santo Domingo City on Saturday, January 14.

Both thought

that the instability of the situation made it imperative to act
quickly.

They determined to concentrate their efforts in the

capital.

If Morales could depend on the support of Finance

Minister Vel~squez and other Horacistas in the Government, a
trip to the north to converse with the local Horacista·leaders
would not be necessary.

Furthermore, they were of the opinion

21 Ibid.
22
A. c. Dillingham to Francis B. Loomis, December 21,
1904, Miscellaneous Letters, December 21-31, 1904, roll 1233.
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that for the time being nothing could be done with the Jimenistas. 23
Arrangements were made for Dillingham's formal presentai

tion to President Morale·s at ten o'clock on Tuesday morning,
January 17.

In the meantime, in a confidential interview,

Dillingham reiterated to the President the United States' position.

Again, the necessity for financial reform was stressed,

and the President was assured that the Government in Washington
was motivated solely by the desire to improve the Dominican
Republic's welfare. 24
Morales replied that he and his Cabinet, with the
/

exception of Velasquez, were ready to accept the United States'
proposal.

Provided that he could count on North American back-

ing, the President was even willing to carry out the arrangement without his Finance Minister's support.

The topic of

conversation then turned to the necessity ef economic and
administrative reforms.

Morales' plans along this line called

for the abolition of the army and of the payments to military
chiefs, reduction of the number of provinces and officials,
improvements of roads and schools, and an increase in the
efficiency of the judicial administration. 25

The President

requested that, in addition to merely aiding in the restoration
of financial stability and the preservation of order, the
United States also assist in bettering the industrial conditions
23 oawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, FRUS, 1905, p. 303.
24

Ibid., p. 304.

25 Ibid.
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of the Republic.

This could be achieved by permitting the·

removal of existing export duties on cacao, tobacco, and coffee.
soth Dillingham and Dawson agreed to recommend the inclusion

in the agreement of a clause which would provide for the termination of these duties. 26 Moreover, fearing adverse public
opinion and opposition from his Horacista supporters, the
president urged the necessity of a quick conclusion of the
. t•ions. 27
nego t 1a
The formal presentation on the seventeenth was surrounded with military pomp.

During the ceremonies, Dawson

made it a point to drink a toast to "the health of the President and the 'Independence of the Dominican

Republic~'"

Fol-

lowing the reception, the United States envoys called upon
the members of the Cabinet.
I

I

They were then informed that

•

Velasquez and Sanchez had been designated as commissioners with
full powers to treat with the North Americans.

In the mean-

time, Dawson had informed the Finance Minister that the plan
submitted on January 6, for joint control of the customhouses
was unacceptable and in turn had submitted a draft of an agreement based on the instructions from Loomis. 28
Prior to Dillingham's arrival, the negotiations between
the Dominican Government and Dawson were kept secret.

With

the Commander's arrival, however, it became common knowledge
26 on January 16, the Department of State wired Dillingham approval of this provision. Ibid., p. 305.
28 Ibid., pp. 304-305.
27 Ibid., p. 304.
L
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that the Government was contemplating some type of arrangement
with the United States.

This in turn resulted in the press and

the populace demanding more detailed information.

Rumors

began to spread that the Vice President was about to break with
the Government and lead a revolt against it.

Moreover, there

was a persistent fear that the United States planned to annex
samani Bay, if not the entire country.

According to Dawson,

the press charged that Morales and his colleagues were selling
out the country without consulting the people. 29
In this apparently explosive ·atmosphere, Dawson and
Dillingham met with S~chez and Vel~squez on January 18.

The

ensuing discussion indicated that the four men had come to
agreement on the essentials.

Consequently, the Dominicans

prepared a draft agreement based on the plan which Dawson had
·submitted on the seventeenth.

This new set of proposals was

completed and discussed on Thursday, January 19.

The North

Americans "found it necessary to insist upon many modifications
in verbiage and detail;" but, an agreement had been reached
before the two commissions separated. 30
As was evident from Dawson's previous attitude, Minister
I

Velasquez had to forego the possibility of joint control of
the customhouses.

Nevertheless, both he and Foreign Minister

29 rbid., p. 305; Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7,
No. 118, ibid., p. 351.
30 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, ibid., p. 305.
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sinchez insisted on the inclusion of certain clauses which
they thought would protect the sovereignty of their nation,
provided for at least token control of the customhouses, and
provide sufficient revenues for the expenditures of the government.
In addition to providing for the collection of all the
customs and the adjustment of all the debts by the United
states, the agreement stipulated that the North American republie would guarantee "the complete integrity of the Dominican
Republic. 1131 Both Jimenistas and Horacistas agreed on this
point.

Refusal to accept the clause would have been considered

a virtual declaration of the United States' intention to annex
the Republic.

Dawson and Dillingham assented to the inclusion

of this provision "without hesitation or discussion."

They

felt that President Roosevelt's "recent message to Congress,
his verbal statement to Captain [sic] Dillingham just prior to
the latter's departure on this mission, and the general tenor
of the Department's despatches" justified such action. 32

l

31This clause is contained in the second paragraph of
the preamble. Ibid., p. 311.
32 Dawson to Hay, January 23, 1905, No. 107, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13. The message to
which Dawson referred was evidently the President's annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904, announcing the so-called
Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The reference was
probably to the following section: "all that this country desires
is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can
count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that.it
knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social
and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States."
FRUS, 1904, p. XLI •
...............

l
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I

I

Sanchez and Velasquez refused to consent to the in.clusion
of a clause which would have forced the Dominican Government
to alter its tariffs according to the suggestions of the United
I
I
states. 33 They were afraid that the clause would be used by
the United States to force a revision in the Dominican tariff
structure so as to give preferential treatment to North American
products.

However, it was agreed that the Dominican Government

would only institute a tariff or tax reform in agreement with
the United States. This, Dawson and Dillingham felt, was in
•
• .
34
accord wi•th t h e Department I s intention.
The hope of retaining some control, if only a shadow
of control, over the customhouses lingered .in the minds of the
Dominican commissioners.

sc<nchez and Vel~squez insisted that

any commission appointed to adjust the foreign or domestic
~

debt include representatives of the Dominican Government.
Employees in the customhouses "sofar as the fulfillment of
their duties and the exercises of their rights is concerned,"
were to be "considered as DODli.nicans and therefore subject to
the laws of the Republic. 1135 In addition, the Dominican
Government was to have a representative in each customhouse
33 The Department of State had included such a provision
in Dillingham's instructions but not in those sent to Dawson.
Secretary of State to Commander Dillingham, January 5, 1905,
FRUS, 1905, pp. 300-301. Dawson to Secretary of State,
Jaii\iary 23, 1905, No. 107,ibid., p. 309.
34 oawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, ibid., pp. 309, 312.
35 Article 2, ibid., p. 311.
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who would watch after his Government's interests. 36
On their part, Dawson and Dillingham were careful to

see that this quasi joint control did not interfer with effective
administration by the United States.

The reasonableness of

the request for joint representation on commissions appointed
to adjust the debts was not contested by the North American
envoys.

However, the provision denying virtual diplomatic

immunity to the United States appointees in the customhouses
was accepted only after considerable discussion and after
Dawson and Dillingham were convinced 'that it was designed to
secure "faithful execution of Dominican custom laws and regulations."

Moreover, Dawson believed that any abuse of this

clause could easily be prevented.

Right of inspection was

also subject to considerable discussion, but was eventually
agreed to on the grounds that the Dominican Government could
inspect but could not interfer with the collection of the customs. 37
The Dominican commissioners were also somewhat successful in securing sufficient revenues for the' support of their
Government.

Some modification of the Department of State's

original instruction that the division of revenues be on the
sixty per cent for the creditors and forty per cent for the
Government, was acheived.

The agreement stipulated that forty-

five per cent would be collected for the benefit of the creditors.
Any extraordinary expenses which might arise in connection,
36 1b1°d.,

PP• 308 I

311 •

37 Ibid., p. 308.
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~ith

the collection of the customs would be charged to the

portion earmarked for the creditors.

Finally, the salaries

I

of all the employees in the customhouses were to be provided
for from the fifty-five per cent. 38
In reporting the course of the negotiations, Dawson
informed the Department of State that Dillingham would personally
explain their reasons for deviating from the original instructions and accepting the fifty-five per cent-forty-five per
cent division of the revenues.

He, however, went on to point

out that:
I have given the subject of what would be a safe and
reasonable minimum most careful consideration ever since
my arrival, and while I have not yet been able to gather
all the data necessary for a sound estimate, I think that
$75, 000 a month for the first few months is as little as
they can get along with. Later when the President has been
able to dismiss the army and reduce the number of provinces,
it may be that $800,000 [annually] will be safe. Necessarily all the reductions can not be enforced immediately.
The reform will take time and at best the position of
President Morales and his government is bound to be exceedingly difficult for the next year. If he fails the alternative is likely to be very expensive to the creditors and
the United States as well as to the property owners of
this island.39
.
Thus it is evident that Dawson believed that the fortyfive per cent-fifty-five per cent distribution of the customs
revenues was the minimum necessary to provide the Morales
Government with sufficient funds to maintain itself in power.
This evaluation was based on what the United States Minister
considered to be a realistic appraisal of the economic
38 Ibid., pp. 309, 311-312.

39 Ibid., p. 309.
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necessities of the Government.

Reductions in expenses were

necessary but could not be expected immediately.

The failure

of the Government would ·1ead to a worse situation for the

I

creditors and the United States.

I

If reductions in expenses

were necessary, how could a check be placed on governmental
expenditures?

Just such a check, Dawson believed, was found

in the last clause of Article III.

He called the Department

of State's attention to the fact that this clause by which the
'Dominican Government undertakes to keep its administrative
expenditures within the limits of the indispensable necessities of administration,' I believe, not only gives us the
power to insist on a reduction of expenditures whenever we
may deem it advisable, but it opens the door to a real
superintendence of all administrative matters, which in
wise hands can be used to great advantage. Its practical
effect can be made like that of similar clauses in the
financial agreements to which the Government of Egypt is
a party. 0 .
Dawson's allusion to the British control of Egyptian
affairs in no way indicated that he sought annexation of the
Dominican Republic.

It would seem that he was again seeking

a way in which the United States could effectively lend its aid
to the improvement of the financial and administrative conditions
in the Republic.

The idea that United States control in the

Dominican Republic might ultimately follow the pattern set in
Egypt by the British was not unique to Dawson.

An

editorial

in The New York Times on January 21, 1905 noted the beneficial
influence of British administration in Egypt, and indicated that
it seemed as if the Government in Washington intended to follow
4oibid.
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. ' l ar course. 41
a simi

Furthermore, while one might question

whether President Roosevelt envisioned the establishment of a
situation similar to that in Egypt when he determined to
accept the obligation of the receivership of customs in the
DOminican Republic, he had, nevertheless, closely followed and
admired British administration in Egypt for sometime. 42
Excessive expenditures and insufficient funds might
eventually bring down the Morales Government.

There was also

the more immediate threat that opposition to the convention
would result in revolution.

-

To thwart this possibility, it

was the design, evidently of both sides in the negotiations, to
41

.

The New York Times, January 21, 1905, p. 8.

42 Howard K. Beal, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of
America to World Power (New York: Collier Books, 1967), pp. 152153. In general,. it would seem that Roosevelt considered United
States control of the Philippines to be comparable to that of
the British in Egypt, rather than using the British example for
justifying North American control of the Caribbean republic.
Ibid., p. 153. David H. Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident
!Iilperialist (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
l968), pp. 82, 88-89.
Perhaps the example of British control of Egypt was in
the back of his mind when he determined to act in the Dominican
Republic rather than let the situation there progressively grow
worse, with the ultimate possibility of European intervention.
In 1903, the German ambassador, Spec von Sternburg, suggested
that the United States take the lead in backing an international
syndicate which would take control of the finances of Venezuela.
Howard K. Beal in his work Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of
America to World Power recounts the President's reaction:
"Roosevelt objected strenuously, 'I told him,' the President
recounted, 'that at first blush myjlidgment was very strongly
that our people would view with the utmost displeasure any such
proposal, because • • • it would not only tend to produce complication among the guaranteeing powers but would pave the way for
reducing Venezuela to a condition like that of Egypt,·' and that
the Monroe Doctrine meant' of course that no European power
should gain control of any American republic.[sic]" p. 347.
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present the opposition in the Dominican Republic with a fait
In part, at least according to Dawson, this was the
-accompli.
reason why the question of senatorial ratification was never
I

.
d b y the Dominican
. .
. .
43
mentione
commissioners.

It also explained,

oawson reported, the inclusion of paragraph "a" of Article II:
•From and after the date on which this contract takes effect
the present customhouse employees shall be considered as acting
under its provisions."

If the incumbent employees could be

considered to be acting under the agreement, the United States
had, at least after a fashion, taken charge of the customhouses. 44
With regard to a more definitive re-organization of
the customhouses, Dawson advised his superiors that this be
done "carefully and deliberately by an experienced man, who
should come as soon as possible."

Always congnizant of the

· tenuous position of the Government, he suggested that Monte
Cristi should receive an .American collector by February 1, the
date upon which the convention became effective.

Since Puerto

Plata was already under the administration of the deputy
financial agent, by the application of the Award of July 14,
1904, nothing need be done there.

As for the other ports, Daw-

son saw little harm in allowing them to stay temporarily under
the direction of Minister Vel,squez.

The Finance Minister had

instituted some reforms already, and Dawson hoped "that the
43 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No.
118, FRUS, 1905, p. 351.
44 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, ibid., pp. 308-309.
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desire of getting places under the American management will
tend to make the present collectors strictly enforce duties." 45
The initial personnel necessary to take charge of the
I

!

customhouses, Dawson suggested, should consist of a chief and
two assistants.

The chief would take charge of the custom-

houses in the capital, while one of the assistants administered
I

the customhouse at Sanchez and the other took charge of Puerto
Plata.

The official currently in charge of Puerto Plata would

administer Monte Cristi.
left for later.

I

/

Macoris, Samana, and Azua were to be

Until these officials arrived, Dawson planned

to have reports made to him.

Also, Abbott would be there to

.
h'im assistance.
.
46
give

The uncertainty of the political situation made both
Dawson and Dillingham uneasy, and even the agreement of January
19 could not remove their apprehension.
signed document could do that.

Only the finally

On the nineteenth and twentieth,

preparing for any eventuality, Dillingham wired the Departments
of State and Navy advising the stationing of naval vessels at
.
.
.
.
I
Santo Domingo
City,
Monte Cristi,
an d Samana.

Commander Dilling-

ham alleged that he did not anticipate an uprising but that
the ships would serve to provide communications for the United
. t errup t e d • 47
. . t er •~f th e t e 1egraph were in
St ates Minis
46 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 307.
47 Ibid., pp. 305-306. Dillingham to Secretary of the
Navy, January 19, 1905, telegram, Numerical File 1199, Records
of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National Archives, Washington, D. c. This telegram with several others from Rear
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on

I

the twentieth Dawson and Velasquez worked to bring

the Spanish and English versions of the document containing the
agreement into accord.

However, since the task of making the

final copies could not be completed that night, the document
was finally signed on Saturday morning, January 21. 48
There can be little doubt that Dawson agreed with
Dillingham's request for ships made on the nineteenth and
twentieth.

In wiring the Department of State of the signing,

Dawson noted that some "excitement and criticism" existed.
He further indicated that he wished to disarm this opposition
"by a friendly attitude as to details;" however, a "firm attitude
as to essentials and the presence of force was advisable for
moral effect upon malcontents. 1149 Apparently Dawson was willing
'

to use the naval force for more than mere "moral effect" if it
. were necessary to accomplish the transfer of the customhouses.
Within a few days after the signing of the agreement, Rear
Admiral Charles D. Sigsbee, conunander of the Caribbean squadron
of the United States Navy, outlined for Dawson a possible
course of action for the navy to follow.

In areas where there

might be opposition to the transfer of the customhouses, the
Admiral Charles D. Sigsbee, Conunander of the Caribbean squadron
of the United States Navy, to the Secretary of the Navy, are
to be found bound at the very end of the Numerical File case
number 1199. They are bound out of chronological order and
were evidently given no specific file number.
48The document is dated January 20, 1905; nevertheless,
it was not signed until January 21. Dawson to Secretary of
State, January 23, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 306, 312.
49 Ibid., p. 306.
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oominican Government would take the initiative in landing
troops and would be supported by the naval forces under the
•

command of Sigsbee.

i

"This proposition," the Admiral assured,

•is not intended to limit the extent to which I may use the
force under my command, but rather to assume the policy that
might be most acceptable to the people of San Coming [sic] and
of the United States."
Admiral's suggestion.

Dawson replied that he agreed with the
He thought that it provided for the

"prompt and decisive action which may be necessary to preserve
our rights, and at the same time will prevent any adverse
' .
..so
cri' t icism.

By the end of the third week in January, 1905, the
I

first steps toward an United States control of the Dominican
customs had been taken.

In the initial stages of these negotia-

. tions it was Dawson who successfully prepared the way for the
signing of the agreement on January 21.

After the arrival of

Commander Dillingham, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine, from the documents, whose influence was more important.

However, it would seem that the document which was finally

signed was based upon the draft which Dawson had presented to
I

Velasquez on the seventeenth.
Although from all reports the views of the two men
were in accord, in a long and somewhat rambling letter, dated
50 secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State,
February 2, 1905, (transmitting Admiral Sigsbee's report to
the Secretary of the Navy), Miscellaneous Letters, February 17, 1905, roll 1238.
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January 16, 1906, to Robert Bacon, who had succeeded Loomis as
Assistant Secretary of State, Dillingham appears to claim most
of the credit for negotiating the agreement for himself.

His

objective, however, was clearly not to discredit or deny Dawson's part.

It was rather to answer the critics of President

Roosevelt who were accusing the President of following an unwise
course in the Dominican Republic and of intentionally entering
into an agreement with the Dominican Government without submitting it for the advice and consent of the Senate. 51 For
his part, in his report to the Secretary of State on the course
of the negotiations, Dawson expressed his gratitude to the
Department for having sent Dillingham.

Dawson found the Com-

mander to be "a most agreeable colleague" and reported that
Dillingham
has by his energy, tact, frankness, and decision done
more than any other American could in so short a time
with the members of the Dominican Government, and quick
action was essential to success.52
If the exact part which Dawson played in the latter
part of the negotiations is somewhat unclear, his attitude and
objectives are certainly more precisely defined in the documents.
He was willing to consider the Dominican sensibilities insofar
as he could without weakening the cardinal principle of effective
control of the administration of the customhouses by the United
51 Dillingham to Bacon, Janaury 16, 1906, Miscellaneous
Letters, January 13-19, 1906, roll 1278.
52 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, FRUS, 1905, p. 309.
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The objective of this principle was to assure the

collection of adequate sums, thereby enabling the Dominican
I

Government to pay its debts and to introduce reforms.
Dawson, fully aware of the weakness of Morales' position, skillfully conducted the negotiations in such a manner
as to neither alienate the Horacista support which Morales
enjoyed nor to lose his own flexibility.

From the documents

it would appear that throughout the negotiations neither Dawson
nor Dillingham resorted to any threat of force to persuade the
Dominicans to consent to the North American conditions for
control of the customs.

Indeed, there was little likelihood

that they would have had to, for there appears to have been
I

little, if any, determined resistance to this control among
the members of the Government.

Once the agreement was signed,

·however, Dawson was more than willing to lend the Dominican
Government military support in putting it into operation.
The reports of Dawson's work as Minister in the Dominican
Republic were appearing in the newspapers back in the United
States to the delight of at least one of his friends.

On

February 3, Charles G. Dawes wrote
I note with much pleasure comments of the press of the
country upon your action of Minister of the United States.
I congratulate you on the great oppoetunity [sic] which is
open to you, and upon the international re~~tation which
your successful efforts are giving to you.
·
·
53 nawes to Dawson, February 3, 1905, Dawes Collection,
container January-June, 1905, File D.
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signing of the agreement of January 21 did not close the
opportunities of which Dawes spoke.
•

While Dawson and Dillingham
I

had achieved United States control of the Dominican finances
on paper, it was another thing to put this accord into operation.

(

. CHAPTER VI
I
THE PROTOCOL OF FEBRUARY 7 AND THE MODUS VIVENDI:
JANUARY 27, 1905 - APRIL 26, 1905
As the negotiations leading to the agreement of January
21 drew to a close, the Department of State apparently did not
feel that it was being kept fully informed of what was happening in the Dominican capital.

Twice on January 20, and once

on January 21, Dillingham and Dawson received telegrams requesting more information.

Even though they evidently complied with

these requests, the substance of the agreement appeared in
the newspapers, first in the Dominican Republic then in the
United States, before the Department received it.
proved embarrassing for Washington. 1

This naturally

In the United States, news of the signing of an agreement first appeared in the late issues of the New York evening
papers, on Saturday, January 21. 2 The Sunday morning editions,
in both New York and Washington, carried virtually complete
descriptions of the agreement which had been signed the previous
day. 3 The explanation for the leak was rather simple. Hoping
1 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, FRUS, 1905, pp. 306-307.
2John Bassett Moore, The Collected Papers of John
Bassett Moore, Vol. III (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1944) , p. 181.
3

The New York Times, January 22, 1905, p. 1.
Washington Post, January 22, 1905, p. 1.
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to quiet the opposition, the Morales Government had confidentially
given out some of the provisions before the entire convention
bad been agreed to by the commissioners.

The press evidently
obtained this information and printed it. 4
On Monday, January 22, Assistant Secretary of State

Loomis issued a statement to the press intended both to clarify
the position of the United States Government and to forestall
criticism.

Loomis reported that the United States had decided

to accept the formal and free invitation of the Dominican Government to assist it in its financial crisis.

He noted that

"more than one of the great powers" had urged the Administration either to intervene or to consent to the intervention of
European creditors.

"Therefore," Loomis stated, "representa-

tives of this Government and of Santo Domingo have signed a
memorandum of a proposed agreement looking· to the American
control of the fiscal affairs, upon the request and with the
consent of the Dominican Government."

He further explained

that the United States was neither assuming a protectorate
over the Republic nor guaranteeing its debts. 5 In spite of
the Loomis press release, President Roosevelt came under attack
in the Senate the following day for having exceeded his authority in entering an agreement with the Dominican Republic without the consent of the Senate. 6
4 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905, No.
107, FRUS, 1905, p. 308.
5 The Washin2ton Post, January 23, 1905. p. 3.

6The Washinszton Post, January 24, 1905, p. 4.
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Loomis' statement that the accord of the twenty-first
consisted merely of a "memorandum of a proposed agreement"
hardly corresponded with. Dawson and Dillingham's view on the
matter.

Since Dawson was already making plans for the adminis-

tration of the customhouses on February 1, there can be little
doubt that he considered the agreement which he and Dillingham
had signed as binding on the United States.

For its part, the

state Department claimed that no authorization had been given
for the signing. 7 However, it would seem that neither Dawson
nor Dillingham considered that they had exceeded their instructions.

Dawson reported that he and Dillingham had signed an

agreement which "in all essentials • • • either coincides with
i

the instructions given us, or corresponds as closely as was
practicable. 118 It is possible that Dawson and Dillingham under. stood that they were to sign an executive agreement.

And if

so, they were evidently not informed to do otherwise by their
superiors. 9 Moreover, it appears as if the question of ratification was avoided for fear that the delay might give the
opposition in the Dominican Republic time to organize to overthrow the Morales Government. 10 The confusion which developed
7H. c. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean (New York:
Russell and Russell, l965), p. l60.
8Dawson to Secretary of State, January 23, 1905,_No.
107; FRUS, 1905, p. 308.
9
Munro, ~· cit., p. 101.
10 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No.
118, FRUS, 1905, pp. 351-52.
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probably resulted more from the opposition which the agreement
of January 21 generated in the Senate rather than from any
failure of Dawson and Dillingham to obey instructions or the
I

I

oversight of State Department officials.

When Secretary of

State Hay, who at the time was confined to his home because of
illness, saw the agreement which Dawson and Dillingham had
signed, he recorded in, his diary that he "at once wrote to
Loomis saying it was a Treaty and nothing less and should be
sent to the Senate the moment the text arrived. 1111 However,
'

ratification was impossible without modification.

Therefore,

on January 25, Acting Secretary of State Loomis sent Dawson a
draft protocol of a new agreement.

He was instructed to inform

Morales and the Dominican Cabinet that the previously signed
agreement was merely ad referendum.

Undue publicity was to be
avoided during the course of the new negotiations. 12
Essentially, the draft protocol which Loomis sent to
Dawson was the same as that signed on January 21.

The changes

which were made in Washington were probably considered minor
and resulted, to a large extent, from the decision to have the
.
agreemen t b ecome e ff ec t ive
on 1y a ft er ra t'f'
i ica t'ion. 13 Nevertheless, these alterations should be noted, for some gave the
11Entry for Wednesday, January 25, 1905, John Hay's
diary for 1905, John Hay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D. c., Box 1.
12 Acting Secretary of State (Loomis) to Dawson, January
25, 1905, telegram, FRUS, 1905, p. 313.
13 Ibid.
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agreement a different comp·lexion while others elicited obje·ctions
from the Dominican officials. 14
The new protocol made it clear that it was in the
national interest of the United States to prevent foreign intervention in the Caribbean republic.

Provisions, which were

probably thought likely to meet with senatorial opposition or
to limit the United States control or to diminish the amount
available for paying the creditors, were altered.

The explicit

statement in the second article of the original agreement that
the employees appointed by the United States to serve in the
customhouses would be subject to Dominican law was omitted
from the proposed draft.

The same fate fell to paragraph "a"

of the third article of the original which had provided that
extraordinary expenses would be paid out of the fifty-five
per cent held for the creditors.

Article six of the proposed

draft added the provision that the Dominican Republic could not
increase the "export duties or its public debt without the
consent of the President of the United States."

Article

seven of the original provided that the United States "at the
request of the Dominican Republic, shall grant such other
assistance as may be in its power to restore the credit, preserve the order, increase the efficiency of the civil administration, and advance to [sic] material progress and welfare of the
Republic."

This was altered to read" "The Government of the

14
copies of the two agreements appear on pages 311314, FRUS, 1905.
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united States, at the request of the Dominican Republic, shall
9 rant such other assistance as the Iformer may deem proper to
restore the credit • • • • " Thus, while the United States
might extend additional assistance the amount and type of
assistance were left solely to the discretion of the Government in Washington.

Finally, the eighth article of the draft

provided that the agreement would go into effect only after
it had been ratified by the United States Senate.
When Dawson received the Department's draft protocol
on January 27, he immediately presented it to President Morales,
Foreign Minister sfutchez and acting Finance Minister Lemarche,
who was standing in for Vel~squez.

After signing the agreement

of January 21, the Finance Minister had traveled to Puerto
Plata and Santiago with the dual objective of forestalling opposi· tion in the northern part of the country to the agreement and
of facilitating the transfer of the customhouses to North
American control.

The Dominican officials were willing to

accept the proposed draft and even thought it possible and
convenient to have the Dominican legislature ratify the new
accord. 15
There were, however, some reasons for apprehension.
In the first place, it· would be impossible, Dawson was informed,
to guarantee Horacista acceptance until Velfsquez had returned.
Far more vexing to the Dominicans was the possibility that the
15 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, pp. 316-17.

~United

151
States Senate might not ratify the accord.

Concerning

senatorial ratification, Dawson could only offer the assurance
that President Roosevelt would do everything possible to
secure ratification.
empty.

I

Moreover, the treasury was virtually

This situation of financial embarrassment was the

result of the method of collecting the custom revenues.
Promissory notes, some not due for as long as two months, were
collected in the place of cash.

The Government had used these

notes as security for loans to meet inunediate expenses.

All

of the promissory notes collected for the month of January
had been used up and with the agreement between the United
States and the Dominican Government still pending, it would be
impossible to obtain a loan.

In order to aid the Morales

Government over this critical stage, Dawson agreed to try to
persuade some local banker to lend the Government the necessary
funds, if the State Department did not object to this procedure. 16
To achieve this end, Dawson approached Santiago
Michelena, a Puerto Rican and an United States citizen, 17 who,
in addition to being a prosperous merchant, operated one of
the largest banks in the Dominican Republic.

Michelena was

willing to lend his assistance on two conditions: Dawson would
16 Ibid., p. 318.
17 Although United States citizenship was not conferred
on Puerto Ricans until 1917 with the passage of the Jones Act,
Michelena apparently was an United States citizen in 1905.
Dawson specifically refers to Michele~a as an American citizen.
Ibid. Also see, Dawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110,
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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have to see that his rights were respected and would have to
agree to recommend that he be continued as the banker after
I

the permanent arrangement had been made.

Dawson replied that

he could give no promises on the latter point.

Nevertheless,

he did not hesitate to point out that Michelena's "American
citizenship, his financial standing and his willingness to help
the Dominican Government pending the present negotiations,
would certainly all have great weight if it became necessary to
select a banker. 1118
Dawson's next step was to secure his superiors' approval
for any agreement between the Dominican Government and Michelena.
In a telegram to the Secretary of State on January 27, Dawson
I

reported that he could secure Dominican assent to the new
draft protocol provided that the Department would authorize
some means to tide the Government over in its current financial
embarrassment.

He concluded by explaining that the necessary

credit could be obtained if he were authorized to agree to
transfering temporarily the collection of the revenues to a
banker. 19 On the twenty-eighth, Loomis replied that while the
Department of State had no authority to approve the arrangement,
there was no objection to it provided that neither the provisions
of the protocol nor the rights of the Dominican Improvement
18 oawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
19 oawson to Secretary of State, January 27, 1905, telegram, ibid. Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 110, FROS, 1905, p. 318.
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company under the Award of July 14 were obstructed. 20

Upon

receiving Michelena's consent to the arrangement, Dawson pro•

I

ceeded to draw up a contract which was signed on January 29,
by Michelena and the acting Finance Minister. 21
By this contract, Michelena was authorized, as of
February 1, to collect the custom revenues and to direct the
employees in the customhouses.

In return Michelena was to pay

the Dominican Government $75,000 monthly in four equal installments.

Since the custom revenues would still be in the form

of promissory notes, as these notes came due the banker would
apply the sum to eliminating the debt which the Government had
thus incurred with him and also pay the salaries of the custom1

house employees.

Any balance that remained was to be held in

trust by Michelena for the Dominican Government "subject to
the order of" Dawson.
for his efforts.

Naturally, Michelena was compensated

He was to receive one-half per cent per month

interest on all sums due him, two per cent commission each
month on the amount collected to cover the $75,000, and one
per cent each month for the transfer of that amount.

The

Dominican Government held itself responsible for the faithful
fulfillment of the contract before the United States Minister.
The contract itself was to remain in effect at the discretion
· 20 Loomis to Dawson, January 28, 1905, telegram, Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98. Dawson to Secretary
of State, February 13, 1905, No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 318.
21 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 319.
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of the Minister. 22

Once the agreement had been concluded,

Michelena began a tour of the Republic in order to arrange for
the collection of the custom revenues and the payment of the
budget. 23

I

Dawson later explained to his superiors that he had
included the clause which provided for the contract to remain
in effect at his discretion in order that he could end his
•responsibility should the Department not approve" of his
action.

He also admitted that this clause provided him with

a powerful diplomatic weapon, which could be used to get

Velasquez to agree to sign the new protocol.

If the Finance

Minister were reluctant, Dawson could always threaten to
terminate the contract, thus returning the Government to its
condition of financial embarrassment.

Also, Dawson apparently

intended to use the clause, which authorized Michelena to
retain the surplus revenues at the United States Minister's
direction, as a lever against the Finance Minister.

By in-

eluding this clause, Dawson saw to it that the Dominican Government would remain dependent on Michelena.

However, the

surplus thus gathered would also act as an aid to the Dominican
22 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, No.
110, enclosure 1: Contract between the Dominican Government and
Santiago Michelena, FRUS, 1905, p. 325. Melvin Knight, The
Americans in Santo DOiiiiilgo (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928f,
pp. 29-30.
23 oawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, No.
110, ibid., p. 319. Evidently Michelena's assumption of the
collection of the customs produced rumors that the United
States had taken over some of the customhouses. On February 3,
the Department wired Dawson for information on this point. He
replied that the rumors were false and probably resulted from a
misinterpretation of Michelena's activities. Ibid., p. 321.

155

Government, by providing a fund upon which it could fall back
when the protocol was finally signed.

Dawson reported that in

his judgment, "Velfsquez,• signature and the accumulation of a
surplus were both absolutely essential to the success of the
whole negotiations. 1124
In fact, the Michelena contract had achieved more than
either merely tiding the Morales Government over in a time of
financial embarrassment or providing Dawson with a handy lever

,

to exert pressure on Velasquez to assure the Finance Minister's
agreement to the Department's protocol.

While Dawson does not

report that this was his intention, and perhaps it was not,
what in effect he accomplished by the contract was the partial
implementation of the agreement of January 21, and a possible
springboard for legally furthering United States involvement
in the Dominican 'financial situation.

Collection of the customs

was now completely out of the hands of the Dominican Government.
There had been, of course, no provision for the adjustment of
the external and interior debts of the Republic, nor for the
payment of the claimants from the surplus.

However, the col-

lection was in the hands of an United States citizen whose
rights were guaranteed before the United
States resident minister.
I
Any interference in the collection could certainly result in
the active involvement of the United States Government to protect its citizen's rights.
It is also to be observed that Michelena received a
24 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905, No.
110, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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25
.
f or h'is services.
.
consi'derable remuneration

However, aiding

him was apparently not one of Dawson's major concerns.

It

was verbally agreed between Michelena and acting Finance Minister
i,emarche that the banker would temporarily suspend the collection of his commission and interest.
arrangement. 26

Dawson approved of this

However, in conducting the negotiations for

the contract, Dawson was careful to follow the Department's
wishes and not interfer with the rights of the Improvement
Company under the Award.

Both Michelena and the Dominican

Government were clearly given to understand that the customhouse at Puerto Plata, which was being administered under the
Award of July 14, 1904, could not be included in those which
• h e 1ena I s d'irec t~ion. 27
wou ld come un der Mic
A few days after the signing of the contract with
Michelena, Dawson had another interview with Morales and the
Foreign Minister.

His purpose was to make known the State

Department's decision to make a minor grammatical change in
the preamble of the protocol.

While refusing to give unquali-

fied approval to the Department's draft, President Morales
took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the interview to
make some proposed changes of his own.

Dawson, insisting on

the necessity of accepting the protocol just as it came from
25 Melvin Knight in his work The Americans in Santo
Domingo claims that Michelena could anticipate over $27,000
a year in interest and fees. QE_. cit., pp. 29-30.
26

b

Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 110, enclosure 2: Minister Dawson to Mr. Michelena,
January 29, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 325.
27
Dawson to Secretary of State. February 13. 1905.
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washington, refused even to entertain most of the changes.·

on

four points, however, the Dominicans stood fast.

First

they would not consent to ¢late the protocol as of the nineteenth.

/

I

Second, to exempt the customhouse employees from

Dominican legal jurisdiction would wound national pride and
cound not be accepted.

Third, if the protocol called for

ratification by the United States Senate, it must also be submitted for the ratification of the Dominican legislature.
Finally, the protocol must stipulate that the agreement would
terminate as soon as the debt was paid. These points seemed
•more or less reasonable" to Dawson 28 and he, therefore, wired
them to Washington. 29 The State Department was willing to
agree to the changes which the Dominicans requested.

But

Dawson was urged to obtain Dominican approval as soon as possible, since Congress was about to adjourn~
sible, however, to rush the Dominicans.

It proved impos-

Morales insisted that

it was imperative to await the return of Finance Minister

Vel~squez from his trip to the north, lest the Horacistas withdraw their support from the Government. 30
In addition to the attitude of the Horacistas, another
No. 110, ibid., p. 319.
28

Dawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
29 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 320.
3oibid., pp. 320-321.
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possible threat to the Government was the reaction of the Jimen-

-

istas in Monte Cristi towards the willingness of the Morales

Government to allow United States intervention in the customhouses.

Negotiations directed towards assuring Governor Arias'

acceptance of the January 21 agreement or of securing control
of the port of Monte Cristi, in addition to re-negotiation the
protocol with Morales, occupied a large portion of Dawson's
attention prior to Finance Minister Vel~squez's return to the
capital.
On January 25, two days before he received Loomis'
instructions to renegotiate the agreement, Dawson wasinformed
by President Morales that Governor Arias had protested the
accord and had threatened to resign.

If Arias fulfilled his

threat, a revolt in Monte Cristi was a certainty.
inunediately took steps to forestall this danger.

Dawson
The United

States consul at Monte Cristi was instructed to advise Arias
to await more definite information before going ahead with his
resignation.

Dawson assured that the "interests of Monte

Cristi will be respected."

Admiral Sigsbee and Conunander

Dillingham, who were already on their way to visit the northern
coastal cities on board the Admiral's flagship the

u.s.s.

Newark,

were also alerted to the possibility of trouble in Monte Cristi.
The danger seemed temporarily to pass when the consul at Monte
Cristi telegraphed that Arias was willing to wait until he
saw the full agreement before taking further action.

By

January 27, Sigsbee and Dillingham were on their way to meet
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with Arias and give him the full details of the agreernent.~ 1
When they arrived on the twenty-eighth, they quickly got
in touch with Arias.

The ostensible reason for the Governor's

opposition was the failure of the agreement to include any
reference to ratification by the Dominican legislature. 32
However, the real reason, Sigsbee reported, was Jimenista distrust of the Morales Adrninistration. 33 Nevertheless, by
February 1, Arias was willing to accept the terms of the agreement signed on January 21, without modification.

Sigsbee

wired the Secretary of the Navy on the second, suggesting
!prompt installation of American custom authorities. 1134
It is possible that the officials in Washington,
I

considering the problems that had already arisen with Monte
Cristi and the fact that Arias was now willing to accept United
States control of the customhouse there, decided that since
the January 21 agreement could not become operative on
31 Dawson to SecretarY of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 111, FRUS, 1905, pp. 326-27.
32 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 111, enclosure 2: Dillingham to Dawson, January 29, 1905,
ibid., p. 333. Sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, January 30,
l905, telegram, Numerical File 1199, bound at the end of the
file, Records of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National
Archives, Washington, D. c.
33 sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, February 1, 1905,
telegram, Numerical File 1199, bound at the end of the file,
Records of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National Archives,
washington, D. C.
34 sigsbee to Secretary of the Navy, February 2, 1905,
telegram, ibid.
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February 1, as had originally been planned, it was wisest to
take control of the customhouse under the only legal means
avai.lable: the Improvement, Company Award of July 14, 1904.
I

on

I

Friday, February 3, the Department telegraphed this decision
35
to Dawson.
In spite of Dawson's urging, Morales and his Cabinet

proved reluctant to issue the formal request that the United
States take over the customhouse at Monte Cristi.

They pro-

tested that such action would drive Arias into revolt and
that it would be better to let Michelena take charge.

Dawson,

nevertheless, was soon convinced that the possibility of Arias
revolting against the Government was not the real reason for
preferring Michelena's control of Monte Cristi's customhouse
to United States control under the Award.

What the Dominicans

really feared was that Monte Cristi would be placed under the
control of John T. Abbott of the Improvement Company and that
this was merely a harbinger of what would come when the protocol
was finally ratified. 36 Dawson later informed the State Department that he had
slowly come to the conclusion that it is impossible to
ignore or overcome the dislike of the Improvement Company,
and of all persons who have been connected with it, which
is felt by Dominicans of all parties. This hatred originally arose from the widely entertained belief that the
main cause of all their present financial troubles was an
alleged corrupt alliance between President Heureaux and
35 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 111, ~' 1905, p. 328.
36 rbid., pp. 328-329.
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the Improvement Company. This feeling has been exacerbated
by the bitter controversies which have continually gone
on during the last five years between representatives of
the Improvement Company and the various Dominican administrations. While this feeling of distrust is not really
directed against Judge Abbott personally, its existence
was the principal reason why three months ago the Dominican
Government refused to ask the United States to take over
Sanchez, Samana, and Monte Cristi customhouses under the
award, notwithstanding that the terms offered by Judge
Abbott were so advantageous and liberal to this government. 37
Even though he realized that the true cause of the
Dominican opposition to the United States controlling Monte
Cristi, Dawson refrained from excluding the possibility that
Abbott might be placed in charge of the customhouse, since he
did not know what position Washington would take.

Instead he

argued that once the port was in the charge of the United
I

States, it could no longer be used by the Government's opponents as a port of entry for weapons.

Moreover, he pointed out

that his Government considered control of the port of Monte
Cristi under the Award to be essential and was deserving of
the confidence of the Dominican Government.

Whatever their

fears and reasons, the Dominican Cabinet finally consented to
make the necessary formal proposa1. 38
In his telegram of February 4, informing the State Department of the Dominican Government's "request" that the United
States assume control of the customhouse at Monte Cristi,
Dawson made it clear that Morales and his Cabinet were afraid
that this was merely the first step to complete control by the
37 Ibid., p. 329.

38 Ibid.
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xmprovement Company when the protocol went into effect.

The

oepartment telegraphed back the same day that a naval officer
had been instructed to take charge 'of the customhouse at Monte
Cristi.

In addition, Dawson was instructed to

assure the Dominican Government in [the) case pending
[that when the) arrangement between the two governments
is consumated the Santo Domingo Improvement Company will
not have possession nor control of the customhouses. The
United States itself would collect the revenues and make
distribution as contemplated by the pending arrangement. 39
When Vel£squez returned to the capital in early February,
he proved even more difficult to deal with than Dawson had
anticipated.

At first, the Finance Minister refused to consider

the draft protocol, insisting on the form of the one signed
on January 21. 40 He then attempted to obtain modifications of
the draft protocol so that it would contain certain of the
guarantees

inclu~ed

in the earlier document.

Above all, it

was essential to include an iron clad guarantee that the
territorial integrity of the Republic would be protected.

In

addition, Vel£squez desired to include clauses which would
provide for any extraordinary expense to be paid out of the
fifty-five per cent reserved for the creditors, and which would
assure the appointment of Dominican subordinates in the customhouses.

Finally, while the Dominicans were willing to pledge
~

themselves unconditionally not to increase the debt, Velasquez
39 Ibid., pp. 329-330.
40 Dawson to Hay, February 7, 1905, No. 108, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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thought it unnecessarily offensive to virtually pledge to do
so at the behest of the President of the United States. 41
Dawson repeatedly answered that he was not authorized
I

!

I

to agree to any changes in the draft protocol.

He did try,

however, to quiet the Dominican fears on the question of territorial integrity.

He stated that the United States was willing

to guarantee against European aggression and to disclaim any
aggressive intention on its own part; nevertheless, "the United
States would not assume the responsibility implied in making
a general guaranty of Dominican territorial integrity."
When this failed, Dawson consented to telegraph the Dominican
position to the Department of State.

On the fourth, he wired

the Secretary of State that the Dominican Finance Minister
wanted a statement assuring the territorial integrity included
in the first paragraph of the proposed draft, in addition to
the one already included in the second paragraph. 42
Wash~ngton

thought that this was unnecessarily repeti-

tious and insisted on the original form.

However, information

that Vice President cfceres had received an alarming wire
from Leonte V~squez, the Dominican consul-general in New York,
reporting that the United States Government intended to use
the proposed protocol as a means of eventually annexing the
Dominican Reputilic, convinced Dawson that some guarantee on
41 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, i905,
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, pp. 321-322.
42

Ibid.

r.
•

this point had to be included in the agreement. 43
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Therefore,

on Sunday, February 5, Dawson again wired the Department explainr

ing the adverse effect Vasquez's telegram had had on the Dominican
Government.

On the sixth, Dawson received permission to include

a clause by which the United States agreed "to respect the
complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic. 1144
Dawson found it embarrassing and difficult to continually
I

resist Velasquez's demands for changes in the protocol.

On

•
•
I
the one hand, Minister
Velasquez,
Dawson reported, was "a

thoroughly honest, patriotic man, whose exceptional integrity
has justly earned him the prestige he enjoys among the better
classes of Dominicans."

On the other hand, neither President
I

Morales nor Foreign Minister scfnchez would disagree with him.
Rather, they supported him, fearing that his resignation would
. result in the lose of Horacista support for the Morales Administration. 45
In spite of any respect that he may have had for the
I

Finance Minister, Dawson was determined to persuade Velasquez
to sign the protocol.

To secure this, he decided to exert

pressure on the Finance Minister.

Dawson was fully aware that

43 Ibid., p. 322.
44 Ibid. On the question of including a guarantee that
the United States would respect the territorial integrity of
the Dominican Republic, William Loeb, Roosevelt's secretary,
wrote to Acting Secretary Loomis that "the President says of
course put in anything the Dominicans want about our not annexing the Island--the stronger the better." William Loeb, Jr. to
Loomis, February 6, 1905, Despatches from the Dominican Republic,
vol. 13, roll 13.
45 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
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washington would entertain no more changes; however, on the
I

sixth he again wired the Department, stating that Velasquez
would sign provided that the protocol was so altered as to
I

I

I

include an effective guarantee of the territorial integrity
of the Republic and that the clause providing for the consent
of the United States President before the Dominican debt could
.
d were e l'imina
. t e d • 46 If by chance, the Department
be increase
accepted this latter change, the former already having been
I

approved, Velasquez would have to yield and sign.

If the

Department refused to consent, as Dawson doubtless thought
would be the case, the Dominicans then would have no alternative
but to accept the protocol as it stood or reject the entire
idea of United States intervention in the customhouses.

How-

ever, if even this failed, Dawson still had one last resort:
"an order suspending Michelena's contract.!147
Dawson received the expected telegram rejecting the
proposed alterations on the sixth, and conveyed this informaI

•

tion to Minister Velasquez early the next morning.

It was

evident that the desired effect had been achieved.

Neverthe-

less, the Finance Minister insisted on a further postponement
until he consulted with his colleagues in the Cabinet and with
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, pp. 322-323.
46 Ibid., p. 323.
47 Dawson to Hay, February 13, 1905, No. 110, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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congressional leaders.

48

The rest of the morning was spent in preparing the
English copies of the protocol.

I

Shortly after two o'clock

in the afternoon, Vel~squez arrived at the Legation and agreed
to sign provided that Dawson would consent to answer in writing
a letter which stated that the Dominican commissioners believed the only justifiable modifications of the convention
signed on January 21 were those stating that the convention
was to be considered ad referendum and providing for the agreement to terminate as soon as the debt was paid.

Dawson agreed.

In his reply, he wrote that while agreeing with the Dominican
commissioners that the modifications they mentioned were
I

necessary, the United States Government believed that others
were also necessary and the protocol as presented by Washing. ton must be accepted without further alteration.

Thus, after

being absolved of any guilt for not having secured further
modi£ications, Vel~squez and S~nchez yielded.

The protocol

was signed at four o'clock Tuesday afternoon, February 7, and
immediately transported by an United States naval vessel to
San Juan, Puerto Rico in order to arrive in time to catch the
mail boat to New York. 49
Dawson took satisfaction in reporting that, in spite
of difficulties, relations between the Dominican officials
48 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 110, FRUS, 1905, p. 323.
49 1bid., pp. 323-324, 326.
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and himself had remained amicable.

He was convinced that "all

pominican factions" appreciated "that the State Department and
its representatives" in Santo Domingo were sympathetic and
understood the Dominican susceptibilities.

Further he believed

that they realized that the United States would administer
the protocol in a spirit of selflessness.so

By "all Dominican

factions" Dawson obviously did not mean either all political
factions or the entire Dominican population.

His statement

undoubtedly referred to the various factions within the Morales
Government.

He was aware of the fact that there were those

who would not support the Government's actions.

In handling

these, he realized the value of a show of force to keep them
I

-in line.

Two United States navel vessels had been stationed

in the harbor at Santo Domingo.

Dawson acknowledged that the

. presence of these ships had had "a powerful moral effect on
the rash and ignorant elements, who unhappily are in the
majority and who do not yet understand the real benefits the
country will derive from the arrangement. •

..

On February lS, President Roosevelt sent the protocol
to the Senate, along with a message giving the background of
the situation in the Dominican Republic and the reason which
impelled him to take the action that he had.s 2 For over a
so !.2:._.
b'd ' p. 324 •
Slibid.
S2Message from the President of the United States,
transmitting a protocol of an agreement between the United
States and the Dominican Republic, providing for the collection
and disbursement by the United States of the customs revenues
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•onth, first in the regular session and then in a special session, the protocol remained before the upper house without any
sign that it would receive, ratification.
I

,..

Meanwhile, in the

I

Dominican Republic the last three weeks of February and the
first half of March passed without much change in either the
political or financial conditions.

Although critical prob-

lems did arise, Dawson did his best to minimize their disruptive
effects.
Monte Cristi, under the virtually independent Governor
Arias, continued to be a potential source of unrest within the
Republic.

When the Morales Government had consented on

February 4, to place the customhouse in that port under the
control of the United States by the Award of July 14, 1904,
Lieutenant Conunander E. F. Leiper of the United States Navy
was appointed by Washington as the provisi0nal collector of
customs.

On Thursday, February 9, Dawson received an alarming

telegram from Admiral Sigsbee reporting that Arias would not
allow Leiper to take control of the customhouse.

Dawson im-

mediately got in touch with the Foreign Minister.

S~nche z

explained that the mix-up had resulted from an oversight by a
subordinate in the Foreign Office, who had failed to notify
Arias of the Government's decision to allow the customhouse
to be administered by the United States.

As soon as the over-

sight had been discovered, the necessary instructions had been
of the Dominican Republic, signed on February 7, 1905, ibid.,
pp. 334-349.
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sent to Arias.

Not completely satisfied that this would be

sufficient, Dawson requested that Arias be inunediately sent
I

another explicit telegram.

On Saturday, February 11, word was

received that Arias had consented to the transfer of the customhouse to Leiper's control.SJ
Dawson thought that the misunderstanding at Monte
Cristi had, at least in part, resulted from an oversight by
the central government.

However, he also thought that Arias

was probably not without blame.

The Governor, Dawson reported,

probably had been glad to take advantage of the delay in the
transfer to permit friends to disembark cargoes without paying the full duties.s 4 To Dawson the real value of United
\

States control of the Monte Cristi customhouse was that the
port could no longer possibly serve as a base for a revolution
. against the Morales Government.

While there was still talk

of a Jimenista uprising in the interior, he believed that
these malcontents were without financial means or important
political leaders, and that the Government felt competent to
handle any local uprising.

Dawson, nevertheless, still be-

lieved that every precaution should be taken.SS
Rmnors that President Morales had been opposed to
SJDawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 190S,
No. 111, ibid., pp. 331-332.
s 4Dawson to Hay, February 13, 190S, No. 111, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
SSDawson to Secretary of State, February 13, 1905,
No. 111, FRUS, 190S, p. 332.
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subJilitting the protocol to the Dominican legislature for ratification, proved to be another source of discontent.

By

February 16, Morales was· afraid that these rumors would prejudice the Dominican deputies and he approached Dawson for
assistance in disproving them.

The President asked for a

letter which would state that from the beginning of the negotiations the Dominican chief executive had favored submission of
the protocol to the Dominican legislature.

The publication of

such a letter, Morales hoped, would silence the damaging
charges made against him.

Dawson willing agreed to comply
with the President's request. 56
Undoubtedly, there were a few tense moments on
\

February 24, when an unsuccessful attempt was made on Morales'
life.

Dawson reported that five men of Jimenista sympathies

He described them as "of the lower classes, 1157
and believed that they had little backing. 58 Furthermore, he

. were apprehended.

reported that the ambiguity brought about by the delay in
ratification was actually serving to strengthen the position
of those who were opposed both to the protocol and to Morales.
He informed Washington that some were even claiming that a
revolution against the President could count on moral support
56 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No.
118, ibid., p. 351.
57 Ibid., p. 352.
58 Dawson to Loomis, February 29, 1905, unnumbered,
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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the United States. 59
Dawson did his best to dispel any fears Morales might
have entertained concerning possible ratification and also
attempted to add to the atmosphere of good relations between
the United States and the Dominican Republic.

He reported

that he assured Morales that it was the custom in the United
states to call a special session of Congress immediately after
the inauguration of the president on March 4, and that this
special session would undoubtedly consider the protocol.
Dawson also advised Washington to give Morales adequate warning if anylength of time was anticipated before ratification,
in order that the President could take the necessary precautions. 60

.

In order to. give expression to the spirit of friend-

ship existing between the United States and the Dominican
Republic, Dawson got Admiral Sigsbee to join with him in taking

a conspicuous part in the celebration of Dominican Independence
Day, on February 21. 61
On the financial side, Michelena continued to collect
the customs at those ports not administered under the Award
of July 14, 1904.

The original contract between the banker

and the Dominican Government had been abrograted and a new one
signed.

Since the arrangement was working well, and undoubtedly

59 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905,
No. 118, ~, 1905, p. 353.

GO Ibid.
61 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No. 120,
ibid., pp. 394-395.
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since Dawson no longer needed the contract as a diplomatic
I

weapon to use on Finance Minister Velasquez, the United States
I
62
Minister was not mentione~ as a party to the contract.
Nevertheless, Michelena was guaranteed the right to secure
redress through diplomatic channels, while the Dominican Government promised to keep expenses below $75,000 a month and to
preserve the surplus which was being accumulated. 63
The special session of the United States Congress,
which Dawson had mentioned, was convened on March 5.

But

ratification of the treaty had not been accomplished when the
congress adjourned on March 18.

To a large extent, senatorial

opposition came from what was considered the President's high
\

handed method in trying originally to put the agreement into
_,J

operation without senatorial ratification.

When news of the

. adjournment reached Santo Domingo on Monday, March 20, the
Dominican Government naturally became apprehensive.

The situa-

tion was not improved when, on the following day, a telegram
from

w.

L. Bass in New York City was published stating that

the Senate had rejected the protocol.
vocating revolution were held.

Meetings openly ad-

While his Government took

what precautions it could, Morales nervously phoned the United
States Legation every hour hoping to learn something definite
62 oawson to Secretary of State, March 7, 1905, No.
118, ibid., p. 353.
63 oawson to Loomis, February 29, 1905, unnumbered,
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
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from Dawson.

On Wednesday, March 22, the tension was somewhat

eased when The New York Herald's correspondent in Santo Domingo
•

I

received a telegram from his paper stating that Congress had
adjourned; however, no action had been taken on the protocol.
Finally, on Thursday, Dawson received word from the State
oepartment.

He was informed that the protocol had been favorably

reported out of conunittee and would probably be ratified in the
.
64
next session.
At this point it would seem that the already difficult
position of the Morales Government daily became more impossible.
In addition to the ever present threat of revolution a new
problem was· added when Michelena, disgruntled over the possibility of not being able to collect sufficient collateral to
cover his advances to the Government, threatened to terminate
. his contract with the Morales Administration.

The problem

arose out of the Government's earlier practice of granting
preferential contracts to some of the larger importers, which
allowed them to substitute government due bills for the regular
.
promissory
notes. 65

More bothersome to the Morales Government than either
the threat of revolution or the possibility of losing Michelena's
financial assistance was the attitude of the European powers,
whose nationals were creditors of the Republic, to the n9n64
Dawson to Secretary of State, March 27, 1905, No.
122, FRUS, 1905, pp. 356-57.
65

Ibid., pp. 357-58.
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ratification of the protocol.

Dawson reported that an ultimatum

and a show of force by a European power would demonstrate to
the entire country that Morales no longer had the forbearance
66 I
I
of the foreign powers.
On Tuesday, March 14, even before
congress adjourned, the Italian crusier the Calabria, under
the command of Count Moriundo, arrived at the port of Santo
The commander and the Italian charg~ d'affaires had

Domingo.

called upon Dawson in order to learn what the prospects were
for the payment of Italian claims under the various protocols
I

that had been signed between the Dominican Government and its
Italian creditors.

The Italian officials were also interested

in learning what effect the protocol of February 7 would have
on the earlier agreements.

Dawson replied that no specific

plan for the payment of the debts had yet been made.

Nor

would it be possible to determine how much·would be paid annually until the amount of the yearly revenues and the extent
of the debt had been determined.

However, he added that he
.
was sure that the Government in Washington would try to adopt
.

a plan which would be acceptable to the Italian Government.
Furthermore, he was willing to transmit any practical suggestions
that the Count might wish to make.

The latter, however, was

satisfied with Dawson's answer and offered no suggestions.
On March 20, the Italian ship steamed out of the harbor at

Santo Domingo.

Instead of heading for Havana, as originally

intended, its destination was Kingston, Jamaica.
66

Ibid., p. 357.
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of the Calabria had produced considerable alarm regarding the
Italian Government's attitude.

Its withdrawal to the nearer
port of Kingston did not· offer much solace. 67
Since word of the adjournment of the United States
congress had reached Santo Domingo City, several foreign creditors
began exerting pressure on the Government.

For example, on

I

the twenty-third, the Belgian charge made a formal demand that
the Dominican Government resume payment under an agreement
signed between the Government and the Belgian creditors in
1901.

The principal Italian creditor, a Mr. Bancalari had

been pressing the Morales Government for sometime to allow him
to collect those custom revenues which had previously been
I

guaranteed to him.

With the adjournment of the Senate, he began

to urge that some precaution be taken to prevent the complete
lose of the revenues during the coming months. 68
Dawson was fully aware of these difficulties confronting Morales and his ministers.

He had kept fully abreast with

Bancalari's demand, though he claimed not to have discussed
them either with the Italian nor with any member of the Government.

Dawson later reported that, at the time, he believed

that the "creditors and government would soon reach a point
where they would be obliged to come to me with a proposition
of a modus vivendi. 1169
67 tbid., pp. 355-357.
69 Ibid.

68 Ibid., p. 357.

1

176

11,111'!.

11!

According to Dawson's report dated March 27, 1905, his
expectations were not long in being fulfilled.

On Friday

I .

morning, March 24, Velasquez requested that Dawson come to the
Finance Ministry.

When he arrived, Dawson discovered that the

Finance Minister, as a result of the strain, was contemplating resigning.

He attempted to dissuade Vel~squez from this

course of action by appealing to the latter's sense of patriotism.

Dawson explained that the Finance Minister's resignation

would only result in worse troubles for the Dominican Republic.
After all, the year in office had provided Vel~squez with
invaluable experience and moreover. "his proven honesty and
patriotism carried weight with foreign creditors and the Domini\

can people. 1170
c

I

Velasquez, whether he was persuaded by Dawson's argu-

. ments or not, next came to what was probably the real reason
for the interview.

He asked Dawson to propose some modus

vivendi which could be in effect until the protocol of February
7 had been ratified by the United States Senate.

In view of

his previous experience in dealing with Vel~squez, Dawson
reported that he was certain that the Finance Minister already
had devised some plan of his own.
present a plan. 71

Therefore, he declined to

True to Dawson's expectations, Vel~squez then preceded
to indicate that he was willing to agree to a temporary arrangement which would provide the Dominican Government with forty-five
7 oibid., p. 358.

71 Ibid.
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per cent of the total customs revenues while the remaining·
fifty-five per cent would be held in 1 trust by the United States
Minister, pending ratification or rejection of the protocol
I

by the Senate.

I

I

Dawson was skeptical that Washington would con-

sent to his receiving any portion of the customs so long as
the protocol had not been ratified.

Nevertheless, he believed

that an alternate depository could be found.

If the original

plan were not acceptable, Vel1squez was willing to name a joint
commission.

Dawson would be a member of the commission.

Again,

Dawson doubted that Washington would approve of his involvement in the arrangement.

In addition, he found another possible

obstacle to the proposed modus vivendi.

He could not, Dawson

I

told Velasquez, agree to any accord which might interfer with
the Award to the Improvement Company.

An agreement along the

lines which the Finance Minister had proposed might very possibly do just that.

Would the other foreign creditors agree

to have the funds.earmarked for their payment held in trust
while the Improvement Company continued to be paid?

Later, in
I

an interview with President Morales and Foreign Minister Sanchez, the same plan was formally presented to Dawson. 72
Following his interview with Vel1squez, Dawson reported
that he, either directly or indirectly through intermediaries,
proceeded to sound out the Italian, Belgian, French, and
Spanish diplomatic representatives in Santo Domingo with regard
I

to their attitudes towards Velasquez's proposal.
72 Ibid.

In general,

-
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these men were favorably disposed to the suggestion.

The

Italian representative, who was expecting Dawson's call, urged
the United States Minister to agree to act as trustee.

Al-

though surprised to learn of the plan, the Belgian diplomat,
after consulting with his Italian colleague, indicated willingness to accept it provided that the bondholders agreed to the
moratorium and that the Improvement Company would also agree
to a suspension of its payments.

Again, Dawson gave no encourage-

ment on this latter point, but confined himself to pointing
out the value of the Improvement Company Award in denying ports
to potential revolutionaries and thus preventing rebellion.
The French official took the same position as the Belgian representative, while the Spanish envoy apparently agreed without reservation.

The major North American creditors, outside

of the Improvement Company, were also willing to accpet.

In

addition to ascertaining their general acceptance of the proposed modus vivendi, Dawson also learned from his inquiries
that the foreign creditors of the Dominican Republic would
prefer the appointment of a single North American to collect
the customs at the ports not then being administered under
the Improvement Company's Award.

To all of these creditors

and foreign representatives, Dawson gave no assurances other
than that he would submit the plan and the creditors views
to Washington. 73
73 Ibid., pp. 358-59.
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On Saturday, March 25, Dawson wired the Department of
state that under the pressure of foreign creditors and fear of
revolution, the Dominican Government was willing to agree to a
modus vivendi.

The creditors of the Republic, excepting the

Improvement Company, would agree not to press their claims,
provided fifty-five per cent of the custom receipts were held
in trust in New York pending ratification or rejection of the
protocol of February 7.

The remaining forty-five per cent

would go to the Dominican Government.

Morales' Government

would appoint whomever the United States chose to nominate to
administer the southern ports.

It would request that the two

remaining northern ports be administered under the Improvement
I

company Award.

Dawson urged that "some modus vivendi [was]
absolutely necessary." 74
In his written report of the twenty-seventh, Dawson
reported that the Dominican Government was reluctant to turn
the northern ports over to Abbott or to any one else who had

been connected with the Improvement Company, though under the
circumstances, even Abbott would be accepted.

However, an

agreement would have to be reached with the Improvement Company
whereby the financial agent acting under the Award of July 14,
1904, would hold in trust fifty-five per cent of the receipts
of the ports under his control, with the remaining forty~five
per cent being turned over to the Government. 75 Dawson hastened
74 Ibid., p. 359.
75 oawson to Hay, March 22, 1905, No. 122, Despatches from

~
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to explain that the modus vivendi would in no way effect the
rights of the Improvement Company under the Award, nor the
substantive rights of the other foreign creditors who had
claims to collect portions of the revenues of various other
ports.

The creditors, Dawson explained, would merely be

agreeing to temporarily suspend their right of collection pending ratification or rejection of the protocol. 76 Dawson's
unwillingness to endanger the Improvement Company's rights
was undoubtedly motivated by his belief that any infringment
would not receive the Department's approval. 77
A different version of the origin of the modus vivendi
is given in a letter written on March 13, 1906, by A. E.
Coulter, a United States citizen who was a long time resident
in the Dominican Republic and manager of the Richmond,
Virginia based Habanero Lumber Company.

Coulter addressed

his letter to Secretary of State Elihu Root, John Hays' successor in the Department of State.

Coulter recounts that

news of the adjournment of the United States Congress without
ratification of the protocol of February 7, had produced
rumors and actual open opposition to the Morales Government,
and that the representatives of the foreign creditors were
preparing to demand that the various customhouses which had
the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
76 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 27, 1905, No.
122, FRUS, 1905, p. 359.
77 This is also Munro's opinion. QE_. cit., p. 105.
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t>een guaranteed to them under previous agreements be turned
over to them.

According to Coulter's letter, on Thursday

March 23, he, Bancalari ·the chief Italian creditor, and Hamilton Peltz, the correspondent of The New York Herald, were
lunching together.

Their conversation centered on the emergency

resulting from the failure of the United States Senate to
ratify the protocol of February 7.

During this conversation,

Coulter claims that he suggested that a possible solution
to the problem might be a modus vivendi which would carry out
the basic scheme of the proposed protocol on an.informal

.

basis until the Senate had had another opportunity to ratify
the agreement.

Control of the Dominican custom revenues would
I

be placed in the hands of an United.States citizen who would
be nominated by President Roosevelt and appointed by President
Morales.

This North American would apportion the revenues to

the Dominican Government for its budget and to the foreign
creditors.

Bancalari approved of Coulter's suggestion and

thought that the other foreign creditors would also agree to
accept it.

Thereupon, Bancalari and Coulter supposedly called

-upon President Morales, who willingly agreed to the scheme.
The two men then proceeded to call upon the German and Spanish
consuls, and the Belgian Minister.

All three agreed to refrain

from pressing their claims until the Senate had acted on the
protocol, provided that the proposed modus vivendi could be
placed into operation.
Dawson.

Then Coulter and Bancalari called upon

Dawson according to Coulter, objected to the planned
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-odus vivendi because he thought that the Improvement Company
, · would not consent to the plan.

!

Furthermore, he suggested that

a commission comprised o·f United States, Italian, and Belgian
representatives would be more acceptable.

However, Bancalari

refused to agree to this suggestion, stating that only a plan
providing for the United States to uphold the collector in
his office would be acceptable to the foreign creditors.

At

any rate, Coulter claimed that Dawson agreed to transmit the
plan to Washington.

According to Coulter's version, Peltz

then wired the entire plan to the Herald, from whence it was
transmitted for the first time to the Department of State.
On

Friday morning, March 24, Dawson supposedly received instruci

tions to wire the Department fully on what was happening in
the Dominican Republic.

.

In the afternoon of the same day,

Dawson supposedly wired the plan of the modus vivendi, and
.
.
requeste d permission
to approve o f i' t • 78

From the evidence available, it is difficult if not
impossible to reject either version as being a complete fabrication.

Dawson's report is certainly the more contemporary and

thus might be considered the more reliable.

It must be ad-

mitted, however, that it is possible to argue that both versions
were probably tinged by personal interest.

On the one hand,

it can be maintained that Dawson's report "assumes the credit
of the negotiations for himself, as is natural since he was
78A. E. Coulter to Root, March 13, 1906, Miscellaneous
Letters, March 7-13, 1906, roll 1288.
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the diplomat in charge."

79

While this is possibly true, it·is

also possible that his report merely reflects events as he
witnessed them from his vantage point.
I

I

I

The impact of personal interest, however, is certainly
•ore evident in coulter's letter of March 13, 1906.

Coulter

was definitely interested in seeing the protocol of February 7,
1905 ratified by the Senate.

His company, the Habanero Lumber

company was not a creditor of the Republic; however, the order
which Coulter thought would result from the application of
the agreement would enable the Lumber Company to develop its
holdings of over one and a half million acres. 80 On January 11,
1906, Coulter and another representative of the Habanero
'Lumber Company called on President Roosevelt.

At that time

the President apparently told Coulter and his associate that
they could aid their own interests and that of the United States
by urging their senators to vote for the ratification of the
protocol. 81 Coulter claimed that he had spoken to some senators
during the time that intervened between January and March, 1906.
Furthermore, he stated that he found that the major objection
to the protocol among the senators to whom he spoke was their
belief that President Roosevelt had exceeded his authority by
79 J. Fred Rippy, "The Initiation of the Custom Receivership in the Dominican Republic," The Hispanic American Historical
Review, XVII (November, 1937), 457.
SOA. E. Coulter to Root, March 13, 1906, Miscellaneous
Letters, March 7-13, 1906, roll 1288.
81The New York Times, January 12, 1906, p. 4.
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placing the agreement into operation through the modus vivendi
before the Senate had ratified the protocol.

The letter of

I

March 13, 1906 to Secretary Root was written, according to
coulter's own admission,
that this plain statement of facts may assist in demonstrating that the President did not instigate the movement, and will refute the criticism of the opponents of
the ratification of the treaty that in so doing infringed
on the constitutional privileges of the Senate.82
In view of this motivation, Coulter naturally was going to
minimize the role of Dawson, the official United States representative, in the arranging of the modus vivendi.
In spite of the degree of self interest in back of
each report, the Dawson and Coulter versions of the origin
\

of the modus vivendi are possibly largely complementary.
Coulter's claim that both Dawson and the Dominican Government
. were aware of the modus vivendi prior to Dawson's interviews
I

I

with Velasquez, Morales and Sanchez on Friday morning, March
24, does not disprove Dawson's version of the story.

It does,

however, possibly explain where the Dominicans received the
idea.

Dawson's failure to indicate the interview with Coulter

and Bancalari in his report of the twenty-seventh or to wire
the Department immediately on the proposed modus vivendi is
easily explained.

On the one hand, Dawson undoubtedly con-

sidered it unlikely, as he indicated in his report, that the
State Department would be willing to become further involved
82 A. E. Coulter to Root, March 13, 1906, Miscellaneous
Letters, March 7-13, 1906, roll 1288.
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in the financial affairs of the Dominican Republic without
the legal basis of the protocol.

To do so, he probably reasoned,
I

might only aggravate the senatorial opponents of the protocol.

on the other hand, given his belief of the Department's reluctance for further involvement before the ratification of the
treaty and his fear that the modus vivendi might infringe on
the Improvement Company's rights, Dawson probably would not
have considered it justifiable to submit the plan without a
formal presentation of the plan by the Dominican Government.
This, of course, did not come until the twenty-fourth.
The fact that Bancalari was involved with Coulter in
formulating the plan would explain why the Italian diplomatic
I

representative was expecting Dawson's visit and why he urged
Dawson to act as receiver.

However, if Coulter and Bancalari
I

.

_had called upon the Belgian charge d'affaires, why should have
the proposal been a surprise to him when Dawson approached him
on the subject?

A possible explanation for this conflicting

report might be that the Belgian representative in Santo
Domingo was also accredited to Havana.

Coulter claimed that

the Belgain representative was planning to leave Santo Domingo
City on the very day that he and Bancalari approached the
./

.

charge, the latter was going to return to the Cuban capital.
While it is not clear whether or not he changed his plans and
stayed, it is possible that if he did leave he did not have
time, either fully or even partly, to inform the official left
in charge of the Belgian interests of the proposed modus vivendi.
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Therefore, on the twenty-fourth, when Dawson got in touch with
.

I

the Belgian charge the plan could have been a surprise to him.
Thus, insofar as they cover the events in the Dominican
I

I

Republic, the Dawson and Coulter reports do not necessarily
contradict one another.

It is not unlikely that the modus

vivendi had its origin in the Coulter-Bancalari-Pletz luncheon
conversation on March 23, and that Coulter and Bancalari passed
on the idea to the Morales Government.

Furthermore, it is pos-

sible that the men brought the subject to the attention of the
other foreign creditors and even to Dawson.
However, on some points the two versions cannot be
reconciled and it appears that Coulter's is incorrect.

Accord-

ing to Coulter the news of a proposed modus vivendi was first
brought to the attention of the State Department by the Washington representative of The New York Herald, the Herald having
received the report from Peltz, its correspondent in the
Dominican Republic.

The State Department supposedly then wired

Dawson for further information.

A check of the Miscellaneous

Letters of the Department of State for the days of March 21
through March 26, 1905, where any written or telegraphic messages from the Herald's representative should be filed, failed
to turn up any such message.

Furthermore, an examination of

the diplomatic instructions sent by the Department of State
to the United States representative in the Dominican capital
also failed to indicate the instructions which Coulter claimed
Dawson received.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to say
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t1hether this discrepancy was caused by a faulty memory on
coulter's part or merely his desire to persuade potential
readers that he and not "the Roosevelt Administration or its
representative in the Dominican Republic really originated the
idea of the modus vivendi. 83
By Tuesday, March 28, President Roosevelt had decided
to agree to a modus vivendi.

on the twenty-ninth, Alvey A.

Adee, second Assistant Secretary of State, who was serving as
acting secretary, telegraphed Dawson the President's positive
reception of the idea of the modus vivendi.

The plan outlined

in Adee's telegram of the twenty-ninth differed somewhat from
that outlined in Dawson's telegram of the twenty-fifth.

The

I

President's plan called for the United States Secretary of
War to nominate and the Dominican President to appoint men who
'l/

would administer 'all the customhouses in the Dominican Republic.
Those selected by the Secretary of War were to be "men of
capacity and absolute integrity, with some knowledge of Spanish."
The forty-five per cent of the revenues collected would be
turned over to the Dominican Government.

The remaining fifty-

five per cent would be deposited in some New York bank, also
to be selected by the Secretary of War.

If the treaty were

83Whether or not the Department accepted Coulter's
version at its face value, Secretary Root sent a copy of
Coulter's letter to Senator Daniel of Virginia. In his cover
letter, Root explained that he sent the letter "because it bears
upon the subject of our conversation a few days ago. I do not
Know [sic] the writer but I understand him to be a very clever
gentleman. He appears to have a property interest in Santo
Domingo which entitles him to our consideration • • • • " Root
to Senator Daniel, ibid.
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eventually ratified by the Senate this latter sum would then be
divided among the Republic's creditors, if it were rejected,
the sum would be turned ·over to the Republic.

Dawson was

instructed to inform the Dominican Government that the United
states agreed to the modus vivendi "in order that pending the
final disposition of the treaty no change shall take place in
the situation which would render useless the consummation of
the treaty or bring complications into its enforcement."

The

agreement was to take the form of an executive agreement.
There was to be no reference to duties assumed by the United
States vis-~-vis the Dominican Republic. 84
From this communique it was clear that the Administra1

tion in Washington had decided to reject the idea of allowing
th~

northern ports to continue to be administered under the

. Improvement Company's Award of July, 1904,.and thus, for the
benefit of the Company.

This decision would seem to indicate

that President Roosevelt had decided to follow a new policy
with regard to the Improvement Company. 85 Actually, it was in
line with the Department's telegram of February 4, instructing
Dawson to assure the Dominican Government that under the protocol,
the United States and not the Improvement Company would control
the customhouses.

A further indication of this policy was the

appointment of Dr. Jacob H. Hollander, a professor of Political
84 Acting Secretary of State {Adee) to Dawson, March 29,
1905, telegram, FRUS, 1905, pp. 361-62.
85
Munro, ~· cit., pp. 105-106.
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Economy at Johns Hopkins University and formerly treasurer.of
puerto Reio, as the confidential agent of President Roosevelt. 86
The announcement of this appointment was sent to Dawson on
March 25.

87

I

I

In his letter of March 28, instructing acting

secretary of State Adee to inform Dawson of the acceptance of
the Dominican modus vivendi, Roosevelt specifically outlined
86 The possibility of sending Hollander to the Dominican
Republic in order to study the fiscal conditions of the Republic
and to reconunend appropriate changes had first come to the attention of the Department of State almost a year before the appointment was made by Roosevelt in March, 1905. In April, 1904,
Powell informed the Department that Morales was anxious to have
a person knowledgable in fiscal matters to be appointed by the
State Department to come to the Dominican Republic and to propose
changes in the tariff laws and in the administration of the treasury. In reply to this request, Roosevelt suggested the name of
Jacob H. Hollander. Hollander evidently considered the appointment but ultimately declined to accept it in mid-September, 1904.
In October, when Dawson was studying the tax structure of the
Dominican Republic, he wrote to Hollander asking that the latter
suggest some books which would give him a better background in
the general topic of taxation and governmental administration.
In November, Hollander sent a bibliography to Dawson and noted
that he regreted that his academic conunittments prevented him
from coming in person to the Dominican Republic. Nevertheless,
he expressed great interest in the financial and economic conditions of the Caribbean republic. It would appear that from
November until his appointment in March, 1905, Hollander had
no further direct contact with the situation in the Dominican
Republic. Powell to Hay, April 18, 1904, No. 841; Powell to
Hay, June 6, 1904, unnumbered, Despatches from the Dominican
Republic, vol. 11, roll 11. Dawson to Hay, August 30, 1904,
No. 30, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 12, roll
12. Hay to Powell, April 23, 1904, unnumbered, Instructions
to Haiti-Santo Domingo, Haiti, vol. 4, p. 488. Loomis to Dawson,
September 22, 1904, No. 24, Instructions to Santo Domingo,
vol. 1, p. 19. Dawson to Hollander, October 28, 1904; Hollander
to Dawson, November 23, 1904, Miscellaneous Letters, November
14-23, 1904, roll 1229. John Hay to Roosevelt, April 20, 1904,
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Series 1, Letters received April 929, 1904, Box 27.
87

Acting Secretary of State {Adee) to Dawson, March 25,
1905, No. 49, FRUS, 1905, p. 355.
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aollander's duties.

Hollander was to "thoroughly investigate"

all financial claims against the Dominican Government, "includ•

I

in9 the claim of the American Improvement Company."

He was to

ascertain the conditions under which the loans were made, the
amount actually received by the Caribbean republic and the
88
nominal amount of the debt.
The Dominican cabinet officials were pleased to learn
that President Roosevelt had decided to accept the modus
vivendi.

There was, of course, no objection to the decision

to include all the ports under the modus vivendi rather than
placing all of the northern ports under the Improvement Company
Award.

Nevertheless, Finance Minister Vel~squez did contest
I

certain provisions of the State Department's telegram.

I

Ve las-

quez argued that an international commission of receivers would
. better.insure acceptance of the modus vivendi by the European
creditors than the appointment of a single United States
nominee.

Also, he desired that the phrase "President of the

United States" replace "Secretary of War."

_The explicit men-

tion of the latter official might leave the Morales Government
open to undue criticism.

Furthermore, the Finance Minister

felt that the functions of the yet to be appointed customs
receiver and his assistants should be more specifically defined, and that they should collect only that portion of.the
88 Roosevelt to Adee, March 28, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt,
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. IV, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951),
p. 1149.
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revenues which were to be held in trust for the creditors.
TO replace the incumbent collectors and to alter the established methods of collection, he pointed out, would be tantamount
to the executive repealing the laws and constitutional provisions by mere decree.

He consequently proposed that the

North American appointees in each customhouse, in addition to
receiving the portion destined for the creditors, merely verify
the acts of the Dominican collectors. 89
On the first two points there was little discussion.

Dawson explained that his conversations with the representatives of the foreign creditors had indicated that they preferred
a single receiver appointed by the United States Government.
I

Therefore, he did not feel justified in transmitting Velasquez's
suggestion to Washington.

With regard to replacing the phrase

"Secretary of War" with the "President of the United States, 11
Dawson agreed to wire the Department of State for permission
to make the substitution.
received on March 31.

The necessary authorization was

However, the question of the functions

of the receiver of customs and his assistants produced a more
90
.
.
1 eng th y d iscussion.

In reporting to the State Department Dawson acknowledged
the correctness of Vel~squez's position on the illegality of
superseding the incumbent customs officials.
89

Nevertheless, in

oawson to Secretary of State, April 1, 1905, No.

123, FRUS, 1905, pp. 362-363.

9 oibid., p. 362.

r
~

.
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answering the Finance Minister, Dawson maintained that it was
not yet the time to define specifically the functions of the
united States appointed receiver.
I

He stated that he believed
I

that a receiver, who would appoint the necessary assistants
and who would be supported by the Dominican Government, might
be able to collect all the legal revenues without regard to
special contracts.

Thereby, the purpose of the modus vivendi

would be successfully carried out.

But, the situation was to

remain flexible enough to permit modification after the arrival
of Hollander. 91
Dawson apparently next exerted mild pressure on the
Morales Government.

The internal disorders and the presence

of the Italian warship the Calabria, which had returned to
Santo Domingo on the twenty-eighth, prompted President Morales
to seek immediate publication of the modus· vivendi.

Dawson,

however, pointed out that he was authorized to agree to the
interim proposal only if the Department's telegram of March 29
were accepted.

He thereby effectively cut off further dis-

cussion of the details.

The Dominican Government acquiesced.

President Morales issued the necessary executive decree on
Firday afternoon, March 31, and it went into effect the next
day. 92
The pressure of circumstances merely forced the members
of the Dominican Government to accept the accord without a
specific definition of the duties of the receiver and his
91 Ibid., p. 363.

92 Ibid.
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assistants.

Certainly this problem had not been resolved.

On

April 3, 1905, acting Secretary of State Loomis informed Dawson
that President Roosevelt had selected Colonel George R. Colton,
a former collector of customs in the Philippine Islands, as
the principal collector at the port of Santo Domingo.

Washing-

ton had decided that Colton was to receive a salary of $500
per month and was to be assisted by a statistician, an accountant, and a stenographer.

All salaries and traveling expenses

. .
Go vernment. 93
were t o b e pai"d b y the Dominican
I

Dawson had a lengthy conference with Morales and Velasquez, on Wednesday, April 5.

No objections were raised con-

cerning the payment of salaries or the traveling expenses of
the United States nominees'. 94

However, when the discussion

turned to the functions of Colonel Colton's deputies in the
various customhouses the unanimity of opinion broke down.
Morales felt that he himself should appoint, after consultation with Colton, those who were to assist the North American
receiver.

I
•
•
Velasquez,
moreover, again
noted the illegality
of

any attempt to replace the incumbent custom officials or their
. t an t s. 95
assis

93 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 6, 1905, No. 125,

ibid., p. 367. Colonel Colton came to his new post with seven
years experience as collector of customs at Manila and Iloilo.
Ibid.
94with regard to Colton's salary of $500 per month,

Dawson noted that the Dominican officials accepted it "although
the minister of finance doubtless feels that it is unjust that
he himself should receive less than half the amount agreed upon
for the American receiver." Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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In part, Dawson was willing to accept the President's
r

p0sition.

He informed Morales that while the United States
1

would not argue over the· matter of the form of the appointments,
nevertheless, Colton had to be free to make the actual selection
of his own assistants.

I

The Minister also assured Velasquez that

Washington would disturb the Dominican officials only insofar
as it was necessary to insure the full collection of the duties.
This assurance could not have been very comforting to the
Finance Minister, when Dawson indicated that the final decision
on how this objective could best be attained would have to
await the report of a practical expert, who had studied the
situation.

But, until such a report had been made, Dawson
I

believed that it should be clear to all that deputies with full
rights of inspection and regulation, and directly responsible
to Colton ought to be stationed in each customhouse.

This

arrangement would be beneficial to both the creditors and to
the Dominican Government.

On the one hand, the creditors would

be assured of obtaining their full portion under the modus
vivendi.

On the other hand, Colton's assistants would be able

to put an end to the preferential contracts held by powerful
importers and to prevent the lowering of duties at the various
customhouses in order to attract business away from competing
ports of entry, thus assuring the Government of its full share
also. 96
96 1bid., pp. 367-368.
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Dawson's arguments were apparently convincing, for ·
I

Finance Minister Velasquez stated that he welcomed the assistance
to the Dominican Government and its creditors.
I

colton would

I

be given a free hand in forming his own organization and would
receive every assistance necessary to fulfill his purpose.

For

after all, Vel~squez explained, his and Colton's ultimate
objectives were the same. 97
At first sight it would appear that Dawson was in fact
maintaining two contradictory positions.

While making assur-

arices that the Dominican customs officials would not be disturbed, he insisted that North American officials be appointed
in every customhouse.

Evidently what he had in mind was a

system in which the legally appointed Dominican officials
would remain in office; but their actions would be scrutinized
by Colton's deputies.

Certainly, Dawson was not in favor of

replacingthe Dominican officials.

He fully realized the impor-

tance of patronage to the Morales Government.

The sudden dis-

missal of the incumbent customhouse employees, he informed
Washington, "would probably give rise to serious embarrassments and even grave disorders ••

..

/

Velasquez's acceptance of this position also appears
to contradict his previous position.
not the case.

However, such is probably

In January, when negotiations first began, it
I

is true that Velasquez was most anxious to obtain joint control
97 Ibid., p. 368.

98 Ibid., pp. 367-368.
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of the customhouses.

But, this position had been completely

rejected by Dawson months before, and to revive it in April
i

"°uld have been futile.

Furthermore, the pressure of circum-

stances had already forced the acceptance of the modus vivendi,
which in effect had turned the customhouses over to North
A111erican control.

I

Therefore, it is probably that Velasquez

was willing to settle for at least titular control of the customhouses with no flagrant violation of the Dominican constitution and no overt disruption in the patronage system.
In April, Hollander and Colton arrived in the Dominican
Republic.

Hollander came first, arriving on April 10.

During

the last week of April and the first of May he completed his
I

work in the capital and began to carry his investigation to
. . 1 ci•t•ies • 99
the provincia

Colonel Colton arrived during the

. last week of April and was presented to President Morales on
April 25.

I

Colton and Velasquez immediately got down to dis-

cussing the administration of the customhouses.

Although the

negotiations were evidently conducted primarily by Colton,
Dawson lent what assistance he could and attended the meeting
between Colton and the Dominican officials.
finally reached on April 26.

Agreement was

Dawson felt that the arrange-

ments made assured efficient collection of all the duties, and
would prevent embarrassment for the Government at that time
99 Dawson to Hay, April 24, 1905, No. 128, Dawson to
Hay, May 9, 1905, No. 136, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
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and later when the convention came up for ratification. 100

By

MaY 9, Colton had completed all arrangements for the customhouse in the capital and sent his chief assistant to take
charge of the customhouses in the other ports of entry.
Thus, four months after the beginning of the negotiations for United States control of the Dominican customhouses
and financial affairs some form of this control was, in fact,
implemented.

Dawson's handling of the negotiations leading

to the protocol of February 7 and the modus vivendi would seem
to demonstrate that he attempted to smooth the difficult path
the Dominicans found it necessary to travel.

When the Morales

Government found itself short of funds in January, an arrange\

rnent was made to tide the Government over this critical stage.
,·

When it was possible, Dawson attempted to take into consideration Dominican susceptibilities and to inform the State Department of these.

Nevertheless, Dawson was determined to ac-

complish his goal of placing the customhouses and financial
affairs of the Republic under North American control.

In

achieving this, he was not opposed to exerting diplomatic
pressure when necessary.

Though, it was never necessary or

even considered necessary to use physical force against the
Government, Dawson was not in the least opposed to lending
"moral support" in the form of United States naval vessels to
lOODawson to Secretary of State, April 26, 1905, telegram; Dawson to Secretary of State, April 27, 1905, No. 132,
~, 1905, p. 370.
Dawson to Hay, May 9, 1905, No.138,
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
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the Morales Government in its dealings with its opponents.
The period from the signing of the agreement on January
21, to the proclamation ·of. the modus vivendi on March 31,
I

I

I

witnessed a changing of the attitude of the Roosevelt Administration towards the Improvement Company.

From its privileged

position under the Award of July 14, 1904, the Company was
relegated to the status of the other creditors by the modus
vivendi and by Hollander's mission.

Although Dawson did not

advise against this course, he was somewhat slow to realize
or to advise on the necessity for this change.

However, he

apparently was not unaware of the need for it.

According to

Dawson's own admission, he "slowly came to the conclusion
that it is impossible to ignore or overcome the dislike of
;

the Improvement Company."

This would seem to indicate that

he was aware of the dislike but thought it.possible to disregard it.
Dawson's failure to realize that continued support
of the hated Improvement Company caused his country to be
suspect in the eyes of even those who were willing to accept
United States intervention in the customhouses, and increased
anti-American sentiment, undoubtedly grew out of his belief
that the State Department was determined to continue to
champion the Company's rights.

Indeed, this policy had been

made clear to him when the State Department wired its approval
on January 28, 1905, to an

arrangemen~

which would provide

financial assistance to the Dominican Government until a new

199

protocol could be negotiated and signed.

Moreover, to Dawson

the Dominican attitude was clearly unwaranted.

He reported

that the Morales Government "and the foreign creditors have
little confidence in Judge Abbott, although I know that
personally he deserves it. 11101 Nevertheless, the myopia
which Dawson demonstrated in supporting the Improvement Company, in spite of Dominican dislike, opened him, perhaps not
unjustly, to an indirect charge by Colton of having contributed
to the anti-American attitude in the Dominican Republic. 102
lOlDawson to Hay, March 27, 1905, No. 122, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
102 colton to Taft, June 18, 1905, personal and confidential, Numerical File 1199, bound at the end of the file, Records
of the Department of State, R.G. 59, National Archives,
Washington, D. c.
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CHAPTER VII
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO:
NON-INTERFERENCE INTERVENTION
MAY, 1905 - MAY, 1906
On May 9, 1905, Dawson wrote to the Secretary of State

requesting a leave of absence. 1

In part this leave was neces-

sitated by his health; in part by his desire to discuss Dominican financial matters with Professor Hollander, who had returned to the United States in early May and was planning to
leave for Europe on June 13.

Permission for the leave was wired

to Dawson on May 20, and shortly thereafter he left for the
I
United States. 2 During the period i:rranediately preceeding this
request and in the interval while waiting for permission to
leave, Dawson was primarily concerned with.matters which might
disturb the modus vivendi and in formulating a possible alternate
to the agreement of February 7, if the latter should fail to
receive senatorial ratification.
The relationship between the Dominican Government and
its French and Belgian creditors represented a possible threat
to the operation of the modus vivendi.

By an agreement signed

in 1901, the Dominican Government had promised to pay these
creditors $300,000 a year on the amount owed and an additional
1 Dawson to Hay, May 9, 1905, No. 139, Despatches from
the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
2 oawson to Hay, May 22, 1905, No. 143, ibid.
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$10,000 a year to cover the creditor's cost of maintaining·
agents to look after their interests.
ago fallen into arrears.'

The former sum had long

However, up to the time of the modus

vivendi, the latter sum had been continually paid at the rate
of $833.33 a month.

With the proclamation of the modus

vivendi, Finance Minister Vel~squez decided that the time had
come to terminate this payment also. 3

I

Velasquez reasoned that

the modus vivendi obviated the need of the agents entrusted with
watching out for the interests of the Franco-Belgian creditors.
This task would now be performed by the collector of customs
appointed under the modus vivendi.

When these creditors ob-

1

jected, Velasquez could only suggest that the sum be paid out
of the fifty-five per cent which was being deducted by Colonel
Colton. 4

.

Dawson realized that the status of· the modus vivendi
would definitely be endangered if the Franco-Belgian creditors,
who were among the largest, were alienated and refused to
continue to accept the arrangement.

While he could not agree

to allow the $833.33 monthly sum to be paid out of the fiftyfive per cent held for all the creditors, since the modus
vivendi simply provided for the collection of this sum not for
its distribution, Dawson attempted to remain neutral in the
dispute and refrained from expressing any opinion on the validity
3

~'

Dawson to Secretary of State, May 15, 1905, No. 142,
1905, pp. 371-373.
4Ibid., pp. 371-73.
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of either the creditors' position or that of the Finance
Minister.

Instead he suggested moderation on the part of the

Morales Government.

I
.
I
Dawson reported
that he a d vised
Velasquez

to have his views presented to the French and Belgian Governments in such a way as "to secure a calm and impartial consideration of them."

He thought that the Govemments involved would

not insist on the payment of the monthly sums if they were
convinced that the interests of their nationals were adequately
protected under the modus vivendi. 5
Dawson's personal views on the matter of the payment of
the monthly sum were somewhat different from the calm and disinterested impression that he tried to convey to both the
I

Dominicans and the agents of the Franco-Belgian creditors.
.

He

I

thought that Velasquez really had intended to pay the $833.33
. out of the forty-five per cent of the revenues tumed over to
the Government, but once the modus vivendi was in operation
the Finance Minister saw an opportuni·ty to secure an extra
$10,000 yearly for strictly internal expenditures and consequently decided to terminate the payments to the creditors.
In spite of .his convictions on this matter, Dawson thought it
unwise to bring this point up in his conversations with Vel~squez,.particularly in view of the latter's "extreme sensitiveness and impulsiveness and the importance for Colonel Colton's
sake of not jeoparding our cordial relations, at least for
5 Ibid.

I

p. 373.
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the present. 116
On May 12, President Morales informed Dawson that
•

I

following the example of the _United States Senate, as reported
in the newspapers, the Dominican legislature had subjected
the protocol of February 7 to amendment.

Morales wanted Dawson

to look over the amendments and see if they would be agreeable
with those being considered by the Senate.

The President

assured Dawson that he was not interested in securing the
amendments but rather in preventing any embarrassment for the
Dominican Congress by having its alterations rejected.

Dawson

replied that while he was interested in aiding Morales secure
the ratification of the protocol by the Dominican legislature,
I

he could not enter into a discussion either of the amendments
that were rumored to have been considered by the Senate or of
those proposed in Santo Domingo.

Nevertheiess, if a copy of

the Dominican amendments were given to him unofficially he
would be glad to send them on to Washington. 7
Although Dawson was unwilling to discuss any amendments,
it would seem that he and Morales and possibly Colton discussed a possible alternative to the protocol just in case the
latter were not ratified.

This alternate plan called for an

United States corporation, to be known as the Bank of Santo
Domingo and controlled by United States citizens, to refund the
6 Dawson to Hay, May 15, 1905, No. 142, Despatches
from· the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
7Dawson to Hay, May 13, 190.5, No. 141, ibid.
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debt of the Republic at its market value, which would be at·
about thirty-five to forty cents on the dollar.

In return for

its services, the Bank would receive a financial commission
·
·
' / l u d'ing a rai
I ' l roa d concession.
.
and various
concessions
inc

Th e

b<>nds issued by the Bank would be secured by all the revenues
of the Republic, excluding the municipal taxes.

The revenues

would be collected by a receiver who would be an United States
citizen nominated either by the President of the United States
or by the Bank and the President of the Dominican Republic.
The receiver would have the authority to appoint other United
States citizens as subordinates.

For its part, the Dominican

Government would agree not to alter its tariff rate or other
taxation without the consent of the Bank and the approval of
~

the receiver.

Moreover, the Dominican Government would place
I

certain lands at Manzanillo and Samana bays and at the port
of Azua in the hands of the Bank.

Whenever necessary, the

Bank would, without any formality, turn these over to the United
States for use as naval stations~
8colton to Taft, June 11, 1905, personal, Numerical File
1199, bound at the end of the file, Records of the Department
State, R.G. 59, National Archives, Washington, D. c. Colonel
Colton felt that this plan was superior to that provided for in
the protocol of February 7, 1905. He reported to Secretary of
War Taft that the plan would immediately place the Dominican
Republic "upon a self supporting and safe financial basis" with
the North American Bank being interested in aiding the internal
development of the country. Colton thought that the problem of
the Dominican foreign debt would be completely removed since it
would be absorbed by a North American corporation. The embar~
rassment to the United States Government caused by the necessity
of interfering in the internal financial affairs of another
country would be removed, and it could relegate its interest to
the normal process of protecting the lives and property of its

;ii'
II.
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The substance of the alternate plan was sent to Secretary
of war Taft by Colonel Colton. 9 No mention of it is made in
I

anY of Dawson's written reports, although it is possible that
be may have discussed it with Roosevelt or the Assistant
secretary of State after returning to Washington.

The plan

itself received less than enthusiastic reception from President
ROOsevelt. 10 In writing to Hollander about the proposed plan,
the President revealed his reason for being wary of it.

He

wrote, "I am always afraid of seeming to back any big company
g:

~
~-

t

which has financial interests in one of these South American
states, and can only do so under the narrowest restrictions
citizens. Moreover, it would be easier for the Dominicans
themselves to accept since it would remove the fear of United
States intervention. Commercial relations between the two
countries, Colton maintained, would be closer and United States
citizens would "g·radually acquire the Dominican market through
. the natural business [sic] evolution that most follow." The
Dominicans would also benefit. The receiver with the vast amount
of information available to him could both readily handle the
financial transactions of the country and protect the country
from fraud. Colton further noted that this plan, contrary to
that envisioned in the protocol, would keep the funds in the
Dominican Republic rather than draining the Republic of fiftyf i ve per cent of its custom revenues. He maintained that with
the depressed condition of the Dominican business, this latter
system could only produce further harm to the business community,
while the new plan would actually act as a stimulus, by recirculating the money in the country. To Colton another advantage, so far as the United States was concerned, was that the
new plan provided for the Dominican Government to place certain
lands at Manzanillo and Sarnana Bays and at the port of Azua in
the hands of the Bank. These lands were to be turned over to
the United States without formality, whenever they might.be
necessary for use as naval stations. Ibid.
9

Ibid~

lORoosevelt to Spooner, July 7, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt,
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. IV, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951),
p. 1265. [Hereafter cited as Roosevelt Letters.]

i
i

206

and most sharply defined conditions."

11

In view of Roosevelt's

attitude, it is difficult to say whether this plan would have
i

been accepted if all other means failed.

But such was not the

case, and no more reference was ever made to it.
Once back in the United States, Dawson continued his
efforts on behalf of the protocol. 12 At eleven o'clock in the
morning of June 7, Dawson met with President Roosevelt, 13 presumably to explain the Dominican situation to the President.
The report must have interested Roosevelt, for during the course
of the interview he asked Dawson to prepare a memorandum on
the conditions in the Caribbean republic and suggested that he
see Senator John

c.

Spooner of Wisconsin, a member of the
I

Senate's Foreign Relations Conunittee.

However, shortly after

this meeting with the President Dawson left for a trip west, 14
11 Roosevelt to Hollander, July 3, 1905, ibid., p. 1259.
12 since there was no secretary at the Legation in the
.
Dominican Republic who could act as charg~ d'affaires ad interim
while Dawson was absent, the State Department decided to send
Mr. M. Marshall Langhorne to preside over the Legation and
Consulate General as deputy consul-general until Dawson returned
to his post. Langhorne arrived in Santo Domingo City on June 2,
1905. Acting Secretary of State (Loomis) to General skichez,
May 23, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 374; Langhorne to Hay, June 5,
1905, No. 146, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14,
roll 14.
13Appointment book 1905, Roosevelt Papers, series 9,
Diaries, 1905-1906, Box 2.
14 It would appear that Dawson's itinerary during.this

trip included stops in Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, and possibly
Iowa. Both the death of his mother, who died in the spring of
1905 and was buried in Madison, and his desire to see Senator
John c. Spooner may have taken Dawson to Wisconsin. Business
interests and political ties probably would have led him back

~

1.
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the preparation of the report had to await his return on

June 2 7.15
on July 1, Dawson submitted two memoranda to the Presi/

dent.

!

The longer of the two was ultimately published in

virtually its complete form in the 1905 volume of Papers Relating
'
16
to the Foreign Relations of the United States.
The second

-

to Iowa. In Chicago, it is likely that he stopped to visit
shortly with his friend Charles G. Dawes and to discuss their
joint efforts on a biography of President McKinley. On the way
back to Washington, Dawson stopped off in Canton, Ohio, the
home town of the late President, in order to interview Judge
John Day, a close friend of McKinley's and Secretary of State
in the President's cabinet during the Spanish-American War.
While in Canton, Dawson also interviewed some relatives of the
late President. Mrs. Dawson, who was expecting their second
child and who had come back to the United States with their
son Allan sometime before Dawson had returned in early June,
remained in Washington while her husband made his western trip.
Dawson to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905, personal, Despatches from
the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14. Dawson to Dawes,
July 3, 1905, Da~es Collection, General correspondence, JulyDec. 1905. Dawson to Spooner, July 11, 1905, John Coit Spooner
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D. c. [hereafter cited as the Spooner papers], General Correspondence, 1905, June-September, Container 77.
15

Dawson to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905, personal,
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
Dawson to Roosevelt, August 9, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, series 1-letters received August 7-21, 1905, Box 95.
1611 Memorandum on the Dominican Modus Vivendi, Its
Effects Up To The Present Time, And The Reason That Lead To Its
Adoption," July 1, 1905, FRUS, 1905, pp. 378-389. The only
deletion from the printed copy concerned the tenuous status of
the modus vivendi. Dawson reported that there were some members
of the Horacista Party who would be willing to see the modus
vivendi modified so that funds would once again come their way.
Moreover, he noted that the "conunon people are too ignorant to
understand the complicated details of the financial and international situation." Also those whom Dawson termed \lnreconciled
revolutionary factions" were desirous of seeing the modus
vivendi terminated. This section appears on page ten of the
original (Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll
14), and is deleted from page 381 in the copy printed in ~, 1905.
11
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memorandum was marked confidential and only a brief passage,
which Roosevelt included in a letter to Spooner, has been
printed. 17 Both of these memoranda, which illustrate Dawson's
attitude toward the intervention of the United States in the
I

financial affairs of the Dominican Republic, were probably
intended for use by the President in his efforts to persuade
the Senate to ratify the protocol of February 7.

However,

since they do not differ from his earlier actions or reports,
their potential public character would not seem to detract
from their veracity.
Dawson saw international and internal advantages
accruing to the Dominican Republic from the modus vivendi.
He reported that the continual borrowing by the Dominican
Government and its practice of offering custom receipts from
various ports of entry as security for these debts had led to
a situation in the past few years where foreign intervention
had been repeatedly "imminent and could not have been long
deferred had not the modus vivendi been proposed and accepted."
Seizure of the customhouses would only have complicated the
problem.

Since the principal source of revenue was the custom

revenues, the Dominican Government would not have had sufficient
funds, and some international agreement in which the United
States would have had to take a part would have been necessary.
Furthennore, given the small per centage of the debt that
17 Roosevelt to Spooner, July 7, 1905, Roosevelt Letters,
Vol. IV, p. 1263. The original of the memorandum appears in
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.

r
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receipts from a customhouse would have paid, the seizure of one
or two customhouses by a European power would have been virtually
•

permanent.

I

However, the modus vivendi, Dawson thought, eliminated

these vexing international complications.

For the first time

in five years the creditors had some assurance of receiving
their payments.
undisturbed. 18

Thus, they were willing to leave the situation

Dawson also believed that the internal affairs of the
Dominican Republic benefited from the modus vivendi.

He pointed

9ut that the "honest and sensible business methods" which
Colton had introduced into the customhouses had resulted in an
increase in the revenues collected.

In spite of the fact that
I

fifty-five per cent of the revenues were being deposited in
New York for the eventual payment of the Republic's creditors,
. Dawson claimed that the Morales Government·was realizing
more money from its forty-five per cent than it had when it
collected the entire amount.

This in turn resulted in the

Government being able to pay its employees and to pay cash
for its necessities.

Moreover, now that the threat of internal

revolution had been greatly reduced, the Government could
devote some of its energies to administrative reforms and
internal improvements.

The political stability which the

country now enjoyed, he maintained, also had a salutary effect
on economic developments.

~,

Production of tobacco, which had

1811 Memorandum on the Dominican Modus Vivendi • • • "
1905, pp. 380-81.
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greatly declined during the revolutionary period, was experiencing a tremendous growth.

The acreage

devoted to sugar pro-

duction was also being increased.

The cacao industry was prosI
.
19
perous, and ranching was undergoing a revitalization.
/

I

Dawson also felt that the modus vivendi would have an
educative effect on the Dominican officials.

Colton's administ-

ration of the customhouses would serve as an example for the
Dominicans.

They "would soon become competent to work the

machinery themselves ••

..

n

Confidence in the Government's

ability to pay would be restored.
foreign collectors.

Dominicans would replace the

The debt would be re-serviced on favorable

terms, "and, finally, the necessity for foreign financial
control would disappear of itself. 020
Whatever its advanta'ges, the modus vivendi was only a
.
21
temporary expedient.
~he protocol, however, Dawson maintained,
would provide for a secure settlement of the Dominican debt.
The provisions of the protocol providing for the collection by
the United States of a portion of the revenues which would be
divided among the creditors, Dawson believed, adequately met
the need of providing the creditors with a sense of security
that the debts would be paid.

Of course, it would be necessary

to divide proportionally among the creditors the sum collected.
On

this point, Dawson did not foresee any problem developing
19 1bid., pp. 379-380.
21 Ibid., p. 382.

20 Ibid., p. 381.
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with the Dominican or European creditors.

They would, he felt,

be willing to accept a portion of the fifty-five per cent
I

rather than demand a larger sum.

However, he thought that

the Improvement Company might cause some trouble if it did not
receive the complete yearly payment provided for under the
Award of July 14, 1904.

It

~ould

the actual amount of each debt.
two difficulties would arisee

also be necessary to fix

Here Dawson predicted that
On the one hand, an examination

of the debts might lead to the conclusion that equity demanded
they be scaled down, and, on the other hand, some decision
would have to be made concerning the exact proportion of the
fifty-five per cent which each creditor would receive.

In

I

spite of the difficulties which might arise on these two
points, and in view of the fact that the country was still a
. long way from complete economic recovery, Dawson told the
President that he hoped that both would be done, "in justice
to suffering and poverty stricken Santo Domingo and to our
own character as a high-minded, helpful and courageous government. •

..
Dawson concluded his confidential memorandum to

Roosevelt by urging against so amending the protocol that the
custom collectors would have extra-territorial inununity from
the Dominican law.

Such an amendment was being considered by

22 Dawson to Roosevelt, July 2, 1905, enclosure:
Confidential memorandum, July 1, 1905, Despatches from the
Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.

r·
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Dawson felt that this

would unnecessarily "wound Dominican national pride and susceptibilities."

.

i

He went on to state that

Dominicans have reluctantly reconciled themselves to the
hard necessity of accepting foreign customs collectors,
but I doubt whether I could persuade them to confer explicitly on these collectors extra-territorial immunity • • • •
In substance and in practice the Dominican Government will
concede such immunity without a murmur or a hitch, but the
the [sic] Dominican reading and writing public would bitterly
resent a treaty provision that flagrantly and in so many
words violates their constitution, deprives their country
of one of the most essential attributes of sovereignty and
places it in the eyes of the world in the same category as
Turkey, China, or Morocco. Santo Domingo believes that it
deserves as good treatment in this respect as the European
powers have given Greece.23
To further aid in getting the agreement through the
Senate without offensive amendments, sometime in late July or
early August, Dawson sought out Senator Spooner at his summer
home in Pittsburq, New Hampshire.

Dawson explained that he

wanted personally to explain "certain Dominican matters" to
the Senator.

Spooner was willing to discuss the Dominican

situation; however, he insisted on the distinction that any
discussion would be on a personal basis and not official basis.
At the end of the interview, Dawson left with the impression
that the Senator understood the "pet prejudices and weaknesses
.

of the Dominican public opinion" and would be considerate of them.
23 Ibid.
24 Dawson to Roosevelt, August 9, 1905, Roosevelt Papers,
series !--letters received, August 7-21, 1905, Box 95. Dawson to
Spooner, July 11, 1905, Spooner Papers, General correspondence,
1905, June-September, Container 77.
From the brief notation Spooner made on Dawson's letter
of July 11, it would appear that the Senator was not completely

2j
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Before returning to Santo Domingo, Dawson made one more
effort to remove criticism of the Administration's actions in
the Dominican Republic. · At the suggestion of the Department

I

;

of State he called upon Mr. Albert Robinson, an editorial
writer for The New York Sun.

Dawson, in an ambiguous reference

to Robinson, found him to be something of a mugwump, "a man
with an anti-imperialist's attitude of mind, though not the
opinions of one."

In addition, Robinson's knowledge of certain

of the events immediately preceeding the signing of the protocol
were inaccurate and Dawson attempted to correct this.

Dawson

felt that his conversation with Robinson had resulted in the
Sun taking a more objective view of the Dominican situation. 25
Although his efforts while in the United States during
the summer of 1905 did not help to speed the protocol through
the Senate, they 'illustrate two aspects of.his thought.

In

the first place, there can be little doubt that Dawson supported
the principle of United States involvement in the financial
affairs of the Dominican Republic.
two points:

This support was based on

the protocol prevented a difficult international

pleased to meet with Dawson. He wrote:
July 11, 1905
About San Domingo,
Came here without invitation awaiting my self, arriving without
notice at 9 at night.
Spent an hour or so with him."
25 Dawson to Root, January 19, 1906, Elihu Root Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. c.
[hereafter cited as the Root Papers], General correspondence,
D-J, 1906, Container 45.

r
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problem and the Dominican Republic received benefits from ·the
united States interference.

Secondly, Dawson realized that in
I

spite of any benefits which might accrue to the Dominican Republic, interference with its sovereignty was difficult for the
Dominicans to accept.

Therefore, he was_ anxious to make this

as least offensive as possible.
Dawson and his family arrived back in the Dominican capital on September 10, 1905. 26 Upon his return he found the
political conditions "entirely peaceful and satisfactory. 1127
The situation remained much the same until mid-October.

Then

word reached the capital that a revolution was about to errupt
in Monte Cristi, and that this uprising would have the financial
I

support of a North American couple named Reader. The rumored
uprising never materialized. 28 Nevertheless, the possible

.

involvement of the Readers in the political and financial
affairs of the Dominican Republic had already come to the attention of the Department of State.

In fact, in September, Dawson

had been instructed to report fully on the Readers' machinations
in the Caribbean republic and on any connection they might have
with the Improvement Company in opposing the protocol of
26 oawson to Secretary of State, October 19, 1905,
No. 177, enclosure 1: Dawson to Admiral Bradford, October 12,
1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 399.
27 Dawson to William Loeb, Jr. (Roosevelt's secretary),
September 20, 1905, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
28 Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
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February 7, 1905.

29

On October 7, Dawson sent the Secretary of State a
.
'

lengthy report containing the information he had concerning the
Readers.

He reported that the Readers had their first contacts

with the Dominican Government in October, 1904.

At that time a

I

friend of President Morales, one Eliseo Perez, became acquainted
with the North American couple while he was in New York.
P~rez informed Morales of the Readers' supposed mining interests

in Peru and that they were interested in undertaking financial
operations in the Dominican Republic.

In late December, Mr.

Reader came to Santo Domingo and on the twenty-ninth was granted
an interview with Morales.

At that time Reader presented the

President with a plan which called for extensive monopolistic
I

concessions, the leasing of Samana Bay, and permission to
collect all the Republic's revenues.

In return the Readers

would refund and consolidate the public debt.

It was just

then that the initial negotiations for the custom's receivership started, and the President referred Reader to the Foreign
Minister for further consultation.

/

When Sanchez discussed the

matter with Dawson, the latter stated that he knew nothing
about Readers' plans nor had he received any instructions from
the State Department regarding them.

Consequently, he refused

to read the plan which Mr. Reader had given the Foreign Minister.
In view of the United States Minister's lack of instructions,
29 Loomis to Dawson, September 28, 1905, telegram;
Loomis to Dawson, September 29, 1905, telegram, Diplomatic
Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, pp. 71-72, roll 98.
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sanchez returned the plan to Reader, and the latter apparently
returned to the United States.

In March, Mrs. Reader began to

circulate reports that her husband had made a verbal contract
I
I
with Morales for the adjustment of the Dominican debt, but
that it had been dropped because of a protest on the part of the
United States Minister made on instructions from Washington. 30
The argument that the protocol of February 7, was harmful to
the Readers was also used in the Senate as a reason for opposing ratification of the protoco1. 31
Failing to secure the support of the Morales Adm.inistration for their scheme, Dawson continued, the Readers attempted
to form some type of an arrangement with the discontented
elements in the Republic.
Monte Cristi.

They turned to the Jimenistas in

Sometime in late spring 1905, Reader returned

.

/

to the Dominican Republic and contacted Demetrio Rodriguez
and Desiderio Arias.

Dawson reported that Reader, at that time,

claimed that he had the support of the Improvement Company.

He

alleged that the Company was afraid that:if the protocol were
not defeated the outcome of Hollander's investigation would be
detrimental to its interests.

Before returning to the United
I

States, Reader had signed agreements with Rodriguez concerning
mutual obligations in the event of a successful revolution. 32
30 Dawson to Root, October 7, 1905, No. 169, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
31Munro, ~· cit., p. 103.
32 Dawson to Root, October 7, 1905, No. 169, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
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In his report of October 7, Dawson accepted the validity
of the reports that Reader claimed the support of the Improvement
•

I

company and that he actually had signed contracts with the
Jimenistas in Monte Cristi, but he did not place much faith in
the truth of the claim itself.

He did not believe that the

Improvement Company was really involved in any revolutionary
plot against the Morales Government.

He thought that Reader

fabricated the connection with the Company to explain the possible source of the vast sums that would be necessary to finance
any revolution.

Furthermore, Dawson was convinced that

I

Rodriguez would not long support Reader's contracts once it
became evident that the North American's promises were empty.
I

I

Rodriguez, according

t~

Dawson, only considered his contracts

with Reader "as an anchor to windward in the storm which would
follow the defeat of the convention. 1133
Although the reports of the revolution supported by
the Readers seemed to be baseless, another rumor, which also
became current in mid-October, had more substance.

This concerned the growing split within the Dominican Government. 34

The Morales Government, as indicated, was a coalition consisting of dissident Jimenistas, who had supported Morales when he
broke with Jim~nez, and Horacistas.

Within the Government,

Morales himself was in the embarrassing position of being without any firm supporters, for the Horacistas upon whom he
33 Ibid.
34 oawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, ibid.
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depended for support distrusted him.

So long as the financial

situation remained critical and there was a possibility of
revolution, the coali tio·n seems to have held together fairly
well.

However, the modus vivendi provided the Government with

adequate money and the involvement of the United States seemed
to protect the Government from either foreign intervention or
domestic rebellion.

-

With the advent of this stability, it

would appear that the Horacistas became

less convinced of

the need to allow Morales as free a hand as they had in the
direction of the affairs of the country.

Instead they began

to demand that Horacistas fill all the major posts, with the
obvious intention of relegating the President to the status
of a mere figure head.

I

The first open indication of the break in the Government
I

came around October 19, when Vice President Caceres and General
Guayabin, both prominent Horacistas, arrived at the capital
demanding that the Cabinet be re-organized to eliminate those
who were not stanch Horacistas.

On Saturday, October 20,

I

Caceres had a heated interview with Morales, who threatened to
resign.

Within a day, however, a compromise had been reached.

Agreeing to stay, Morales pledged to remove several nonHoracistas from the Cabinet and from other important administrative posts. 35 As a result of this agreement, two cabinet
ministers and the governors of two provinces were ultimately
replaced.

Fermine P~rez, Minister of War, and Bernardo Pichardo,

35 Ibid.
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Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, were respectively
by Luis Tejera and Eladio Victoria.
.

,

r~placed

Carlos Ginebra, governor

of Puerto Plata, and Epifania Rodriguez, governor of La Vega,
were also removed. 36
During the first week of November, the Morales Government uncovered a revolutionary conspiracy apparently centered
/

at the port of San Pedro de Macoris, but possibly extending
into the entire southern part of the country.

The leaders

were Jimenistas or Jimenista sympathizers; moreover, the
Dominican Government gave some credence to rumors that the conspirators were receiving aid from interests in the United
States who were opposed to the protoco1. 37 Steps were taken by
the Morales Government to thwart the potential revolution.
Known conspirators were arrested; troops were sent against

.

the insurgent strongholds; and Dawson was requested to ask for
the stationing of a United States naval vessel at the port of
I

San Pedro de Macoris to discourage a revolutionary assult there.
The adversity which the Government faced failed to resolve
the differences between Morales and the Horacistas.

The Horacistas

demanded that the Government continue to bring ever increasing
pressure upon the potential Jimenista insurgents.

The Presi-

dent, on the other hand, believing that everything was under
control, opposed sending out any further expeditions. 38
36 Dawson to Root, November 3, 1905, No. 182, ibid.
37 Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid.
38 Ibid.
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There were also several other indications that the
split between the Horacistas and the President was becoming
I

deeper and more permanent.

Horacistas began to demand that the

protocol of February 7 be so amended as to provide that congressional approval had to be obtained before the executive
could ask for assistance from the United States.

Since the

Horacistas controlled the congress, this would have precluded
any attempt by Morales to pull a coup on the dominate party.
There was further indication that even with this amendment the
Dominican Congress might still refuse to ratify the protocol.
Furthermore, the compromise which had been reached between
•

I

Morales and Vice President Caceres had not been accepted by
I

some of the other leading Horacistas.

Former President Horacio

I

Vasquez, from whom the party derived its name, still opposed
.Morales and encouraged ciceres to join with him in opposing
the protocol.

The Vice President, faithful to his October
I

connnittment1D Morales, refused to support Vasquez.
was a division within the Horacista Party.

The result

For his part,

Morales appeared more determined to re-assert himself.

Foreign

I

Minister Sanchez, a staunch supporter of Morales, urged him to
do so.

An

apparent surge in popularity produced by the common

belief that he was resisting Horacistas added further impetus
for the President to exert himself.

Moreover, Governor Arias

had sent his secretary to the capital to assure the President
that in the event of a Horacista coup, he could depend upon
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the support of the forces in Monte Cristi. 39
While the division continued to grow, a tenuous balance
of power, brought about by the factionalism within the Horacista Party and the apparent strengthening of Morales' position,
temporarily lent a degree of stability to the Dominican political scene.

The opposition, which some of the Horacistas

had been showing towards the ratification of the protocol,
seemed to diminish when Emiliano Tejera, a Horacista leader
and early supporter of the protocol, reaffirmed his support of
the agreement, promising to continue to work for its ratifica.
40
ion.

t

Dawson's actions in dealing I with
the factionalism were
.
prompted by his main objective: securing the ratification and
ultimate implementation of the protocol.

In late April, 1905,

. the State Department had instructed him to' do everything that
he properly could "looking toward the maintenance of order and
the establishment of good feeling on ·the part of the various
political factions. 1141

This was the basic strategy he tried

to follow, since he considered ratification of the protocol had
its best chance if the principal members of the existing Government stayed together.

The resignation of Morales, Dawson thought,

would lead to a revolution among the anti-Horacista elements in
39 Ibid.
40 Dawson to Root, November 25, 1905, No. 193, ibid.
41 Adee to Dawson, April 25, 1905, No. 59, Diplomatic
Instructions to Santo Domingo, vol. 1, p. 58, roll 98.
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the country.

The withdrawal of Vice President ciceres or

Vel~squez from the Cabinet would probably result in an uprising

in the northern section of the country, the Cibao, where the
I

aoracistas were in a majority.

In either case the chances of

the protocol being ratified by the incumbent Dominican Congress
would be greatly reduced. 42
Dawson's conviction that the interests of the protocol
would be served best by keeping the principal members Of the
Government together did not mean that he was willing to use
I

his influence to persuade Morales to make concessions concerning
these or other members of the Cabinet.

To the contrary, Dawson

refused to be drawn in or to t.ake sides during the factional
bickering. 43 He either urged moderation or left the Dominicans
to work out their own compromise.

Moreover, he reported to

Washington, that 'he considered it his

offi~ial

duty to maintain

relations with Morales and the minister he chose to name.
Dawson saw this not only as his duty, but also as the only
politic thing to do "because all Dominican politicians Morales
and Sanchez and their immediate followers are the most convinced and determined friends of the pending Convention. •

..

He realized that if he insisted upon Morales retaining men in
the Cabinet whom the President did not desire to retain, they
42 Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
43 Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178; Dawson
to Root, November 3, 1905, No. 182; Dawson to Root, November
18, 1905, No. 185, ibid.
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,,

would be kept.

However, to follow this course, Dawson correctly

believed, he would be constituting himself virtual director of
the Dominican internal politics, a ;position for which he had
no authority.

Furthermore, he thought it would probably only

lead to the elimination of Morales and his supporters, the one
faction that had a definite plan for the payment of the debt
44 To assure Mora1 es th a th e s t'll
1
W1' th Uni'ted States ai'd.
enjoyed the confidence of the United States, Dawson had called
the President's attention to the fact that his own letter of
credence was directed to Morales as president and that there
was no indication or intention of withdrawing recognition. 45
Dawson did not have the same confidence in the Horacista
I

support of the protocol as he did in Morales' support.

I

Ve las-

quez's early reluctance to accept the agreement came to mind
and Dawson could not be sure that the Finance Minister and the
Horacistas would not reject the protocol if they could find
an alternative.

I

Nevertheless, in dealing with Caceres and

I

Velasquez, he always treated them as important in the internal
politics and in the implementation of the agreement and modus
.
d'1. 46
viven

The political factionalism that Dawson witnessed in
the Dominican Republic caused him to have a rather poor opinion
of the Dominican political and military classes.

Those who were

44 Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid.
45 nawson to Root, November 3, 1905, No. 182, ibid.
46 nawson to Root, October 23, 1905,
No. 178, ibid.

224

involved in the factional disputes and the accompanying opposition to the agreement with the United States, he believed, were
i

confined to these classes.

The military and the politicians,

Dawson maintained, were basically opposed to the convention
because it would endanger "their salaries and perquisites."
While the "more intelligent and patriotic" members of these
classes realized that any Dominican Government, to survive, had
to prevent the customhouses from falling into the hands of
revolutionaries, Dawson reported that "the average politician
and jefe forgets about this when his immediate selfish interests
are threatened. 1147 The mercantile and non-political elements
of society, he claimed, remained more firm than ever in their
I

support of the protocol, particularly now that they had had a
chance to witness the operation of the modus vivendi under
Colonel Colton's tactful administration.

But, he wrote the

Secretary of State that he was becoming more and more convinced
that only the intervention of the United States as envisioned
in the agreement could save the Dominican Republic
from anarchy and bankruptcy, and prevent its turbulent,
fickle, selfishly ambitious politicians from fighting each
other for the off ices as they have done since the foundation
of the Republic. 4 8
:
In spite of what he had to say about Dominican politicians
in general, he did not basically have an unfavorable opinion of
the members of the Government who were directly involved in this
47 Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid.
48 Ibid.
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factional strife.

I

I

Vice President Ramon Caceres he described

as "a honest, unambitious, and patriotic individual" who had
come to the point of breaking with Morales as a result of pressure from friends.

,

I

I

Velasquez, whose honesty and patriotism he

had earlier attested to in most favorable terms, in this instance,
was "the most aggressive and uncompromising man in the Cabinet. • •
Dawson found Morales to be a determined individual, but unfortunately possessing a characteristic common to many Latin Americans.

In his report to the Secretary of State, Dawson wrote:

It seemed to me--although of course I did not say so to
President Morales--that like most Latin-Americans he is
subject to being diverted from his serious purpose by considerations of personal dignity, especially when he is conscious that his motives are good and unselfish. He is the
coolest and most persistent Dominican who is prominent in
political life, and yet he came near in this instance to
throwing away the results of his two years hard work largely
because his feelings were profoundly hurt at what he considered Horacista ingratitude.49
In spite of his refusal to become involved in the
partisan factionalism within the Government, Dawson had no
intention of allowing a revolution either to endanger the
Morales Government or to threaten the operation of the modus
vivendi.

Therefore, he made an effort to lend what aid he could

to the Morales Government and to provide for the possibility of
armed intervention, if necessary, to maintain the modus vivendi
and prevent the customhouses from falling into the hands of
revolutionaries.

In early November, when Foreign Minister S~-

chez asked Dawson to request the presence of an United States
49 Dawson to Root, October 23, 1905, No. 178, ibid.
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naval vessel at the port of San Pedro de Macoris, Dawson made
an investigation and while he found that the situation had not
i

yet become serious, the ·presence of a vessel was justified,
in view of the possibility that

th~re

might be a sudden deteri-

oration of the political conditions in the Republic.

At that

time, the Department of State instructed Dawson that while the
ships would be sent, marines were not to be landed without a
specific request from the Dominican Government that they were
needed for protection of the lives of American citizens, and
that this protection temporarily could not be provided by the
. .
au th ori't'ies. so
Donu.nican

Consequently, to justify the landing

of United States forces, it would be necessary to be sure that
I

United States citizens were working in the customhouses, if
there were none living in a given port city. 51 By November,
1905, North Americans were already employed in the customhouses
at Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata and Santo Domingo City.

United

I

States citizens were living in Macoris; however, neither this
I

I

port nor Sanchez or Samana had regularly employed North Americans
in the respective customhouses.

Dawson had asked Colonel Colton

if a United States employee could be placed in the customhouses
in each of these ports.
the posts. 52

But, there were not enough to fill all

SODawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185, ibid.
51 Dawson to Root, November 18, 1905, No. 185; Dawson
to Root, No~ember 20, 1905, personal, ibid.
52 Ibid.
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The mutual distrust between Morales and the Horacistas
again surfaced on November 26 and 27, as Morales finally deter•

i

mined to exert himself in an attempt to regain what he considered
to be his legal prerogatives.

His ,first move was to demand

the resignation of the commandante of the troops stationed in
the capital.

He claimed that this man was his personal enemy

and was organizing the troops to depose him.

The President

I

further suggested to Finance Minister Velasquez that the entire
Cabinet resign.

To both of the propositions, the Horacistas

were naturally opposed.

They interpreted them as demonstrating

Morales' intention to break completely with the Horacistas and
form a cabinet of his own supporters.

In the meantime, the

conunandante and Minister of War Luis Tejera had' placed themselves
at the head of the troops and barricaded the army quarters,
.
' t as. 53·
re using
to a drn't
i any one b u t Horacis
f

In an attempt to reconcile their differences, Morales
met with the prominent Horacistas on Monday, November 27.
sides requested that Dawson be present at the meeting.

Both

Again

he attempted to maintain neutrality, taking neither side and
avoiding any involvement in the internal politics of the Republic.
This position did not, however, prevent him from pointing out
the failure to reach an agreement or compromise would certainly
lead to civil war, which would damage the Republic in the eyes
of world opinion, and possibly ruin the Horacista Party. 54
53 Dawson to Root, December 5, 1905, No. 196, ibid.
54 Ibid.
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Ultimately, a compromise was reached.
sacrificed the cornrnandante.

The Horacistas

The Minister of War, Luis Tejera,

resigned his portfolio and, assumed command of the Santo Domingo
garrison.

I

I

Tejera's place in the Cabinet was filled by Carlos

Ginebra, who was replaced as governor of the capital city by
Lorenzo Aristy.

Ginebra's and Aristy's appointments were vic-

tories for Morales.

However, the Horacistas were perhaps the

real victors, for they retained control of the troops stationed
. the capi't a 1 • 55
in
The compromise did not, of course, remove the underlying
cause of the factionalism: the mutual distrust between Morales
and the Horacistas.

The Horacista officials, on their own au-

thority, had already begun what appears to have been a systematic harassment of those either known to oppose, or suspected
of being opposed, to them.

On the twenty-seventh, Bernardo

Pichardo, the former Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, who had
recently been driven from the Cabinet by the Horacistas, asked
Dawson for asylum.

Dawson, however, did not consider that the

situation warranted such action.

Nevertheless, he did promise
to use his influence to avoid violence. 56 Undoubtedly, his
refusal to grant Pichardo asylum was largely prompted by the
belief that such action might only precipitate further division
in the Government, and actually make it appear as if he were
siding with Morales against the Horacistas.
55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.
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On Saturday, December 2, Dawson received word that· Vice
President C~ceres, accompanied by an armed escort, was headed
.

i

towards the capital, reportedly to demand the resignation of
Morales.

Although doubting that this was really the Vice Presi-

dent's purpose, Dawson thought that popular sentiment might
I

force Caceres to take such a course.
I

However, upon checking
I

with Velasquez, Dawson learned that Caceres was indeed coming
and that when he arrived, a definite settlement or rupture
would be made with the President.

In view of the apparently

worsening situation, Dawson conferred with Admiral Bradford
who was aboard the
Domingo City.

u.s.s.

Olympia, which was anchored off Santo

Following Bradford's suggestion, Dawson sought
.

I

an interview with the Governor of the capital and reminded him
of the responsibility of the Dominican authorities to protect
the lives and property of United States citizens in the event
the public order was endangered. 57
ca'ceres arrived in the capital that Saturday evening
and the next morning Dawson was asked to meet with C~ceres,
I

Velasquez, and Emiliano Tejera.

The Vice President assured

Dawson that he had no intention of either. starting a revolution
against Morales or of demanding the President's resignation.
Nevertheless, the Horacista leaders stated that they expected
Morales to govern in complete accord with the wishes of their
party and to dismiss those who were not in sympathy with the
party.

Foreign Minister sinchez and Fermin P~rez, Governor of
57 Ibid.
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Puerto Plata, were singled out as two officials who fitted
into this category.

Dawson advised against disturbing the
•

I

status quo by demands from either side for cabinet changes as
long as the protocol was still pending.

To do so, he aruged,

might endanger the continuance in power of the Horacistas and
•the most fundamental interests" of the Republic. 58 While
Dawson's arguments did not seem to have much affect on the Vice
President, the Horacistas informed Dawson that they were willing
to. guarantee the ratification of the protocol by the Dominican
Congress, provided that it were amended to provide that the
Congress would be consulted before the Dominican executive
could request assistance from the United States. 59
I

Nextthe Horacista leaders and Dawson met with President
Morales.

Although the question of S~nchez's resignation did
I

. not come up directly at the meeting, Velasquez presented a
contract whereby Morales would agree to appoint only officials
approved by the Horacista Party; in return the party would
guarantee its continued support of the President.

To assure

compliance with the agreement, both sides were to hold themselves
responsible for its fullfillment before Dawson.

Following his

set policy, Dawson refused to become involved in the internal
politics by accepting any pledges. 60
In the meantime, Dawson had wired Washington about the
possibility of a break between Morales and the Horacistas, and
asked if he were authorized to request Admiral Bradford to land
59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.
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troops to protect the lives of United States citizens and maintain order in the event that Morales were imprisoned,
resign, or assassinated.

forced to

Dawson noted that if the President

I

I

were forced out "no constitutional[ly] recognized Government
would exist to ask American assistance as indicated in your
telegram of the eighth of November." 61 This last statement seems
to be inaccurate and might indicate that Dawson felt it necessary to intervene if events came to such an impasse that Morales
was forced out.

In the event Morales were forced out, the
/

Cabinet would still be in existence and Caceres could have
easily succeeded to the position of chief executive.

Thus a

constitutional government would have continued to exist.

This

was precisely the position that Dawson later took, when Morales
..
62
fled from the capital.
Secretary of State Root, however, was determined that
the United States would not get involved in this domestic
political factionalism.

On Monday, the fourth, Dawson received

a reply to his telegram of the previous day.

Dawson was instruc-

ted to "strongly advise" Morales against breaking with his
Cabinet.

But, the State Department was "not willing to give

instructions to Admiral [Bradford] based on assumption that
President and Cabinet will create [a] situation requiring our
intervention for the protection of American citizens. 1163 Two
61 Ibid.
~'

62 Dawson to Secretary of State·, January 2, 1906, No. 202,
1906, Part 1, p. 539.
63 secretary of State to Minister Dawson, December 4, 1905,
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days later, when the State Department received word of serious
disturbances in the Dominican Republic, Root again wired Dawson
that the United States could not take part in the factional
strife.

Troops were not to be landed except "when absolutely

necessary to protect life and property of American citizens."
This, of course, included protection of United States citizens
involved in performing their duties in the customhouses.

How-

ever, the Secretary of State noted that if the Dominican Government wanted to terminate the modus vivendi, the North Americans
employed in the customhouses would receive protection to withdraw. 64

Root obviously had no intention of maintaining the

modus vivendi against the Dominican Government's wishes.
Dawson called on Morales after receiving Root's telegram
of the fourth.

Informing the President that the State Depart-

ment advised against a break, he urged
with the Horacista leaders.

Mor~les

to meet again

Morales opposed dismissing scfnchez,

•
•
I
b ut as k e d Dawson to arrange for anoth er meeting with Caceres,

Tejera and Vel~squez.

Dawson then contacted Vel~squez, urging

him to meet with the President again, and try to reach a compromise.

Dawson promised to "spare no reasonable efforts to see

that the latter [Morales] played fair."

When the meeting finally

took place on the fifth, Dawson was again sununoned and again he
FRUS, 1905, p. 408.
64 Secretary to State to Dawson, December 6, 1905,
telegram, ibid.
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refused to take sides. 65

The apparent outcome of this meeting
I

was Morales' decision to get rid of Sanchez, in spite of his
earlier unwillingness to do so. 66
The exit of S~nchez from the Cabinet was not the major
event which occupied the attention of either Dawson or the
oominican politicians on Wednesday, December 6.

They were

rather confronted with a surge of anti-United States sentiment,
brought about by a poorly timed transfer of marines from one
ship to another.

Admiral Bradford evidently assumed that the

factionalism between the Horacistas and Morales was about to
produce an open rebellion and determined to prepare to land
marines if necessary.

In all, there were three United States
I

naval vessels stationed off Santo Domingo City.
light draft, the
river.

u.s.s.

u.s.s.

One ship of

Scorpion, lay at the mouth of the Ozama

The other two, the cruisers the

u.s.s.

Olympia and the

Des Moines, unable to approach as closely to shore as

the Scorpion, lay at anchor a short distance out.

In order to

supplement the number of men aboard the Scorpion who would be
able to land if such became necessary, Bradford ordered landing
parties to proceed from the larger ships to the Scorpion.

The

transfer was scheduled for ten o'clock in the morning of the

sixth~ 67
65
.
Dawson to Root, December 5, 1905, No. 196, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
66 oawson to Root, December 15, 1905, No. 197, ibid.
67 Ibid.
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Dawson, according to his report, had no knowledge of this
planned maneuver until he was informed of it by Lieutenant
commander Jones of the Scorpion at 9:30 on the morning of the
sixth.

i

I

At that late hour, it was impossible to contact Admiral

Bradford in time to prevent the transfer of men.

However,

realizing that the appearance of armed men moving from the
cruisers towards the shore line might be misinterpreted as an
intended landing, Dawson rushed to inform Vel,squez, C~ceres,
and Morales of the true destination of the marines.

Initially,

the Dominicans did not seem to think that the movement would
produce any undue excitement in the capital.

However, as the

four men sat in the President's office discussing the meeting
of the previous day and the decision to replace Foreign Minister
I

Sanchez, the Minister of War rushed in to announce that twelve
boats filled with armed men had left the Olympia and the Des
Moines, and were apparently preparing to land.

In a few minutes,

another official burst into the room with the news that a band
of armed men was entering the Government Palace.

These men,

commanded by the commandante of the city, were under the impres1

sion that Morales and Sanchez had called upon the North American troops for support in the dispute with the Horacistas, and
consequently had come bent on killing the President and Foreign
Minister. 68
Upon hearing that the Palace was being invaded, Vice
President c'ceres, according to Dawson, ran to the door saying
68 Ibid.
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that he washed his hands of all responsibility for what might
happen.

I

Dawson, however, attempted to calm Caceres by pointing
i

out that these were the Vice President's men, and that he could
not shirk responsibility for their actions.

He further offered

I

to go out with Caceres and .assure the conunandante and his men
of the pacific intention and true destination of the landing
parties.

I

The appearance of Caceres and Dawson successfully

halted the group, and the men were persuaded to withdraw.
I

Dawson, Emiliano Tejera, and Velasquez then hurried to the city
wharf. 69
In the street, men, young boys, and women were rushing
towards the water front determined to defend the capital against
I

what they believed to be an inuninent North American invasion.
In some instances the anti-Yankee sentiment of the populace

.

. resulted in threats against the lives of United States citizens
and those Dominicans in their employ.

At the wharf, Lieutenant
I

Commander Jones met Dawson, and Tejera and Velasquez.

Dawson

had Jones repeat to the two Dominicans, and then to the conunandante who again appeared on the scene, what instructions had
been given to the troops that had been moved to the Scorpion.
With the officials at least assured that no invasion was contemplated, Dawson then agreed to arrange for the return of the
troops from the Scorpion to the other ships, provided that the
Dominicans would guarantee the safety of United States citizens
living in the capital.
69 Ibid.

While Lieutenant Conunander Jones went
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off to contact Admiral Bradford, Dawson, exhibiting what must
have been considerable courage and disregard for his own safety,
I

remained in the office of the port commander.

About one o'clock

in the afternoon, Dawson went out to the Scorpion to meet with
Bradford and to arrange for the withdrawal of the troops.

By

late afternoon, calm had been restored to the city and the
troops returned to the Olympia and the Des Moines. 70
Once the excitement had died down, Dawson turned again
I

to the problem of Sanchez's removal from the Cabinet.

Earlier

in the day, Morales had asked Dawson to inform the Foreign
Minister that his resignation would be sought.

In this way

the President would be spared the embarrassment of confronting
I

his loyal supporter and, in addition, it was felt that Dawson,
under the circumstances, would probably be the only one who
. could find S~chez.

Upon returning to the· Legation, Dawson

found the Foreign Minister waiting for him.

Taking the news

I

well, Sanchez offered to resign, provided his safety was guaranteed and that he would be given a foreign post.
agreed to these terms.

Morales

However, skichez's premature publica-

tion of the conditions of his resignation led to further division
of the Cabinet and the threat on the part of the Minister of
71
the Interior to have the former Foreign Minister arrested.
I

Dawson's own attitude to the Sanchez matter was

~imply

I

to see that Sanchez left the country as soon as possible following his resignation.
71 Ibid.

Although S~chez, who felt his life
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endangered, asked for asylum in the United States Legation;
Dawson refused to become involved.
I

To do so, he believed,

.

might convince Caceres that he did not enjoy the United States
I

I

Minister's trust, thereby endangering Dawson's own moral ascendency over the "simple minded, slow thinking, loyal and
brave though violent and inexperienced" Vice President. 72 GrantI

ing asylum to Sanchez might also give the impression that Dawson was siding with the Horacistas' opponents.

The sooner

I

Sanchez left, the sooner a continuing source of friction between
'
Morales and ciceres would be removed. 73
The events of the last week of November and the first
week of December further strengthened Dawson's conviction,
which he had expressed in his July memorandum to President
Roosevelt, that the modus vivendi rested on insecure foundations.
Endemic civil war and partisan rivalries had eroded the authority
of government officials and party leaders over their followers.
This shortcoming became particularly evident in time of crises.
In addition, the leaders themselves, Dawson believed, demonstrated
a political ineptness.

He reported that he was

more convinced than ever the Dominican statesmen--even the
best of them--lack the training which is valuable in the
practical conduct of a modern Government, and that a spirit
of respect for law, order and regular responsible administration is almost absent. Some of them talk fluently,
intelligently and reasonably on the subject, but it is mere
theory. In times of stress they practically revert to more
primitive ways of thinking and acting.
In a word they are like children and plain speaking,
coupled with a careful observance of the amenities, is
72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.
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necessary in dealing with them. They are prone to ask·for
foreign advice when they get into snarls, but are apt to
misconstrue the spirit in which it is given, and to rush
to the conclusion that the foreigner is either with or
against their particular faction. Instinctively they recognize their own limitations, although their Spanish pride
will never let them explicitly admit it. When advice is
given, they usually act on it, but never admit that they
do so. They are more concerned with the form than the substance, offering in this a curious contrast to Americans
and Englishmen. Though in their hearts they may hate and
fear us, at bottom they have a singularly implicit belief
that we do not lie, which governs their actions except
when their suspicions a?! accidentally aroused or when they
lose their heads • • • •
Following the excitement of the sixth and the storm over
the resignation of scfnchez, a temporary calm fell over Dominican
politics.

Emiliano Tejera was appointed to be the new Foreign
Minister, a choice which Dawson thought was excellent. 75 Vice
President ciceres again departed for the northern part of the
country, leaving affairs in the capital in the charge of the
President and the· Cabinet. 76 All things considered, Dawson
reported that he was daily becoming more convinced that Morales
and the Horacistas had finally come to a working agreement. 77
Actually the calm was deceptive and Dawson's confidence
poorly founded.

By the twenty-first, rumors were circulating

I

that Caceres was headed for Puerto Plata to remove the non74 Ibid.
75 nawson to Secretary of State, December 20, 1905, No.
198, FRUS, 1905, p. 409.
76 nawson to Secretary of State, December 20, 1905,
No. 199, ~., p. 410.
77 nawson to Root, December 15, 1905, No. 197, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
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I

I

aoracista governor of that province, Fermin Perez.

Though ·the

I

rumors apparently lacked substance, Governor Perez precipitated a show down by attempting to arrest the commander of the
port who was a Horacista.

The result was that Morales himself
I
18
issued a decree removing Perez.
If Dawson or any of the Horacistas construed Morales'
action against P~rez as indicating the President's complete

submission to the Horacista Party, they were sorely mistaken.
On Sunday, December 24, about seven o'clock in the evening,

Morales casually left the capital on the pretext of attending a
Christmas Eve dinner.

Two or three miles from the city he

was met by a band of twenty-five or thirty men.

The President

i

and his associates then proceeded to take several government
horses from a nearby pasture and rode off to the west.

Morales'

intention was to 'setup a temporary capital~ dismiss the Cabinet
and form another one which would be loyal to him. 79 Unfortunately for Morales, his active participation in the coup was
thwarted when he fell from his horse on December 25, and broke
his leg. 80
Horacista and Jimenista reaction to the President's move
crystalized quickly.

By ten o'clock on the evening of the

twenty-fourth, Morales' flight was known in the capital.

Early

78 nawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1906,.No.
202, FROS, 1906, Part 1, pp. 536-37.
79 rbid., pp. 538-39.
80 nawson to Secretary of State, January 16, 1906, No.
203, FROS, 1906, Part 1, p. 544.
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the next day about a hundred government troops were sent after
him.

I

Vice President Caceres was sununoned back to the capital

by the Cabinet to take charge of the executive and Congress

I

I

was convened in order to impeach the President.

In the mean-

time, Morales had been joined by local Jimenista leaders and
there was a simultaneous uprising by the Jimenistas in Monte
Cristi. 81 The Jimenista forces received re-inforcements and
supplies at the Government's expense when the Dominican gun
boat Independencia defected to Monte Cristi while on a supply
,
82
mission to the port of Sanchez.
Within a week, it became apparent that the combined
Morales coup and Jimenista uprising were doomed to failure.
January 2, the Jimenista forces launched attacks
Plata and Santiago.

On

against Puerto

In both instances the Government's forces

successfully defended their positions, and.in the attack against
I

Puerto Plata, the·Jimenistas lost General Demetrio Rodriguez,
one of their most capable leaders. 83 The inability of the
revolutionaries to gain control of any customhouse, or to obtain
supplies from the outside, coupled with Morales' disability and
the effective and prompt action of the Cabinet probably helps
to account for the quick failure of the revolution.
81 oawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1906, No.
202, ibid., pp. 538, 540.
82 Ibid., p. 540.
83 oawson to Secretary of State, January 16, 1906, No.
203, ibid.
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At any rate, by January 3, Dawson had received a letter
from Morales asking the United States Minister to intervene on
I

his behalf in return for which he promised to resign and go
into exile.

Despite the President's flight and intrigues with

the Jimenistas, which constituted a breach of his earlier promises not to break with the Horacistas and plunge the country
into revolution, Dawson decided to use his influence in an
effort to save Morales' life and bring the insurrection to an
end without further damaging the reputation of the Dominican
Republic "in the eyes of the civilized world." 84 Therefore, he
approached Foreign Minister Tejera and Vice President C~ceres
on the possibility of a guarantee for Morales' life, in return
I

-

for the President's resignation and exile.

After initial reluc-

tance prompted by doubts on the legality of accepting a presi-

.

dent's resignation while he was under an indictment of impeach/

ment, Caceres agreed to the arrangement.

Thereupon, Dawson

I

contacted the Spanish and French charges d'affaires, M. Flandrin
/

and Sr. Albinana, and asked them to accompany him to Caceres'
office in order to receive the Vice President's verbal promise
to the conditions.

Once this had been accomplished, Dawson

and the other two diplomats began the rather long and difficult
process of contacting the fugitive Morales.

Finally, on the

night of January 11, the Spanish charg~ located the President
near the capital and escorted him to the city, where he took
84 Dawson to Root, January 16, 1906, No. 203, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15.
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asylum in· the United States Legation.

Once there, he submitted

his resignation, and Dawson transmitted it to the Cabinet.
.

'

Throughout the next day, Flandrin and Albinana stayed with
Morales, while Dawson made arrangements for the former president's exile.

Early that afternoon, the injured Morales, accom-

panied by Dawson, Flandrin, Albinana, and Foreign Minister Tejera,
left the United States Legation and headed for the wharf.

The

Government supplied a strong guard as a precautionary measure
against any demonstration either favorable or hostile to the
ex-president.
the

u.s.s.

From the city wharf, Morales was carried out to
Dubuque, which took him to San Juan, Puerto Rico. 85

By the middle of January, the major part of the insur1

rection was over.
surrendered.

On the fourteenth, the Independencia had

Furthermore, before going into exile, Morales

. had given Dawson a note, at the latter's request, to transmit
to the Jimenista leaders in Monte Cristi, calling upon them to
lay down their arms.

The reception of this note and the advance

of government troops probably prompted Governor Arias to agree
to surrender on the bases of a restoration of the virtually
autonomous conditions which had existed in the province prior
to the revolution.

The Government, desiring to terminate once

and for all this independent status, refused to grant these
terms.

A prison break, staged by the Horacistas who had been

jailed in Monte Cristi and their seizure of the citadel, coupled
with the arrival of government troops persuaded Arias and his
85 Ibid.
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major supporters to take refuge on the United States naval ·
vessel stationed at the port. 86 Although guerrilla warfare
continued for sometime afterwards in the province, with the
I

I

flight of the principal Jimenista leaders from Monte Cristi,
the major threat to the Government ended.
Once the revolution was all but over, Dawson's main
I

anxiety was for the continued stability of the Caceres Government.

The insurrection had been less damaging to the Govern-

ment than previous uprisings; nevertheless, as a result of the
revolutionary disturbances, the Government had found it necessary
to enlarge the size of the military forces under the commands
of the various provincial governors.

Dawson hoped that these

forces would be reduced as soon as possible, lest the governors
use their increased forces to weaken the central government. 87
There was also the danger that the.continuing factionalism
within the Horacista Party, which in part was now caused by the
I

dislike of some for Finance Minister Velasquez and President
I

Caceres, might destroy the tenuous stability which the Government's victory had recently secured.

In addition, President

c/.ceres, according to Dawson, was without ambition and to some
degree lacked self-confidence.
opposed to resigning in favor of

He, therefore, was not at all
so~e

one upon whom the Horacistas

86 oawson to Secretary of State, January 16, 1906, No.
203, FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 546.
87 oawson to Root, February 2, 1906, No. 211, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, ·roll 15.
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cou ld Join

I

In early February, Caceres announced

that he had determined to resign and that former president
I

.

!

Horacio Vasquez, the nominal head of the Horacista Party, would
accept the presidency. 89 Despite his recognition of ciceres'
definite limitations as a party leader and an administrator,
Dawson was not in favor of the change. 90 In the first place
he felt that any change in the Government was dangerous.

Second-

/

ly, he knew that Caceres supported the convention of February 7,
1905.

I

Horacio Vasquez's position on this matter was uncertain.

Dawson, nevertheless, thought it best that he express no opinion
I

on the question of Caceres' resignation.

Instead, he leftthe
I

events take their course, and members of Caceres' own party
I

prevailed upon him to serve out the remainder of the presidential
term.
ff .

.0

1~.

I

Finally, Caceres relented and agreed to continue in
91
The continued peace of the Republic, Dawson was con-

vinced, depended on three factors.

First of all, it was necessary

that the principal leaders of the Horacista Party and the Government be in agreement.

Secondly, the insurgents had to be denied

the supply of munitions.

Finally, the possibility of the customhouses falling into revolutionary hands had to be prevented. 92
88 Ibid.
89 Dawson to Root, February 15, 1906,
90 Dawson to Root, March 8, 1906, No.
91 Dawson to Root, February 15, 1906,
to Root, March 8, 1906, No. 233, ibid.
92 Dawson to Root, April 2, 1906, No.

No. 218, ibid.
233, ibid.
No. 218; Dawson
236, ibid.
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The last two objectives were fairly well secured by United
States control of the customhouses under the modus vivendi and
an embargo on the shipment of all fire arms and amunition from
the United States to the Dominican Republic, which had been in
~ffect since mid-October, 1905. 93
In order to aid in soothing the f actionalsim among the
Horacistas and to end any misconception concerning United States
interference in Dominican domestic politics, Dawson took the
I

opportunity of Horacio Vasquez's visit to the capital in March
to meet with the former president.

Dawson thought that he had

I

succeeded in convincing Vasquez of the United States' neutrality in the internal political problems of the Republic.
/

Further-

I

more, he was convinced that Vasquez would offer no opposition
so long as the convention was pending. 94
Although the Jimenista opposition was prevented from
obtaining munitions with any degree of facility and continually
denied any hope of taking control of the customhouses, armed
opposition to the Government continued on a diminished scale in
the province of Monte Cristi. 95 Elsewhere, open revolutionary
activity was apparent. 96 In dealing with its opponents, the
Government took stern measures, arresting several of the leaders
93 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 19, 1905, No.
177, FRUS, 1905, pp. 398-99.
94 Dawson to Root, April 2, 1906, No. 236, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15.
95 nawson to Root, July 24, 1906, No. 270, ibid.
96 Dawson to Root, May 22, 1906, personal, ibid.
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in direct violation of its promise in January to grant amnesty
to all the revolutionaries.

On the one hand, Dawson did not

think that the oppressive measures of the Government would re'

I

I

I

sult in a major danger to the stability of the Government, even
though there was opposition to its harsh methods.

He reasoned

that the oppressive tactics were not as severe as the country
had previously been used to. 97 On the other hand, he reported
that he attempted to encourage those members of the Government
who favored amnesty. 98
Even though he did not foresee an immediate danger to
the Government, Dawson, nevertheless, did believe that the
continued factionalism among the Horacistas and the action of
the Jimenista opposition within the Republic and the rumors of
inuninent invasion by the exiles were helping to weaken the
Government. 99 He may have been correct in.this evaluation.
However, it was also true that between October, 1905 and February, 1906 the Dominican Government had successfully passed
through a very critical period.

In spite of factional division

within the Government and revolution on the part of the opposition, the constitutional government had survived, somewhat
changed in composition but still intact.
Throughout the period of factional bickering from October,

•

to the time of Morales' flight from the capital on December 24,
97 Dawson to Root, April 2, 1906, No. 236, ibid.
98 Dawson to Root, May 22, 1906, personal, ibid.
99 Dawson to Root, May 21, 1906, No. 251, ibid.
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Dawson claimed that he refused to take sides or to interfer in
the internal politics of the Dominican Republic.

Nevertheless,

his claim of non-interference in Dominican domestic politics was
more apparent than real.

The facts that both sides in the dis-

pute consulted him and requested his presence at the meetings
between them attest to Dawson's impartiality.

But the mere

fact that he was so consulted indicated that even had he wanted
to, he could not have avoided involvement in the internal politics of the Republic.

United States support of the modus

vivendi and the pending protocol already constituted interference
into the affairs of the Dominican Republic and necessarily made
the United States Resident Minister one of the most important
\

men in the Dominican capital and certainly the most important
diplomat there.

Furthermore, while it would appear that his

urging of compromise and moderation on both sides helped to
prolong the uneasy Morales-Horacista coalition, this urging itself constituted an involvement in the internal affairs of the
country.

This in no way implies that Dawson exceeded the wishes

of his superiors.
instructions.

Such action was within the scope of his

Dawson had been instructed to do what he could

to keep harmony among the factions; but, he was also told that
the United States could not become involved in the internal disputes of the Dominican Republic.

The problem was one of deter-

mining what constituted interference in Dominican internal
affairs.

To Dawson and to Secretary of State Root, urging har-

mony between the factions did not, whereas taking sides did.
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The revolution of late December and early January perhaps

illustrates the impact of United States involvement in

the Dominican Republic.

!

There can be little doubt that the

modus vivendi and the success of the Cabinet were closely connected.

The uninterrupted operation of the modus vivendi for

almost nine months had provided the Government with adequate
funds to meet the emergency and had denied these funds to the
opposition.

In addition, the fact that United States citizens

were in control of the customhouses prevented them from falling
into the hands of the revolutionaries.

The seizure of a custom-

house by the Jimenistas would certainly have led to armed intervention to protect the North Americans who were working there.
i

Given these conditions, the question arises of why did
the Jimenistas decide to revolt in late December, 1905.

The

_possible key to the answer may lie with President Morales.
Above and beyond his

host~lity

to the Horacistas, Morales had

another quality which may have made him attractive to the Jimenistas.

Since Morales was constitutional president, was it not

possible then that the United States Minister and the Government
in Washington might continue to recognize him as the head of
the Government and thus lend support to the Jimenista cause?
If this were the case, Dawson's attitude was crucial, and he
chose to continue to support the Horacista dominated Cabinet.
At the time of Morales' flight in December, Dawson took the
I

position that the questions of the legal right of Caceres to
succeed Morales and of the continuation of the Government were

r
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primarily points of Dominican constitutional law.

His rea·son-

ing on this matter was put forth in a despatch on the revolution
dated January 2, 1906.

Dawson wrote:
I

I

I

The cabinet formerly named by President Morales is still
in possession and exercising their functions. The only
power given the President by the Dominican constitution is
that of naming and removing the cabinet ministers. Once
named they are the executive, and until they are removed or
attempted to be removed by either Morales or Caceres, or
are expelled from the capital and government offices, the
question of who has the right to remove them is largely
academic.100
This was not always, however, Dawson's position.

In

November, he had noted that his letter of credence was directed
to Morales as president, and on December 3, he had wired for
instructions concerning the landing of marines without

the

explicit statement from the Dominican Government that it was
unable to provide protection for the United States nationals,
in the event Morales was somehow removed from the scene.

As

has already been mentioned, his reasoning then was that with
Morales removed no constitutional government would exist.
can this change of view be explained?

How

There is no conclusive

explanation, but there are several possibilities.
One possible explanation might be that Dawson had not
read the Dominican constitution prior to his telegram of December 3, but had read it prior to his despatch of January 2.

Al-

though up to December 3, Dawson makes no mention of having read
or not having read the constitution, it would be very surprising
lOODawson to Secretary of State, January 2, 1906, No.
202, FROS, 1906, Part 1, p. 539.
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if he had not read it.

He had made a study of the Dominican

financial affairs, had some acquaintance with the historical
development of the country, and had become thoroughly familiar
with Dominican politics and politicians.

It would, thus, be

absurd to think that, under these conditions, he had not become
acquainted with the fundamental law of the Republic.
A second possibility might be that in early December,
Dawson thought that a complete break between Morales and the
Horacistas would result in the disintegration of the Government.
But this is not the indication he had given in the December 3
telegram.

Therefore, it would seem that he did not particularly

foresee the dissolution of the Cabinet, and, thus a government
I

would still have existed according to his later interpretation.
Perhaps the most logical explanation is that in early

.

. December he thought that direct United States intervention would
be necessary if Morales were forced out, but by the end of the
month, he no longer considered this either necessary or desirable or in accord with his instructions.

Dawson's doubts con-

cerning the Horacistas support of the protocol, his attitude
towards Dominican politicians in general, his conviction of the
necessity of the protocol in particular, the succession of
events between December 3 and December 24, and the instructions
he received from the State Department have to be taken into
account in explaining this change.
To begin with, within his own definition of the term
Dawson seems to have been sincere in his desire not to become
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involved in the internal Dominican politics.

However, he was

anxious to see to it that there was a legal basis for intervention to protect the operation of the modus vivendi.

Moreover,

he also considered the Morales faction to be the strongest
supporters of the protocol and he did harbor doubts concerning
the firmness with which the Horacistas would support the agreement if they could find an alternative.

But, it is to be noted

that prior to sending the telegram of December 3, Dawson had
been informed by the Horacista leaders of their willingness to
quarantee the ratification of the protocol provided it was so
amended to allow for congressional consultation on the question
of requesting United States assistance under the agreement.
From his statements concerning the Dominican politicians, it is
equally clear that Dawson had little faith in the average Dominican politician putting the welfare of his

~ountry

partisan interests when the two clashed.

Dawson himself, how-

ahead of his

ever, had become convinced that the only salvation for the
Dominican Republic was to be found in the protocol.

Therefore,

in early December, it is not unlikely that he may have placed
little faith in the Horacista promise and may have thought that
once Morales was forced out there would be little certainty not
only of continued support for the protocol, but also that the
Horacistas would ask for assistance in maintaining the operation
of the modus vivendi.

Consequently, United States intervention

might be necessary to protect the modus vivendi without the consent of the Dominican Government, and it might serve to strengthen
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the Morales faction if a complete break came.
Between December 3 and December 24, several events
occurred that may have c·aused him to change his mind.

I

After

1

slnchez's exit from the Cabinet, the office of Foreign Minister
was filled by Emiliano Tejera, who had long been in favor of
the agreement with the United States and had recently reaffirmed his support of it.

Therefore, by the end of December,

it is probable that the Horacista pledge of continued support
for the protocol appeared to have more substance.

In contrast

to this, Morales who had been firmly in back of the treaty, and
as far as any one knew still was, had, by his flight, now found
his chief support among the Jimenistas, who had been opposed to
the treaty or at best accepted it with the greatest reluctance.
Of course, it is possible that Jimenista opposition primarily
came from identifying the treaty with the Government which they
were trying to oust.
this.

But there is no way of being certain of

Certainly Dawson, in spite of his conviction that any

government would ultimately come around to the position of
accepting the treaty as necessary, would have found it difficult
to expect a Jimenista backed government, even with Morales at its
head, to be favorable to the treaty.

Therefore, after the

flight of Morales on December 24 and the Jimenista uprising,
the Horacista dominated Cabinet would seem to have offered the
pest security for eventual implementation of the treaty and the
continuance of the modus vivendi.
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Furthermore, even if he could have counted on a Morales
lead-Jimenista supported government to support the protocol and
•

I

the modus vivendi, Dawson probably would have been discouraged
from requesting authorization to intervene.

During the excite-

ment of December 6, when it was thought that the United States
was planning to land troops at Santo Domingo City, a violent
anti-Yankee sentiment became apparent.

In reporting the events

of the sixth, Dawson attributed this sentiment to the mistaken
belief that the marines were actually planning to land and intervene in the quarrel between Morales and the Horacistas.

He

further noted that the reaction of the populace "also indicated
that in their hearts this people dearly values its independence
I

and would sacrifice their lives in a struggle to preserve it
even though they well know that such a struggle would be hope. less."lOl

However, in the same report, he· also stated that he

believed the intesity of the popular reaction resulted from
circulation·of rumors among the lower classes that United States
"occupation or annexation means their oppression, enslavement
and even extermination," and that displays of anti-United States
sentiment following December 6 had been confined to young men
and "members of the lower classes. 11102 Certainly then, Dawson
undoubtedly was aware of the presence of an anti-Yankee feeling
among the people; but it would also appear that he may

h~ve

101Dawson to Root, December 15, 1905, No. 197, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
l0 2 Ibid.
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considered it of little importance since it was confined to
socially unimportant individuals.

Nevertheless, he was anxious

to have a naval vessel c"iose by jus't in case it were needed to
protect United States citizens in the capita1. 103 If he did
underestimate public sentiment in early December, Dawson could
not overlook its presence after Morales fled from the capital.
By the twenty-seventh he had received word that United States
citizens in the interior of the country were frightened that
.
104
they would be harmed if marines were landed.
On the twenty-

'

eighth, he wired the Secretary of State that the French charge

d'affaires had offered to have a French war ship sent to aid in
protecting the lives of foreigners, thus eliminating any danger
I

to them which might result from the landing of North American
troops. 105 Therefore, fear of causing a popular uprising against
United States citizens and their holdings in the Dominican
Republic may have acted to discourage Dawson from considering
military intervention.
Even if this fear did not discourage him, the instructions he was receiving from the Secretary of State would have
caused him to think twice before requesting permission to land
marines.

For his part, Secretary of State Root fully concurred
lOJibid.

104 Dawson to Secretary of State, telegram received
December 27, 1905, FRUS, 1905, p. 411.
105 Dawson to Secretary of State, telegram received
December 29, 1905, ibid., p. 411.
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with Dawson's concept of non-interference in the internal
political affairs of the Dominican Republic: that is, not taking
sides in the factionalism but urging both sides to be moderate
and to compromise.

i

I

In fact, as has been noted, Dawson's

actions on this point were based on his instructions from the
State Department.

Nevertheless, Root made it clear that the

United States would not insist on the continuation of the modus
vivendi if the Dominicans did not want it continued, nor would
the United States intervention, if necessary, go beyond protecting the lives and property of United States citizens. 106
When Root received Dawson's telegram containing the French offer
to lend assistance lest United States intervention result in
harm to foreigners in the Dominican Republic, the Secretary of
State replied that the restrictions he had earlier placed on
United States intervention--landing of troops only when necessary to protect lives and property of United States citizens
and to be confined to that task alone--were to be strictly observed.

"In that case," Root maintained, "there will be no land-

ing of troops under any such circumstances as to justify apprehension of danger to [the) lives of foreigners. 11107 These
instructions could leave little doubt that the State Department
was not interested in intervening either to maintain the modus
106 secretary of State to Dawson, December 6, 1905,
telegram, ibid., p. 408.
107 secretary of State to Dawson, December 29, 1905,
telegram, ibid., p. 411.
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vivendi against the Dominican Government's wishes or to support
one of the factions in the Morales-Horacista dispute.
•

I

Whatever the explanation for Dawson's change of mind
concerning the effect of Morales' presence on the constitutionality
of the Dominican Government, his principal objective seems to
have remained the same: maintain a government in power that
would continue to support the convention signed with the United
States.

Following the restoration of order in Janaury, the

continuation of this policy can be seen in Dawson's preference
I

I

of Caceres' retention of office as opposed to Vasquez's ascension to the presidency, and in his attempts to strengthen
I

·

I

the Caceres Government by trying to convince Vasquez that the
I

United States was truly neutral in matters of Dominican internal
politics, and by urging of moderation upon the Government in
dealing with its Jimenista opponents.

In pursuing this course,

Dawson was undoubtedly motivated by the conviction that the
modus vivendi and the protocol of the treaty February 7# 1905,
eliminated a vexing international problem brought about by the
Dominican debt.

But certainly his support of the treaty, with

its sanction of United States interference in the financial
affairs of the Dominican Republic, also came from his broader
view that the treaty and the modus vivendi offered the Republic
financial and political stability, and economic prosperity.

r
CHAPTER VIII
MISSION COMPLETED:
MAY, 1906 - MAY, 1907
By February, 1906, although a year had passed since
the representatives of the United States and the Dominican Republie had signed the protocol of the treaty, it had not yet been
ratified by the United States Senate.

Despite this delay, the

Dominican Government, anxious to secure its ratification, apparently still regarded the protocol as the solution to the
Republic's international financial problems.

In February, 1906,

Foreign Minister Tejera asked Dawson what the United States
would do if the convention were rejected by the Senate.

While

the Dominican Government was willing to continue devoting fiftyfive per cent of its revenues to the payment of its debts,
Tejera feared that if the treaty were rejected, the European
creditors would demand control of the ports which they had been
guaranteed under the various protocols.

At any rate, the Domi-

nican Government would be unable to hold its customhouses against
either European intervention or revolutionary forces.

Dawson

refused, however, to discuss what position the United States
would take in the event of senatorial rejection.

He told

Tejera that instructions would be sent from the Department of
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state when the time required.

1

Not all the members of the Horacista Party concurred
with the Government's continued support of the convention.
some argued that the treaty should be rejected.

They used the

success of the modus vivendi as proof that the Dominican Republie could make its own arrangement with its creditors for a
settlement of the debts.

In view of Tejera's statement that

the Government would not be able to prevent either the European
creditors or revolutionaries from seizing the customhouses,
Dawson was probably correct in observing that those who argued
thusly were insincere.

He thought that if they were once re-

sponsible for the government, they would accept the protocol
without question rather than face the certainty of being overthrown if it were rejected. 2 This argument also overlooked the
fact that the modus vivendi itself constituted United States
interference in the affairs of the Dominican Republic and that
North American support for the agreement was what made it
successful.
Whatever the advantages of the modus vivendi, it was
only a temporary expedient.

Notwithstanding Dawson's optimistic

report of July 1, 1905, on the beneficial effects of the modus
vivendi, after having been in operation for a year, certain
1 Dawson to
Root, February 15,
Republic, vol. 15,
2 Dawson to

Root, February 15, 1906, No. 218; Dawson to
1906, personal, Despatches from the Dominican
roll 15.
Root, April 19, 1906, No. 241, ibid.
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defects in the arrangement were becoming apparent.

In the first

place, it was beginning to have an adverse effect on the Dominican economy.

In his memorandum to President Roosevelt in July,

1905, Dawson had reported that the peace the modus vivendi
had brought to the Dominican Republic by denying the customhouses
to the revolutionaries, and thereby discouraging revolutions,
had led to an increase in production in the Republic.

In July,

1906, Dawson had an opportunity to make a fairly extensive tour
of the Republic and from his observations and from the reports
that he received, he was able to report that the economic
improvement he had reported the previous year was continuing.
Only in Monte Cristi did the economy remain stagnant. 3
Nevertheless, it was also becoming apparent to Dawson
that the modus vivendi was also having a slow, but still very
present, enervating effect on the economy.

The monthly removal

from the country of fifty-five per cent of the revenues collected in the customhouses, he reported, was beginning to hamper
. 1 opera t'ions. 4
commercia

He thought that it would not be un-

reasonable to suspect that a shortage of circulating currency
would exist by September, 1906. 5 Dawson was particularly concerned over the fact that this lack of currency might have a
3oawson to Root, July 24, 1906, No. 269, ibid.
4 Dawson to Secretary of State, May 10, 1906, No. 247,
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 561.
5 Dawson to Root, July 24, 1906, No. 269, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15.
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harmful effect on the small farmers.

He saw a definite connection

between the prosperity and the increase in this class and permanent peace in the country.

In May, 1906, he expressed his

view on this subject in a despatch to the Secretary of State.
Dawson wrote:
The longer I live in this country the more confident I
am that the danger from the professional revolutionary class
can be temporarily eliminated by keeping the customhouses
out of their reach. But back of the danger from this class
is the possibility of a revolution caused by sheer poverty.
That is the real reason ~onte Cristi is such a dangerous
Province, and the fall of Heureaux was due to his extravagance, which led to his interfering with the currency and
the consequent ruin of the small producer and laborer.6
The possibility of a critical lack of currency and subsequent
injury to the Dominican economy were factors, among others,
which Dawson believed should be taken into consideration in
formulating the State Department's attitude towards a Dominican
law which appeared to alter the modus vivendi by authorizing
the diversion of thirty per cent of the export duties for the
construction by the Dominicans of a railroad line between the
two inland cities of Santiago and Moca. 7
A second defect in the modus vivendi was that no provision was made for the distribution of the funds placed in
trust for the creditors.

By the early spring of 1906, some of

the foreign creditors appeared anxious to have the sum which
6 Dawson to the Secretary of State, May 10, 1906, No.
247, PRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 562.
7 Ibid., p. 561.
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had accumulated in New York divided among themselves. 8

Ini-

tially, Dawson did not seem to favor any division prior to the
ratification of the treaty.

His position is explained both

by the lack of any instructions from Washington and by what he
considered to be the difficulty of determining what percentage
each creditor would receive. 9 However, he slowly came around
to believing that the continued presence of a large sum in New
York actually served as temptation for potential revolutionaries
to attempt to overthrow the Government in order to get hold of
the money.

In addition, he believed that an actual payment to

the creditors would serve to convince those Dominican politicians
who continued to oppose the treaty "that no backward step is
practicable. 1110 By May 22, 1906, Dawson was writing the Secretary of State, asking if the Department had considered persuading the creditors to reach a voluntary agreement with the
Dominican Government over the division of the sum already held
in New York.

He thought that the Dominicans would agree to

such an arrangement provided that the Italian creditors and the
Improvement Company did not demand a division based on the
yearly payments which they had been promised. 11
8Dawson to Root, April 4, 1906, No. 239; Dawson to Root,
April 18, 1906, No. 240, Despatches from the Dominican Republic,
vol. 15, roll 15.
9 Dawson to Root, April 18, 1906, No. 240, ibid.
10 Dawson to Root, April 19, 1906, No. 241, ibid.
11 oawson to Root, May 22, 1906, personal, ibid.
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In fact, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance
did attempt to reach a voluntary agreement with the creditors
on the proportional division of the trust fund. 12 At the end
of May, the Cabinet, encouraged by reports received from the
Dominican Minister in Washington, decided to send Minister
I

Velasquez to Washington in order to consult with Secretary of
State Root and Professor Hollander on the possibility of making
some voluntary arrangement for the settlement or refunding of
the debt. 13 When Vel~squez departed on June 9, he evidently
had been instructed to secure some agreement which would allow
for refunding and reduction of the debt, without submitting
each debt to the investigation of a commission. 14
In Washington, Secretary of State Root had apparently
been thinking along lines similar to those which Dawson and
the Dominican Government were following.
lem, however, was somewhat larger.

His view of the prob-

By achieving a voluntary

adjustment of the debt through an agreement between the Dominican Government and the creditors, Root hoped to remove some
of the objections which had been brought up in the Senate against
the protocol.

This would not end the need of a treaty because

the debt adjustment would be contingent upon a convention by
12 Dawson to Secretary of State, June 9, 1906, No. 256,
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 563.
13 Ibid., p. 564. "Chronology of Political Events in
Santo Domingo," FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 599.
1411 Chronology of Political Events in Santo Domingo,"
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, p. 599.
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which the United States would guarantee the servicing of the
debt.

The advantage lay in the fact that the United States

would be relieved of the burden of supervising the adjustment
of the debt. 15
I

During the summer of 1906, Velasquez and Hollander devised a plan for the adjustment of the various debts and claims
against the Republic.

All were reduced, depending on their
character, from ten to ninety per cent. 16 In addition, Vel~squez and Hollander concluded negotiations with Kuhn, Loeb and
Company of New York for the purchase of $20,000,000 worth of
five per cent bonds at the rate of 96 per cent of their face
value.

The Morton Trust Company, also of New York, was to act

as the fiscal agent of the Dominican Republic.

The contract

with Kuhn, Loeb and Company was contingent on the Dominican
Republic and the United States entering into and ratifying,
prior to April 1, 1907, a treaty whereby the United States
would agree to supervise the collection of the Dominican customs during the life of the bond issue.

Furthermore, creditors'

acceptance of the debt adjustment was required.

Upon the satis-

factory fulfillment of these provisions, the Kuhn, Loeb and
Company would buy the bonds issued by the Dominican Government.
15 Root to Eollander, May 7, 1906; Root to William N.
Cohen, June 18, 1906, Root Papers, part 2, Letter Books:
February 16-0ctober 16, 1906, pp. 223, 358, Container 186.
These letters are also quoted in Philip c. Jessup's biography
of Elihu Root. Philip c. Jessup, Elihu Root, Vol. I (New
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938), pp~ 546-47.
16
Munro, ~· cit., p. 119.
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The money thus obtained would be deposited with the Morton Trust
company, which would in turn pay off the various claimants
and creditors.

Concessions which had been granted by previous

Governments would also be bought back.

The remainder of the

amount on deposit with the Trust Company would be used by the
Dominican Government to defray the cost of issuing the bonds
.
17
. t erna 1 improvements.
an d f or in

Secretary of State Root, who was touring Latin America
after attending the opening sessions of the Pan-American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro, found no objection with the
agreement between the Dominican Government and Kuhn, Loeb and
Company, but felt that an agreement with the creditors would
help to produce a favorable impression on the Congress. 18 On
September 27, Hollander left for Europe in order to secure the
consent of the major European creditors to the plan which he
I
19
and Velasquez had formulated.
By the last week of October,
he had succeeded in obtaining his immediate objective: the
consent of the Belgian and French creditors, and one of the
1711 The Republic of Santo Domingo and Kuhn, Loeb & Co.:
Agreement for a Government Loan," (signed September 11, 1906);
"An Agreement Between the Republic of Santo Domingo and the
Morton Trust Company," (signed September 11, 1906), Numerical
File 1199/1-2, Files of the Department of State, Record Group
59, National Archives, Washington, D. c.
(Hereafter numerical
file references shall be cited merely as Numerical File with
the appropriate file and document numbers.)
18
unsigned telegram sent from Buenos Aires, August 21,
1906, Numerical File 1199/ 1/9.
19
Hollander to Adee, September 24, 1906, Numerical
File 1199/3.
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major Italian creditors.

20

This did not constitute all of' the

European creditors and, in spite of the continued opposition of
some, the State Department refused to consider altering the
21
debt adjustment plan.
The problem of dealing with the North American creditors
was left to the Dominican Government's financial representatives
in the United States, the Morton Trust Company and Messrs.
Stetson, Jennings and Russell of New York. 22 The Improvement
Company was opposed to the adjustment, but, again, the State
Department offered little sympathy. 23 The domestic creditors
/

of the Dominican Republic were to be handled by Velasquez, who
returned home in late September. 24
Since all of the negotiations prior to the first of
October had taken place either in the United States or in Europe,
Dawson did not have a part in them.

/

When Velasquez returned

to Santo Domingo City at the end of September, Dawson conferred
with him on the problem of getting the domestic creditors of
the Republic to accept the debt adjustment plan.

At that time,

20 Hollander to Root, telegrams, October 11, 1906,
October 16, 1906, October 19, 1906, October 25, 1906, Numerical File 1199/4-6, 8.
21
.t
Munro,~·~.,
p. 124 •
22 Hollander to Adee, September 24, 1906, Numerical
File 1199/3.
23
Munro, ~· cit., p. 124.
24 Hollander to Adee, September 24, 1906, Numerical
File 1199/3.
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. 25

neither of them foresaw any major problem from this quarter.

About this time, an event occurred which could have had
serious repercussions in the Dominican Republic.

On September

29, 1906, the United States intervened to assume control of the
Cuban government under the Platt Amendment.

This action could

have had disastrous effects upon the Dominican public, which
might have interpreted it as a mere preview of what lay in store
for their republic.

Consequently, Dawson closely observed

Dominican reaction to the news coming from Cuba.

The initial

reaction of the Dominicans to the Cuban intervention, Dawson
. d'ff
. d
reporte d , was one o f in
i erence. 26 In f act, h e was surprise
by "the lack of real sympathy among Dominicans for Cuba. 1127

He

did not foresee any drastic change in the Dominican attitude,
unless there were serious clashes between United States and
Cuban forces.

Even then, he did not think that the intervention

would necessarily be interpreted as an attempt to destroy
Cuban independence, or, by inference, as an indication of the
ultimate fate of the Dominican Republic itself. 28
In spite of these initial reports of Dominican indifference towards events in Cuba, some politicians who opposed the
United States' interference in Dominican affairs used it as a
25

Dawson to Root, personal, October 2, 1906, Numerical File 27/75.
26 Dawson to Root, October 2, 1906, No. 304, Numerical
File 27/74.
27 Dawson to Root, October 2, 1906, personal, Numerical
File 27/75.
28 Ibid.
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pretext to argue that the Dominican Republic would be deprived
29
The depth of this opposition is reflected
of its sovereignty.
in an article by Espaillat de la Mota, the congressional deputy
from La Vega.

To cope with United States intervention, he sug-

gested la doctrina del fosforo: distruction of North American
properties and extended guerrilla warfare, thereby making it
economically unfeasible for the United States to retain contro1. 30
Arguments against the policy of United States involvement in
Dominican financial affairs, however, had no more effect on the
Government when they were connected with the Cuban intervention
than prior to September, 1906.
Since the question of debt adjustment appeared about to
be settled without any apparent difficulty and since no other
major problem was immediately foreseeable, it seemed opportune
for Dawson to take a leave of absence. 31 It had been over a
year since he had a vacation and, for sometime, he had been
urging his superiors in the Department of State to grant him
permission to return to the United States for much needed
medical treatment.

Almost nine years in the tropics had taken

their toll on his health.

Shortly after coming to the Dominican

Republic, he developed tropical ulcers of the feet.

After his

29 colton to Taft, October 26, 1906, confidential,
Numerical File 27/126.
30 william H. Gale (U.S. consul at Puerto Plata) to
Assistant Secretary of State Bacon, November 12, 1906, No. 10,
enclosure: "La Doctrina Del Fosforo, Listin Diario, October 13,
1906, p. 2, Numerical File 27/130.
31 Dawson to Root, October 2, 1906, personal, Numerical
File 27/75.
11
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return from the United States in the fall of 1905, he had found
it difficult, if not impossible, to wear shoes, and merely
using his feet produced such a reaction that he was frequently
confined to bed for a few days at a time.

The only cure for

this ailment seemed to be an extended period in a cooler climate. 32
Permission for a leave was finally granted and on October 16,
Dawson left for the United States. 33
Shortly after his arrival in Washington, Dawson was
ordered back to Santo Domingo City. 34 Consequently his leave
was cut short and he left the United States, arriving in the
Dominican capital on Saturday, December 1, aboard a United
States naval vessel which had been sent to bring him from San
Juan, Puerto Rico. 35 It would seem that the principal objective of Dawson's sudden return to the Dominican Republic was
to investigate the slow pace with which the domestic creditors
32 Dawson to Bacon, September 3, 1906, personal,
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
33 Dawson to Root, August 12, 1908, No. 141, Numerical
File 2765/28. During Dawson's absence the United States Legation
in Santo Domingo was left in charge of Rosswitte E. Pollock who
was temporarily serving as clerk of the Legation. Pollock originally came to the Dominican Republic as a Weather Bureau Observer
in the employment of the United States Department of Agriculture.
When the clerk at the Legation resigned on August 15, 1906, Dawson
asked Pollock to fill the position temporarily, since his own
official duties with the Weather Bureau had been completed. Numerical File 2078 passim. Dawson to Bacon, September 3, 1906,
personal, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
34 oawson to Root, August 12, 1908, No. 141, Numerical
File 2765/28.
35 Pollock to Secretary of State, December 10, 1906,
Numerical File 27/151. Acting Secretary of the Navy to the
u.s.s. Marietta stationed at Santo Domingo City, November 23,
1906, telegram, Numerical File 27/147.
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were accepting the debt adjustment scheme.

There is some evidence

that Hollander and the officials in Washington were becoming
concerned over this matter. 36 During his brief stay of one
week, Dawson, who interviewed several prominent creditors,
concluded that the question of the domestic debt had virtually
been settled. 37 In fact, on December 5, Dawson wired the Department of State that the Dominican Government had issued a decree
fixing the terms of non-foreign debts. 38 If Dawson and his
superiors in Washington were convinced that there would be no
further problem with the domestic creditors, they were mistaken.
Dissatisfaction with the plan of debt settlement was still
strong in Puerto Plata, 39 and shortly after Dawson left, opposi40
tion to the settlement developed in the Cibao.
However, by
December 24, this opposition had apparently abated. 41
Upon his return to the United States on December 18,

42

36 Hollander to Root, December 7, 1906, Numerical File
1199/16.
37 colton to Secretary of War Taft, December 10, 1906,
Numerical File 1199/31.
38 Dawson to Secretary of State, December 5, 1906,
telegram, Numerical File 1199/15.
39 cornrnander w. F. Fullman, commanding officer of the
u.s.s. Marietta stationed at San Pedro de Macoris, D.R., to
Secretary of the Navy, December 26, 1906, Numerical File 27/158.
40 colton to Taft, December 10, 1906, Numerical File
1199/31.
41

vel~squez to Secretary of State, received December 24,
1906, telegram, Numerical File 1199/29.
42 oawson to Secretary of State, December 18, 1903 [sic],
telegram, Numerical File 2765/2. Bacon to Dawson, December 18,
1906, telegram, ibid.
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oawson continued working on matters connected with the debt
settlement.

It would seem that his attention was primarily

taken up with the case of the Vicini Claim which amounted to
$1,500,000 and had been reduced fifty per cent by the debt settlement.

This claim was based on a much smaller loan which had

been greatly inf lated as the result of an interest rate of two
per cent a month.

The original loan, made by an Italian subject,

had been inherited by his Dominican wife and children, who
had all been born in the Dominican Republic, and could thus be
considered Dominican nationals.

Nevertheless, since the original

loan was contracted by an Italian national, Finance Minister
I

Velasquez had been reluctant to include this claim in the decree
of early December, 1906, settling various domestic claims.
Subsequently, the Vicini heirs refused to accept the reduction
which the Dominican Government hoped to impose upon them; perhaps in part this refusal was founded on the hope of support
from the Italian Government. 43 Dawson consulted with Joubert,
the Dominican Minister in Washington, concerning the Vicini
claim, urging that he wire the Dominican Government to issue
another decree including this claim and others which had been
omitted from the earlier decree. 44 Since the debt adjustment
matters had been handled through Hollander, Joubert was reluctant
43 Dawson's memorandum for Root, December 27, 1906,
Numerical File 1199/32.
44 Dawson's memorandum on Santo Domingo, January 10,
1907, Numerical File 1199/39 1/2.
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to send the telegram, but advised that Hollander do so. 45

Hol-

lander was contacted and on January 11, the necessary telegram
was sent.

The supplementary decree fixing the remaining domes-

tic debts, whether the claimants had assented or not, was published on Monday, January 14, 1907. 46
In December, it was announced that Dawson had been
I

transferred from the Dominican Republic to Bogota, Colombia.

47

In spite of this announcement, there was still an important
matter to attend to in the Dominican Republic.

Although the

question of the debt adjustment had proceeded reasonably well,
there was still the problem of negotiating a new treaty, as
provided for in the contract between the Dominican Government
and Kuhn, Loeb and Company.

This treaty was to establish

United States collection of the custom revenues for the duration
of the bonds.

The officials in the State Department felt that

it would be better to entrust the negotiating of the treaty to
Dawson with his extensive knowledge of conditions in the Dominican Republic, rather than to the newly appointed Minister,
Fenton R. Mccreery, who was being promoted from the post of
48
Secretary of the United States Embassy in Mexico City.
45 Ibid.
46 Root to American Legation in Santo Domingo, January 11,
1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/35b. Pollock to Sec~etary
of State, January 12, 1907, Numerical File 1199/36.
47 Pollock to Root, December 26, 1906, No. 327, Numerical
File 27/154.
48
Root to Mccreery, January 17, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 3987/.
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Therefore, sometime during the second week of January, 1907,
oawson left the United States, arriving in the Dominican capital on January 23. 49 It would appear that he brought with him
a draft treaty which was to serve as the basis for further
.

.

nego t iations.

50

The telegrams exchanged between Dawson and Root during
the negotiations and the form of the treaty finally adopted,
indicate that Secretary of State Root hoped to obtain two major
objectives in the treaty which he entrusted to Dawson. 51
First, and most important was the object of securing United
States control over the collection of the Dominican custom
revenues for the life of the bonds.
of States:>ught to provide

th~

Secondly, the Secretary

United States Government with

guarantees that it would both have adequate authority to see
that funds would be available to pay off the debt contracted
by the bond issue and that the burden of administering Dominican financial affairs would be as brief as possible.

In order

to assure these guarantees, the treaty provided that the Demi49 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 24, 1907,
telegram, Numerical File 2765/4.
SOThis statement is based on Dawson's telegram to the
Secretary of State, on January 28, 1907 (Numerical File 1199/
48) in which Dawson refers to a draft treaty. The original
copy of the draft treaty does not seem to have been filed in
Numerical File 1199. However, it is quite clear from the
telegrams exchanged between Dawson and the Department of
State that the content of the draft treaty and the treaty
finally signed on February 8, 1907 were similar and that the
objectives of both were identical.
51

The ratified treaty appears in FRUS, 1907, Part 1,
pp. 307-309.
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nican debt would not be increased without the previous agreement
of the United States.

Nor would the Dominican Government be

allowed to alter its tariff scale without United States consent.
Moreover, the final clause of the first article provided that
if the sum collected in one year by the custom's receiver exceeded $3,000,000, one half of the surplus would be devoted
to a sinking fund to be used for the redemption of the bonds.

52

For their part, the Dominicans seemed also to have two
major objectives to obtain during the negotiations.

In the

first place, they were opposed to the necessity of gaining
United States sanction for the alteration of their tariff
schedules.

The Dominican position on this point was prompted

by three motives.

While they did not mention it, they undoubted-

ly hoped to retain as much independence in the control of their
financial affairs as was possible.

There was also the fear

that the United States might use the control over tariff revision for its own benefit. 53 Finally, to molify the Horacista
members of Congress who opposed the treaty, the Dominican Government thought it necessary to remove those phrases which blatantly indicated an infringment on Dominican sovereignty. 54
52 Root to Dawson, February 2, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/50.
53 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 1, 1907,
telegram, Numerical File 1199/50.
54 Dawson to Secretary of State, January 28, 1907,
telegram, Numerical File 1199/48. Dawson to Secretary of State,
February 6, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/55. Dawson to
Secretary of State, February 1, 1907, telegram, Numerical File
1199/50.
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The second major objective of the Dominican negotiators was to
provide as much money as possible for their Government's use.
This point had also come up in the earlier negotiations for the
protocols of January 21, 190S and February 7, 190S.

In order

to secure this objective, they were anxious to have some specific
limitation placed upon the expense of the general receiver of
customs, who would be appointed by the United States.SS

Fur-

thermore, they sought to have the final clause of article one,
which provided for the diversion of one half of the revenues in
excess of $3,000,000 for a sinking fund, to be changed so that
the revenues would have to be in excess of $4,000,000 before
funds could be put into the sinking fund, and then only one
third of the excess rather than one half would be diverted.s 6
Secretary of State Root was willing to concede to some
of the Dominican wishes.

Dawson was instructed to agree to
modify the offensive phraseologys 7 and to include a clause
limiting the expenses of the collector of customs.s 8 Nevertheless, the Secretary still insisted that the United States must
SSDawson to Secretary of State, January 28, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/48. Dawson to Root, February 3, 1907,
telegram, Numerical File 1199/Sl.
SGDawson to Secretary of State, February 1, 1907,
telegram, Numerical File 1199/SO.
s 7 Root t o American
.
. s an t o Domingo,
.
J anuary
Lega t'ion in
29, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/48.
SSibid. Root to Dawson, February 4, 1907, telegram,
Numerical File 1199/Sl.
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be consulted on, and agree to, any tariff change. 59

Root

argued that the United States did not gain any benefit from
the treaty, that it was not reasonable to expect to administer
a tariff for fifty years and not know what that tariff would
be, and that this provision did not allow the United States
to alter the Dominican tariff so as to favor North American
60
The Secretary of State further refused to alter the
trade.
clause concerning the diversion of funds in excess of $3,000,000
for the sinking fund.

He pointed out that this clause would

enable the Dominican Government possibly to end the debt and
thus the United States supervision in less than fifty years.
This, he maintained, should indicate to the Dominicans that
the United States did not intend to prolong or increase its
interference.

Moreover, Root noted that the Senate would not

be too pleased with the length for which the United States
bound itself under the treaty, and this clause would help persuade the senators that the term of service to the Dominican
Republic would, in fact, be shorter. 61
In spite of Root's insistence that the United States
must approve any tariff change, President ciceres maintained
59 Root t o American
.
.
.
s anto Domingo,
.
Legation
in
January
29, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/50.
60 Root to American
.
.
. s anto Domingo,
.
Legation
in
January
29, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/48. Root to Dawson,
February 2, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/50.
61
Root to Dawson, February 2, _1907, telegram, Numerical
File 1199/50.
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that he could not secure congressional ratification of the 'treaty
unless this provision was modified.

In view of the Secretary

of State's previous communications, Dawson evidently felt obliged to halt the negotiations and ask for an official refusal
. .
Governmen t • 62
f rom th e Dominican

This, of course, would have

led to the termination of the negotiations on the treaty and
the subsequent failure of the loan agreement.

It is doubtful

that Dawson really hoped to place the Dominican Government in
such dire straits.

Probably what he wished to do was to pres-

sure C~ceres into a¢cepting the United States' position.
Whatever Dawson's purpose, Root certainly was not ready
to end the negotiations.

On February 6, he instructed Dawson

to use his discretion and, if necessary, exclude from the treaty
the clause specifically requiring that the import duties not
be altered "except by previous agreement with the President of
the United States. 1163 Dawson, however, did not choose to avail
himself of this permission to consent to the Dominican wishes.
Instead, on February 8, he signed a treaty which still required
"previous agreement with the President of the United States"
for changing the Dominican tariff.

The Dominican representa1

tives, Foreign Minister Tejera and Finance Minister Velasquez,
in addition to signing the form of the treaty which Dawson signed,
62 oawson to Secretary of State, February 6, 1907,
telegram, Numerical File 1199/55.
63 Root to Dawson, February 6, 1907, telegram, Numerical
File 1199/50.
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also signed another form which was closer to that permitted by
Root on February 6.

Dawson thought it unadvisable to agree to

the alternate version without first consulting with Root; nevertheless, he agreed to explain the Dominican viewpoint to the
Secretary of State. 64
On February 9, Dawson left the Dominican capita1 65 and
arrived in Washington with the signed treaties on February 19. 66
After consulting with Secretary of State Root, it was decided
that the form of the treaty preferred by the Dominicans would
be accepted by the United States. 67 The treaty was then submitted for senatorial ratification.

In contrast to the difficult

time that the protocol of February 7, 1905 experienced in the
Senate, the new treaty was ratified by the twenty-fifth of the
month.

Only a minor verbal change, which did not alter the
meaning of the document, was required by the Senate. 68
64 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 8, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/57. Tejera to Dawson, personal,
February 7, 1907, Numerical File 1199/88. For the two versions
of the treaty see: Pollock to Secretary of State, February 11,
1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/59.
65 Pollock to Root, February 9, 1907, No. 336, Numerical
File 27/178.
66 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 19, 1907,
telegram sent from New York City, Numerical File 2765/5.
67 Root to American Legation in Santo Domingo, February
20, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/59. Dawson to the
Dominican Plenipotentiaries for the Dominican American Financial
Convention (Tejera and Velasquez), February 20, 1907, Numerical
File 1199/72-73.
68 Root to Dawson, February 27, 1907, unnumbered, Numerical File 1199/59. Dawson to Minister Exteriors (Dominican
Republic), March 2, 1907, Numerical File 1199/7la.
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It did not, however, appear as if ratification would
be so smoothly achieved in the Dominican Republic.

By mid-

February, the State Department began receiving distressing news
from William H. Gale, the United States consul in Puerto Plata.
Reporting that there was widespread opposition to the loan agreement, Gale asserted that if the C~ceres Government pushed the
new treaty through the Dominican Congress there would be an
anti-Yankee revolution.

He also informed Washington that the

opposition was reflected in the Cabinet's determination to force
.

I

I

President Caceres to dismiss Finance Minister Velasquez for
the latter's part in negotiating the loan agreement.

Twelve

provincial governors had also supposedly come out in opposition
to the loan.

Gale maintained that although Dawson questioned

both the sincerity of the opposition to the loan and the possibility of a revolution over this matter, opposition was quite
real and deep and a revolution very probable. 69
Apparently, as a result of Gale's dire reports, it was
decided to return Dawson to the Dominican Republic, to report
I

on the situation and lend whatever aid he could to the Caceres
Government in its efforts to get the treaty ratified by the
Dominican Congress.

Arriving back in the Dominican Republic

on March 9, Dawson immediately wired the Department of State
that conditions were not as bad as Consul Gale had indicated.

70

69 Gale to Secretary of State, February 16, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/61. Gale to Root, February 16, 1907,
unnumbered, Numerical File 1199/74.
70 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 9, 1907, telegram,
Numerical File 2765/7.
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BY that time, word had already been received in Washington that
the Dominican Government was united in its intention to secure
ratification of the treaty. 71 Dawson's subsequent investigations
indicated that neither the division within the Cabinet nor
opposition on the part of the provincial governors, which Gale
. t e d • 72
ha d reporte d , exis

By March 25, Dawson could wire Root

that the Dominican Government was assured of the support of the
two-thirds of the congressmen necessary for the ratification
of the treaty, and that the treaty would be submitted in early
April, following the recess for Holy Week. 73 That Dawson's
evaluation of the situation was basically correct is corroborated in Colonel Colton's reports to the Bureau of Insular
Affairs and to Secretary of War Taft.

However, Colton's re-

ports do indicate that a split in the Government was rumored
and that there was opposition to the debt adjustment and loan
contract.

The latter was based to a large extent on partisan
I
14
dislike of Velasquez.
On April 5, the treaty was presented to the Dominican
71 Bacon to American Legation in Havana, March 4, 1907,
telegram, Numerical File 1199/75.77.
72 Dawson to Root, March 31, 1907, No. 342, Numerical
File 1199/104. Dawson to Root, March 13, 1907, unnumbered,
Numerical File 1199/104.
73 oawson to Secretary of State, March 25, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/102.
74 colton to Taft, March 12, 1907, Numerical File 1199/
112. Colton to Edwards (Bureau of Insular Affairs), March 19,
1907, Numerical File 1199/109. Colton to Taft, April 4, 1907,
Numerical File 1199/122.
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congress, whereupon it was referred to a committee for consideration. 75

In the meantime, William L. Bass, a United States

citizen and proprietor of the sugar estate "Consuelo" in San
I

Pedro de Macoris, circulated in the Dominican Republic copies
of a letter he had received from Senator Weldon B. Heyburn of
Idaho.

In this letter the Senator stated that he supported

the treaty because it was the first step toward eventual annexation of the Caribbean republic.

Since this was precisely the

argument which the opponents of the treaty were using, the
revelation that a United States senator thought along these
76
d'd
· ·
· h ammunition.
· ·
.
i provi'de t h e opposition
wit
Weakening
1 ines
the chances of the ratification of the treaty was exactly
what Bass had in mind when he circulated Senator Heyburn's
letter.

Bass was himself opposed to the treaty.

In part, this

opposition probably resulted because the treaty would tend to
assure the incumbent Government's continued existence.

Bass,

who had difficulty with the Government over the payment of a
production tax on his sugar consequently had allied himself
with the Jimenista opponents of the current regime.

Deluging

the Department of State with letters opposing the treaty, Bass
even submitted a resolution to the State Department which he
suggested be approved as a joint resolution by Congress.

This

75 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 5, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/115. Dawson to Root, April 23, 1907,
No. 361, Numerical File 1199/143.
76 colton to Taft, April 4, 1907, Numerical File 1199/122.
Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical File 1199/272273.
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resolution called for the President to be authorized to intervene in the Dominican Republic, with armed force if necessary,
to assure stability and order.

Once the resolution were passed,

according to Bass's plan, the United States would convene an
assembly consisting of representatives, not only of the Government in control of the republic, but also those opponents of
the regime who were in exile.

The assembly would then work out

the details of this "friendly intervention."

Thereupon, the

United States would intervene in either a forcible or friendly
manner, with force "if necessary to handle any intractable
element which happened to be in control, and in a friendly
manner" to assist "the many who, while desiring peace in the
country, have no opportunity afforded them to help bring it
about," because of their exile or imprisonment.

The intent

of Bass's plan was clearly to lend aid to the Jimenista opponents of the C'ceres Government in their attempt to displace
't •
l.

77
Dawson made every possible effort to mitigate the

,

effect that the Heyburn-Bass letter might have on the Caceres
Government.

He pointed out to Foreign Minister Tejera that al-

though Senator Heyburn had introduced a resolution for the
annexation of the Dominican Republic in December, 1905, this
77 Root to Senator Joseph B. Foraker, January 15, 1907,
Numerical File 1927/la. Bass's letters opposing the treaty were
so numerous and his involvement in Dominican affairs so extensive
that the Department of State establisned a file particularly
for him, Numerical File 1927.

282

resolution had never received any support. 78

In early March,

secretary of State Root decided that the Dominican Government
should confidentially be informed of the plans that Bass was
attempting to promote, and had forwarded the documents to Dawson.
These arrived just at the time the Heyburn-Bass letter became
known. 79 During his interview with Foreign Minister Tejera,
Dawson also exhibited these documents.

It was thus clear to

the members of the Government that Bass's real objective was
to plot their overthrow, and that the Heyburn letter was merely
an attempt to strengthen the opposition.

If any thing, the

effect was to unify the Cabinet further.

Hoping to publicize

Bass's true intentions, Tejera asked permission to publish
the proposed joint resolution.

Although Dawson had been

instructed to show this resolution confidentially to the Dominican Government, he decided that under the circumstances, it
would be wise to allow its publication, provided no mention
was given of how the Dominican Government received it. 80 Dawson
also submitted to the Government for publication a copy of a
New York Tribune editorial which had been sent to him by the
State Department and which noted that Heyburn's annexationist
plans reflected neither public nor official governmental opinion
78 Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical
File 1199/272-273.
79 Root to Dawson, March 5, 1907,
Numerical File 1927/4a.
80 Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical
File 1199/272-273.
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in the United States.

81

The circulation of the Heyburn-Bass letter did result
in pressure being exerted on the members of Congress by those
Horacistas who opposed the treaty. 82 Nevertheless, the President had received sufficient pledges of support from congressmen and he insisted that these be fulfilled. 83 The Congressional committee, which had been entrusted with studying the
treaty, by a vote of two to one, finally submitted a favorable
report on April 22, 1907. 84
One of the majority members of the committee included
in his report a recommendation that at the time of ratification
Congress attach explanatory statements to the treaty in order
to remove any ambiguity. 85 These explanations consisted of
three major clarifications.

First, those officials to be ap-

pointed by the president of the United States to collect the
Dominican customs were not to include those employees who by
Dominican law were to be appointed by the president of the
81Bacon to Dawson, April 5, 1907, telegram, Numerical
File 1199/117. Dawson to Secretary of State, April 12, 1907,
telegram, ibid.
82 Dawson to Root, April 15, 1907, personal, Numerical
File 1199/131.
83 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 23, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/130.
84 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 22, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/127.
85 oawson to Secretary of State, April 23, 1907, No.
361, Numerical File 1199/143.
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Republic.

Second, the United States would intervene to protect

the general receiver and his staff only when the Dominican
Government was unable to do so.

Finally, the needed tariff

reform was to go through as soon as the Dominican Government
could demonstrate that the custom revenues had exceeded
$2,000,000 for the two proceeding years. 86 Though these explanatory statements did not alter the sense or meaning of the
treaty, Dawson, in wiring the Department of State, referred to
them as "amendments, 1187 and strictly speaking, if they were to
be attached to the treaty, they might be considered amendments.
Dawson's telegram led Root to wire back that it was not necessary to bother to telegraph the amendments as the negotiations
had reached a point where they must end.

The treaty had to

be accepted as the Senate had approved it and no amendments
could be considered. 88
By a vote of seventeen to four with three abstentions,
the Dominican Congress ratified the treaty on May 3, 1907, and
adopted the explanatory statements. 89 However, many of the
86 1bid. Emilio c. Joubert to the Secretary of State
(Root), May 24, 1907, enclosure 1, FRUS, 1907, Part 1, pp. 310-311.
87 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 22, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/127. Dawson to Secretary of State,
April 23, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/130.
88 Root to Dawson, April 24, 1907, telegram, Numerical
File 1199/130.
89 Dawson to Secretary of State, May 4, 1907, telegram,
Numerical File 1199/141. Mccreery to .Root, May 8, 1907, telegram, Numerical File 1199/146.
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congressmen were opposed to the treaty and apparently voted
/

for ratification only under pressure from President Caceres.
At one time ciceres had reached the point where he was ready
to suspend the provision of the Constitution which forbade
presidential dissolution of congress, in order that he might
have a new congress elected.

Only with difficulty were Dawson

and Foreign Minister Tejera able to dissuade Caceres from this
90
dangerous course.
Root finally decided that the United States could
accept the explanatory statements, since they were nothing
more than "a matter of construction" and agreed with that which
the United States placed on the treaty.

However, these state-

ments could not be included with the treaty since this would
be tantamount to the President accepting an instrument different
from the one approved by the Senate. 91 It was finally agreed
that the explanatory statements would be accepted by a mere
exchange of diplomatic notes. 92 On July 8, 1907, ratifications
were exchanged in Washington, and on July 25, President Roosevelt
issued a proclamation declaring the Dominican-United States
treaty to be in effect. 93
90 Dawson to Root, May 18, 1907, Numerical File, 1199/169.
91 Root to Mccreery, May 9, 1907, telegram, Numerical
File 1199/146.
92 Root to Mccreery, May 24, 1907, No. 8, Numerical File
1199/170-172. The Dominican Minister (Joubert) to Secretary of
State (Root), May 24, 1907; Secretary of State (Root) to Dominican Minister (Joubert), May 24, 1907, FRUS, 1907, Part l,pp.310-12.
9311 By the President of the United States of America.
Proclamation, 11 FRUS, 1907, Part 1, pp. 307-310.

A

286

The failure of the Dominican Congress to ratify the
treaty by April 1, 1907, and subsequent delays in ratifying
the loan agreement, coupled with the financial panic of 1907,
caused the New York bankers to withdraw the original rather
liberal agreement. Consequently, a new loan contract had to
94
be negotiated.
But this matter was not to concern Dawson.
His task ended with the ratification of the convention of
February 8, 1907, by the Dominican Congress.
Dawson's part in handling the negotiations which
occurred during his last year in the Dominican Republic was
much less than in previous years.

In part, this is explained

by the fact that the negotiations for the debt adjustment and
loan contract were conducted in Washington rather than in
Santo Domingo City.

But it is also true that Dawson had no

. part in conceiving or formulating the idea of a voluntary debt
adjustment between the Dominican Government and its creditors.
His suggestion to the Department of State that the Dominican
Government and its creditors come to some voluntary agreement
concerning the distribution of the trust fund held under the
modus vivendi came out of his desire to see the removal of a
possible attraction for potential revolutionaries and to demonstrate that there would be no backing out of the basic plan of
United States assistance in solving Dominican financial problems.
Moreover, by the time Secretary Root received Dawson's suggestion,
94 Munro, ~· cit., pp. 121-122.
550.

Jessup, op. cit., I,
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the Secretary had already grasped the possibility of a voluntary
agreement between the Dominican Government and its creditors
in a broader scope, that is, as the ultimate answer to senatorial objections to the protocol of February 7, 1905.

This

does not mean that Dawson was slow in perceiving the advantages
of a voluntary agreement.

His duty was to implement the policy

which had been established and, to achieve that end, his duty
was to advise on what measures would maintain a stable situation
in the Dominican Republic.

Guiding the signed protocol of

the treaty through the Senate or formulating a new policy were
the duties of the Secretary of State.
Dawson's part in negotiating the convention of February
8, 1907 is also less conspicious than in the earlier negotiations.

In part, this can be attributed to the fact that many

of the major points over which contention could have developed
had already been smoothed out.

In the one place where he could

have used his initiative and have accepted the modified version
of the article concerning United States approval of the Dominican tariff revision, he failed to do so.

The only reason he

gave for his action on this point was that he thought it inadvisable to agree to the Dominican version before discussing it
with Root.

This might indicate that Dawson personally felt

that the clause did not give the United States adequate control
of the tariffs and, since he had the stronger version signed, it
was better not to accept the weaker without the Secretary's
approval.

Nevertheless, he promised to present the Dominican
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viewpoint in Washington, and ultimately, this viewpoint was
apparently accepted.
If Dawson's part in formulating the new policy and in
negotiating the new treaty were minimal, what then was his
significance?

To answer this question, one only has to look

at his travel record for the period between October 16, 1906
and May 21, 1907.

In spite of the fact that it had been a

year since he had had a leave of absence, and in spite of the
fact that he was in poor health, during that period he made
three round trips between the Dominican capital and Washington
before finally returning to the United States in May, 1907.
Dawson's presence was necessary to secure the implementation
of the new policy.

When the Dominican Government was going too

slowly or ran into problems in getting the debt adjustment
scheme accepted by the domestic creditors and claimants, Dawson
was sent down to lend his assistance.

Although he had already

been officially assigned to Colombia, his experience made him
indispensable in negotiating the treaty of February 8, 1907
and back he went to Santo Domingo.

When it appeared that the

treaty and loan agreement would encounter opposition in the
Republic, he was again sent back.

Certainly, the fact that

the Dominican Government trusted him aided in resolving any
doubts they may have had when the Heyburn-Bass letter gained
notoriety.

Furthermore, Dawson's beneficial influence over

President ca'ceres can be seen in his and Tejera's efforts to
dissuade the President from resorting to unconstitutional means
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to get the treaty ratified by the Dominican legislature.

In

short, his contribution to the successful ratification of the
February 8, 1907 convention was extensive.
In addition to his contribution to the ratification of
the treaty, the last year that he spent in the Dominican Republic
is also significant in that it demonstrates his changing attitude towards the problem of enedmic revolution which confronted
the country.

Originally Dawson thought that the major problems

of the Dominican Republic, fiscal insolvency and revolution,
could be solved by implementing a plan which would secure the
customhouses for the Government and set aside a portion of
the custom revenues for the payment of the creditors.

It

eventually became apparent to him, however, that the modus
vivendi was a mixed blessing, and that in the long run, peace
and a stable government depended on more than preventing the
customhouses from falling into the hands of revolutionaries.
He finally concluded that these goals also depended on maintaining the well being of the small farmers and laborers.
Although Dawson may have been slow in realizing the ill effects
of the modus vivendi, that he did realize them attests to his
ability to learn from his observations.

Moreover, his evalua-

tion of the underlying causes of the revolutionary instability
of the Republic demonstrates his deepening understanding of
politico-economic problems of the country.
It is understandable that, once United States control
over Dominican finances had been established and the financial
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problems besetting the Republic apparently solved, Dawson should
take some satisfaction in having completed his mission.

Writing

to his friend Charles Dawes in June, 1907, Dawson noted that he
i

wanted to have a long talk with Dawes about the struggles of
the past three years.

"I pulled it off fin ally," he wrote, "but
the chances were against me at nearly every stage. 1195
Dominican reaction to Dawson and his achievements was
undoubtedly mixed.

Among those who accepted United States in-

terference in the financial affairs of the Republic and those
who benefited from the moral support lent by the United States
navy, it is not unlikely that he was considered a friend.

In

late December, 1906, R. E. Pollock, who had been left in charge
of the Legation during Dawson's absence, informed the State
Department that news of Dawson's transfer and promotion to the
United States Legation in Colombia had produced expressions of
regret among his many friends in Santo Domingo.

Pollock went

on to state that Dawson was "regarded as a just and honorable
statesman, a wise Diplomat [sic] and a good friend. 1196 President
I

Caceres reiterated this sentiment at the formal reception of
the new United States Minister, Fenton Mccreery.
Dawson, the President noted: "Vuestro antecesor.

Referring to

. . ha sido

un buen amigo de la Republica Dominicana y ha dejado recuerdos
95 Dawson to Dawes, June 6, 1907, Dawes Collection, Name
File, 1906-1914, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder.
96 Pollock to Root, December 26, 1906, No. 327, Numerical File 27/154.
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que le hara"n grato en todo tiempo. 1197

In view of Dawson's

continually cordial relations with and unflaging support of the
Government, it is probable that this statement was motivated

bY more than mere convention.
Among those who did not approve of United States interference in the financial affairs of the Dominican Republic, it
is doubtful that Dawson's transfer was greeted with much sorrow.
Deputy G. Alfredo Morales, the dissenting member of the legislative committee which had been entrusted with studying and
reporting on the treaty of February 8, 1907, had submitted a
minority report to the Dominican Congress.

In his report,

Morales argued that the treaty violated Dominican sovereignty
and was unconstitutional.

Using Senator Heyburn's letter to

Bass as evidence, he maintained that the real objective of the
treaty was the annexation of the Dominican Republic by the
United States.

To Deputy Morales, Dawson was a mere instrument

of the North American imperialists.

The Minister, according

to Morales, had completed his assigned task with more adroitness
and polish than had earlier annexationists.

Nevertheless, even

Dawson, the Deputy contended, could not hide his Yankee contempt for "Dominicans as well as all those of the Spanish race. 1198
97 McCreery to Root, May 18, 1907, No. 5, enclosure:
President Caceres' speech, Numerical File 3987/15.
98
Mccreery to Root, July 22, 1908, No. 111, enclosures:
translations of clippings from the Gaceta Official, June 26,
July 10, 13, 27, 31, August 3, 7, 10, 14, 21, 24, 28, 1907,
Numerical File 1199/400-401.
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To prove this point, Morales observed that at times Dawson had
appeared in the Government Palace in slippers, with his trousers
turned up, and without a neck tie. 99
Doubtless, Morales chose to interpret Dawson's casual
appearance, necessitated by ulcerated feet, as an insult to
the Dominican Government.

How seriously Morales himself con-

sidered this argument might be debated, and certainly the
charge that Dawson sought annexation of the Dominican Republic
is unfounded.

Nevertheless, Morales' speech does indicate

that Dawson incurred the enmity of some Dominicans.

Since he

had been so intimately connected with the various agreements
signed between January, 1905 and February, 1907, it is not
surprising that, in the minds of some, dislike of the United
States-Dominican treaty of February 8, 1907 was coupled with
dislike of the Minister who had had such a large part in negotiating it.
If those opposed to the treaty of February, 1907, misinterpreted Dawson's motives and actions, it is also to be noted
that Dawson himself never seemed to appreciate fully or to
credit seriously the Dominican national sentiment that opposed
United States interference.

In reporting on the disturbances

which occurred in the Dominican capital on December 6, 1905, in
reaction to the transfer of marines from the Olympia and the
Des Moines to the Scorpion, Dawson attributed the anti-United
States sentiment evident at that time to the mistaken belief
99 Ibid.
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that the United States troops were actually planning to land
and intervene in the quarrel between President Morales and the
aoracistas.

He further noted that the reaction of the populace

"also indicated that in their hearts this people dearly values
its independence and would sacrifice their lives in a struggle
to preserve it even though they well know that such a struggle
100
would be hopeless."
However, in the same report he also
stated that he believed the intensity of the popular reaction
resulted from circulation of rumors among the lower classes
that the United States "occupation or annexation means their
oppression, enslavement and even extermination," and that displays of anti-North American sentiment immediately following
December 6, 1905, had been confined to young men and "members
of the lower classes." 101 Again, in writing to Secretary of
State Root in early April, 1907, Dawson reported that among the
"well-informed" opponents of the February 8, 1907 treaty there
was little fear that the United States intended to annex the
Republic.

However, he maintained that among the illiterate

segment of the populace this remained a real fear.

He informed

Root that:
The negros [sic] here believe that the Yankee whites would
lynch, abuse and reduce them to servitude and want to come
here for that purpose. What the Convention really is they
don't know and they are inclined to believe when they are
told that it provided for annexation or is a flimsy piece of
trickery having the same object in view. The existence of
100 Dawson to Root, December 15, 1905, No. 197, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, ·roll 14.
lOlibid.
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such a sentiment has been the cause of nine-tenths of the
anxiety and tight places I have been in during the last
three years. Sometimes it lies dormant but it is always
there reag¥ to be realized by some unforeseeable circumstances .1
While it is probably true that the lower classes might easily
be swayed to oppose the intervention of the United States as
the result of reports of what might happen to them at the hands
of the Yankees, that Dawson appears to have placed so much
stress on this factor for causing actual or potential opposition to the intervention, would seem to indicate that he could
not grasp the possibility of a sincere opposition based on
nationalistic and patriotic sentiments.
The nine years Dawson had spent in the diplomatic service had provided him with considerable experience, and there
would seem to be little doubt that he had decided to remain in
the profession.

During the time spent in Santo Domingo City,

Dawson seems to have made no mention of possibly resigning to
seek his fame and fortune elsewhere.

To the contrary, in a

letter to Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon in September, 1906, Dawson wrote, "I love the diplomatic profession and
hope that with my increasing experience in it I shall yet be
able to do some good work. 11103
There were, however, problems which made his service in
the Dominican Republic at times personally unpleasant and difficult.
102
Dawson to Root, April 2, 1907, personal, Numerical
File 1199/272-273.
103
Dawson to Bacon, September 3, 1906, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
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perhaps the biggest problem was his health.

As has already

been mentioned, the long periods in the tropics had weakened
his health.

In November, 1904, ulcers developed on his feet.

In the tropical heat the condition progressively grew worse,
frequently forcing him to interrupt his work.
badly in need of a rest in a cool climate.

By 1906, he was

However, it was

decided that conditions in the Dominican Republic necessitated
his continuance at his post throughout the summer and early
104
fal1.
It was not until May, 1907, that he was able to return
to the United States and take a much needed rest.

The result

of this continuous work was a worsening of his physical condition.

In a letter to Secretary Root, in mid-April, 1907,

Dawson wrote that he previously thought that his troubles had
been confined to his feet and stomach,

b~t

his physican re-

cently had told him that he also had "symptoms of cerebral
exhaustion. 11105 Nevertheless, Dawson felt confident that a
few weeks in a cooler climate would cure him of these problems,
and apparently it did. 106
Dawson's work load, of course, was very demanding.

In

view of the pending protocols and the modus vivendi, it was
l0 4 Ibid.
105 Dawson to Root, April 15, 1907, personal, Numerical
File 1199/131.
106 oawson to Dawes, July 20, 1907, Dawes Collection,
Name File, 1906-1914, Dawson-Fai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder.
In this letter, Dawson reported that his doctors had told him
that he had been "close to neurasthenia."
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necessary for him to keep informed on all political developments
within the Republic and to confer almost daily with the principal
members of the Government, the Receiver of Customs, the commanders
of the United States naval vessels stationed off the Dominican
coast, and with the other foreign diplomats assigned to the
Dominican capital.

Periodic trips to the provincial capitals
were also necessary. 107 In addition to his duties as resident
minister, Dawson also was consul-general and, consequently,
responsible for the general supervision of the United States
consular matters in the Dominican Republic.

Since no provision

was made for a secretary of legation, virtually all of the work
of the Legation fell upon his shoulders.
all his own translating and typing.

He was forced to do

Funds were available for

one clerk who served in both the Consulate-General and the
Legation.

This arrangement proved to be both insufficient

and inefficient.

The excessive work load, Dawson felt, af-

fected the quality of his work and his effectiveness as a diplomat.

In a despatch to the Secretary of State in late April,

1907, urging appropriation of funds for sufficient clerical
staff in both the Legation and the Consulate-General, Dawson
noted that as a result of the demands on his time he had not
had the necessary time and energy for important negotiations,
or to maintain adequate personal contacts.

Furthermore, he

reported that frequently he had to act without due consideration
107 oawson to Root, September 25, 1905, No. 165,
enclosure: Memorandum, Despatches from the Dominican Republic,
vol. 14, roll 14.

297
on routine but important matters.

These arrangements had also

prevented him from preparing the consular reports required of
him as Consul-General, and had impared his health. 108
The Department of State was not indifferent and did
endeavor to improve the situation.

The contingency fund and
the allowance for the hiring of clerks was increased. 109

Moreover, in 1906, the Department was able to obtain an appropriation for a secretary of legation for the Dominican mission. 110
Nevertheless, the arrival of the secretary and the hiring of
the necessary clerical staff had not yet occurred when Dawson
left Santo Domingo in May, 1907. 111
Another hinderance to the efficient performance of his
duties, Dawson informed the
ficient salary.

Dep~rtment

of State, was an insuf-

The statutory yearly salary provided for

the resident minister and consul-general in the Dominican Republic was $5,000.

In addition to this, Dawson received approxi-

mately another $1,400 yearly, derived from consular and notarial
fees, 112 and it is not unlikely that he was able to keep his
108 Dawson to Root, April 30, 1907, No. 362, Numerical
File 2502/3.
l0 9 Ibid.
llOAdee to Dawson, July 5, 1906, No. 118, Diplomatic
Instructions, Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98, p. 118.
111 Dawson to Root, April 30, 1907, No. 362; Mccreery to
Root, June 8, 1907, No. 13, Numerical File, 2502/3-4.
112 Dawson to Root, July 23, 1906, No. 268, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15.
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· 113
expenses wi'th'in th'is l'imit.

·
· d.
Neverth e 1 ess, h e maintaine

that the meagerness of his salary compelled him and his family
to live "in a way not becoming a representative of the United
states" and prevented him from maintaining "those social relations which in a Latin-American country add so much to his
• Is]
[ t h e represen t a t ive

114
• fl uence an d e ff•iciency.
•
H
rea 1 in

In view of the high cost of living in the Dominican Republic,
the constant need of protection by North American interests
there, the extensive commercial relations and the importance
of the political relations between the two countries, and in
general, the amount of work handled by the Legation and Consulate-General, Dawson recommended that the salary should be
increased to that appropriated for an equal post in Venezuela,
Colombia, Costa Rica, or Guatemala. 115

The State Department,

following Dawson's recommendation, did include an increase to
$10,000 for the salary of the resident minister and consulgeneral in the budget for the fiscal year 1908.

116

Again,

this did not go into effect until after Dawson's transfer to
Colombia.
113 Dawson to Root, September 25, 1905, No. 165, enclosure: memorandum, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol.
14, roll 14. Dawson to Root, July 23, 1906, No. 268, Despatches
from the Dominican Republic, vol. 15, roll 15.
114

Dawson to Root, September 25, 1905, No. 165, Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 14, roll 14.
115
116

Ibid.

Bacon to Dawson, November 20, 1906, No. 150, Numerical File 2502/.

r

299
Despite his pressing schedule and poor health, Dawson
seems to have found some time and energy to devote to the study
of the historical development of the Dominican Republic.

His

investigations were not, however, for mere personal satisfaction.
In 1906, he submitted two lengthy memoranda to the Department
of State to aid in further negotiations.

The first consisted

of a chronology of political events in the Dominican Republic
from February 27, 1844 to September 30, 1906. 117 The other
dealt with the history of the Dominican-Haitian boundary dispute. 118 The depth and value of these documents were fully
119
appreciated by his superiors in Washington.
In November, 1904, Dawson agreed to undertake a more
ambitious historical study.

He agreed to co-author a biography

of President William McKinley with Charles G. Dawes.

Their

work was to be part of the American Statesmen series published
by Houghton Mifflin and Company. 120 The book, according to
Dawson's outline, was to be based on sound historical research.
117 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 18, 1906, No.
309, enclosure: Chronology of Political Events in Santo Domingo,
FRUS, 1906, Part 1, pp. 572-600.
118 Dawson to Secretary of State, June 16, 1906, No. 261,
enclosure: Memorandum on the Boundary Question Between Haiti
and Santo Domingo, ibid., pp. 600-08.
119 Acting Secretary of State to Dawson, July 11, 1906,
No. 120; Acting Secretary of State to Pollock, October 31, 1906,
unnumbered, ibid., pp. 600-608.
120 Dawes to Dawson, September 29, 1904, Dawes . Co11 ection,
.
Letter Press Books, August 19, 1904 to November 16, 1904, p.
235. Dawson to Dawes, November 3, 1904, Dawes Collection, JulyDecember, 1904, File D.
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He proposed that he and Dawes check the secondary literature,
conduct personal interviews and use the late President's
personal letters. 121 Dawes' business commitments forced him
to withdraw from any active participation in the project. 122
Nevertheless, Dawson insisted that his friend's name must appear on the title page regardless of any actual contribution. 123
Dawson, in fact, did begin the research while back in the United
States on leave, in the summer of 1905. 124 Apparently, his
own duties prevented him from doing much work on the biography
until the summer of 1907.

The manuscript was to be completed

by the following spring, with publication scheduled for the
fall of 1908. 125 A rough draft of the biography was probably
finished; but, Dawson never had time to complete the task. 126
121 Dawson to Dawes, November 3, 1904, Dawes Collection,
July-December, 1904, File D.
122 Dawes tow. B. Parker c/o Houghton, Mifflin Co.,
December 31, 1904; Dawes to Dawson, December 31, 1904; Dawes to
Dawson, January 6, 1905; Dawes to W. E. Both c/o Houghton,
Mifflin and Co., January 6, 1905, Dawes Collection, Letter Press
Book, November 17, 1904 to March 6, 1905, pp. 331, 332, 374-76.
123 Dawson to Dawes, January 31, 1905, Dawes Collection,
January-June, 1905, File D.
124 Dawson to Dawes, July 3, 1905, Dawes Collection,
July-December, 1905.
125 Dawson to Dawes, July 4, 1907, Dawes Collection,
1906-1914, Name File, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder.
Dawes to Dawson, July 12, 1907, Dawes Collection, Name File,
President McKinley Folder.
126 oawes to W. B. Parker, Century Magazine, May 3, 1912,
Dawes Collection, Letter Press Book, Personal Letters, January
22, 1912 to November 16, 1912, p. 427. In a letter to Mrs. Dawson, shortly after her husband's death, Dawes inquired about the
manuscript and requested that, if it could be found, it be sent
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In contrast with his Brazilian service, Dawson seems to
have been contented with his position in the Dominican Republic.
There is no indication that he was looking for immediate promotion.

It would have been difficult for Dawson not to realize

the importance of his work in the Dominican Republic, and, in
part, this satisfaction may have resulted from the belief that
the Dominican assignment would provide a basis for further
advancement.

If this were his conviction, it was certainly

bolstered by Dawes, who assured him that he was making a name
and reputation for himself which he "could not have done in
some of the more high salaried embassies."
he wrote , "wi 11 come later. " 12 7

"All of these,"

Despite his satisfaction with the post in Santo Domingo,
Dawson did apply to accompany Secretary of State Root on his
trip to the Pan-American Conference held at Rio de Janeiro in
1906.

Dawson felt that his knowledge of Spanish, Portuguese

and French and his acquaintance with the Brazilian politicians
to him. He would then attempt to prepare it for publication.
Dawes to Mrs. Louisa Dawson, May 7, 1912, ibid., 446-47. It
is difficult to say whatever happened to the manuscript. There
is no indication that Mrs. Dawson either found it or forwarded
it to Dawes. Moreover, while Houghton, Mifflin Company's catalogue for 1904 does list The Life of William McKinley by T. c.
Dawson as being in preparation, no further reference is made to
the book nor do the Company's records apparently contain any
contract or indicate receipt of a manuscript. Mrs. Barbara E.
Amidon, Permissions Department, Houghton, Mifflin Company, to
the author, October 17, 1969.
127 Dawes to Dawson, May 6, 1905, Dawes Collection, Letter
Press Book, March 6, 1905 to July 11, 1905; also see Dawes to
Dawson, February 3, 1905, Dawes Collection, Jan-June, 1905, File
D. Dawes to Dawson, February 1, 1906, Dawes Collection, Letter
Press Book, December 6, 1905-April 13, 1906, p. 380.
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and those from other Latin American countries might be useful
to the Secretary of State.
wanting to return to Brazil.

There were also family reasons for
His wife was anxious to see her

family and show off the children.

Moreover, the experience in

the Dominican Republic had been a strain on both Dawson and
his wife and he felt that a rest would be to their benefit. 128
Root, h owever, d eci. d e d t o k eep h.is party as sma 11 as possi. bl e, 129
and Dawson was informed that it had been decided not to include
any incumbent diplomatic officer in the Secretary's delegation. 130
There is also little indication that Dawson took an
active part in the United States domestic politics while he
was in Santo Domingo City.

The pressure of his work at the

Legation, of course, would have prevented him from returning
to the United States to participate in the presidential campaign of 1904, as he had done in 1900.

He did, however, make

a $50.00 contribution toward the expenses of the Republican
.
1 Committee.
.
131
Na t iona

Naturally, he rejoiced in Roosevelt's

128 Dawson to Root, January 29, 1906, unnumbered, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
129 Root to the President, December 14, 1905, Root
Papers, Letter Book, October 20, 1905-February 15, 1906, part
1, p. 183, Box 186.
130 Root to Dawson, May 17, 1906, unnumbered, Diplomatic
Instructions, Santo Domingo, vol. 1, roll 98, p. 111.
131 Dawson to Dawes, September 13, 1904, Dawes Collection, July-December, 1904, File D. Dawes to Dawson, September 28, 1904, Letter Press Book, August 19, 1904 to November
16, 1904, p. 233.
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. t
vie
ory. 132

This apparently was the extent of his direct in-

volvement in the affairs of the Republican Party.
However, while political patronage still dominated
the diplomatic service, President Roosevelt and Secretary of
State Root were attempting to improve the quality of United
States representatives by assigning competent men to critical
133
posts.
Consequently, it is possible that political considerations may have had little or no bearing on Dawson's appointment to be United States Minister in Bogota, Colombia.
Colombian-United States relations had not yet recovered from
the strain placed upon them by the involvement of the United
States in the Panamanian revolution of 1903.

A skilled diplo-

mat, experienced in handling Latin American politicians was
needed to fill the post being vacated by John Barrett who had
resigned to become the Director-General of the International
Bureau of American Republics.

Certainly Dawson's extended

service in the area, particularly his successful handling of
the negotiations in the Dominican Republic and extensive knowledge of the history of South America fitted him admirably for
this new post.
132 Dawson to Loomis, December 17, 1904, personal,
Despatches from the Dominican Republic, vol. 13, roll 13.
133
Munro, £I?.• cit., p. 22.
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CHAPTER IX
I

COLOMBIA:
1907 - 1909
Although Dawson's commission as Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary to Colombia was dated January 10,
1907, it was a little over nine months before he presented
his letters of credence to the Colombian president. 1

Preoccupa-

tion with Dominican affairs, his own poor health, and that of
his wife account for this delay.

During the summer of 1907,

Dawson and his wife rented a house in Falmouth Foreside, Maine.
There he recuperated and worked on the McKinley biography,
while Mrs. Dawson awaited the birth of their third child.
If Dawson's health alone had detained him, it is possible that
he would have left for his new post in the early summer.

Con-

sidering the difficulty of the journey to the Colombian capital,
however, he felt that it was impossible for him to go before
. wi' fe was a bl e t o accompany h'im. 2 By late August, the baby,
h is
their second son, had been born and Mrs. Dawson was well
enough to begin the trip.

Consequently, on the thirty-first,

1 untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments from 1907
to 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. Register
of the Department of State, September 20, 1911 (Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 11.
2 oawson to Bacon, July 2, 1907, Numerical File 2765/12.
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the family started on the trip to Colombia. 3

After brief stops

in Kingston, Jamaica, and Baranquilla, Colombia, they arrived
at Cartagena in late September.

From there, they began the

arduous journey by rail, steamboat, and finally mule to the
. 1•
capita

.
Bogota/ was finally
reached on October 9. 4

The trip from the Caribbean coast to the capital was
long and undoubtedly trying.

However, it did provide Dawson

with an opportunity to meet and talk with several Colombians.
From these conversations and observations, he was able to draw
some conclusions, which he admitted might be premature, concerning the "national character and ideals" of the Colombians.
Personally he had found those whom he met to be polite, respectful to authority, and courteous to foreigners.

In political

and social affairs, he gained the impression that the President,
General Rafael Reyes, and the Catholic Church were the dominate
influence in the country.

Diplomatically, a major obstacle

to cordial relations between the United States and Colombia
remained the bitterness felt by the Colombians towards the
United States as a result of the latter's involvement in the
Panamanian revolution of 1903.

On this point, Dawson was led

to conclude that Colombian public opinion had become reconciled
to the loss of Panama, and that resentment towards the United
States was "mostly confined to the office-holding classes."
3oawson to Root, August 10, 1907, No. 1, Numerical
File 2765/14.
4 oawson to Root, October 15, 1907, No. 2, Numerical
File 2765/17.
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He, therefore, felt that this resentment would probably be
less important in his work than he had originally been led to
.
5
be 1 ieve.
There can be little doubt that in promoting Dawson to
Colombia, Secretary of State Root hoped that the new minister
would work towards an improvement of United States-Colombian
6
The cordial reception which Dawson received at
relations.
his formal presentation to the Colombian President, on October
16, seemed to indicate that the Secretary of State's anticipation would be fulfilled.

In reporting on the official presenta-

tion, Dawson wrote: "I feel that my mission here has begun on
a favorable footing and that the lack of success, if it comes,
will be due to my own mistakes or to events not to be controlled." 7
The initial steps towards a rapprochement between the
two countries, in fact, had already been taken by the time
Dawson arrived.

His immediate predecessor, John Barrett, who,

as was previously mentioned, had resigned as Minister to Colombia to become Director General of the International Bureau of
American Republics, had proven to be a sympathetic friend of
Colombia and had made an effort to establish personally cordial
5 Ibid.
6 Root to Dawson, March 2, 1907, unnumbered, Numerical
File 2765/GB.
7 Dawson to Root, October 21, 1907, No. 3, Numerical
File 2765/18. For a description of the official reception
and for the speeches delivered by Dawson and Reyes, see enclosures three and four with the same despatch.
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relations with the Colombian Government. 8

More important was

the attitude and steps taken by General Rafael Reyes, who became the President of Colombia in 1904.

In domestic affairs,

Reyes governed in a dictatorial fashion, dismissing the elected congress and calling a national assembly composed of members
selected by himself.

He did succeed, however, in restoring

Colombian international credit and in securing some internal
improvements. 9 In the area of international relations, Reyes
took steps early in his administration to achieve a rapprochement with the United States.

To resolve the problem of Pana-

manian independence, he initially suggested a plebiscite in
Panama, with other differences between Panama and Colombia being settled by means of a treaty and arbitration.

However,

the Department of State rejected the idea of a plebiscite.
/

Reyes then sent Diego Mendoza Perez as his Minister to Washington.

Mendoza was to treat with the United States Govern-

ment on the various questions pending before the two countries.
However, in his negotiations with the Department of State,
Mendoza maintained that the United States was responsible for
the Panamanian Revolution and insisted that the interpretation
8E. T. Parks, Colombia and the United States 17651934 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1935),
p:-432. George B. Lane, Jr., "The Role of John Barrett in
the Development of the Pan-American Union 1907-1920" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School, American University, Washington, D. C., 1962), pp. 179-89.
9Hubert Herring, A History of .Latin America From the
Beginnings to the Present (2nd ed. rev.; New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1962), p. 512.
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of the United States-Colombian treaty of 1846, under which the
united States had claimed the authority to prevent Colombian
intervention to suppress the Panamanian revolution, be sub10
mitted to arbitration.
It seemed likely that at this juncture a complete break
in diplomatic relations between the two countries might occur.
However, in a meeting with Minister John Barrett in May, 1906,
President Reyes again indicated his desire to come to some
agreement with the United States and Panama.

While rejecting

the idea of arbitration or indemnity, he suggested a new basis
for the agreement.

This plan included a treaty of commerce

and friendship between the United States and Colombia which
would assure the latter of special privileges in the use of the
canal, and provide for Colombian recognition of the independence of Panama, and Panama's assumption of a proportion of
the Colombian national debt. 11 The plan was favorably received in Washington, and when an invitation was extended to
Root to visit Cartagena in the summer of 1906 during his return
trip from the Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro, he
accepted.

On September 24, 1906, Root and Barrett met with

the Colombian Foreign Minister Vazquez Cobo at Cartagena.
Their discussion centered around a Colombian memorandum containing the basis for a United States-Colombian treaty.
10

Parks, ~- Cit. I pp. 429-31.
11 Ibid., pp. 431-33.
12
Ibid. I pp. 433-34. Jessup, ~· cit., I, 522.

This
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plan was similar to that discussed by Barrett and Reyes irt
13
May.
After Root's return to Washington, negotiations looking
towards tripartite agreements among Panama, Colombia, and the
united States were undertaken with the new Colombian Minister,
Enrique Cortes, and the Panamanian Minister Jose D. Obaldfa. 14
By the summer of 1907, these negotiations had bogged
down on two points: the proportion Panama was to assume of
the Colombian national debt, and the exact boundary between
Panama and Colombia.

These problems seemed to be resolved in

July, 1907, when Secretary of War William H. Taft, who was
assisting in the negotiations, was able to secure Colombian
consent to accept $2,500,000 as the Panamanian share of the
debt, and to submit the boundary question to arbitration. 15
However, before Minister Cortes would finally agree on the
boundary issue, it was necessary for Root to assure him that
the United States accepted the boundary of Panama as that established by the law of New Granada of June 9, 1855. 16 On
August 17, 1907, protocols were signed in Washington between
the Panamanian and Colombian representatives providing for a
treaty on the basis of Colombian recognition of Panama's inde-

522-23.

13Memorandum, October 8, 1906, Numerical File 1502/1-2.
14
Parks, ~· cit., p. 434. Jessup, ~· cit., I,

15 Taft to Athos (Root), July 7, 1907, Numerical File
1502/31 1/2.
16 Cortes to Root, August 18, 1907; Root to Cortes,
August 26, 1907, Numerical File 1502/55. Parks, op. cit., p.
434. Jessup, ~· cit., I, 524.
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pendence, Panama's recognition of Colombia's claim to 50,000
shares of the New Panama Canal Company stock, and Panama's
agreement to turn over to Colombia the first ten payments
received from the United States under the Hay-Bunau Varilla
Treaty of 1903. 17 The actual negotiating of the treaties was
to be postponed until December, 1907. 18
In spite of the progress in negotiating the treaties,
the prevailing sentiment in Bogott for rapprochement with the
United States, and Dawson's early observations on the decline
of Colombian bitterness towards the United States, there were
still indications that all had neither been forgiven nor forgotten.

This point was clearly brought out in several des-

patches which the State Department received in the surcuner and
fall of 1907.

.

/

In June, William Heimke, the United States

'
I
reported that on June 18, the Diario Oficial
Ch argeI in
Bogo t a,

noted that it was the intention of the Colombian Government
to establish diplomatic relations with Japan.

According to

rumors, HeimkE{' wrote, the real objective of this move on the
part of the Colombian Government was to form an offensive
and defensive alliance with Japan, and to cede to that country
coaling stations on both the east and west coasts of Colombia.
These would, of course, be used by the Japanese navy in the
event of war with the United States.

Since the establishment

of coaling stations so close to the Panama Canal would de17
18
58 4/9.

Parks, ~· cit., p. 434.
Taft to Root, August 17, 1907, Numerical File 1502/
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finitely be detrimental to United States interests, Heimke' ·
gave more than passing interest to this rumor. 19 In August,
the Department of State received a further report of a Japanese-Colombian alliance.

This time the report came from the
United States consul at Maracaibo, Venezuela. 20 To further

substantiate his earlier report, in late September, Charge'
Heimke' forwarded a copy of an article entitled "Colombia y el
I

Japon" which had appeared in the June 3, 1907 issue of the
semi-official paper El Nuevo Tiempo.

Heimk~ reported that he

had been able to ascertain that the author of the article was
noneother than the subsecretary of the Foreign Office.

In

this article, the author forecast the extension of diplomatic
and commercial relations between the peoples of Asia and the
Americas, with the two forming an alliance to thwart European
and North American imperialism.

Moreover, he predicted an

eventual war between the United States and Japan over the control of the Pacific.

In foreseeing this conflict, the author

noted that the Japanese would be looking for strategic possessions and hinted that their sights would be turned to
Central and South America.

Even if the war never material-

ized, he thought that "los japoneses pueden ser neustros
futures grandes amigos."

They would help populate the country,

19 Heimke to Root, June 20, 1907, No. 198, confidential, Numerical File 7804/1.
20 Eugene Plumacher to Bacon, August 7, 1907, Numerical File 7804/5.
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and assist in the building of canals and railroads.

21

Al-

though the article may have indicated the intention of the
Colombian Government to institute closer relations with Japan,
it is to be noted that the Reyes Administration evidently
also intended the article to serve as a prod to urge upon the
united States the importance of maintaining good relations
with Colombia and quickly concluding the negotiations then
under way in Washington.

22

Nevertheless, the idea of the inevitability of war
between Japan and the United States was widespread in Colombia; upon his arrival, Dawson himself observed it and reported
accordingly to Washington.

In a despatch to the State Depart-

ment in late October, he noted several articles demonstrating
this widely held belief which had appeared in Colombian news. papers.

One of these, an article from a Barranquilla paper,

quoting from a correspondent living in Panama maintained that
as soon as it was known that the Japanese fleet was bombarding San Francisco, California, Colombians all over South and
Central America would rush to place their services at the disposal of the Japanese Government, thereby vindicating the national honor of their country. 23
21 Heimke' to Root, Seytember 26, 1907, No. 234, enclosure: "Colombia y el Japon," El Nuevo Tiempo, June 3, .1907,
Numerical File 7804/2-3.
22

.

/

Heimke to Root, September 26, 1907, No. 234, Numeri-

cal File 7804/2.
23 oawson to Root, October 31, 1907, No. 8, Numerical
File 9271/7.
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Further indications of closer relations between Colombia and Japan were also coming from the United States Embassy
in Tokyo.

In January, 1908, Ambassador Thomas J. O'Brien
I

sent Washington an extract of an article which appeared in a
Japanese newspaper.

This article gave an account of the

actions of one Mr. Izquierdo, a Colombian citizen, who had
visited several Government Ministers and was making proposals
for Japanese immigration to Colombia. 24
The possibility of a Japanese-Colombian treaty providing for Japanese coaling stations off the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of Colombia would naturally have been of great
concern to Washington at any time.

However, the news of this

supposed treaty and of the closer relations developing between
Japan and Colombia arrived at the State Department at a particularly crucial point in United States-Japanese relations
and thus caused even more concern.

In the late spring and

early summer of 1907, United States-Japanese relations were
shaken by a war scare brought about by political and press
reaction in Japan to discrimination against Japanese immigrants in California.

The United States press also made its

contribution to the war fever.

In fact, however, there was no

disposition in either the Japanese or United States Governments
for war, and with the passage of time the war scare subsided
to flare up less violently later in the year and again in 1908.
24 0 1 Brien to Root, January 17; 1908, No. 149,
Numerical File 7804/7-8.
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Nevertheless, in 1907, the belief that war between Japan and
the United States was inevitable was widely held.

In England,

France, and Germany, Japan was considered to be a five to
four favorite to win in any conflict with the United States. 25
Hence, the war scare combined with the reports from
/

Bogota, Maracaibo, and Tokyo and the State Department's own
observations of increased intimacy between the Colombian
Minister and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, led to
the serious consideration of the possibility of a JapaneseColombian treaty.

On March 7, 1908, Dawson was instructed

"discreetly to use every effort either to disprove or to substantiate the existence of such an agreement, and if it exists
to ascertain its terms."

He was informed that the Department

considered this information "of some importance" and a moderate expense incurred during the investigation would be met
by a separate account.

Dawson was assured that there had

been no break in the friendly relations between the United
States and Japan.

However, the possibility of a Japanese-

Colombian treaty had "a bearing upon the Monroe Doctrine,
which makes it very interesting and worthy of attention. 1126
25 Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), pp. 181, 188189, 194. Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises: An Account of the International Complications Arising From the Race Problem on the Pacific Coast
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 228-60.
26 Root to Dawson, March 7, 1908, No. 25, confidential,
Numerical File 7804/9.
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While this despatch did not reach Dawson until early
May, 1908, he was quickly able to obtain some important information.

He learned that prior to his own arrival in Bogota',

president Reyes had sent the aforementioned Antonio Izquierdo
to Japan for the purpose of arranging for Japanese immigration
to Colombia.

He was further able to obtain a telegram that

Izquierdo had sent to Reyes, stating that contracts with
steamship companies for immigration had been agreed upon,
and as soon as a treaty was signed, the Japanese Government
would send agents to inspect the sites for Japanese settlements.

A later telegram from Izquierdo, Dawson reported,

concerned trade and immigration but made no mention of coaling stations.

Dawson believed that at the time Reyes sent

Izquierdo to Japan, the President had in mind not only immi. gration but also a treaty providing for Japanese coaling
stations on the Pacific coast of Colombia.

However, Dawson

thought that it was unlikely that he could get any direct
proof of this latter point unless, by chance, he got hold of
Izquierdo's instructions.

He would continue his inquiries,
he wrote, and report later. 27
Dawson was correct in assuming that Reyes was planning
to negotiate a treaty with Japan.

However, he erred as to

the extent of the treaty and the place where the negotiations
were to take place.

Enrique Cortes, the Colombian Minister

27 Dawson to Root, May 5, 1908, No. 90, Numerical File
7804/10.
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in Washington, not Izquierdo, was entrusted with the task. 28

on July 20, 1908, Dawson wrote to the State Department that
he had just ascertained that on May 26, Cortes and Baron
I

Takahira, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, had signed
a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation.

He was

unable to secure a copy of the treaty but promised to forward
one to Washington as soon as he could. 29
On July 24, 1908, the Takahira-Cortes treaty was read
and discussed in a secret session of the Colombian National
Assembly; but, by the thirtieth, Dawson was able to get the
major provisions.

The treaty provided for the exchange of

diplomatic and consular representatives.

In addition, the

citizens of one country residing in or emigrating to the
other were to be free from military service, and were to enjoy commercial and civil rights, and religious freedom.

Daw-

son noted that the treaty obviously contemplated Japanese emigration to Colombia; however, he stated that he had no reason
to believe that any contracts or arrangements for this immigration had yet been made.

Nor did he have any basis for be-

lieving that a secret clause providing for Japanese coaling
stations had been included in the treaty.

Nevertheless, he

28 1
0 Brien to Secretary of State, December 17, 1908,
No. 537, Numerical File 7804/34.
29
Dawson to Root, July 20, 1908, No. 128, Numerical
File 7804/12.
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reported that he would continue to investigate this point. 30

By August 6, he was able to forward a Spanish copy of the
treaty to Washington.
31
secret clause.

Still there was no indication of a

In fact, it would seem that the principal objective
of the treaty simply was Japanese emigration to Colombia. 32
However, Dawson's original contention that Reyes had contemplated. more than this when he initially sent Izquierdo to
Tokyo evidently possessed some foundation.

Paxton Hibben,

the Secretary of the Legation who was acting as charge" during
Dawson's absence from Colombia in October, 1908, reported
that he had received information from an informant close to
the Foreign Minister that Reyes originally intended a closer
alliance than that achieved by the Cortes-Takahira treaty.
Hibben's informant, however, stated "with confidence" that
no secret clause existed.

Moreover, the Japanese immigration

scheme would be dropped if the negotiations in Washington on
the United States and Panamanian treaties were successful.
Evidently, the reason for this decision was popular hostility
in Colombia to the influx of Japanese immigrants, uncertainty
as to United States reaction, and the hope that the money
30 oawson to Root, July 30, 1908, No. 133, confidential,
Numerical File 7804/13.
31 oawson to Root, August 6, 1908, No. 104, Numerical
File 7804/14-15.
32 Hibben to Root, October 27, 1908, No. 184, confidential, Numerical File 7804/23.
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received from Panama by the treaty and the privileges accorded
Colombia in the use of the canal would contribute more to
Colombian prosperity than any arrangement with Japan. 33
It is difficult to say from whom Dawson and Hibben
obtained their information concerning Izquierdo's mission to
Japan and the Cortes-Takahira treaty.

It is possible that it

was supplied to them by their friends among the President's
family or from contacts in the Foreign Office.

It is also

possible that they might have resorted to bribery.

In Decem-

ber, 1908, Dawson submitted a request to the Department of
State for the sum of $58.00, the amount he had expended on
the investigation of the Colombian-Japanese treaty.

While

this was certainly a small sum, there seems to have been an
aura of intrigue over the entire operation. 34
Whatever President Reyes' motives in taking steps to
form a Colombian-Japanese treaty, it would seem that during
his time in Colombia, Dawson continued to work towards a better
understanding between the United States and Colombia.

Inso-

far as his personal relationships were concerned, he seems to
33Hibben to Root, October 27, 1908, confidential,
Numerical File 7804/23. Charg' Hibben noted that there was
considerable opposition from the Catholic hierarchy in the
area where the settlement of Japanese immigrants was proposed.
Consequently, he suggested that if the Department of State
were determined to oppose the influx of these immigrants into
Colombia it might be profitable to work through the Church in
doing so. Hibben to Secretary of State, December 5, 1908,
Numerical File 7804/27.
34 Dawson to Root, December 18, 1908, unnumbered,
Numerical File 7804/26.
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have succeeded admirably in gaining the acceptance and favor
both of the Colombian Government and the high society of the
capital.

Dawson's own pleasant disposition, refinement and

interest in Colombia, coupled with his wife's grace and charm,
were all certainly assets in gaining an entrance to the polite
society of the capital. 35 Among his most intimate personal
friends in Bogota were two of President Reyes' nephews,
Lufs Felipe and Climaco Calderdn.

The latter had served as

Colombian Minister to Washington and at one time Foreign
Minister. 36 Furthermore, the Reyes Government came to value
I

Dawson's presence in Bogota.

In his report to the Colombian

National Assembly in July, 1908, Foreign Minister Francisco
/

.

/

Jose Urrutia, who had replaced Vasquez Cobo in March, 1908,
noted that both the Colombian Minister in Washington, Enrique
Cortes, and Dawson "have taken pains to maintain the good
understanding between the northern Republic and Colombia. •
.. 37 When Dawson took a leave of absence in September, 1908,

..

the Colombian Foreign Minister, in a private letter to Minister
Cortes, urged: "Would to God that when you speak to Mr. Root,
you would express to him in the name of this Government that
35 Hibben to Root, September 22, 1908, No. 165,
enclosure 2: translation of an article from El Nuevo Tiempo,
September 22, 1908, Numerical File 2765/33-35.
36 oawson to Root, March 10, 1908, No. 60, Numerical
File 5025/24. In March, 1908, another brother, Victor Calderon, whom Dawson knew only slightly became Minister of War. Ibid.
37 Report o f Francisco
.
J oseI Urrutia,
.
•
.
Co1 omb.ian Foreign
Minister to the Deputies of the National Constitutent and
Legislative Assembly, July, 1908, Numerical File 5025/61.
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Mr. Dawson has made himself deserving of the highest esteem
for his relevant qualifications as a gentleman and as a diplomat.

It would be a real pity if he were not to come back to

.
pos t • • • • "38
h is

The Colombian Government's esteem for

Dawson and that of his Colombian friends was again reflected
in communications to the Department of State at the time of
his transfer to Chile, in 1909. 39
Dawson's concern for maintaining good relations, avoiding incidents which might sitr up anti-Yankee sentiment,
and attempting to understand the problems confronting the
Colombian Government are, to some extent, demonstrated in his
handling of two cases involving the protection of United
States commercial interests.

In 1907, Holt and Company of New

York, a flour exporter, in a letter to the Department of State,
argued that the imposition of an import tax on flour by the
Reyes Government had resulted in the decline in the amount of
United States flour exported to Colombia.

The Company urged

that the State Department threaten to impose a three cent
tariff on Colombian coffee, as was authorized by the Dingly
tariff of 1897.

This threat alone, the Company felt, would

be sufficient to secure a reduction of the Colombian
38Extract from a private letter of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, September 15, 1908, to the Colombian Minister
in Washington, handed to the Secretary of State by the Colombian Minister, October 19, 1908, Numerical File 1502/91.
39 Guzman (Colombian charge) to Knox, May 15, 1909,
Numerical File 2765/52. Northcott to Knox, August 18, 1909,
No. 1, Numerical File 19007/16-17.
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tari.ff • 40
action.

Dawson, however, argued against such a course of
He thought that the threat to impose an import tax

on Colombian coffee would only serve to antagonize Colombia.
Furthermore, he did not believe that the Colombian tax violated the favored nation clause of the 1846 treaty with the
41
United States.
In another case involving a West Virginia
corporation known as the Cauca Company, a concern which had a
railroad building concession and whose claim amounted to
$193,204.02 plus six per cent yearly interest from Janaury 26,
1898, Dawson diligently represented the North American corporation's interest, but continually informed the Department of
State that the Colombian Government was not delaying because
of any reluctance to pay, but simply because the financial
conditions of the country were such that it could not make
immediate or large monthly payments. 42
40 Holt and Company to Root, April 9, 1907; Sanderson
and Son (Agents for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company) to
Root, April 9, 1907, Numerical File 5775/-1.
41 Dawson to Root, August 20, 1908, No. 148, Numerical
File 5775/6. Dawson's position on the threat to impose the
import tax on Colombian coffee was similar to that taken by
Charg~ William Heimke who was in charge of the Legation prior
to Dawson's arrival in Bogot~.
42 Dawson to Root, February 12, 1908, No. 51; Dawson
to Root, February 12, 1908, No. 51; Dawson to Root, March 12,
1908, No. 63; Dawson to Root, March 21, 1908, No. 67; Edwin
Denby to Bacon, February 2, 1909, Numerical File 2086/64, 66,
69, 72-73, et passim.
The Cauca Company's claim had its origin in a concession granted by the Colombian Government to one James L.
Cherry of San Francisco, California in 1890. Under this concession Cherry was to build a railroad from Port Buenaventura
to the city of Cali. Cherry shortly thereafter sold his

r
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These two instances do not, in any way, indicate that
Dawson was not interested either in protecting United States
concession to the Cauca Company which had been incorporated
under the laws of West Virginia. This Company undertook the
building of the railroad, and did, in fact, complete a portion
of it. However, in 1894, a dispute arose with Colombia and
the Government decided to confiscate the concession. At that
time the State Department intervened on behalf of the Company
on the grounds that the Colombian Government's action was a
denial of justice under the concession. The Colombian Government agreed to negotiations with the Company, and an agreement
was eventually reached which provided that the Government
would receive the railroad for the actual cost of the construction. Two-hundred thousand dollars was paid to the Company
and any further payment was to be determined by a commission
consisting of the Secretary of State, the Colombian Minister
in Washington and a third commissioner, who eventually turned
out to be Professor Lewis M. Haupt of Philadelphia. An award
against Colombia was finally handed down by this Commission in
October, 1897. Colombia ultimately appealed the award to the
United States Supreme Court, where, except for minor alterations, it was upheld. The entire amount to be paid by Colombia, under this award, was $393,204.02 less the $200,000 which
had already been paid. In addition, six per cent yearly interest was to be paid on the unpaid portion beginning with January 26, 1898, the date of the original payment. The final decree was handed down on July 16, 1903, and the formal demand
for payment was made on July 23, 1903. In August, 1903, the
Company asked the Department of State to take some action;
but, evidently, no action was taken. In October, 1906, Representative Edwin Denby, of Detroit, Michigan, wrote to James B.
Scott the Solicitor of the State Department asking that some
action be taken on behalf of the Company, some of whose stockholders lived in his district. As a result of this letter, in
February, 1907, Charge Heimke was instructed to bring the matter to the attention of the Colombian Government and to use
his "good offices in order to obtain a settlement of the liability." While not contesting the Company's claim, the Colombian Government decided to transfer negotiations to Washington
in the hope of having the Company agree to reduce the interest.
This is where the matter stood until Dawson was instructed to
bring the matter again to the attention of the Colombian Foreign Minister in January, 1908. Edwin Denby to James B. Scott,
October 27, 1906; Root to Heimke, February 23, 1907; Lane and
Schramme Attorneys in Fact for Cauca Company to Jose M. Passes
(Colombian Charge in Washington), October 1, 1907; Root to
Dawson, January 3, 1908, No. 10, Numerical File 2086/1, 57, 62.
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commercial interests in Colombia or in seeing the extension of
Yankee enterprises in that republic.
true.

The contrary is actually

In the case of the Cauca Company, as has been noted,

he did his best to secure a settlement satisfactory to the
company.

Moreover, in January, 1908, as a result of the great-

ly fluctuating rate of exchange, Dawson advised North American
exporters both to exercise great caution in giving credit to
Colombian importers and not to extend their operations for the
present time.

However, he reconunended that the time was

propitious for establishing mining and industrial enterprises.
Again, the rate of exchange prompted him to make this suggestion.

Wages were, of course, paid in Colombian currency and,

since the workers principally used goods of domestic manufacture or production, a rise in the rate of exchange would
not necessitate a proportionate rise in wages.

"The net

result," he reported, "would be that the employer, who pays
his labor from funds obtained by the sale of foreign drafts,
would get it cheaper. 1143
The most important issue in Colombian-United States
relations during Dawson's assignment to Bogot~.was, of course,
the Colombia-Panama-United States treaties then being negotiated in Washington.

Dawson had no part in the initial nego-

tiations and only a minor role in their later phases.

His

contribution in the matter of the treaties seems to have been
confined to three points: advising the Reyes Government to
43 Dawson to Root, January 25 , 1908 , No. 45 , co n f'1dential, Numerical File 10717/1.
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avoid any action which might endanger the negotiations,
lending some assistance in the last phase of the negotiations,
and finally urging Reyes to secure their ratification.
By the time he arrived in the Colombian capital, the
preliminary negotiations had been concluded and the protocols
outlining the basis for the treaties had already been signed.
However, the boundary issue continued to present a difficulty.
In spite of Root's acceptance of the boundary as defined by
the New Granada law of 1855, the Panamanians attempted to
44
extend their control beyond these limits.
In mid-September,
1907, a small Panamanian party visited, and, for all practical
purposes, occupied the little village and port of Jurado,
on the Pacific coast about ten miles south of Point Ardita.
The Colombian Government claimed that this area lay within
I

the Colombian department of Choco and, not unnaturally, interpreted the Panamanian action as an attempt to extend Panama's jurisdiction prior to the conclusion of the treaty. 45
The Panamanians, however, contended that Juardo had been under
the jurisdiction of the former Department of Panama since 1898,
and that by occupying the village they were not actually
disturbing the status quo. 46
44

Parks,~·

cit., p. 434.

45
Dawson to Root, October 28, 1907, No. 5, Numerical
File 9271/8.
46
squiers to Secretary of State, telegram, November
19, 1907, Numerical File 9271/6.
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The Panamanian occupation of Jurado was the first
problem to confront Dawson upon arriving in Bogota in October,
1907.

When the matter was brought to his attention, he wired
''

the news to Washington, and advised Vasquez Cobo, the Colombian Foreign Minister, against taking any hasty or violent
action. 47 For the time being,the Reyes Government decided
to work through the United States in an attempt to dislodge
the Panamanians.

However, pressure was being exerted on

/

I

Bogota by the provincial authorities in Checo to grant them
permission to expell the intruders.

The possibility of an

unauthorized or accidental clash between Colombians and Panamanians, in the disputed area, was growing progressively more
likely.

Moreover, the Government itself was fearful that its

inaction might be interpreted as a willingness to cede more
Colombian territory.

Such a stand, of course, would not be
48 D
.
. '
publ'ic opinion.
awson con t 'inue d t o
t o 1era t e d b y Co 1 o mb ian

advise against the use of force.

He assured the Colombian

Foreign Minister that the diplomatic course which the Government had decided to follow would be far better calculated to
gain the support of Secretary of State Root than the use of
force.

He further pointed out that since Root had apparently

decided that the boundary laid down by the 1855 law was the
47 oawson to Root, October 28, 1907, No. 5, Numerical File 9271/8.
48
Dawson to Root, November 18, 1907, No. 17, Numerical File 9271/21.
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correct one, the Panamanians would not receive United States
support in claiming additional territory. 49
Dawson's assurances were well founded.

Secretary of

state Root remained firm in his support of the Colombian position and finally indicated that the United States would have
no objection to Colombia extending its jurisdiction over the
disputed territory. 50 On March 22, 1908, the region was, in
fact, occupied by a Colombian military expedition.

This ac-

tion had the salutary effect for the Reyes Government of stopping opposition arguments that the treaty negotiations would
'
o f more Co 1omb'ian t erri't ory. 51 Roo t
1ea d t o th e cession
offered no solace when the Panamanian Government called upon
the United States to intervene and protect the integrity of
the Republic as provided in the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty of
52
. November 18, 1903.
He informed the Panamanian Legation in
Washington that the United States did not consider the Co.lornbian action or, for that matter, the boundary dispute with
Colombia, as in any way endangering the independence of the
Republic of Panama.

Furthermore, the Secretary pointed out

that the treaty of 1903 could not be interpreted in such a way
49 Ibid.
50 oawson to Root, March 6, 1908, No. 58, Numerical
File 1502/84.
51 oawson to Root, April 13, 1908, No. 80, Numerical
File 9271/46.
52 Arango to Root, April 3, 1908; Arango to Root,
April 5, 1908, Numerical File 9271/34, 37.

r
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as to mean that the United States was obliged to accept the
validity of the Panamanian view in every international controversy involving that republic.

Specifically concerning

the Jurado district, Root noted that he accepted the boundary
line of 1855, and the nationality of Jurado depended on its
location in reference to that line.SJ
Colombian occupation of Jurado did not settle the
boundary issue.

In fact, the Colombian and Panamanian posi-

tions seemed to be irreconcilable.

Since arbitration on the

boundary would only serve to delay the final settlement with
the United States and Panama, the Colombian Government pre. so l u t'ion. 54 M'inis
. t er Cor t es in
.
f erre d not t o resor t t o th is
Washington agreed to proceed with the negotiations on the
basis of not mentioning the boundary issue in the treaty.SS
However, still fearing accusations of being willing to cede
Colombian territory, the Reyes Administration thought it esS6
sential that the treaty include a boundary clause.
The
solution ultimately adopted was partly to delimit the Panama-Colombian boundary, while leaving the ownership of the
SJRoot to Arosemena, May 14, 1908, Numerical File
9271/38.
S 4 oawson to Root, March 6, 1908, No. S8, Numerical
File 1502/84.
s 5Parks, £E.· cit., p. 434.
56 oawson to Root, March 6, 1908, No. 58, Numerical
File 1502/84.
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Jurado region to be settled by arbitration. 57
/

On September 20, 1908, Dawson left Bogota to return
to the United States for a leave of absence. 58 Before leaving,
he called upon President Reyes.

I

At that time, Reyes expressed

his urgent desire that the treaties with Panama and the United
States be concluded as soon as possible.

Dawson, in turn,

offered to join with Root and Cortes in working towards the
successful completion of the negotiations. 59 Once back in
Washington, Dawson apparently conferred with Minister Cortes,
and it is possible that he may have taken some part in the
negotiations.

However, it is impossible to say what he

actually did. 60
On January 9, 1909, the tripartite treaties were finally signed.

In the treaty between Panama and the United States

only the first article directly effected Colombia.

The United

States consented to Panama assigning to Colombia the first
ten yearly payments of $250,000, which the United States had
agreed to pay Panama under the Hay-Bunau varilla Treaty.

The

57 Parks, op. cit., pp. 434-435. Panama-Colombian
Treaty, Article IX";" FRUS, 1909, pp. 232-33.
58 Hibben to Root, September 22, 1908, No. 165,
Numerical File 2765/33.
59 Extract from a Private Letter of the Colombian
Foreign Minister to the Colombian Minister in Washington,
September 15, 1908, handed to the Secretary of State on October 19, 1908, by the Colombian Minister, Numerical File
1502/91.
60 cortes to Dawson, November is, 1909, Numerical
File 1502/258.
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treaty between Colombia and the United States regulated Colombian use of the completed canal and, in the meantime, the use
of the trans-isthmus railroad.

In time of war 1 Colombia

was to have free use of the canal to transport troops and
war materials.

In addition, Colombian products and mail were

to enter the canal zone on the same basis as products and
mail from the United States.

Article VI, which would later

cause opposition in Colombia, provided that all Colombian
ports open to commerce would be open, free of any port fees,
as a refuge in the time of distress to any ship involved in
the building of the canal or passing through the canal.

Be-

sides partly delimiting the boundary between the two countries
and leaving the ownership of Jurado region to later arbitration, the Panama-Colombian treaty provided for Colombian
recognition of Panamanian independence.

Panama, in turn, a-

greed to transfer to Colombia the first ten annual payments
received from the United States, thereby settling the question
of Panama's share in the Colombian national debt.

Provisions

were also made for determining the citizenship of those individuals who were residing in Colombia but had been born in
Panama or vice versa.

For any one treaty to become effective,
61
.
.
a 11th ree h a d t o b e ra t i"f"ie dby th e respective
coun t ries.
6111 Treaties Between the United States and the Republic of Panama and Colombia Relating to the Panama Canal, Both
signed January 9, 1909," FRUS, 1909, pp. 223-29. "Treaty
Between the Republics of Panama and Colombia," ibid., pp.
229-33.
-
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Once the negotiations were completed and the treaties
signed, Secretary of State Root decided that Dawson should
return to Colombia with the treaties. 62 It was also apparently thought that Dawson might lend some assistance in
securing Colombian ratification. 63 Upon arriving back in
/

Bogota, on February 13, Dawson found the initial Colombian
reaction to the treaties to be favorable.

Nevertheless, those

who opposed Reyes' policies began to call for the submission
of the treaties to a popularly elected congress for ratification rather than to the Reyes appointed National Assembly. 64
Despite these rumblings, Reyes convened the National
Assembly on February 22.

On the twenty-third, Foreign Minister
65
Urrutia presented the treaties to the Assembly.
However,

by the end of the month, the opposition began to gain mo. mentum, and, in an effort to calm it, Reyes agreed to summon
an elected congress to meet in February, 1910.

In the mean-

time, the National Assembly would continue to function and
62 Dawson to Root, January 5, 1909, (also Root's
notation at the bottom of the letter) , Numerical File 1502/
105.
63 Dawson to Dawes, January 21, 1909, Dawes Collection, Name File, 1906-1914, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic]
Dawson Folder.
64 Dawson to Secretary of State, February 17, 1909,
No. 235, Numerical File 1502/160.
65 oawson to Secretary of State, February 24, 1909,
No. 239; Dawson to Secretary of State, February 24, 1909,
No. 240, Numerical File 1502/167, 169.
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ratify the treaties.

66

Also, by this time Dawson could report

that he was observing some genuine opposition among the public
to the boundary article in the Panama-Colombian treaty and
the presence of considerable hostile sentiment towards Panama
and the United States resulting from the 1903 revolution. 67
Reyes' efforts to mollify the opposition proved inadequate,
and during the first week of March, it continued to gain
strength.

Dawson, seeing that Reyes was becoming irresolute

regarding the ratification, made an effort to let the President know that the United States Legation expected him to proceed with the ratification. 68
The committee of the National Assembly which had been
entrusted with studying and reporting on the treaties delivered its report on March 8.

The majority report £avored rati-

fication of the treaties.

Nevertheless, one member of the com-

mittee, Francisco de P. Mat~us issued a minority report opposing ratification.

I

In his report, Mateus argued that Article

VI of the treaty with the United States, by which Colombia
agreed to allow ships, either engaged in building or using the
canal, free use of Colombian ports as a refuge in time of distress, would result in the lose of Colombian sovereignty over
66 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 8, 1909, No.
244, Numerical File, 5025/81.
67
Ibid.
68 Dawson to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1909,
No. 247, Numerical File 1502/184.
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these ports.

In addition, he maintained that the failure to

define the limits of the district of Jurado in the Panamanian
treaty indicated that the United States and Panama were planning to extend the boundary line far enough into Colombian
territory to include an alternate canal route through the
.
69
Atra t o River.
On the evening of the eighth, the capital was rocked
by student demonstrations against the treaties.

By the ninth

the crowds had grown both in size and in temper.

The United

States Legation now became a target of some of the demonstrations.

Around two o'clock in the afternoon a delegation of

about forty students was admitted and Dawson agreed to meet
with them.

The leaders, basing their arguments on the conten-

tions that the National Assembly was not a constitutional body
and that recognition of Panamanian independence would dishonor
and disgrace Colombia, politely delivered speeches expressing
their opposition to the ratification of the treaties.

Dawson

replied that it would be improper for him as a foreign diplomat to discuss the merits of the treaties with private individuals.

However, he assured the students that the United

States had only the friendliest sentiments towards Colombia,
wishing it peace and prosperity. 70 While the students probably
left unconvinced by Dawson's statements, the meeting possibly
69 Ibid.

?Oibid.
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did have a good effect upon them. 71

Dawson did not lodge a

complaint with the Colombian Foreign Office over the demonstrations at the Legation; nevertheless, the Legation was soon
placed under heavy police guard.

Future demonstrations in
the vicinity were thwarted and the leaders arrested. 72
In spite of Government attempts to stop the demonstra-

tions elsewhere, they continued to grow in intensity.

On the

thirteenth, in an effort to calm the students, Reyes agreed
to meet with some of them in order to discuss the treaties.
The students, however, soon turned the meeting into a denunciation of the Reyes financial policies, his supression of
freedom of the press and failure to call an elective congress.
Shortly after the meeting Reyes submitted his resignation as
President to the National Assembly, and Carlos Holguin, the
designado, took the oath as acting President.

Dawson was

inclined to think that Reyes' move was prompted by his desire
to demonstrate his own indispensability.

Before the day was

out, Reyes had regained his composure, or had decided that he
had made his point.

He resumed the presidency and determined

to restore order by arresting the opposition leaders and declaring a state of seige.

As a result of these moves by the

President, Dawson hoped that the treaties would quickly be
71 Hibben to Secretary of State, June 21, 1909, enclosure 1: British Vice Consul Huckin to Sir Edward Grey,
March 19, .1909, Numerical File 5025/228.
72 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 29, 1909, No.
247, Numerical File 1502/184.
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acted upon.

However, the Colombian Foreign Minister indicated

that the opposition had been too successful in stirring up
popular resentment against both the treaties and the domestic
i

policies of the Reyes Administration to allow for any inunediate action on the treaties. 73
In the Assembly the opposition continued to center
its attack on the treaties around Article VI of the treaty
with the United States and the boundary article in the Panamanian treaty.

Dawson believing that the resentment against

the treaties "was being swallowed up in the feeling against
the Government and considerations on internal politics and
personal ambition," was eager to remove the complaints against
these articles.

By so doing, he hoped "to soften the blow in
case Reyes should make up his mind to act vigorously. 1174
Consequently, on the seventeenth he wired the

State Depart-

ment urging that the Panamanian and Colombian Ministers in
Washington exchange notes defining the limits of Jurado.

Re-

garding Article VI of the United States treaty, he requested
permission to give the Colombian Foreign Minister a note
stating that the United States understood the article to be
merely a reiteration of that provision of international law
which provided for the refuge of a ship in distress, with
the addition that the Colombian government would grant this
refuge without the imposition of port fees.
73

Ibid.

74

Ibid.

He also requested
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permission to make a minor punctuation correction in Article

vr.75
Authorization to make the necessary correction in
Article VI and to officially inform the Colombian Foreign
Minister of the United States' interpretation of that article
was quickly sent. 76 However, the Panamanians were reluctant
to exchange notes on the exact limits of Jurado, and the State
Department, now under the direction of Secretary of State
Philander

c.

Knox, did not feel called upon to express an
77
opinion on the Panamanina-Colombian boundary.
By the twentieth, Begot~ seemed to be back to normal.

The state of seige had been raised and Reyes had promised
fiscal reforms and the immediate calling of an elected congress.

Nevertheless, the political situation was still con-

sidered too tenuous to take up once again the matter of the
.
78 On the twenty-fifth Dawson and the Colombian
t rea t ies.
Foreign Minister completed the correction of Article VI and
Dawson presented Urrutia with a note containing the United
States' interpretation of the article.

At that time Dawson

was informed that Reyes had decided to push the treaties

75 Dawson to Secretary of State, undated telegram,
received 3:00 P.M., March 18, 1909, Numerical File 1502/166.
76 Knox to Dawson, March 19, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1502/166.
77 rbid. Knox to Dawson, April 19, 1909, confidential, NumerICal File 1502/179-180.
78 Dawson to Secretary of State, March 29, 1909, No.
247, Numerical File 1502/184.
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through, without any further delay.

Following this plan, on

the twenty-sixth, the President summoned several members of
the National Assembly to the Presidential palace and had them
r

I

i

sign a document pledging themselves to ratification of the
treaties at the meeting of the Assembly on March 29.

News of

the President's action leaked out, and once again resulted
in plotting against the Government.
became common in Bogot,.

Rumors of revolt again

Members of the Assembly were threat-

ened with assassination if they voted for ratification, and
r

even the Archbishop of Bogot,, who had favored the treaties,
wrote to Reyes advising their withdrawal and the immediate
summoning of an elected congress.

Whether the Archbishop's let-

ter wc:sdecisive, Dawson was unable to say; however, on the
twenty-seventh Reyes announced both that he would recommend
that the National Assembly put aside the treaties and that an
elected congress would meet on July 20, 1909.

Dawson was dis-

tressed over this change in plans and spent the twentyseventh with his friends in the Assembly and Government attempting to prevent the delay in considering the treaties.
However, his efforts were to no avail. 79
Since the treaties would not be considered by the Colombian congress until August at the earliest, Dawson thought
that it would be better for the Legation to be left in charge
of the Secretary.

He reasoned that he himself would be pres-

sured to become involved in Colombian domestic politics as the
79 Ibid.
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elections drew near, and while he did not doubt that he would
continue "to be prudent," he was fearful that there would be
misapprehensions and misrepresentations of his attitude. 80
Moreover, Dawson's return to Bogot~ in January had been somewhat unexpected, and he had been forced to leave his family in
the United States.

He was, therefore, eager to return to the

United States as soon as possible, in order that he might ac,, 81
company them back to Bogota.
His superiors in the State
I

Department, however, decided that his presence in Bogota was
required until the treaties had been ratified. 82 Despite
this decision, within three weeks of receiving word that he
would have to stay in Colombia, he was instructed to return
to Washington.

He was informed that he had been promoted to

the Legation in Chile, and it was the State Department's
desire that he return as soon as possible to confer with the
. .
/ E11"iott Northcott. 83 By Apri. 1 2 5 ,
new minister
to Bogota,
Dawson was on his way to Washington. 84
Insofar as Dawson's mission had been concerned with
SO Ibid.
81 Dawson to Root, January 18, 1909; Dawson to Bacon,
January 20, 1909, Numerical File 2765/38-39.
82 wilson to Dawson, April 3, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 2765/43a.
83wilson to Dawson, April 20, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 2765/45a.
84 Hibben to Secretary of State, April 25, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 2765/47.
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securing the ratification of the treaties, it had been a failure.

They were never to receive the ratification of the Colom-

bian legislature.

As a result of the strong opposition to

both the treaties and his domestic policies, Reyes resigned
the presidency and went into exile in the summer of 1909. 85
In the face of the popular opposition in Colombia, Washington's reaction to Colombian ratification of the treaties became one of indifference.

In June, Assistant Secretary of

State Huntington Wilson, serving as Acting Secretary, wired
I

•

Charge Hibben to this effect.

Wilson noted that the interests

of Colombia and Panama were more involved than those of the
United States, and, in view of the prevailing Colombian mood,
the United States Legation "should maintain an impassive and
dignified attitude. 1186 Since it appeared certain that the
Colombian-United States treaty would not be ratified by the
congress which convened in July, 1909, the new Colombian Government proposed a re-negotiation of that treaty. 87 However,
the State Department maintaining its air of indifference and
basing its argument on the joint character of the Panama.
d States-Co1 o.mb'ia treaties,
.
. t 'ions.
Unite
re f use d to re-open negotia

1909,
1909,
1909,
1909,

85 Parks, ~· cit., p. 436.
86 Acting Secretary of State to Hibben, June 11,
telegram, FRUS, 1910, p. 398.
87Northcott to Secretary of State, September 29,
telegram; Northcott to Secretary of State, October 1,
No. 12, FRUS, 1910, pp. 399-401.
88 Acting Secretary of State to Northcott, October 4,
telegram, FRUS, 1910, p. 402, Parks, ~· cit., p. 436.
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Furthermore, although relations between Colombia and
the United States remained officially cordial, between March
and August, 1909, the anti-United States sentiment among the
I

citizens of Colombia grew to such an' extent that according to
oawson's successor, it was even stronger than it had been immediately after the Panamanian revolution. 89 This hostility
was only increased by Reyes, who threatened his opponents with
United States intervention. 90 Dawson, of course, had personally maintained cordial relations with the Government and had
also cultivated friendship with members of Colombian society.
This did not spare him from the attacks of those who opposed
both the treaties and the Reyes Administration.

In May, Daw-

son was subject, along with other United States officials, to
atta-cks in some Colombian papers. 91 Being the Minister of the
United States, he was a natural focus for anti-Yankee sentiment.
Undoubtedly, the failure to achieve ratification and
the growth of anti-United States sentiment in Colombia were
both results beyond Dawson's control rather than the outgrowth
of any act or fault on his part.

If Dawson failed, it was in

his inability to fully realize the extent to which anti89 Northcott to Secretary of State, August 18, 1909,
No. 2, Numerical File 5025/286.
90 Northcott to Secretary of State, August 18, 1909,
No. 2; Northcott to Secretary of State, November 8, 1909,
No. 24, Numerical File 5025/286, 314.
91uibben to Knox, May 13, 1909, No. 262, Numerical
File 1502/222. Hibben to Secretary of State, May 19, 1909,
No. 264, Numerical File 5025/126.
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Yankee sentiment still lingered in Colombia.

A failure to

fully credit nationalist opposition to United States policies
had also been evident during his service in the Dominican
Republic.

There, however, this oversight was not as import-

ant in achieving the ultimate goal of his mission.

The opposi-

tion was not as well organized, and the Dominican Government
could always count on the moral support of the United States
navy in its struggle to retain power.
Colombia.

Neither was true in

The opponents of Reyes combined a genuine popular

hostility towards the treaties with opposition to Reyes'
domestic policies to force the President's ultimate resignation.

Intervention, of course, was never even contemplated

either by Dawson or his superiors in Washington.

CHAPTER X
CHILE:
THE ALSOP CLAIM 1909
William Howard Taft's victory in the November, 1908
presidential election assured the continuation of Republican
control of the federal executive.

However, despite Dawson's

desire both to remain in the diplomatic service and to seek
promotion, there was no guarantee that either would be forthcoming under the new Administration.

That he was retained and

promoted was probably the combined.result of his diplomatic
record and the influence of his friends and political patrons.
The necessity oe returning to Bogot~ with the tripartite
treaties in January, 1909, made it impossible for Dawson to be
present to plead his own case when the matter of his promotion
or retention came up.

Hence, he had to depend on the influence

of his political patrons, Senators Albert B. Cummins and
Johnathon Dolliver of Iowa and Walter Smith the congressmen
from his home district, and his friend Charles G. Dawes, who
still had influential political contacts. 1 Originally, it
would seem that Dawson had set his sights on the United States
Embassy in Brazil. 2 Both Iowa senators petitioned the new
1

Dawson to Dawes, January 21, 1909, Dawes Collection, 1906-1914 Name File, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson
Folder.
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secretary of State, Philander c. Knox, to promote Dawson.
Instead of the Brazilian Embassy, however, they sought the
.
.
r,ega t ion
in

B

.
uenos Aires
•.3

Dawes likewise wrote on Dawson's
I

behalf to individuals close to the new Administration, but
without making any specific suggestions. 4 The outcome was the
promotion to Chile.
Dawson, as noted above, left Bogota' on April 25, 1909,
to return to the United States before taking up his new as.
t •5
signmen

By the time he reached Barranquilla, a telegram

from Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson was awaiting him at the United States Consulate.

He was instructed

to stop at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, for about a week and, in
conjunction with Minister Henry

w.

Furniss, to investigate the

"financial and other conditions" in Haiti, in order that he
might be prepared to report fully to the State Department upon
his return to Washington. 6
The inunediate concern of the Department of State was
the attempt of the National Bank of Haiti, a French controlled
3cummins to Knox, February 22, 1909, Dawson's Application and Reconunendation File.
4Dawes to Fred W. Upham, American Trust Co. Bldg,
Chicago, Illinois, March 25, 1909, Dawes Collection, Press
Letter Books, October 9, 1908 to May 22, 1909, pp. 826-827.
See also, Dawson to Dawes, June 8, 1909, Dawes Collection,
1906-1914 Name File, Dawson-Pai, Thomas A. [sic] Dawson Folder.
5 Hibben to Secretary of State, April 25, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 2765/47.
6

wilson to Dawson, April 28, i909, telegram in care of
the American Consulate, Barranquilla, Numerical File 874/43.
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firm, to persuade the Haitian Government to allow it to collect the custom revenues of the republic under a system similar
to that which the United States had recently established in
the Dominican Republic. 7 The State Department had earlier
informed Minister Furniss that the United States viewed "with
concern an arrangement whose potentiality might hereafter so
seriously affect American citizens in Haiti, and the welfare
of the whole country. 118

The Third Assistant Secretary of

State, William Phillips, who was temporarily handling the
Haitian problem, apparently reasoning that Dawson's extensive
experience in the Dominican Republic would fit him well to
investigate conditions in Haiti, suggested that he be instructed to stop off in Port-au-Prince on his way home from
Colombia. 9 No written report by Dawson appears in the Department of State's file on Haiti. 10 However, it is possible that
he may have delivered his report orally.

At any rate, the

State Department's concern seemed to be for naught. The
Haitian Government never approved the Bank's plan. 11
By the end of May, his investigation in Haiti completed,
7Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary (William
Phillips) to the Secretary of State, April 28, 1909, ibid.
8sacon to Furniss, February 23, 1909, confidential,
Numerical File 874/33-34.
9Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary to Secretary of State, April 28, 1909, Numerical File 874/43.
10 see Numerical File 874.
11
Munro, ~· cit., p. 247.
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oawson was back in the United States.

Here he remained for a

month, spending part of his time familiarizing himself with
United States-Chilean relations. 12 His thirty day instruction
period completed, he shortly left for Chile, arriving in Santiago on August 14.

Six days later he formally presented his
credentials to President Pedro Montt. 13 Scarcely had he made
his formal presentation, when he received a telegram from
the Assistant Secretary of State informing him that he had
been assigned to work in the Department of State as chief of
the newly created Division of Latin American Affairs.

He was

instructed to leave Santiago at his earliest convenience, however, not before he had received and complied with instructions
mailed on August 5, concerning the claim of Alsop and Company
against the Government of Chile. 14 These instructions did not
arrive in Santiago until September 12, and another five days
15
passed before Dawson had completely fulfilled them.
12 Dawson to Secretary of State, undated telegram received May 8, 1909, Numerical File 2765/50. Dawson to Dawes,
June 8, 1909, Dawes Collection, 1906-1914, Name File, DawsonFai, Thomas A. [sic] Folder. Assistant Secretary to Dawson,
June 15, 1909, memorandum, Numerical File 944.
13 untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments from 1907
to 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
14 wilson to Dawson, August 27, 1909, telegram, ibid.
Adee to American Legation in Santiago, Chile, September--rl';""
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/157.
15 Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/164. Dawson to Secretary of
State, October 4, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/166.
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Announcement of Dawson's new assignment and pending
departure from Santiago was apparently withheld until this
time.

When the announcement was made, Chilean reaction was

overwhelmingly favorable.

Both the principal government and

opposition newspapers, El Mercurio and La Union respectively,
ran editorials favorably commenting that the decision of the
United States to create a special division within the State
Department to handle Latin American affairs was a sign of the
Taft Administration's desire for cordial and closer relations
with the United States' southern neighbors.

Both papers also

found Dawson well suited for the position of chief of the new
16
b ecause o f h'is wi·ae k now 1e d ge o f La t'in America.
·
. · ·
d ivision
In the days following the announcement, several semiofficial and social receptions honoring Dawson and his wife
were held by the Chilean political and social elite.

These

festivities culminated with a banquet given in Dawson's behalf by the leaders of the major political parties, on Octo17
ber 5, the day before Dawson was scheduled to leave.
I

Here, Joaquin Walker Martinez, the former Minister to
the United States and toastmaster at the dinner, in glowing
terms, praised Dawson for his ability to have gained the
16 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 27, 1909, No.
20, enclosure 2: translation of editorial from El Mercurio;
enclosure 4: translation of editorial from La Union, Numerical
File 2765/80-81.
17 Dawson to Secretary of Stat~, October 27, 1909, No.
20, Numerical File 2765/79.
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esteem and good will of those who had known him during the
short time he had been in Santiago.

The toastmaster further

assured the new Chief of the Latin American Division that in
Chile it was "a unanimous and solid conviction that LatinAmerica should trust serene and tranquilly in the friendship
of Saxon-America," and that he, as a former representative of
his country in Washington, was convinced "that the actual
policy of the United States toward her continental sisters is
sincere and respects our sovereign rights."

Nevertheless,

I

Walker Martinez did not hesitate to caution that if the United
States were "interested in the fate and harmony of these
countries, she will avoid with the greatest care every step
that might give rise to what is called pretension to preeminence, that make impossible the international approximation that she covets and strives so to realize. 1118 While the
toastmaster probably meant his advice to be taken as a guideline for Dawson in conducting the business of the Division of
Latin American Affairs, it was particularly appropriate in
view of the negotiations which were then going on between the
United States Legation and the Chilean Foreign Office.
Despite the fact that Dawson's new assignment had been
announced and that he had set his departure for October 6, he
would not leave Santiago until mid-November, and then it would
18

Dawson to Secretary of State, October 27,.)909, No.
20, enclosure 8: translation of Joaquin Walker Martinez's
speech as printed in El Mercurio, October 6, 1909, Numerical
File 2765/83.
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be under the clouds of deteriorating United States-Chilean
relations.

The issue which was to occupy Dawson's attention

during the remainder of his stay in the Chilean capital was
the settlement of the claim with which the instructions of
August 5 were concerned: the claim of the heirs of Alsop
and Company against the Government of Chile.

This complicated

claim had its origin in a loan made to the Government of
/

Bolivia by a Chilean citizen, Pedro Lopez Gama, in the early
1870's.

In return for the loan, Bolivia was to give Gama

150,000 tons of guano.

Gama himself was indebted for the money

he had advanced to Bolivia to a Chilean corporation known as
Alsop and Company whose partners and capital were both North
American.

In 1875, to meet his indebtness to Alsop and Company,

Gama transferred his claim against Bolivia to the Company,
. which was then in the process of liquidating its holdings.
This transaction was approved by Bolivia.

The following year

Bolivia and Alsop and Company, through its liquidator John
Wheelwright, fixed the principal of the debt at approximately
$805,775.00 in United States currency with five per cent interest from the date of the contract, plus approximately
$232,375.50 in interest already accrued.

The debt was to be

met from the revenues Bolivia received from its portion of
the receipts from the Peruvian customhouse at Arica and from
various state owned mines located in the Bolivian littoral.
These mines were to be selected, by Wheelwright and leased for

r
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a period of twenty-five years. 19
Before any of the provisions of the agreement could
become operative, the War of the Pacific broke out and both
i

the customhouse and the mines fell to the control of Chile.
Following the cessation of hostilities, no provision was made
for Alsop and Company to share in the revenues from the Arica
customhouse, and the application of Chilean mining laws to
the former Bolivian littoral resulted in the Company being
deprived of some of the rights it had acquired under the agreement with Bolivia and being forced to expend large sums of
money to retain the mines which would not have been necessary
under Bolivian law.

An appeal to the Chilean courts and

executive did not resolve the problem of the Company's claim
to the mines and consequently the Company appealed to the Department of State.

In Washington, it was considered that the

action of Chile amounted to a violation of the practices of
international law and the confiscation of the Company's
19The sketch of the background of the Alsop claim up
to 1907 is based on the major documents presenting respectively
the United States and Chilean positions (Secretary of State to
Minister Hicks, April 30, 1907, No. 60; The Chilean Charge to
the Secretary of State, July 31, 1908, No. 122, enclosure:
The Minister for Foreign Affairs to Minister Hicks, April 9,
1908; The Secretary of State to Minister Dawson, August 5, 1909,
No. 5; The Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister Dawson,
October 15, 1909, PRUS, 1910, pp. 138-143, 146-154, 159-178,
178-186), and the description given in Henry Clay Evans' book,
Chile and its Relations with the United States (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1927), pp. 165-167; and
Frederick B. Pike's Chile and the United States, 1880-1962:
The Erner ence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challen e to
United States Dip omacy Notre Dame, In
Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 139-142.
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property.

The result was several years of inclusive exchanges

between the United States Legation in Santiago and the Chilean
Foreign Office concerning the matter of the Alsop claim.

In

1892 and again in 1901, the Alsop claim was presented to
United States-Chilean Claims conunissions which met to settle
claims of citizens of one country against the other.

The

first conunission did not rule on the Alsop claim for want of
time, and the second dismissed the claim on the grounds that
the Company's Chilean registration made it legally a citizen
of that country, and that the conunission was only authorized
to rule on claims of United States citizens against Chile,
not Chilean citizens against Chile.
In the meantime, in the various preliminary negotiations between Chile and Bolivia from 1891 to 1904, looking
towards a definitive peace treaty, Chile had agreed to assume
the Bolivian debt and obligations in the territory which had
been annexed as a result of the War of the Pacific.

Finally,

on October 20, 1904, the two countries signed a peace treaty.
Under the fifth article of that treaty, Chile agreed to assume,
to the extent of 2,000,000 pesos gold of 18 pence, several
claims against Bolivia, among these was the Alsop claim.

In

an additional protocol, signed and made public in November,
1904, the two Governments explained that under article five of
the treaty signed on October 20, it was understood that Chile
had the right to reduce the claims as it saw fit.

Subsequent-

ly, all but two claimants, Alsop and Company being one, agreed
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to a pro-rated settlement.
As previously noted, the Alsop claim had been the object of correspondence between the United States Ministers in
Santiago and the Chilean Foreign Office.

In April, 1907,

Secretary of State Elihu Root instructed Minister John Hicks
to take up once again the Alsop case with the Foreign Minister.
The State Department had recently acquired copies of secret
notes which had been exchanged by the Bolivian and Chilean
plenipotentiaries on October 21, 1904 concerning the meaning
of Article V of the treaty which they had signed the previous
day.

In his note, the Bolivian plenipotentiary stated that by

Article V his Government understood that Chile would cancel
all of the obligations enumerated in the article, Bolivia's
liability being completely eliminated "and the Government of
Chile assuming all liabilities to their full extent."

The

Chilean representative, evading the issue, replied that his
Government recognized that by Article V, it was responsible
for arranging for the permanent cancellation of the claims
mentioned in the article.

The State Department interpreted

these notes to mean that, in spite of the limitations which
the article apparently placed on Chile's responsibility, Chile
had bound itself to pay in full the claims mentioned in the
. 1 e. 20
ar t ic
I

On June 27, 1907, Charge Henry L. Janes presented the
20

secretary of State to Hicks, April 30, 1907, No.

60, PRUS, 1910, pp. 141-142.

351
united States case to the Chilean Foreign Minister, Frederico
Puga Borne.

Subsequently, in an interview with the United

States charg~, the Foreign Minister rejected the United States
contention that Chile was bound to pay in full the various
claims and maintained that Chile's responsibility was limited
to the amount of 2,000,000 pesos as provided by Article V of
the treaty of October 20, 1904. 21 A formal written answer to
Janes' note of June 27, 1907 was not sent to the United States
Legation until April 9, 1908.

In this note, Foreign Minister

Puga Borne explained that he understood that the United States
had been merely exercising its good offices on behalf of the
Alsop claim and that the verbal reply given to the United
I

States charge had been considered sufficient.

However, he went

on, the continued efforts of the Legation on the behalf of
the claimants now made it advisable to explain in full Chile's
position in the matter.

In summary, Puga Borne denied that

Chile had either a responsibility to assume the Alsop claim
because of the conquest of the territory in which the concession had originally been granted or was bound to pay in
full the claim by assuming this responsibility under Article
V of the treaty with Bolivia.

While refusing to acknowledge

the secret notes of October 21, 1904, he maintained that even
if they did exist, the wording of the supposed Chilean reply
was such as to in no way indicate that Chile interpreted
21Janes to Secretary of State; August 5, 1907, No.
163, FRUS, 1910, pp. 143-144.
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Article V as binding it to pay the claims in full.

He repeated

that the Chilean Government had considered the action of the
United States Government on behalf of the Alsop claim as in
the nature of good offices.

Falling back on the decision of

the Chilean-United States Claims Commission in 1901 to the
effect that Alsop was juridically a Chilean person, he denied
that the Company could seek diplomatic intervention from the
United States.

Nevertheless, if the United States insisted

on intervening diplomatically on behalf of the claim, he noted
that his Government could not accept this intervention and
would offer to arbitrate the case. 22
In Washington, it was thought that the Chilean note of
April 9, 1908 did not throw any new light on the case.

Minis-

ter Hicks was informed that the Department of State considered
the note "in a large measure ill-founded in its statements of
fact, and sophistical in its arguments. 1123 Furthermore, Hicks
was reprimanded for mentioning, in his acknowledgment of receipt to the Foreign Minister, that the note of April 9 was
forceful and would receive the careful attention of the Department of State.

He was instructed not to do or say anything

which might indicate that the United States was not sincere in
22
chilean Charg~ to Secretary of State, July 31,
1908, enclosure: the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Minister
Hicks, April 9, 1908, ibid., pp. 146-154.
23 Root to Hicks, November 30, 1908, No. 139, Numerical File 1154/99.
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its efforts to obtain a settlement of the claim. 24
During the last six months of the Roosevelt Administration, the State Department's actions on behalf of the claim
seems to have been directed to obtaining from Chile any information which would have justified Santiago in refusing to pay
the entire amount of the claim. 25

The Taft Administration had

no difficulty in deciding to continue to press for a settlement of the claim.

26

On March 18, 1909, Secretary of State

Knox wrote to the Chilean Minister in Washington, Anibal Cruz,
again requesting information which would justify Chile's at.

temp t t o re d uce t h e amoun t d ue t h e A1 sop c 1 aim.

27

In mid-

April, during an interview with Assistant Secretary Huntington Wilson and J. Ruben Clark of the Solicitor's Office, Cruz
admitted that his Government did not have any specific evidence which would justify a reduction of the claim.
24

Wilson

Ibid.

25 J. B. Scott (Solicitor of the State Department) to
Adee, August 11, 1908, Numerical File 1154/95. Acting Secretary of State to the Chilean Minister, August 29, 1908; Acting
Secretary of State to the Chilean Minister, November 24, 1908;
Chilean Minister to the Secretary of State, November 26, 1908;
Acting Secretary of State to Hicks, January 24, 1909, telegram;
Hicks to Secretary of State, telegram, received February 26,
1909, FRUS, 1910, pp. 154-156.
26

undated and unsigned memorandum on foreign affairs,
Philander c. Knox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D. c., [hereafter cited as Knox Papers],
Correspondence of Philander C. Knox, Vol. VI, 1908-1909,
June 2, April 22.
27 Secretary of State to Chilean Minister, March 18,
1909, No. 22, FRUS, 1910, pp. 156-57.
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asked that the State Department be given a formal note to
28
this effect.
In his note to Knox on April 16, complying
with Wilson's request, Cruz repeated the argument that Alsop
I

I

and Company was a Chilean firm and thus not entitled to the
protection of the United States State Department.

Finally,

he stated that the reduction of the claim was based on the
provision of Article V of the Chilean-Bolivian treaty of
29
October 20, 1904.
The absence of any further communications
for the period April to August, 1909, either between the State
Department and the Legation in Santiago or between the Department and the Chilean Legation in Washington, would seem to
indicate that Knox and Wilson decided to await Dawson's arrival in Santiago before further pursuing the case.
By the time Dawson arrived in Santiago in mid-August,
1909, Washington had decided to press for the settlement of
the Alsop claim on the bases that Chile was guilty of violation of contract and of committing a tort against the Company.
To substantiate the charge of violation of contract, the Department, bringing forth both the correspondence between Chile
and the United States on the Alsop claim and the various protocols between Chile and Bolivia, including Article V of the
28 Memorandum of an Interview Between Assistant Secretary Wilson and Minister Cruz Concerning the Alsop Case, Mr.
Clark of the Solicitor's Office Being Present, April 15,
1909, Numerical File 1154/123.
29 The Chilean Minister to the Secretary of State,
April 16, 1909, FRUS, 1910, p. 157.
.
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treaty of October 20, 1904 and the subsequent secret notes of
October 21, argued that these constituted Chilean recognition
of the validity of the Alsop claim and were tantamount to a
contractual obligation on the part of the Chilean Government
to pay the claim in full.

The contention that Chile had com-

mitted a tort against the Company was based on the argument
that by depriving Alsop and Company of its share of the Arica
customs and by applying Chilean mining laws, Chile violated
"the well established principle of international law that all
private rights and property must be respected and protected
by a government assuming jurisdiction and control over territory in which such rights exist.

. . . 30
n

The Chilean Government's position on these charges,
as made clear in the negotiations prior to and following Dawson's arrival, was in summary, that it recognized only a limited liability towards the Alsop claim.

It denied that it had

ever agreed to pay the claim in full, or that the treaty with
Bolivia and the subsequent secret notes required it to do so.
Concerning Washington's contention that the application of
Chilean mining laws to the former Bolivian littoral constituted
a tort against Alsop and Company, Chile argued that the concession which had been granted to the Company by Bolivia did
not constitute an actual right over the properties but merely
consisted of the assignment of the proceeds of certain property
30

Secretary of State to Dawson, August S, 1909, No.
5, ibid., pp. 159-78.
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to the payment of credit and thus the annexing country did not,
under international practice, have to recognize these concessions.

Furthermore, it was argued that these concessions had

in fact been granted in territory actually belonging to Chile
and which had merely gone back to its rightful owner as a
result of the War of the Pacific. 31
However, Chile's major argument against the United
States intervening diplomatically on behalf of the Alsop and
Company was based on the premise that the Company was a firm
incorporated under the laws of Chile and thus juridically a
Chilean citizen entitled to diplomatic intervention only by
Chile.

To support this position, the Chilean Foreign Office

brought forward the United States-Chilean Claim Commission
decision of 1901, and maintained that if the firm were to obtain redress, it had to apply to the Chilean courts. 32

For

its part, the State Department argued that the Chilean registry

of the firm did not preclude United States diplomatic

intervention on behalf of the Yankee claimants.

The Depart-

ment noted that North American capital had been lost by North
American citizens and that for all practical purposes the
partnership had ceased to exist.

Therefore, it was maintained

31 chilean Charge" to Secretary of State, July 31,
1908, enclosure: Minister for Foreign Affairs to Minister
Hicks, April 9, 1908; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Dawson,
October 15, 1909 (delivered November 27, 1909), ibid., pp.
146-154' 178-186.

--

32 Minister
. .
.
.
o f Foreign
Aff airs
to Dawson, Oc t o b er 15 ,
1909, ibid., pp. 180-81.
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that
to contest the right of the Government of the United States
to intervene in behalf of the injured American partners
in such a partnership, under such conditions, for the loss
of American capital, would be to contest the fundamental
sovereign right of the Government of the United States to
intervene in behalf of its citizens--a proposition for
which the Government of Chile would not, the Government
of the United States feels, for a moment contend.33
Furthermore, the State Department insisted that the decision
of the Chilean-United States Claims Commission neither was
meant to preclude, nor did preclude, United States diplomatic
intervention.

Finally, the Department noted that Chilean

objection to United States intervention on behalf of the Company was recent and had not been brought up in the earlier
. t 'ions. 34
nego t ia

On August 5, 1909, Secretary of State Knox sent Dawson a fifty-four page despatch containing the United States'
position in regard to the Alsop claim and calling upon the
Chilean Government to come to an equitable agreement with the
claimants or to consent immediately to sign a protocol with
the United States agreeing to arbitrate the dispute.

Dawson

was instructed to present this note verbatim to Foreign Minis/

ter Augustin Edwards as soon as possible.

A draft protocol,

containing a lengthy preamble in which the case from the United
States viewpoint was put forth, was included should the
33 secretary of State to Dawson, August 5, 1909, No.
5, ibid., p. 175.
34 Ibid., pp. 175-76.

,...
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Chilean Government decide on the alternative of arbitration. 35
This was the despatch which Dawson had been instructed
to await before returning to Washington to assume his new post
as Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs.

When it

did arrive on September 12, for some reason which is not clear,
oawson did not choose to follow his instructions to the letter.
He did not present the note to the Foreign Minister until
.
36
September 17.
Nevertheless, he had discussed the matter with
Edwards prior to this, and by the thirteenth the Foreign
Minister agreed to arbitration.

On the fifteenth, Dawson sub-

mitted the draft arbitration protocol to him.

Within a week,

Edwards presented a counter draft in which the right of the
United States to intervene diplomatically would also be submitted to arbitration.

Upon being assured by Dawson that this

would not be acceptable, Edwards yielded, but rejected the
lengthy preamble setting forth the United States viewpoint
as one sided and unjustly preventing Chile from noting the
Chilean registration of the firm.

In place of this preamble,

Edwards suggested one of a more general nature which merely
noted that the United States and Chile, not having been able
to agree on the original and subsequent claims of Alsop and
35 Knox to Dawson, August 5, 1909, No. 5, Numerical
File 1154/156A. This document, less the protocol, was
printed in PRUS, 1910, pp. 159-178.
36 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 4, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/164.
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company, h a d agree d t o sub mi't th e case t o arb'itra t'ion. 37
Apparently, foreseeing no great difficulty in corning
to an agreement with the Chilean Government, Dawson wired the
Foreign Minister's preamble to the State Department, and set
October 6, as the date for his departure.

It was at this

juncture that the various receptions and dinners honoring
Dawson were held.

In Washington, the Chilean preamble was

rejected as not sufficiently defining the issues.

Dawson

was told that if Chile wished to enumerate its allegations,
the Department of State would be willing to consider them as
additions to the preamble which had been sent.

Concerning

the issue of Chilean registry of Alsop and Company, the Departrnent thought that articles III and VI of the protocol,
which provided respectively for the manner of submission of
. evidence and the bases for the judgment, were sufficiently
broad to permit the issue to be brought before the arbitral
tribunal.

However, Dawson was informed that the United States

could not allow its right to intervene in the case to be questioned.

Furthermore, he was reminded that, in view of his

impending return to Washington to be Chief of the Division of
Latin American Affairs, it was most desirable that he succeed
in these negotiations.

He was instructed to make known to the

Government of Chile that if its relations with the United
States were considered important, it was essential that this
37 Dawson to Secretary of State, September 27, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/164.
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one controversy, which had existed for over twenty years, be
resolved.

Finally, if a settlement could not be reached by
October 6, he was to delay his departure for another week. 38
I

Over the next six weeks the negotiations would continue
to falter over the right of the United States to intervene
on behalf of that claim.
wards

ag~ed

On October 9, Foreign Minister Ed-

to sign a protocol with a preamble containing

the allegations and counter allegations of the two countries,
without any mention being made of the registry of Alsop and
Company.

'

The Foreign Minister's consent depended on Dawson's

willingness to give him a note, at the time of signing, restating the State Department's position that Articles III and
VI allowed Chile to mention the Chilean registration in its
arguments before the arbitral board.
set October 12, for his departure. 39

Dawson optimistically
Again he was instructed

to delay leaving Santiago. 40
At this point, an agreement might have been possible.
On the sixteenth, Assistant Secretary of State Wilson sent
Dawson a telegram informing him that the Department of State
agreed to the inclusion in the preamble of all the Chilean
counter-allegations so long as these did not include mention
38wilson to Dawson, October 1, 1909, telegram, ibid.
39 oawson to Secretary of State, October 9, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/171.
40 w·1
.
'
Ch'l
i son t o American
Lega t'ion, Santiago,
i e,
October 11, 1909, telegram, ibid.
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of the registration of the firm.

Wilson noted that the Depart-

ment did not see the need for the note which Edwards desired.
He observed that as the articles stood it would be impossible
to prevent Chile from bringing the registry of Alsop and Company or any other information before the arbitral board.

In

Washington, however, it was suspected that the proposed note
was merely another attempt on Chile's part to include the
issue of the nationality of the firm as a matter for arbitration.

The United States position on this point, of course,

had not changed.

Dawson, however, was authorized to suggest,

once the protocol was signed, that, if Chile preferred to
save the expense of arbitration, a subsequent protocol be
signed, which would delay the arbitration, in order to give
Chile an opportunity to come to an agreement with the claim. ants.

Dawson was further to inform the Chilean Foreign Minis-

ter that if Chile suggested a sum which the State Department
considered reasonable, it would be accepted by Washington
even if the claimants did not think it reasonable. 41
In the meantime, however, President Montt and the
Cabinet overruled Edwards and insisted that the portion of the
1901 United States-Chilean Claims Commission's decision dismissing the Alsop claim on the basis that the firm was technically a Chilean citizen be included in the preamble of .the
protocol.

No allegation as to the legal effect of this

41
wilson to American Legation, Santiago, Chile,
October 16, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/174.
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decision was to be mentioned.

Dawson's reaction to this new

demand was to restate the State Department's position that
the United States could not allow its right to intervene on
.
t s t o b e ques t'ione d • 42
be h a lf o f th e c 1 aiman
By November 3, the State Department had decided to
yield somewhat to Chilean preferences.

Secretary Knox tele-

graphed Dawson authorization to accept either of two alternatives.

First, he could accept a preamble containing the

Chilean counter-allegations, including the insertion of the
United States-Chilean Claims Commission's decision on the
legal personality of the Alsop firm.

Secondly, he could agree

to a more general preamble, which would evidently refrain
from mentioning the various contentions of the opposing parties.

In either case, Dawson's acceptance was to be contin-

gent on the Chilean Foreign Minister agreeing to give him a
note at the time of signing stating that the United States'
right to intervene in this case was not questioned.
it to be an issue of the arbitration.

Nor was

If Chile should continue

to refuse to sign an arbitration protocol unless United States
intervention were made an issue of the arbitration, Dawson was
to give notice of his intention to depart by the next ship
and to inform the Foreign Minister that Washington considered
Chile's unwillingness to arbitrate as signifying Santiago's
decision to reach an equitable settlement with the Alsop
42 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 15, 1909,
telegram, ibid.

r
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claimants through the United States charge'.

However, if the

Chilean Government had not given some evidence of intending to
reach an agreement with the claimants prior to his departure,
I

oawson was instructed to bring along with him the Secretary
I

of the Legation, who normally would have acted as charge, and
to leave the Legation in the custody of the United States
consul. 43
On November 5, Dawson wired the Secretary of State
that Foreign Minister Edwards had agreed to sign a protocol
with a preamble containing the various allegations and counterallegations of the two Governments including the Claims Commission's decision on the nationality of the Alsop firm, and
to exchange notes disavowing the questioning of the United
States' right of diplomatic intervention. 44 By the twelfth,
the details of the protocol had been agreed upon and the
English and Spanish texts prepared.

Anticipating no further

delay, Dawson set his departure for the sixteenth.

However,

on the thirteenth, the day prior to the signing, President
Montt and the Cabinet again overruled Edwards and insisted
that the question of the United States' right to intervention
must be included in the protocol.

Dawson informed the Foreign

Minister that unless Chile made some assurances that a
43K nox to American
.
.
.
Legation,
Santiago,
Ch'l
i e, November 3, 1909, telegram, ~·
44 oawson to Secretary of State, November 5, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/182.
·

r
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settlement would be reached with the claimants, the United
states would close its legation in Santiago.

On the morning

of the fourteenth, Edwards countered with two proposals which
were to be transmitted to the Secretary of State through
Minister Cruz in Washington.

The first provided for a cash

settlement, and the second for Chile to pay the amount found
to be equitable by a liquidator appointed by Brazil.

Dawson

informed Edwards that it was doubtful the latter proposal
would receive much favor in Washington in view of the previous
vacillation of Chile unless the Government obligated itself
to obtain the appropriation as soon as the amount had been
determined by the l'iqui. d a t or. 45
Since he had already set the date for his departure,
Dawson felt to change it again would only serve to convince
the Chilean Government that the United States was weakening
in its resolve to settle the Alsop matter.

He left on sched-

ule, therefore, first heading for Buenos Aires and from there
going on to Rio de Janeiro where his family was awaiting him.
Before leaving, he gave Seth Low Pierrepont, the Secretary of
the Legation two notes.
faires.

One accredited him as Charg~ d'Af-

The other provided for the severing of relations.

Neither was to be used until instructions had been received
46
from Washington.
45 oawson to
telegram, Numerical
46 oawson to
telegram, Numerical

Secretary of State, November 14, 1909,
File 1154/186.
Secretary of State, November 16, 1909,
File 1154/187.
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Dawson's departure for Buenos Aires stirred up alarming rumors in Santiago, 47 and provided the opposition with an
opportunity to attack the policies of the Government.

In an

editorial entitled "Que cese el ministerio," on November 19,
La Union interpreted Dawson's departure as tantamount to the
United States severing diplomatic relations with Chile.

It

was noted that the United States Minister had left under circumstances which were not advantageous for Chile's interests
and which amounted "to an affront to his person and to his
diplomatic action. 1148

In an article published the previous

day, which also discussed Chile's relations with the United
States and Dawson's departure, La Union reported that the
F~reign

Minister had given Dawson a note agreeing to arbitra-

tion, but that later the contents had been altered by the
President with the result that the United States Minister
understood that the promise of arbitration had been withdrawn.
Consequently, the article maintained, Dawson thought he had
no other recourse but to leave for Buenos Aires.

The author

of the article stated he had heard the United States Minister
express, prior to his departure, the displeasure which the
Chilean Government's change of positions had caused him.
47 Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29, 1909,
No. 27, enclosure: clipping from El Mercurio (Santiago),
November 21, 1909, Numerical File 1154/257.
48 Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29, 1909,
No. 27, enclosure: clipping from La Union, November 19, 1909,
ibid.
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According to the reporter, Dawson supposedly said that he had
been able to accomplish nothing in Santiago.

Until the Govern-

ment had changed its position, he thought the Alsop matter
could be arranged, but now he would leave.

It was further

reported that Dawson observed that his Government had not named
a new minister to Chile and that he did not know if one would
be assigned.

Nor did he know if the Department of State would

wait for him to return to Washington to negotiate with Minister Cruz or if it would insist on arbitration as had been
promised.

He said, it was stated, that he had provided every

opportunity for the Government of Chile to win his friendship
and that he regretted the unforeseen development which this
disagreeable incident had taken.

The United States Govern-

ment had been kept fully informed, but he had not had time to
receive new instructions.

Nevertheless, he had not lost hope

that the Alsop matter could be satisfactorily arranged by both
countries. 49 The article went on to raise the question of
whether Chile could now count on Dawson's good will.

In com-

menting on the adverse reaction Dawson's departure had in
Santiago, La Union observed that Dawson was going back to the
United States to be an adviser to his government on Latin American affairs and asked how the Government of Chile could let
.
.
so
. 1 eave wi'th sue h an un f avora bl e impression.
h im
49
Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29,
1909, No. 27, enclosure: clipping from La Union, November 18,
1909, ibid.
SO Ibid.
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In an interview with a reporter from La Prensa in
suenos Aires, Dawson attempted to mitigate the effect that his
departure had had in Chile.

He stressed that his departure

was not a severing of diplomatic relations but was merely
prompted by his new assignment which had been announced some
time ago.

He maintained that the press reaction to the Alsop

case was all out of proportion to the real state of the matter.
He further stated that it was his general impression that a
perfectly satisfactory solution would be obtained.

Concerning

the supposed remarks published in La Union, Dawson categorically denied he had such an interview or that he had made the
statements attributed to him.

La Prensa quoted him as saying

"it was not likely that a career diplomat like me, experienced
in that type of diplomatic business would be so impolitic in
. making declarations on diplomatic negotiations, which ought
not to be seen by the public except when the governments
think it convenient. 1151

When asked if the nervousness appar-

ent in the Chilean press might not be explained by the fear
that the United States might support Peru in the Tacna and
Arica dispute, Dawson replied that this was a mistake and that
no one could produce even a shred of evidence to indicate that
the United States was intervening in the Chilean-Peruvian
5111

No es verosimil--agrego--que un diplomatico de
carrera come yo, experimentado en esta clase de asuntos de
cancillerfa, hubiera sido tan impolitico en hacer declaraciones sobre negaciados diplomaticos, que no deben ver la
publicidad sino cuando los gobiernos lo creen conveniente."
La Prensa (Buenos Aires), November 20, 1909, p. 10.

~ntroversy.
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He further observed that the United States had

'

'

nothing to gain in the dispute and that, above all, Washington
hoped South Americans could resolve their own problems.

The

/

south American policy of the United States, he maintained,
.
.
52
was b ase d on th is premise.
Despite Dawson's denial, as printed in La Prensa, the
question of whether he actually made the statements attributed
to him in La Union, still remains.

Lacking any other evi-

dence, the argument reduces itself to a matter of simply
weighing Dawson's words against those of the author of the
La Union article.

On the one hand, Dawson certainly had an

interest in denying the remarks attributed to him.

They

would undoubtedly have been inappropriate for a diplomat to
make, and one would think that Dawson's experience would have
enabled him to act more discreetly.

On the other hand, La

Union was clearly attempting to embarrass the Government of
President Pedro Montt by publishing the supposed statements
of the former United States Minister.

Nevertheless, the

statements which La Union attributed to Dawson were perhaps
not far from the sentiment of frustration he might have felt
towards the negotiations recently conducted with Foreign
Minister Edwards.

Wiring the State Department from Buenos

Aires on November 19, Dawson reported that he was convinced
that the protocol, which he and Edwards had agreed to on the
52 Ibid.
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twelfth, would not have been submitted to the Chilean Legislature until June, 1910, and then, he felt, it would not have
53 Furthermore, his denial of having
. d ra t'f'
receive
i ica t•ion •
.had an interview is not directly contradicted in La Union.
,/

The article merely states: "Pero, antes de partir, tuvimos
/

oportunidad de oirle manifestar el desagrado que este cambio
.I
54 Therefore,
de frente del Gobierno de Chile le producia."
it is possible that the remarks attributed to Dawson were, in
fact, made in an off-handed manner or in private conversation.
Here, as before, no definite conclusion can be reached.

In

addition, Dawson was something less than completely honest
when he referred to the Tacna-Arica controversy.

In an inter-

view with Minister Cruz, prior to leaving for Chile, Dawson
apparently hinted that the United States might decide to side
with Peru in the dispute if Chile did not come to some agreement on the Alsop claim. 55
Back in Santiago, El Mercurio, which was owned by
Edward's family, 56 took Dawson's interview with La Prensa at
face value, and reprinted the gist of his comments.
53 Dawson to Secretary of State, November 19, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/194.
54 Pierrepont to Knox, November 29, 1909, No. 27,
enclosure: clipping from La Union, November 18, 1909, Numerical File 1154/257.
55 Pike, op. cit., pp. 143, 362. Pike bases his claim
on documents froil\the-archives of the Chilean Foreign Office.
56 Dawson to Secretary of State, September 17, 1909,
No. 9, Numerical File 180/28.
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undoubtedly, this was an attempt to disprove La Union's charge
that the Government's handling of the Alsop negotiations had
injured United States-Chilean relations for some time to come
and to squelch rumors that Dawson's departure had amounted to
a severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 57
In the meantime, negotiations on the Alsop claim were
continuing.

On November 16, Minister Cruz, in Washington,

presented the State Department with the alternative plans
which Edwards had mentioned to Dawson before the latter's departure.

The first called for a cash settlement of 67,000

pounds sterling ($335,000) with interest from 1905 until the
date of payment, while the second proposed submitting the
case to the Brazilian Government for liquidation.

Secretary

of State Knox rejected both plans and stated that the Alsop
claim could not be considered settled unless Chile agreed to
sign and carry out an arbitration protocol or made a cash
payment of not less than $1,000,000 United States gold to the
.
t s. 58
c 1 aiman

Pierrepont was instructed to assume the character

I

of Charge d' Affaires and to present the Chilean Foreign Office with a note containing the two conditions under which the
United States would consider the claim settled.

In addition,

57 Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 29,
1909, No. 27, enclosure: clipping from El Mercurio (Santiago),
December 22, 1909, Numerical File 1154/257.
58 Knox to American Legation, Santiago, Chile, November 17, 1909, telegram, Numerical Pile 1154/186. Knox to
Cruz, November 17, 1909, Numerical File 1154/190-192.
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Pierrepont was to state in the note that if the settlement of
the case was not undertaken in one of these ways within ten
days, he had been instructed to leave, entrusting the archives
of the Legation to the care of the uhited States consu1. 59
Pierrepont complied with his instructions on the afternoon of
. h teenth • 60
t h e eig
By threatening to withdraw its diplomatic officers
from Santiago, the State Department did not, strictly speaking,
envision breaking off diplomatic relations with Chile.

There

was no intention of handing Minister Cruz his passport.

The

official argument in Washington was simply that failure to
resolve the controversy over the Alsop claim made the Legation in Santiago virtually useless for conducting negotiations
between the two governments.

Furthermore, the State Depart-

ment did not choose to interpret Pierrepont's note of the
eighteenth to the Chilean Foreign Office as an ultimatum in
·
a·ip 1oma t'ic sense. 61
t h e strict
Whatever the technical interpretation Washington
placed upon Pierrepont's note, Santiago viewed it as an ultimatum. 62

Foreign Minister Edwards hastened to instruct Minister

59 Knox to American Legation, Santiago, Chile,
November 17, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/190-192.
60 Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 18,
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/193.
61Knox t o American
'
'
Lega t 'ion in
Ch'l
i e, Nave mb er. 24 ,
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/206.
62 Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 25,
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/211.
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cruz to inform the State Department that Chile was still willing to arbitrate on a basis where each Government could make
all allegations considered necessary for its case.

To prove

its sincerity, Cruz was to state that Chile had deposited in
London, to the account of the Permanent Court at the Hague,
the sum of

~200,000

($1,000,000), the amount which the Depart-

ment of State had indicated was a minimum acceptable for settling the claim. 63
Despite this expression of sincerity, Chile's insistence that the United States' right to intervene in the
case must be a point of arbitration led to an impasse. 64
Pierrepont would have left Santiago on schedule had not an
alternate solution been

f~und.

On the twenty-fourth Knox

/

wired the charge to propose that the two Governments submit
the matter to King Edward VII of Great Britain as an "aimable
compositeur" who would render a decision which would be binding on both parties. 65 This solution avoided the issue of
the United States' right to intervene on behalf of the claimants of the Chilean corporation.

Pierrepont presented the

proposal to Edwards on November 25, and on the twenty-sixth
63Edwards to Minister of Chile in Washington, November 18, 1909, Numerical File 1154/199.
64 Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 23,
1909, telegram, Numericql File 1154/206.
65 Knox to American Legation in Chile, November 24,
1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/206.
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it was accepted by the Chilean Government.
67
tocol was signed December 1.
This solution was not suddenly

66

The formal pro-

pulled out of the

thin air by the State Department and presented as a possible
solution to the impasse.

The idea of submitting the contro-

versy to a third party for liquidation had its origin in the
Chilean suggestion.of mid-November that the case be submitted
to the Brazilian Government.

At that time it was rejected by

the Secretary of State because he probably thought that it
was only another Chilean attempt to delay a final settlement. 68
Consequently, Pierrepont was instructed to present his note
setting a time limit for the settlement or arbitration of the
claim.

When news of this "ultimatum" became known in the

other South American countries, press reaction in some of them
. d States position.
. .
69
. was bl atant 1y h osti. 1e to t h e Unite

In

Brazil, where Foreign Minister Rio-Branco was seeking close
friendship with both the United States and Chile, the news of
what appeared to be a pending break in relations between the
66 Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 25, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/211. Pierrepont to Secretary of
State, November 26, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 1154/213.
67 Protocol Between the United States and Chile--Arbitration of the Alsop Claim, FRUS, 1910, pp. 186-187.
68 Frederic w. Ganzert, "The Baron Do Rio Branco,
Joaquim Nabuco, and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship 1900-1911," The Hispanic American Historical Review,
XXII (August, 1942)' 450.
69 oudley to Secretary of State, November 23, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/205.
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two countries was greeted with much concern.

70

Both Rio-

Branco and the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, Joaquim
Nabuco, expressed Brazil's. hope that a solution could be
!
I

reached.

I

In addition to meeting with Knox on November 23, and

explaining the Chilean position on submitting the case to a
third party, Nabuco had appealed to his friend, the former
secretary of State, Elihu Root to intervene with Knox. 71 Also on the twenty-third, Minister Cruz presented Knox with a
letter explaining Chile's proposa1. 72 It was apparently out
of this background that the decision was reached to accept the
alternative of presenting the entire case to a third party for
resolution, without a specific protocol containing the allegations of the two Governments.

In his conversation with Knox

on November 23, Nabuco had alluded to the difficulty with
which Brazil would be faced if it were forced to decide a case
between its two friends. 73 A solution to this problem was
70 Burns, ~· cit., pp. 135-136. In his work on United
States-Brazilian relations during Rio-Branco's administration
of the Brazilian Foreign Office, E. Bradford Burns incorrectly states that Chile objected to the United States intervening
on behalf of a private citizen's claim. Ibid., p. 136. As
noted above, the Chilean objection was based on the registry
of the Company.
71 Ibid., pp. 137-138.
72 cruz to Knox, November 23, 1909, Numerical File
1154/204. In contrast to Burns who stress the role of Nabuco,
Pike maintains that Cruz's friendship with Knox was also important in bringing the Alsop controversy to a happy conclusion. Pike,~· cit., p. 142.
73Nabuco to Knox, November 27, 1909, Numerical File
1154/216.

f
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already at hand.

In his telegram of November 23, informing

the State Department that Chile insisted upon the United
states' right to intervene being questioned in any arbitration protocol, Pierrepont also noted that there were indications Chile would be willing to seek the good offices of the
British Government in reaching an agreement with the United
74
States,
hence, the choice of the king of Great Britain. 75
From the vantage point of over half a century, neither
the sum at issue in the Alsop claim nor the controversy itself appear to have been important enough to warrant the
rather drastic measures that the State Department was willing
to take in order to bring the case to a conclusion.
1909, Washington's policy seemed unwarranted to some.

Even in
Minis-

ter Cruz expressed this sentiment in a note to Secretary Knox
on November 23, 1909.

He noted that his "Government could

never have imagined that a pecuniary claim would have assumed
the character and proportion of a controversy which, according to the announcement of the Chargi d'Affaires, may lead to
a suspension of diplomatic relations. 1176 Latin American
74 .
Pierrepont to Secretary of State, November 23, 1909,
telegram, Numerical File 1154/206.
75 1n the award handed down by George V of Great Britain, the claimants were to be paid 187,000 pounds sterling.
The claim as it existed at the time of the WheelwrightBolivian agreement was allowed. However, the United States'
contention that the application of Chilean mining laws to the
former Bolivian littoral had unjustly harmed the Alsop claimants was dropped. Evans,~· cit., p. 168; Pike,~· cit.,
pp • 13 9-14 0 •
76
cruz to Knox, November 23, 1909, Numerical File

,....-
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6 ympathies

were clearly with Chile.

Santiago's version of the

case received publicity in the Latin American press, while
the United States policy was greeted, as has been noted, with
hostility.

To counter this rhostility, the State Department

sent a circular note containing its version of the Alsop claim
to the Legations in the major capitals of South America.

A-

long with the circular were instructions to have the United
states' case published in the local press. 77 Opposition to
the United States policy in the Alsop case was not confined to
Latin Americans.

Fearing that their own business would suffer

as a result of the Alsop controversy, North American business
firms with interests in Chile urged the State Department to
adopt a more lenient attitude. 78
In view of the apparent insignificance of the claim,
the hostility stirred up in Latin America, and the adverse reaction of North American businessmen, the question naturally
1154/204. The same sentiment was expressed by Edwards to
Pierrepont. Pike, ~· cit., pp. 139-140.
77 Knox to Pierrepont, December 1, 1909, telegram,
Numerical File 1154/224 and attached memorandum. Writing in
the l940's former Assistant Secretary of State Hunting Wilson
remembered that the cost of telegraphing the United States
case had been $12,000. F. M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of
an Ex-Diplomat (Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1945), p. 212.
78 w. M. Crane to Knox, November 25, 1909, Numerical
File 1154/225. Pierrepont to Knox, November 29, 1909, No. 27,
enclosure: clipping from El Mercuiro (Santiago), November 20,
1909, Numerical File 1154/257. Dawson to Clark, February 14,
1910, Memorandum from the Division of Latin American Affairs;
J.R.C. [J. Ruben Clark] February 16, 1910, note from the Office of the Solicitor, Numerical File 1154/298.

377
arises of why did the State Department choose to follow the
course it did in the Alsop case.

The answer to this question

can be found in the legalistic
and somewhat self-righteous at,
I

titude which guided the Department in handling of this case.
This attitude is reflected in a note dated February 16, 1910
from J. Ruben Clark to Dawson.

Clark was a member of the Soli-

citor's Office, the State Department's legal advisers, and
had been deeply involved in formulating the policy which the
Department pursued in the Alsop controversy.

Clark's note

was in reference to a letter from Wessel, Duval and Company,
a United States firm with Chilean interests second only to
those of Grace and Company.

In the letter, which Dawson, now

the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, had forwarded to Clark, the Company suggested that the United States
and Chile attempt to reach some agreement prior to the arbitration.

It was apparently Wessel, Duval and Company's hope

that this "out of court" settlement would lessen anti-Yankee
sentiment in Chile. 79
In his note, Clark replied that he did not feel that
the United States could take the initiative in suggesting a
compromise solution to Chile.

To do so, he maintained, would

indicate that the United States was afraid to arbitrate or
that the United States had forced Chile to agree to arbitration merely in the hope of persuading Santiago to settle an
79 Dawson to Clark, February 14, 1910, Memorandum from
the Division of Latin American Affairs, Numerical File 1154/298.
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unjust claim rather than going to the expense of arbitration.
While acknowledging that there were those in Latin America
who would criticize the United States no matter what it did,
Clark rejected the idea that the United States would still
appear as an oppressor even if the arbitral decision went
against Washington.

He suspected that habitual criticism of

the United States came from either willful or ignorant failure
"to understand the people of the United States and the policy
of this Government," and from the habit of judging the United
States by the critics' "own principles and standards."

Con-

cerning these principles and standards, Clark wrote:
They cannot understand that, since were they as powerful
as are we, they would dominate and oppress weaker states
and would seize from such states whatever those states
had of value which they desired {just as Chile wearing a
saintly mien, did with Peru and Bolivia) that th8 Government of the United States will not do likewise.a
Clark was convinced that the complaints of these habitual
critics should be disregarded because there was nothing the
United States could do to please them.

"I find it difficult,"

he confessed, "to restrain my feelings on this matter when I
am faced with the charges of some of these pious hypocrites
who attack us." 81 He was equally unsympathetic towards
United States businessmen who urged leniency in handling the
Alsop claim.

Clark noted that it was merely a question "as to

80

J.R.C. to Dawson, February 16, 1910, note from the
Office of the Solicitor, ibid.
Slibid.

I
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ox is gored."

The very firms which were objecting to

the United States policy in the Alsop case would not hesitate
a minute, he observed, in seeking assistance from the State
oepartment if their own interests were threatened. 82
Clark's remarks on the question of whether or not Chile
should pay the Alsop claim are worth quoting at length.

On

this point he wrote:
On this whole question, I may observe that I have
never been able to understand why a solvent debtor should
not pay his honest debts, nor why a solvent nation should
not meet its just obligations. Nor can I understand why
it should be thought that a request to pay a debt is an
insult or an act of oppression. I always feel that, unless there be some overpowering reason to the contrary,
one may reasonably ask and insist that a solvent debtor
pay his honest debts, even though the debtor might prefer
to avoid payment and even though the request for payment
irritates and annoys the debtor. The good will of such
a debtor can scarcely be classed as legal tender.83
In swnmary, the position of the United States in regard to the Alsop claim was simply that the claimants had a
just case against Chile, and Chile should settle this claim
either by a cash settlement or arbitration regardless of
criticism either from Latin America or United States business
firms operating in Chile.

In his annual message to Congress

on December 7, 1909, President Taft expressed this view more
succinctly and less caustically than Clark, albeit more authoratively, when he said "a citizen himself can not by contact
[sic] or otherwise divest himself of the right, nor can this
Government escape the obligation, of his protection in his
82

Ibid.

83 Ibid.
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personal and property rights when these are unjustly infringed in a foreign country. 1184
Dawson himself seems to have been of the opinion that
i

I

the settlement of the Alsop claim, which had been a bother to
United States-Chilean relations for so many years, actually
served, by clearing the air, to promote better relations between the two countries.

In 1911, while he was serving as

Resident Diplomatic Officer in the State Department, a caricature of President Taft taken from the Chilean magazine
Zizzag came to his attention.

The caption read "He has at-

tained impressive power and conquered universal applause by
his noble idealist character and his great gifts for statescraft."

Dawson sent the caricature to the President's secre-

tary with the comment that "better than a ream of solemn official interchanges the spirit & details of this caricature
show that Chilean feeling toward the U.S. Govt has been revolutionized since I was sent down there two years ago & that
they are gladder than we are that the old Alsop sore was
cauterized. 1185
Insofar as the Chilean Government was concerned, Dawson may have been correct.

In a conversation with Charge'

Pierrepont in the early spring of 1910, Foreign Minister
84

Message of the President, FRUS, 1909, p. xv.

85

.

Dawson to Hilles, undated, acknowledged August 1,
1911, William H. Taft Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D. C. [hereafter cited as the Taft
Papers], Presidential Series No. 2, File 1415.
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Edwards indicated that he thought that the determined policy
which Secretary of State Knox had pursued in finally eliminating the Alsop claim was correct, and that Chile proposed to
follow the same tactics in finally bringing the Tacna-Arica
controversy to a solution. 86 However, notwithstanding a claim
later made by Edwards that the Alsop case had not adversely
affected the good relations between the United States and
Chile, 87 the tactics which the United States had followed in
bringing the Alsop controversy to a conclusion did stir-up
anti-Yankee sentiment in Chile. 88 Dawson's and Edwards'
statements can only be taken at their face value if one disregards popular and non-official sentiment.
86 Dawson to Wilson, May 2, 1910, Memorandum from the
Division of Latin American Affairs, Numerical File 1154/365,
filed in Decimal File 425.11A78.
87P'k
i
e,
88 1bid.

~·

cit., p. 142.

CHAPTER XI
DOLLAR DIPLOMACY:
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE STATE DEPARI'MENT
AND CENTRAL AMERICA 1910-1912
The appointment of Dawson as Chief of the Division of
Latin American Affairs was part of a general reorganization of
the State Department undertaken by Secretary of State Knox.
Huntington Wilson, the new Assistant Secretary of State, was
the guiding spirit in this reorganization.

As Third Assistant

Secretary under Root in 1906, Wilson, who had recently come to
the Department from the secretaryship of the United States
Embassy in Tokyo, had presented the Secretary with a plan for
departmental reorganization along less centralized lines.

To

achieve the plan's objective of greater efficiency, one provision called for the creation of four geographical divisions
to be manned by individuals who had served in the areas and
were consequently familiar with their problems.

Root, ap-

parently preferring to retain direct control over the affairs
of the Department, was reluctant to authorize the complete
reorganization, but did allow Wilson to form and head the Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

With Wilson's ascendancy under

the new Secretary, his ideas of reorganization were bound to
receive a more favorable hearing.

In the summer of 1909,

appropriations for the reorganization scheme were obtained
382
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from Congress and the reorganization itself undertaken. 1
In view of his twelve years service in Latin America,
part of which had been spent in critical areas, and his general
i

I

knowledge of the region, Dawson seems to have been a logical
choice to head the Division of Latin American Affairs.

As

the name indicates, the Division was responsible for United
States relations with the nations south of the Rio Grande.
The order establishing the Division provided that its officers would handle all diplomatic and consular matters "in
relation to Mexico, Central America, Panama, South America
and the West Indies." Routine administrative affairs were
2
excepted.
This wide latitude meant that the Division could
be concerned with such diverse matters as a possible visit to
the United States by President-elect Marshal Hermes da Fonseca
4
of Brazil in 1910, 3 and a revolution in Nicaragua.
1 Huntington Wilson, ~· cit., pp. 153, 156, 161,
181-182.
2order of Secretary Knox establishing the Division of
Latin American Affairs, November 19, 1909, Numerical File
21235/8. Prior to Dawson's returning to the United States,
in December, 1909, William Tecumseh Sherman Doyle, the Assistant Chief, ran the Division. That the Division of Latin
American Affairs was functioning under Doyle's administration
as early as October 25, 1909 would seem to be indicated by
memoranda and other documents contained in the Numerical Files
of the Department of State, for example, see Numerical File
1502/251 et seq. It is possible that even earlier examples
could be found. The Division itself was not officially established by the order of the Secretary of State, until November 19, 1909.
3Numerical File 24173.
4Numerical File 6369/591 et seq.
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The efficiency which the reorganization envisioned was
to be realized not merely in the handling of political relations with foreign powers but primarily in furthering and protecting United States commerical and financial interests in
.
t .
5
f oreign coun ries.

In recognition of the presence of a po-

tentially large field for commerical expansion and the increasing investment of North American private capital in Latin
America in addition to the growing importance of United
States-Latin American diplomatic relation, Dawson was also
to serve as Resident Diplomatic Officer in the State Department. 6

This position was also newly created and like the

geographical division was designed to provide expert advice
to the Secretary of State in the formulation and execution of
policy. 7 With salaries of $7,500 the Resident Diplomatic Officer and the counselor for the Department were the second
highest paid officials in the Department of State. 8
Insofar as the departmental reorganization was concerned
5Memorandum on developments within the Department of
State, undated and unsigned, Knox Papers, Correspondence,
June 2, 1908-April 22, 1909, Vol. 6.
6outline of the Organization and Work of the Department of State. Prepared by Direction of the Secretary of
State (Washington: n.p., 1911), pp. 12-14. Included in the
Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, File 40.
7 Ibid., p. 28.
8The Secretary of State's salary was $12,000, while
the Assistant Secretary and Second Assistant Secretary received $5,000 and $4,500 respectively. Register of the Department of State, September 20, 1911 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1911), p. 21.
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with furthering the legitimate interests of United States commerce and financial investments, it can be seen to fit into
the Taft Administration's policy of dollar diplomacy. 9 In
addition to merely assisting these commerical and financial
interests, and perhaps more importantly, the policy of dollar
diplomacy also implies the use of North American financial
investments to obtain policy objectives.

This latter was fre-

quently used in dealing with the countries of Central America.
As chief of the Latin American Division, Dawson dealt with
both aspects of this policy.
One of the earliest matters which came to Dawson's
attention in January, 1910, was concerned with obtaining new
markets in Latin America.

In March, 1909, the Argentine Gov-

ernment announced that it would accept bids for the construetion of two battleships.

In addition to French, British and

Italian concerns, four North American shipbuilders entered the
competition.

The State Department was desirous of having the

contracts awarded to an United States firm.

However, the anti-

Yankee sentiment stirred up in Argentina by the Alsop controversy and the report that Dawson had supposedly made a speech
in Rio de Janeiro, while on his way home, attributing the
resolution of the controversy to the Brazilian Government when
Buenos Aires was seeking this credit seemed to dampen the
9wilfrid H. Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the
United States, 1890-1920 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1942) I PP• 263-64.

r
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In a memorandum to the Division of Latin American Affairs, in early January, 1,910, Assistant Secretary Wilson
I

noted that he was "getting worried about the battleships" and
asked if the Division could not "think up some further pressure
upon the Argentine. 1111 Dawson replied by asking if all the
information was correct and stating that he was studying the
matter.

He then listed various points which might be used in

bargaining with Argentina.

Regarding his supposed Rio de

Janeiro speech, he suggested that he might write a personal letter to the United States Minister in Buenos Aires on the subject of the speech, which could be shown to the Argentine
12
Foreign Minister if it were thought necessary.
Apparently, it was never necessary to take any action.
On January 21, the Argentine Cabinet awarded the contracts to
the lowest bidder, which happened to be one of the United States
companies.

In a memorandum to Secretary Knox, Dawson observ-

ed that the contract meant that over $23,000,000 would be
spent in the United States to the benefit of North American
10 c. H. Sherrill {U.S. Minister in Buenos Aires) to
Secretary of State, November 25, 1909, No. 160; Sherrill to
Secretary of State, December 9, 1909, No. 181, Numerical File
1070/155 and 159.
11 Assistant Secretary to the Division of Latin American Affairs, Numerical File 1070/161.
12 Dawson to Wilson, January 7, 1910, Memorandum,
ibid.

387
industry and labor.

13

Although the State Department's contri-

bution to this achievement during the time when Dawson was concerned with the matter seems to have been relegated to keeping
the North American firms up to date on the various Argentine
14
specifications and changes,
this was no minor factor considering the distances involved.
The State Department was not always so successful in
securing Latin American contracts for North American firms.
Sometimes this was made difficult by lack of interest on the
part of the companies themselves.

In April, 1910, Minister

Sherrill in Buenos Aires informed the Department of State that
the Argentine Government was interested in having a ship for
use in the Antarctic built in the United States.

This ship

was to be similar to the one used by Commander Peary in his
. exp 1 ora t"ion. 15
Are t ic

As soon as Sherrill's despatch reached

his desk, Dawson got in touch with congressmen in whose districts shipbuilding firms were located.

However, no firm was

interested in the contract, and Dawson thought it unlikely
that the Department would be able to find a ship yard that
13 Dawson to the Secretary, January 22, 1910, Memorandum, Numerical File 1070/175.
14 Ibid.
15 sherrill to Secretary of State, April 4, 1910,.No.
307, Decimal File 835.34/224, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910-29,
Microcopy No. 514, (Washington: National Archives, 1963),
roll 17.
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would want the job. 16
Of course, in addition to looking for new markets in
Latin America for United States industry and commerce, the Division of Latin American Affairs was also involved in protecting already existing North American financial investments south
of the Rio Grande.

An example of this can be seen in the case

of the Bogota' City Railway Company.

In March, 1910, Tunis G.

Bergen, the President of the Railway Company had appealed to
the State Department to instruct the United States Minister in
/

Bogota to watch that the Company's rights were not discriminated against simply because it was an United States corporation .17

Bergen's appeal was prompted by riots against the

Company in early March.

These were anti-Yankee in spirit.

They were particularly directed against the Company's lengthy
. concession which had been granted in 1906 by former President
Reyes, contingent upon the Company converting from animal power
to electricity.

Prior to the riots, the municipal council of

Bogota" had attempted to obtain a modification of the concession. 18
Minister Elliott Northcott in Bogota" was instructed to
investigate and report on the situation. 19 The entire diffi16 T. c. D. to Davis (Bureau of Trade Relations, Department of State), July 1, 1910, Decimal File 835.34/232, ibid.
17 Bergen to Knox, March 22, 1910, Decimal File 341.
114B63/82.
18Northcott to Secretary of State, April 7, 1910, No.
65, Numerical File 570/13.
19 Knox to American Legation, Bogota': April 4, 1910,
telegram, Numerical File 570/5.
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culty was finally resolved in October, 1910, when the municipal government of Bogota" purchased the Company. 20 The State
Department's attitude on the case of the Bogot~ City Railway
I

company seems to have initially been formulated by J. Ruben
Clark of the Solicitor's Office in conjunction with Dawson.
Both men agreed that while sale of the Railway would remove
the cause for friction, the price must be equitable to both
parties.

The value of the Company's property and investment

could not be sacrificed simply because the Colombian
Govern,
ment failed to provide adequate protection.

Furthermore,

until such time as the Government purchased the Railway at a
fair price, the Department expected that the Colombian Government would provide adequate protection to the Company in the
operation of its. street cars .• 21 Later, however, the Department
did agree to get the Company to accept the lowest possible
price. 22 It is unclear whether Dawson was involved in formulating the policy on this last point, since the decision seems
to have been made shortly after he had been appointed Minister
2 °Frazier to Secretary of State, October 7, 1910,
telegram, Decimal File 321.114B63/71.
21 J. R. c. to Dawson, May 10, 1910, Memorandum; Dawson's handwirtten note at the bottom of this memorandum; and
Knox to American Legation, Bogota, May 11, 1910, telegram,
Numerical File 570/15. Memorandum Division of Latin American
Affairs to Doyle and Coughlin, May 14, 1910; and Knox to
American Legation, Bogota, May 14, 1910, telegram, Numerical
File 570/18. Wilson to American Legation, Bogoti, August 17,
1910, Numerical File 570/39. J. R. c. to Dodge, August 20,
1910, memorandum, Numerical File 570/40.
22 wilson to American Legation, Bogota, August 24,
1910, telegram, Numerical File 570/40.
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to Panama.

Apparently, the willingness which existed both in

Washington and Bogotl to reach a settlement on this problem
came largely from the desire to eliminate it as a possible
cause of increased friction between the two countries, whose
relations had never completely recovered from the Panamanian
revolution of 1903.

At any rate, the efforts which Dawson

and other members of the State Department had exerted on behalf of the Bogotf City Railway Company's interests were duly
recognized by the Company's Board of Directors in a resolution
of appreciation passed in February, 1911. 23
In the two preceeding cases, North American business
interests clearly benefited from the assistance given by the
State Department.

At times, however, the relationship between

the businessmen and financiers on the one hand and the State
Department on the other could be mutually beneficial.

While

Central America was the region subject most frequently to that
aspect of dollar diplomacy which called for the use of private
United States capital in attaining policy objectives during
Dawson's tenure as Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, there is at least one instance where this method of
dollar diplomacy was considered for use in South America.
The continual presence of yellow fever and periodic
out breaks of bubonic plague made the chief Ecuadorian port of
23 Bergen to Knox, March 6, 1911, Dawson's Application
and Recommendation File. The original copy of the resolution
is in Decimal File 321.114B63/109.
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Guayaquil a health hazard for ships stopping there.

The possi-

bility of a contaminated ship coming from Guayaquil to the
canal Zone made this problem a critical concern of the United
States.

During the Roosevelt Administration, an effort was

made to encourage the Ecuadorian Government to take effective
action to clean up the port. 24 Although some success was
achieved along these lines, 25 the Government in Quito found it
difficult to secure its complete objective because of strong
local opposition to interference in Guayaquil's affairs. 26
As the result of a request from the United States War
Department, 27 in October, 1909 the State Department instructed
Minister William

c. Fox in Quito to bring the matter of the

sanitation of Guayaquil again to the attention of the Ecuadorian President, General Eloy Alfaro. 28 Fox presented a strong
. protest; but there seemed to be little likelihood of achieving
any concrete results. 29 In addition to local objections in
Guayaquil to interference from Quito, Fox also noted that the
24 william c. Fox (Minister in Quito) to Root, November 16, 1908, No. 390, Numerical File 468/79.
25 Ibid.
26 oawson to Wilson, January 4, 1910, memorandum,
Numerical File 468/93.
27 Acting Secretary of War to Secretary of State,
October 5, 1909, Numerical File 468/91.
28 wilson to Fox, October 25, 1909, ibid.
29 Fox to Secretary of State, December 31, 1909, telegram, Numerical File 468/92.
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financial situation in Ecuador made it difficult for the Government to undertake the project.

However, Fox reported he

felt confident that if some assistance could be offered by
the United States, the central government would accept any
reasonable plan offered by the United States Government or by
a banking firm and would consent to having the work directed
or controlled by United States officials or by the Canal Zone
authorities. 30
In the meantime, Fox had discussed the sanitation of
Guayaquil with Archer Harman, a North American who, because of
his aid to Alfaro during the latter's political eclipse in
1901 and after, enjoyed a considerable influence with the Ecuadorian President.

Harman was also president of the Guayaquil

and Quito Railway.

He devised a scheme to accomplish the

.sanitation of the port and, with Fox's blessing, headed for
Washington to present it to the State Department.

Harman's

interest in the sanitation of Guayaquil, as Fox admitted,
sprang from more than mere humanitarian motives.

Sanitation

of the port would ultimately lead to the development of the
rest of the country with the consequent prosperity of Harman's
rai'l roa d • 31
In Washington, the correspondence relating to the sanitation of Guayaquil was being handled by the Division of Latin
3 °Fox to Secretary of State, December 30, 1909, No.
561, Numerical File 468/97.
31 Fox to Secretary of State, December 30, 1909, No.
560, confidential, Numerical File 468/98.
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American Affairs.

The possibility of closing Panama to any

ship coming from Guayaquil was considered as a means of pressuring Ecuador into taking some effective ;;ction.

Before

closing Panama, Dawson advised that the Le · ,tions in Lima
and Santiago be contacted to learn if Peru and Chile were planning similar action against ships coming from the Ecuadorian
port. 32 Neither country contemplated such action, 33 and Dawson
thought that nothing should be done until he had had an oppor' t erview
'
Harman. 34
tuni' t y t o in
In an interview on January 19, 1910, Harman presented
Dawson with two alternate plans.

The first called for the

United States directly to undertake the sanitation of the port
providing the necessary funds at two per cent interest.

The

cost of the sanitation would be met out of the water tax,
which would be collected by the United States, with the water
works remaining the property of the United States until the
entire debt was paid.

The second scheme provided for the work

to be undertaken by a private United States corporation.

To

secure its investment, the company would own the water works
and enjoy the revenue from these plants plus that realized
from a tonage tax on all imports and exports from Guayaquil at
32 oawson to Wilson, January 4, 1910, memorandum,
Numerical File 468/93.
33 Cresson to Secretary of State, January 5, 1910,
telegram; Pierrepont to Secretary of State, January 7, 1910,
telegram, Numerical File 468/94-95.
34 oawson to Wilson, January 12, 1910, memorandum,
Numerical File 468/96.
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the rate of $2.00 per ton.

To obtain financial backing for the

company, Harman thought that it would be necessary for the
United States to agree to appoint an engineer and sanitary
I

officer to see that the terms of the company's contract with
Guayaquil were carried out, and to support the company in the
event that either the central government or the municipal government of Guayaquil interferred with the concession.

In view

of his influence with President Alfaro and his belief that
the President would remain in power for the foreseeable future,
'

Harman assured Dawson that there would be no trouble in getting
the Ecuadorian Congress to pass the necessary laws permitting
and guaranteeing a loan. 35
Neither of Harman's schemes received Dawson's unreserved approval.

The first plan he rejected outright.

For

the United States to lend the money directly "would be considered throughout South America," Dawson was convinced, "as
virtually an annexation of Guayaquil. 1136 Concerning the second project, he had several reservations.

In the first place

Dawson was not at all convinced that Alfaro was assured of
continuing in power as Harman had indicated. 37 Secondly, he
thought that Harman's scheme which called for the issuance of
35
Dawson to Wilson, January 20, 1910, memorandum,
Numerical File 468/100.
36 T. c. D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum,
ibid.
37 Dawson to Wilson, February 4, 1910, memorandum,
ibid.
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$10,000,000 in bonds was overly generous to the capitalists. 38
Furthennore, Dawson was convinced that the provisions which
called for United States guarantee of the company's rights
were in violation of the Ecuadorian constitution, and to amend
the constitution was a four year procedure. 39 Finally, he
thought that a contract between the proposed company and Ecuador, with the United States guaranteeing the company's rights,
"would incite fears of our imperialistic designs among South
Americans to nearly as great an extent as would Mr. Harman's
first project for the United States to do it directly. 1140
His rejection of Harman's first project and reservations on the second did not mean that Dawson completely rejected the idea of obtaining the sanitation of Guayaquil
through the agency of an United States corporation.

His idea

was to come up with some plan which would provide adequate
guarantee in order that the money could be raised at only a
little above the prevailing interest rates and at the same
time would not arouse hostility towards the United States in
Latin America. 41 By February 8, Dawson had devised a plan
38T.

c.

D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum,

ibid.
T.

c.

39 oawson to Wilson, January 20, 1910, memorandum;
D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum, ibid.
40 Dawson to Wilson, February 4, 1910, memorandum,

ibid.
41 T. c. D. to Wilson, January 31, 1910, memorandum,
ibid. Dawson to Wilson, February 16, 1910, memorandum,
Decimal File 822.124/134.
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which he apparently thought would meet these qualifications.
The sanitation of the port was to be undertaken by a company
incorporated under the laws of Ecuador whose majority stockholders presumably would be United States citizens.

The muni-

cipality of Guayaquil would finance the work of sanitation by
issuing five per cent bonds not to exceed $10,000,000.

These

bonds would be secured by the water and sewerage taxes, a
tonnage tax placed on all exports and imports, and a lien on
all municipal revenues.

The water, sewerage, and tonnage

taxes were all to be collected by an individual chosen by the
company.

Neither the Ecuadorian Government nor the municipal

authorities in Guayaquil could interfer with the company's
rights until such action had been approved by an arbitration
board composed of representatives of the President of Ecuador,
the company and the President of the United States.

The Ecua-

dorian Congress was to ratify the contract and make any neces.
the c h arter o f Guayaqui. 1 • 42
sary c h anges in
Despite the fact that Dawson's plan did not provide
for direct participation of the United States Government in the
santiation project, it is clear that there would have been
adequate opportunity for the United States to intervene if it
were eventually considered necessary to protect the North
American investors.

However, Harman and his legal adviser,

R. Floyd Clarke felt that the needed capital could not be
42
oawson's "Precis of Contract," stamped Latin American Division, February 8, 1910, Decimal File 822.124/133.
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raised unless the United States and Ecuador entered into a
treaty which would provide for the protection of the company's
interests. 43
I

John B. Scott, the Solicitor of the State Department,
favored Dawson's plan and was partly successful in bringing
Harman and Clarke around to his way of thought. 44 Clarke next
presented the Department with the draft of a protocol between
Ecuador and the United States providing for the protection of
. ht s. 45
th e company ' s rig

The protocol, while less formal than

a treaty, was still not acceptable.

Clarke was informed that

the Secretary of State could not agree to negotiate the protocol which had been suggested, but would be willing to consider any other proposal he might wish to make. 46 A solution
was finally reached in April, when Secretary of State Knox
suggested a scheme by which a North American corporation would
contract with Ecuador to effect the sanitation of Guayaquil
and the United States would agree, through a simple exchange
of diplomatic notes, to participate in arbitrating any dispute
43 Dawson to Wilson, February 16, 1910, memorandum
and attached treaty draft: "Proposed form of Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador," February 14, 1910, Decimal File 822.124/134.
44 Dawson to Wilson, February 16, 1910, memorandum,
note at the bottom of this memorandum dated February 17, 1910,
Decimal File 822.124/132.
45 Dawson to Scott, February 19, 1910, memorandum,
Numerical File 468/103.
46 Knox to Clarke, March 14, 1910, Numerical File
468/106. This letter was evidently drawn up by Dawson.
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between the company and the Ecuadorian authorities. 47
No action had been taken on this plan up to the time
that Dawson left the Latin American Division, in August, 1910.

48

In the meantime, however, Harman had presented the State Department with another scheme which would have benefited his railroad and also provided the cash necessary for the sanitation
of Guayaquil.

Dawson, while not conunitting himself fully to

this plan, did find merit in it.

The plan centered around an

offer by the United States to purchase the Galapagos Islands
for $15,000,000.

Ecuador at this time was interested in sel-

ling the Islands in order to raise money for a pending war
with Peru over a boundary dispute.

The Ecuadorian Government

had 30,000 men under arms and had been financing this army
through its customs revenues.

These revenues, however, had

been earmarked to pay off the Guayaquil and Quito Railway and
for the payment of interest on the bounded debt.

In addition,

the railroad had been carrying troops and supplies without pay47 c1arke to Secretary of State, April 9, 1910, Numerical File 468/114; Knox to Francis J. Heney, care of R. Floyd
Clarke, April 20, 1910, Numerical File 468/109a; Guayaquil
Concession, Form, April 22, 1910, attached to Clarke to Secretary of State, April 28, 1910, Numerical File 468/100.
48 The eradication of yellow fever from Guayaquil was
finally achieved between 1913-1919, through the efforts of
the Rockefeller Foundation. By 1930, Guayaquil qualified as
a Class A - 1 port under the standards of the Pan American
Sanitary Code. Lois F. Parks and Gustave A. Nuermberger~
"The Sanitation of Guayaquil," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXIII (May, 1943), 219-220. This article covers
the problem of yellow fever in the port from the founding of
the city until the eradication of the problem in 1919.
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ment.

It was thought that a mere threat by the United States

to seize the Ecuadorian customhouses would be sufficient to
convince President Alfaro to accept any restrictions on the
use of the money which the United States might wish to impose.
Harman, miscalculating the amount which was to be available,
suggested that the money might be paid in the following manner:
$6,000,000 for the sanitation of Guayaquil; $1,500,000 for
arrears of railroad interest; $1,100,000 for the amount due
the railroad for transportation; $2,000,000 towards the Government's floating debt with Ecuadorian banks; $4,750,000 for
five to six years interest on railroad bonds held primarily
by Englishmen. 49
In commenting on this scheme Dawson observed that the
advantages to the railroad and bondholders was clear, but before it could be considered it would be necessary to investigate the Railroad's relations with the Government.

Moreover,

he thought that it would aid Ecuador commercially and United
States commerce indirectly.

The greatest advantage he saw in

the plan, however, was that Ecuador would have none of the
money available to use in war preparations and the health hazard at Guayaquil would finally be removed.so
49 T. c. o. "Memorandum as To Terms and Conditions Upon
Which the Galapagos Islands Could be Purchased," undated,
stamped Division of Latin American Affairs, September 24,
1910, Decimal File 822.014G/80. This document had to be
drawn up prior to September 24, 1910, since that was the date
upon which Dawson assumed his new duties as United States
Minister to Panama.
SO Ibid.
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As previously mentioned, the use of private North American financial investments by the State Department to obtain
policy objectives was a frequent occurrence in Central American1

I

United States relations during the Taft Administration.

The

object of the policy was political stability through financial
stability.

In a memorandum entitled the "Altruistic Policy

of the United States Toward Latin American Countries," which
was signed by Dawson and prepared for a speech Knox was to
give at the University of Pennsylvania on June 15, 1910, this
point is brought out.

Without economic prosperity and good

governmental finances, good government, it was maintained, was
impossible.

The State Department earnestly desired "to bring

about American sodality and to advance American interests everwher~

on this hemisphere by assisting the financially weak

nation~

to improve their fiscal and monetary systems."

Loans

from United States capitalists to help Latin American nations
achieve these goals would be a benefit to both creditor and
borrower. 51
The primary motive in back of this policy of encouraging financial interference to secure sound finances and sound
government was to remove any cause for European interference
5111 Altruistic Policy of the United States Toward Latin
American Countries," May 28, 1910, Knox Papers, General Correspondence, Box 28. This memorandum is signed by Dawson~
but it is possible that someone else in the Division of Latin
American Affairs actually authored it. Nevertheless, from
the corrections, which are made in Da~son's handwriting, it
is clear that he read it carefully.

1111
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in the Caribbean area. 52

In addition there was a spirit of
altruism in aiding these countries progress. 53 Insofar as this
poli¢y was directed towards political stability, it did not
' t ra t'ion, 54
d i'ffer f rom th a t pursue db y th e Rooseve lt Adm'inis
and was in fact a continuation of the growing interest which
the United States Government had shown in the Central American
Republics since 1903. 55
Partisan differences within the five republics of
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala,
would have been sufficient to contribute to revolutionary disturbances.

However, this situation was aggravated by the close

connections between the Liberals and Conservatives in the various countries.

This resulted in the dominate party in one

country aiding its counterpart in another to gain power.

Not

. only did this add to the likelihood of revolution, it also
contributed to international wars.

Moreover, the financial

situations in these states was similar to that which had existed in the Dominican Republic prior to 1905: large foreign
debts and claims against the governments and failure to meet
52 Munro, ~· cit., p. 161. Samuel Flagg Bemis, The
Latin American Poirc -or the United States: An HistoricaY-Interlretation New York: w. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1967)
p. 16 •
53 semis,
cit., p. 161.
~·

54 Munro,

~· cit., p. 161.
ss~., p. 143.

.111

I

402
t

. t 'ions. 56
h ese o bl 1ga
Prior to becoming Secretary of State, Root appears to

have seen an advantage in having at least Costa Rica, because
of its proximity to Panama, under North American financial
control, 57 and towards the end of his tenure in the State Department, a proposition to reorganize Honduran finances received a favorable hearing. 58 However, there was no attempt
to extend a customs receivership, as had been done in the
Dominican Republic, to any of the Central American countries
during the Roosevelt Administration.

Instead, Root worked with

Mexico in order to secure stability on the isthmus by means of
international agreements.

From 1903 on, the State Department

had offered its assistance in preventing international conflicts among the Central American republics.

When war did

. break out in 1906, between El Salvador and Guatemala, the United
States and Mexico were successful in getting the belligerents
to agree to an armistice and later to agree to a general Central American peace conference.

By urging joint action by the

United States and Mexico, Root hoped to eliminate the suspicion which unilateral United States action might have caused. 59
56

~., pp. 142-43.

57 Root to Hay, January 7, 1905, Root Papers, Letter
Book, October 7, 1904-February 17, 1905, pp. 363-64, Con~
tainer 185, Part 1.
58Munro,
't
165
~·

59 Ibid.

I

£!__·, p.

p. 146.

•
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The agreements signed at the conference which met in
San Josi, Costa Rica, in 1906, were ineffective in keeping
the peace.

In early 1907, war broke out between Nicaragua and
I

Honduras, with El Salvador coming to the aid of the latter.
When Jos' Santos Zelaya, the Nicaraguan dictator-President defeated a combined Honduran and El Salvadorean army and sueceeded in setting up a new regime in Tegucigalpa under Miguel
Davila, a general Central America war, directed against
Zelaya's domination of Honduras, seemed likely.

This danger

temporarily passed when Nicaragua and El Salvador agreed on
peace terms in April.

However, Zelaya's continued interference

in Salvadorean internal affairs led Guatemala to prepare for
war against Nicaragua.

Under these circumstances, in August,

1907, Mexico and the United States suggested another Central
American Peace Conference. 60
Although Roosevelt and Root would have preferred the
conference to take place in Mexico City, strained relations
between Guatemala and Mexico resulted in the Central American
republics insisting on Washington.

The agreements signed at

Washington in 1907 among the five Central American republics
provided for the establishment of a permanent Central American
Court of Justice, the neutrality of Honduras, restriction on
the activities of political exiles living within their territories in order to prevent attacks on neighboring states, and
GOibi' d., p. 147 - 49 •
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agreement not to recognize any regime which had come to power
by revolution.

The United States and Mexico were not signa-

tories of these treaties; nevertheless, since they had sponsored the conference and since their representatives had
attended its meetings, they were morally committed to the
principles of the Conference. 61 Although it may have seemed
reasonable to hope that the Washington treaties of 1907, particularly the Permanent Court of Justice, might preserve the
peace in Central America, by 1909, there were· already signs
that neither the agreements nor the court were proving as
effective as hoped. 62
Secretary of State Knox rejected neither the international machinery which Root helped institute, nor, original63 He continued to use these and
.
.
1y, cooperat ion
wi"th Mexico.
merely employed loan agreements and custom receiverships as
additional instruments in attaining his goal.

In so doing,

Knox and the other officials in the State Department were fol.
. t h e Dominican
. .
l owing
t h e examp 1 e set in
Rep ubl.ic, 64 an un d ertaking in which Dawson had played a prominent role.
During Dawson's tenure as Chief of the Division of
Latin American Affairs there is no indication that he opposed
61 aemis,
151-53.

~· Cit.

I

p. 161.

Munro, ~· Cit. I pp.

62 Munro,

~· cit., pp. 155-58.

63 Ibid.

pp. 162 I 164.

I

64 Ibid., pp. 161-162.
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the policy of financial intervention in the affairs of the
Central American republics.

His attitude is reflected in the

case of the Honduran loan and planned customs receiverships.
By the time he came to the Department, negotiations between
the Government of Honduras and the banking firm of J. P.
Morgan and Company were already under way for a loan to refund
the national debt.

The negotiations had the blessing and encouragement of the State Department. 65 In December, 1909, an
agreement was reached providing for the issuance of $10,000,000
of five per cent bonds.

The plan was contingent upon the

United States entering a treaty with Honduras in which the
independence of Honduras would be guaranteed, and the United
States would participate in the collection and distribution of
the custom revenues. 66
When the plan came to Dawson's attention, he was apparently somewhat sceptical about it. 67 He advised that the
Department would want to consider the "numerous bearings" on
the matter of the scheme and that it might be wise, if it were
considered at all, to do so in relation to arrangements with
other Central American states. 68 Perhaps remembering the
65 For the background and the details of these negotiations see ibid., pp. 217-221.
66 Ibid., p. 221.
67 Ibid., pp. 221-22.
68 oawson to Wilson, January 6, 1910, Numerical File
17624/91.
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difficult time that the Dominican treaty had had in the United
States Senate, and basing his opinion on his experience in the
Dominican Republic prior to the modus vivendi of April 1, 1905,
Dawson observed that the "general right of protecting American
citizens and property," would be sufficient without a formal
treaty to allow the State Department to effectively protect a
North American customs collector in the operation of his duties. 69
After further consideration and study of the case, Dawson's
doubts seemed to have diminished.

He concluded that a treaty

on the model of the Dominican treaty of 1907 would be the best
arrangement. 70
At the time that the Honduran loan plan was under consideration, Dawson was also studying Archer Harman's scheme
for the sanitation of Guayaquil.

In regard to the latter, as

indicated, Dawson had rejected the idea of a United StatesEcuadorian treaty protecting North American investment as being
too likely to arouse South American fears of United States imperialism.

There was no similar worry in the case of Honduras.

He thought· that Mexico would secretly oppose the arrangement,
and so would "the grafting military and political elements" in
69 Dawson to Wilson, January 11, 1910, memorandum,
Numerical File 17624/01. Munro also refers to these memoranda, pp. 221-22.
70

Dawson to Wilson, February 21, 1910, memorandum,
Decimal File 815.51/96, Records of the Department of State
Relating to Internal Affairs of Honduras 1910-29, Microcopy
No. 647, (Washington, National Archives, 1966) [hereafter
cited as Internal Affairs of Honduras 1910-29], roll 34.
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the rest of Central America.

Nevertheless, again basing his

opinion on the experience in Santo Domingo, he did not think
that the United States' action would produce much alarm in the
rest of Latin America.

The difference, Dawson explained, was

that "the geographical and international situation as regards

.

Honduras is entirely different from the one we find ourselves
in with regard to Ecuador ••

..

By the time Dawson left

the Latin American Division, the matter of the loan agreement
and treaty had not yet been completed.
Another Central American issue before the State Department at this time was the question of according recognition
to one of the two factions contending for control of Nicaragua.
This situation was the result of a revolution which had broken
out against President Jose Santos Zelaya in October, 1909.
/

Zelaya, a Liberal from the city of Leon, who had ruled dictatorily since 1893, 72 had gained the hostility not only of the
Conservatives from the city of Granada, but also that of North
American business interests centered at Bluefields on the east
coast.

Moreover, his interference in the affairs of other

Central American countries had convinced the State Department
71 Ibid.
72 For descriptions of Zelaya's policies at home and his
interferences in other Central American countries see John R.
McDevi tt, "American-Nicaraguan Relations from 1909 to 1916"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Georgetown University, 1954), pp. 6-28, and Harold N. Denny, Dollars
for Bullets: The Stor of American Rule in Nicara ua {New York:
Te Dial Press, 929 , pp. 64-69.
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that he was a menace to the stability and peace of the region. 73
The October, 1909 revolution, which began in Bluefields
was led by General Juan J. Estrada, the Liberal governor at
I

Bluefields, and the Conservative Don Adolfo Diaz, and supported
/

by the Conservative generals, Emiliano Chamorro and Luis
Mena. 74 Although Secretary of State Knox's former law firm
had represented individuals with interests in North American
companies operating in Bluefields, and while it seems certain
that the State Department had prior knowledge of the revolt,
there appears to be no evidence proving that the Department
was connected with this revolution. 75 Once it was under way,
officially the attitude of the Department of State toward the
revolution was one of neutrality and care was taken not to
.
. 1 ac t'ion. 76 Neverthe1 eave room f or cri't'icism
o f any o ff'icia
less, Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson openly
. d wi'th th e revo 1 u t'ion, 77 an d Knox I s f ai·1ure t o or der
sympa th ize
73 Munro, ~· cit., pp. 169-170, 171-173.
74 J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone {New York:
G. P. Putn~'s Sons, 1940), pp. 169-70.
75

c~llcott, ~· cit., p. 279. Rippy, ~· cit., p.
171. Mcoevitt, ~· cit., p. 31. Munro, £E_. cit., pp. 173-174.
All of these autnors point out that the State Department had
information showing that a revolution was about to develop.
Both Callcott and Rippy imply that Knox's legal or financial
connections may have had an impact on the State Department's
actions. However, Munro, whose book is based on far more extensive archival research than the other two, maintains that
there is no indication of any connection between the Department and the revolutionaries.
76
Munro, ~· cit., p. 175.
77 Ibid.
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Minister John Gardner Collidge, who was on leave, back to his
post in Managua might be considered as a further indication of
this sympathy. 78
Zelaya's execution of Lee Roy Cannon and Leonard Groce,
two United States citizens who were serving in the revolutionary army when captured, provided Knox with an excuse to sever
diplomatic relations with Nicaragua on December 1, 1909.
The purpose of the Secretary of State's note to the Nicaraguan
Legation breaking relations, according to one authority on
United States Caribbean policy, was clearly to bring Zelaya's
downfall. 79 In fact, the attitude of the United States had so
undermined Zelaya's position that he felt it necessary to resign on December 16, and to go into exile in Mexico.

The

Nicaraguan Congress chose Josi Madriz a Liberal who was the
Nicaraguan appointee to the Central American Court of Justice
. '
1 presi'dent. 80
as provisiona

Zelaya's removal did not result in any improved relations between the United States and Nicaragua.

In Washing-

ton, it was felt that there was no indication that Madriz's
Liberal regime was any different from that of Zelaya's, and
recognition was not extended.

Again, officially the attitude

78 R·
't
ippy, ~- £!._•1
p. 171 •
79
Munro, ~· cit., 177.
8°For the details of the events from the execution of
Cannon and Groce see Munro, ~· cit., pp. 175-179. Rippy, ~·
cit., pp. 171-72 and Callcott, 2£• cit., pp. 280-81 give less
1\il'l accounts.
~-
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of the United States Government was one of neutrality and impartiality towards both factions.

The sympathies of the offi-

cials in the State Department, however, continued to remain
I

with the Estrada revolution.

Justifications were found for

refusing to recognize Madriz, and, while perhaps not intending to intervene on Estrada's behalf, continued refusal of
recognition for Madriz and the actions taken to protect foreign lives and property by the United States naval commanders
in the waters off the Nicaraguan coast, acted to the detriment
. regime.
.
81
o f th e Mad riz
In the meantime, the Mexican Government's hostility
to the Guatemalan dictator, Estrada Cabrera, and opposition
to increasing United States influence in Central America led
to the break down of Mexican-United States cooperation in the
82
area.
Furthermore, the friendly attitude of President Por/

firio Diaz towards Zelaya led the State Department to be
. .
suspicious
of

Mexican
•
' t
in

' Nicaragua.
·
83
er f erence in

As Chief of the Latin American Division, besides
81Munro believes that Knox and Wilson may not have
considered the action of the naval commanders in preventing
the Madriz forces from bombarding Bluefields or in preventing
the Maximo J~rez, which had been the S.S. Venus before its
purchase by the Madriz faction, from blockading the port of
Bluefields as a violation of neutrality. Nevertheless, he
does not deny that the action was of definite benefit to
Estrada. Callcott and Rippy, both indicate that these actions were directly intended to aid Estrada. Munro, ~·
cit., p. 184. Rippy,~· cit., p. 172. Callcott, ~·cit.,
p. 282.
82 Munro, 2£.· cit., pp. 164-67.
83 Ibid., p. 179.
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handling all incoming and outgoing correspondence on the Nicaraguan revolution, Dawson frequently met in Washington with
the confidential representatives of Estrada and Madriz, Salvador Castrillo and Lufs Corea respectively. 84 Under the direction of Assistant Secretary Wilson, Dawson helped to formulate some specific policy for the State Department to follow
in dealing with one or the other of the factions.

As in the

case of the Honduran loan, here again there is no indication
that Dawson differed from the policy which Knox and Wilson
had laid down before he came to the Division of Latin American Affairs in December, 1909.
In February, 1910, the State Department was receiving
information which seemed to indicate that the Estrada forces
were about to enter Managua. 85 This information proved to be
premature.

However, at the time Assistant Secretary Wilson,

anticipating a victory by the revolutionary forces, took steps
to recognize Estrada.

The Latin American Division was in-

structed to have the Solicitor's Office draw up a proclamation
recognizing Estrada's Government as the provisional government
84Memorandum, December 29, 1909, Numerical File
6369/591 et passim.
85 Estrada to Castrillo, February 12, 1910, telegram:
Estrada to Castrillo, February 23, 1910, telegram. These
documents are filed with Decimal File 817.00 but are given no
specific file number. Records of the Department of State
Relating to Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, Microcopy
No. 632 (Washington: National Archives, 1966) [hereafter cited
as Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29], roll 8.
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of Nicaragua.

The Division itself was to draw up two letters.

Both of these were to be for Castrillo to present to the Secretary of State at the opportune moment.

The first requested

recognition of the Estrada faction as the provisional government of Nicaragua.

The second was a letter expressing grati-

tude both for the impartial attitude which the United States
had displayed during the revolution and for its influence in
ending the Zelaya regime, and committing the provisional government to certain policies which the United States Government
hoped to see the new Nicaraguan Government implement.

Among

these were punishment of Cannon and Groce's murderers,reorganization of Nicaraguan finances through a loan with North
American bankers and equitable treatment of North American
commercial and business interests, and finally the re-establishment of constitutional government with free elections. 86
Both Dawson and Doyle, the Assistant Chief of the
Division, felt that the Washington treaties of 1907, made it
difficult for the United States to recognize Estrada's Government, which would come to power as the result of a revolution, until the country was constitutionally organized. 87
Doyle, moreover, felt that to include the matter of the loan
in the letter from Castrillo would only lead to a Liberal up86

Hw to Dawson, February 24, 1910, memorandum, Decimal File 810.00/1373, ibid., roll 7.
87

Doyle to Dawson, February 25, 1910, memorandum,
Decimal File 817.00/1375, ibid. T. c. D. to Wilson, February 25, 1910, memorandum attached to Decimal File 817.00/1374,
ibid.
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rising against Estrada's regime.

He pointed out that the

Liberals had continually argued that Estrada's victory would
be the forerunner of United States aggression. 88 Dawson did
not share Doyle's caution.

He felt that the Liberals would

"raise the cry of 'gare aux guis' any way and that the present
is our best opportunity to get the guarantee we really de.
,,89
sire.
A few days prior to the date Dawson and Doyle submitted their opinions to Wilson,the revolutionary forces had
suffered a major defeat. 90

With the changing military situa-

tion, in early March, Corea urged that Madriz be recognized
as de facto and de jure president of Nicaragua. 91

Dawson re-

jected both contentions, 92 and in spite of this changing military situation, the State Department did not become any more
'
Md
' 93
_wi'11'ing t o recognize
a riz.

In mid-April, Wilson asked

88 Doyle to Dawson, February 25, 1910, memorandum,
Decimal File 817.00/1375, ibid.
89

T. c. D. to Wilson, February 25, 1910, memorandum,
ibid. Munro incorrectly states that both Dawson and Doyle argued that the immediate announcement of the loan project would
cause an uprising. Munro, ~· cit., p. 180.
90

Munro, ~· cit., p. 180.

91

.

Corea to Secretary of State, March 8, 1910, Numerical File 6369/828, filed with Decimal File 817.00, Internal
Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 4.
92 Dawson to Hoyt, March 9, 1910, memorandum, Decimal
File 817.00/1770, ibid., roll 11.
93

Munro, ~· cit., p. 181.
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Dawson to draw up a plan for the United States to follow in
regard to Nicaragua.

He was also to prepare an official state-

ment which would vindicate the United States' position and
I
i
94
could be given to Madriz and made public.
Dawson suggested that a reply be sent to Corea's note
of March 8, requesting de facto and de jure recognition of
Madriz's presidency.

In the note the United States would argue

that Corea had not shown conclusively that Madriz was in control of the country and enjoyed the support of the people,
thus entitling him to de facto recognition.

Furthermore, Corea

was to be informed that before the United States recognized
any Nicaraguan government, that government would have to indicate its willingness to prosecute those responsible for Cannon
and Groce's deaths.

No indication of this willingness, it was

to be maintained, was apparent in the Madriz faction.

Finally,

any government recognized would have to agree to fulfill faithfully the Washington agreements of 1907. 95
Dawson thought that in addition to sending the note to
Corea, it should also be sent to all United States Legations
and Embassies in Latin America and be given as wide a publicity
94 Hw to Dawson, April 14, 1910, memorandum, Numerical File 6369/906, filed in Decimal File 817.00, Internal
Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 4.
95 oawson to Wilson, April 18, 1910, memorandum, "Project for Action in the Nicaraguan Situation," attached note
to Corea, Numerical File 6369/907, filed with Decimal File
817.00, ibid.
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as possible.

By doing this, it was hoped that any hostile ·

criticism of the State Department's actions, particularly any
criticism from Mexico, would be off set.

Upon receiving the

note, Dawson thought that Madriz would have two alternatives.
First, he could give the United States the guarantees it
sought and this might be done by requesting that a special commission be sent to Managua.

Or, he could refuse to give any

guarantee seeking the support of Mexico and joining with the
anti-Cabrera factions in the other Central American countries. 96
Apparently, Dawson did not anticipate a favorable
reception for the United States note in Managua.

He suggested

that the United States be ready to seize forceably the custom
receipts from Corinto and deduct a fixed sum as an indemnity
for the murders of Cannon and Groce and for installments due
. on the Emery claim, a North American claim against Nicaragua
which had been pending for sometime.

However, he thought

that this action ought to be postponed until after the Pan
American conference which was to meet in Buenos Aires in 1910,
and until after the State Department had come to the conclusion
that Mexico and Madriz were "determined to continue their antiAmerican policies. 1197
Dawson's severe stand was perhaps motivated by what he
thought was increasing Mexican influence in Central America
96 Dawson to Wilson, April 18, 1910, memorandum, "Project for Action in the Nicaraguan Situation," ibid.
97 Ibid.
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and the danger that the State Department's plan to reform the
economy of Nicaragua might be thwarted by Madriz.

He noted

that Madriz was trying to get a loan from a British syndicate
which would be guaranteed by both the custom receipts and the
liquor and tobacco monopolies for the next thirty-four years.
This plan, Dawson thought, "would complicate and embarrass our
Central American negotiations and interests for years to come."
In addition, he observed that the Guatemalan dictator Estrada
Cabrera was beginning to show signs of being unfavorable to
North American influence and loan projects.

Dawson inter-

preted this attitude as perhaps indicating that Estrada Cabrera
feared "that the pressure of Zelayaism and Mexicanism will be
too strong and is contemplating lining his pockets as quickly
as possible in the meantime."

Dawson saw little hope for

stability in Central America in the immediate future unless
the United States should decide "to let the anti-Estrada
Cabrera and Mexican factions have free swing for the next year
or two."

In view of the situation as Dawson saw it, he

thought that by presenting Corea with the note he suggested,
the United States would be showing its determination and would
thus "force Mexico and Madriz to come to us and try to reach
terms. 1198

An offer by the Central American Court of Justice to
mediate between the two factions in Nicaragua, which eventually
98 Ibid.
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came to nothing, may explain why Dawson's plan was not
adopted by the State Department. 99 Or, in April, the plan
may still have been considered too bold.

However, this does

not mean that his suggestions were necessarily out of tune
with the thinking in the Department.

In June, J. Ruben Clark

of the Solicitor's Office was instructed to draw up a memorandum which could be used to justify United States military
intervention in Nicaragua and to gather precedents for obtaining congressional approval for the use of the armed forces
with and without a formal declaration of war. 100 Although
Clark's memoranda on these topics were never used, the fact
that they were drawn up would seem to indicate a more aggressive policy was being considered as time passed.
In late August, the revolution came to an end with the
victory of Estrada's forces.

Madriz's position had been weak-

ened when in May the United States naval commander at Bluefields prevented any fighting in the city and refused to allow
the Madriz forces to bombard or blockade this last stronghold
of the revolutionary forces.

Following the failure to take

Bluefields,small uprisings against Madriz occurred in areas
previously secured, and in July, the revolutionary forces
assumed the offensive which ultimately resulted in their capture
99

Munro, ~· cit., p. 183.

lOOJ. R. c. to Wilson, June 20, 1910; memorandum,
"Outline--Nicaragua," June 8, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/14861487, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 9. Munro
mentions these memoranda, pp. 185-87.
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of Managua on August 28.lOl
On August 26, Thomas P. Moffatt, the United States Consul at Bluefields, cabled the Secretary of State that Estrada
was planning to inform the State Department through Castrillo,
of the policies his Government intended to follow.

These in-

eluded "re-establishment of the country's finances," elimination of the monopolistic policies of Zelaya, and free election
of a constitutional president within six months. 102 They did
not differ radically from the policies which the State Department hoped to see fulfilled.

The latter were included in a

telegram Castrillo sent to Estrada, stating the exact terms
in which Estrada should ask for recognition as provisional
president, 103 and were almost identical to those which Wilson
had mentioned in his instructions to the Latin American Division in February.

Elections were to be held within six months.

The assistance of the United States was to be sought in obtaining a loan from North American bankers.

This loan was to

be secured by a portion of the customs revenues collected in a
manner to be agreed upon by the United States and Nicaragua.
Assurances were to be given that those responsible for the killing of Cannon and Groce would be brought to justice and an
101Munro, ~· ~·,
.
p. 186 •
102 Moffatt to Secretary of State, August 26, 1910,
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1352, Internal Affiars of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 7.
103
Munro, ~· cit., p. 187.
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indemnity paid to the families of the dead men.

Finally, the

United States Government was to be requested to send a commissioner to Nicaragua to act on any of the matters which might
I 104
require a formal convention.
Estrada was reluctant to accept the United States' program, and informed Castrillo that David Arellano was being
sent to Washington as a special envoy to treat with the State
Department on the various points included in Castrillo's
telegram.

Castrillo replied that the situation was difficult

and urged the immediate acceptance of the United States' program.

He argued that an envoy sent to Washington would be able
to achieve nothinq. 105 Castrillo's reply apparently persuaded

Estrada that if he wanted the recognition of the United States
he would have to comply with the program set down by the State
Department, and, on the tenth of September, he sent Castrillo
a telegram requesting recognition, including all the points
that the State Department wanted.

However, with regard to the

election of the president, there would be a delay of one year,
the exact date being fixed by a constitutional convention con104wilson to American Consul, Managua, September 1,
1910, Decimal File 817.00/1370A, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 7.
105 undated and unsigned memorandum containing the
telegrams exchanged between Castrillo and Estrada on September 9, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/1369, ibid. Olivares to
Secretary of State, September 3, 1910, telegram, Decimal
File 817.00/1369, ibid.
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voked for that purpose. 106

The formal request for recognition

was transmitted to the State Department on September 12, and
two days later Wilson replied to Castrillo's note, thus according Estrada's provisional Government recognition as the
l0 7 By 0 c t ob er 8 , Knox an d
.
d e f ac t o government o f Nicaragua.
Wilson had selected Dawson as the United States commissioner
Estrada had been required to request. 108
Dawson, at this time, was no longer Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs.

In June, 1910, he had been

appointed Minister to Panama and had left for his new post in
the late summer.

Two and a half weeks after the formal pre. d not'f'
.
sen t a t ion
o f h'is ere d en t'ia 1s, 109 h e receive
i icat'ion o f

his appointment as Special Agent of the United States to the
. . .
1 Government o f N'icaragua. llO
provisiona

The ob'Jeet o f Dawson I s

mission was to secure the implementation of the program which
the provisional Government had promised to fulfill in its
106 castrillo to Wilson, September 12, 1910, Decimal
File 817.00/1395, ibid.
107wilson to Castrillo, September 14, 1910, Decimal
File 817.00/1395; Wilson to American Consul, Managua, September 16, 1910, telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1400, ibid.
108 Adee to Secretary of State, October 8, 1910,
Decimal File 817.001452a, ibid., roll 8.
109 untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments from
1907 to 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation Fiie.
llOAdee to Dawson, October 11, 1910, telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1432A, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29,
roll 8.
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reques t f or recogni' t 'ion. 111

Dawson's knowledge of the Sta·te

Department's desires and his knowledge of the situation gained
as Chief of the Latin American Division, in addition to his
proximity to Nicaragua made him a logical choice for this
assignment.
He arrived in Managua on October 18, and almost immediately found that before he could hope to accomplish his
mission, it would be necessary to restore some semblance of
unity among the various factions into which the revolutionary
. . t egra t e d • 112 Estra d a, it
. wi·11 b e reme mb ere d ,
par t y h a d d isin
despite his opposition to Zelaya, was a Liberal.

The revolu-

tion itself, however, was really a Conservative movement
against the dictatorship of Zelaya.

Once Managua had been cap-

tured and the provisional Government established, there were
those in the Conservative Party who wished to limit greatly
Estrada's powers and to take repressive measures against the
Liberals.

Furthermore, personal ambitions led to division

among the Conservatives themselves.

The two prominent Conser/

vative military leaders, Generals Luis Mena and Emiliano
Chamorro, were vying with one another for control of the military supplies and the presidency of the republic. 113 Dawson
111 Ibid:.
112 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 19, 1910,
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1443, ibid.
113 oawson to Secretary of State, October 28, 1910,
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1445; Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/1473, ibid.
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reported that under these conditions the situation was "virtual
anarchy. 11114
The elimination of Estrada and the creation of a completely Conservative Government might have removed some of
the problems.

Dawson, however, thought Estrada's retention of

the presidency was the only way to placate the Liberals and
thus prevent another revolution.

Consequently, he followed

a course which would keep Estrada as president and at the
same time have the various Conservative factions reconciled
and supporting Estrada.

A popular presidential election, Daw-

son thought, was at that time impractical and potentially
"dangerous to peace."

The solution, therefore, was to call a

constitutional convention which would have the power to draw
up an electoral law and would select Estrada as the president
for a term of two years. 115 The advantages of this scheme were
clearly that Estrada, as constitutional president, could be
recognized by the United States and the plan for economic reform began, without any violation of the Washington agreements
of 1907, and that the enforced presidency, while securing the
peace, would be only temporary.

To secure this plan, Dawson

resorted to a series of agreements signed by the four prominent
/

leaders in the revolution: Estrada, Adolfo Diaz, a Conservative
114 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 28, 1910,
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1445, ibid.
115 Dawson to Secretary of State, October 28, 1910,
telegram, Decimal File 817.00/1445; Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File 817.00/1473, ibid.
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but a personal friend of Estrada, 116 Mena, and Chamorro.

,

Estrada, Mena, and Diaz were willing to accept this
plan.

Chamorro initially proved reluctant.

To discourage any

I

idea that a revolution wa~ possible, Dawson inf ormed all four
1

1

men that the United States would never recognize a government
which came to power by a coup d'etat.

Whether this or other

considerations persuaded him, Chamorro finally agreed to the
arrangement which Dawson proposed. 117 On October 27, Estrada,
I

•.

Mena, Diaz, and Chamorro signed three sets of agreements. By
the first, they agreed to the election of a constitutional
assembly which would meet in December and elect a president
and vice president who would serve for a two year period.

The

/

four agreed to support the candidacy of Estrada and Diaz for
president and vice president respectively.

Furthermore, they

agreed that the constitution which would be composed would
abolish monopolies and provide for the protection of the legitimate interests of foreigners.

Finally, a popular election

would be held to fill the office of president for the term
following the interim period.

The second agreement provided

that a claims commission would be instituted between the
United States and Nicaragua to eliminate any unsettled claims.
The four also agreed to see that those responsible for Cannon
and Groce's deaths were prosecuted and an indemnity paid to
116Munro, ~· cit., p. 188.
117
Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File
817.00/1473, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 8.
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the families of the North Americans.

The final agreement com-

mitted the men to ask the United States Government to assist
Nicaragua in obtaining a loan guaranteed by a portion of the
customs receipts, with United States aid in collecting these. 118
In addition to these three sets of agreements, Estrada,
/

/

Diaz, Chamorro, Mena and Fernando Solorzano, another prominent
Conservative, signed a fourth agreement which dealt with the
election of Estrada's successor.

The five men agreed that

Estrada would not succeed himself.

By a majority vote, they

would select candidates for the presidency and vice presidency
whom they would support in the election for Estrada and
I

Diaz's successors.

In order not to interfer with the freedom
'

of elections, they also agreed not to concentrate troops in
any one section of the republic.

Finally, the supporters of

Zelaya were not to be permitted to enter the administration. 119
Taken together, these four agreements are known as the Dawson
Agreements. 120
In a note to Dawson, the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister,
I

/

Tomas Martinez, officially informed the United States of the
program which the Nicaraguan Government was committed to follow
in the first three agreements.

In reply, Dawson expressed the

118 ~, 1911, pp. 652-54.
119 Ibid., p. 654.
120
see Munro, ~· cit., pp. 188-89; Callcott, ~· cit.,
p. 283; Rippy, oo. cit., p:-!74; and Issac J. Cox, Nicaragua
and The United states-1909-1927 (Boston: World Peace Foundation
Pamphlets, 1927), p. 710.
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United States' pleasure in the program which had been adop·ted.
Since the fourth agreement concerned domestic matters, no
official notice was taken of it. 121
While Dawson was successful in securing his mission's
objective of officially committing the Nicaraguan Government
to the program which the State Department desired and laying
the foundation for the implementation of this program, he did
not necessarily win the approval of all the Nicaraguan factions.
Among the Conservatives, it is true, there apparently was
support.

The Liberals, however, remembering too well the part

that the United States had played in the down fall of Zelaya
and Madriz, remained hostile.

The possibility of an anti-

United States demonstration prevented Dawson from visiting
Ledn, the Liberal stronghold. 122 Prior to and following Dawson's departure from Nicaragua, Liberal newspapers attacked
him and the Conservatives for making Nicaragua a virtual North
American protectorate.

Representative of these attacks was a

speech of a young man, made at a Liberal meeting in Managua
shortly after the announcement of the agreements.

In his

emotional diatribe he proposed to avenge his country stating:
I willingly offer myself as a sacrifice for my country
and to bequeath it a grand example. Gentlemen, here is my
hand, it is ready to do justice, with it I shall bury the
dagger of vengence into the heart of that Yankee, who
comes to give our country over to those infamous traitors.
121

FRUS, ·191+, p.· .654.

122
Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File
817.00/1473, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 8.
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Tell me that what has just been published is true, and I
swear by the sacred ashes of my parents that in this very
hour, to-morrow, as soon as I may catch that man, I shall
kill him as I would a sick dog, in order to make a warning so that the yankees may know how a weak people answers the brutal imposition of force.12 3
Following the completion of his assignment in Nicaragua, Dawson returned to Panama.

Shortly thereafter, perhaps as

a result of poor health, and certainly to report on his mission to Managua and to assist in the Nicaraguan loan negotiations, he left for the United States. 124 He apparently remained in Washington until February 13, when he left for Honduras to act as Special Commissioner of the United States to
preside over a meeting between two warrin::JHOnduran factions. 125
This new assignment came as a result of a revolution
which had broken out in January, 1911, against the government
of President Miguel Davila.

Davila, as previously mentioned,

123ouoted in J. Johnson {U.S. Consul in Corinto) to
Secretary of State, November 14, 1910, No. 78, Decimal File
817.00/1489, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 9.
124 Dawson to Dodge, November 17, 1910, Decimal File
817.00/1473, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 8.
Untitled calendar of Dawson's appointments 1907 to 1911,
Dawson's Application and Recommendation File. That Dawson
was involved in matters concerning the economic and fiscal
affairs of Nicaragua during his stay in the United States in
January, 1911 is further indicated in a letter from Knox to
Ernest H. Wands, dated January 20, 1911. Wands, the financial
expert who had been appointed by the Department to investigate
the financial situation in Nicaragua, was instructed to consult with Dawson and Elliott Northcott, the new minister to
Nicaragua. Decimal File 817.51/99A, Internal Affairs of Nicaragua 1910-29, roll 70.
125 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Decimal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29,
roll 6.
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had been placed in power in 1907 as a consequence of Zelaya's
victory over the Conservative regime of Manuel Bonilla in the
Nicaraguan-Honduran war of that year.

The leader of the 1911

revolution was none other than Bonilla.

In his attempt to

displace Davila, Bonilla enjoyed the support of the Guatemalan
president, Estrada Cabrera, and individuals who were apparently
closely connected with the United Fruit Company. 126
In early January, 1911, shortly before the beginning of
the revolution, the State Department had been successful in
negotiating with the Davila Government a treaty which called
for Honduras to negotiate a loan for the purpose of refunding
its external and internal debts.

This loan was to be secured

by the customs revenues which would be collected by a Collector-General of customs during the life of the loan.

While

this collector was not directly appointed by the United States,
he would have the approval of Washington, since he was to be
appointed by the Honduran Government from a list approved by
the President of the United States.

Furthermore, both the

United States and Honduras would provide the collector with protection whenever this became necessary.

In addition, negotia-

tions for a loan contract with J.P. Morgan and Company were
nearing completion. 127 'lhe fact that Davila had accepted the
loan treaty and that his enemies were receiving support from
126 Munro,
p. 211.

2£.· cit., pp. 225-227.

127Munro,
cit., pp. 223-224.
~·

Rippy' ~·

~.,
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Guatemala in direct violation of the Washington agreements of
1907 seem to have disposed the State Department to support him
128
h
1 t'
B '11 .

over

oni

a in t e revo u ion.

However, when the Bonilla forces attempted to take
Puerto Cortes, the last Government stronghold on the north
coast, the commander of the

u.s.s.

Tacoma intervened to protect

the lives and property of foreigners living in the city.

He

notified the opposing forces that fighting would not be allowed in or immediately around the city.
would have to

The Government forces

withdraw and meet the revolutionary forces a

safe distance from Puerto Cortes.

This would have acted to

the detriment of the Government forces, and an anticipated
revolutionary victory would make the Government's position
virtually unattainable. 129

Davila protested this restriction

on his forces, but, in view of Bonilla's increasing strength,
he offered to resign.

He called upon the United States to

arbitrate between the two factions and name, or at least approve, his successor. 130
In the State Department, it was decided to support the
Navy's prohibition on fighting in Puerto Cortes.

However,

128G. T. Weitzel to Wilson, January 11, 1911, Memorandum, Division of Latin American Affairs, Decimal File 815.00/
974, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-1929, roll 4. Munro,

2E.· cit., p. 226.

129 Munro, op. cit., p. 229.
130 Munro, op. cit., p. 228. Mccreery to Secretary of
State, telegrams January 27, 28, 29, 30, 1911, Decimal File
815.00/1035-1038, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 4.
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rather than letting this prohibition act as an aid to Bonilla's forces, the State Department authorized the United States
Minister in Tegucigalpa to

sug~est

to both sides that an armis-

tice be instituted and that representatives of the factions
meet under United States auspices aboard an United States naval
vessel in an attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory solution
to their differences, including the question of the presidency
of the republic. 131 The reasoning in back of this decision
seems to have been that.}3onilla's position was considered to
be such that he would ultimately win.

It was thought that

through the agency of a peace conference it might be possible
to have the two factions agree upon an individual other than
either Davila or Bonilla, "but necessarily with Bonilist leanings" as interim president until a popular assmebly could be
elected.

Second Assistant Secretary Adee believed that, in

this way, the United States would be put "in a fairly good
position to entitle us to Bonilla's good will. 11132
By February 11, both sides had accepted the United
States proposition and Dawson was appointed as the United
States' Special Commissioner.

As in the case of the assignment

to Nicaragua, here again his familiarity with the Department
of State's views on the matter and his acquaintance with
131Knox to American Legation, Tegucigalpa, Januai:y 31,
1911, Decimal File 815.00/lOSSA, ibid.
132 Memorandum from the off ice of the Second Assistant
Secretary, January 30, 1911, Decimal File 815.00/ no document
number, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 3.
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Honduran affairs as a result of his service in the Latin Arilerican Division doubtless account for his appointrnent. 133
Dawson arrived at Puerto Cortes on the morning of
February 19, 134 the representatives of Davila and Bonilla corning shortly thereafter.

On the twenty-first, the peace con-

ference formally began aboard the

u.s.s.

Tacoma.

Prior to the

first meeting, Dawson suggested that the representatives try
to form some compromise.

When they were unable to do so, he

interpreted this failure as an indication that neither side
was really interested in coming to a compromise but merely
hoped either to use the conference as a means of forcing its
ideas on the other, or to lead to the termination of the conference and the resumption of the fighting. 135
It soon became clear, however, that both sides were
. anxious to please the United States.

While neither side would

willing give in on any point, both were eager to be the first
.
~~ght rnake. 136 Theret o accep t any sugges t ion
wh'ich Dawson ··~
fore, Dawson apparently following the ideas which were current
in the State Department, formulated a compromise plan himself.
133wilson to Dawson, February 11, 1911, Decimal File,
815.00/ll89A, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 5.
134 Dawson to Secretary of State, undated telegram,
received February 20, 1911, 4:25 P.M., Decimal File 815.00/
1134, ibid.
135 oawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911,
Decimal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 191029, roll 6.
136 Ibid.
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Since Davila had already indicated his willingness to exclude
himself from the presidency, Dawson's plan called for the
elimination of Bonilla as a possible presidential contender
and the conference's acceptance of a supporter of Bonilla as
president.

To implement his plan, Dawson urged the opposing

representatives to reach an agreement on the presidency.
When it became apparent that no agreement could be reached
on this point, and after the factions had agreed upon a program for the provisional government to follow, he consented to
comply with their requests that he suggest the individual
who would serve as provisional president.
cisco Bertrand, a Bonilla partisan. 137

He selected Fran-

The program accepted for the provisional government
provided for a general political amnesty, free elections for
national and local authorities, governmental assumption of the
debts incurred by both factions, the distribution of cabinet
posts equally between Davila and Bonilla partisans, and the
disarming of the opposing military forces.

The provisional

government was to respect all committments made by both the
Davila Government and the revolutionaries.

Finally, the con-

ference recommended that the provisional government settle
the public debt "as a means of recovering the national credit,
which is without doubt indispensible for the development of
137 oawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, and
enclosure: Minutes of the Peace Conference aboard the u.s.s.
Tacoma, Decimal File 815.00/1284, ibid.
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the country • " 13 8
Dawson's mission to Honduras might be considered a
success, insofar as it was directed towards restoring peace
to the country and providing for a relatively orderly transfer of power to Bonilla.

However, the attempt to provide a

compromise solution between the two factions, which was clearly envisioned in the program for the provisional government,
proved to be illusionary.

The success of this plan depended

on the good will of both factions, but particularly the Bonillistas now that they controlled the presidency.
much to be expected.

This was too

The Bonillistas consolidated their posi-

tion appointing only their partisans to office, and in the
October elections, from which Bonilla emerged victorious,
there was no pretense of freedom. 139
Although there seems to have been no attempt to require Bonilla to accept the loan treaty with the United States
and the loan contract which Davila had signed with J. P. Morgan
and Company, 140 there can be no question that Dawson and his
superiors in the State Department hoped that these agreements
would be accepted.

Since the provisional government was sup-

posed to accept the conunitments made by the Davila Government
and since the Bonillista representative at the peace conference
138Minutes of the Peace Conference aboard the
Tacoma, ibid.
139Munro,
't
£e.· £!..._·,
p. 231 •
l 40ibid., p. 231.

u.s.s.
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had indicated that Bonilla would negotiate a loan agreemerit, 141
the possibility that a loan agreement and a form of a customs
receivership would be accepted probably seemed very likely.
I

However, here again, the hopes of the State Department were not
fulfilled. 142
In the meantime, the arrangement which the Dawson
Agreements had set up in Nicaragua was faring even worse than
that established by the peace conference in Honduras.

Dawson's

success in securing a semblance of agreement among Estrada,

,

Diaz, Mena and Chamarro was at best ephemeral.

The continuance

of agreement depended on the willingness of the various parties
to maintain the status quo.
were not willing to do so.

It soon became evident that they
Mena and Chamarro continued to

plot against one another and to attempt to weaken and embarrass
Estrada.

In the spring of 1911, Estrada, in frustration,
/

left the country and Diaz assumed the executive power.
however, really did not alter the situation.

This,

In spite of the

fact that the State Department continued to urge the fulfillment of the Dawson Agreements, the plotting continued. 143
Initially, it seemed that the plan to reorganize Nicaraguan finances through a loan from North American bankers
guaranteed by some form of a customs receivership, supported by
141 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Decimal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29,
roll 6.
142
Munro, ~· cit., pp. 231-35.
143 Ibid., pp. 189-92.
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the United States, would be more successful.

In January, 1911,

the State Department sent Ernest H. Wands to Managua as a financial adviser to the Estrada Government.

By the spring,

negotiations for a loan contract with the firm of J. and W.
Seligman and Company were well advanced.

Moreover, in June

Knox and Castrillo, the Nicaraguan Minister in Washington,
signed a treaty which was identical in content to the one
signed between the United States and Honduras in January, 1911,
providing for a form of a customs collectorship in the event
that Nicaragua obtained a loan from a United States banking
house.

Although the treaty received speedy ratification in

the Nicaraguan Congress, it failed to receive the approval of
the United States Senate. 144
Despite the failure of the Knox-Castrillo treaty to
receive senatorial ratification, in September, 1911, the
bankers signed a loan contract with the Nicaraguan Government.
However, since this loan for $15,000,000 would not become
effective until the treaty was ratified, the bankers agreed
to make an immediate loan of $1,500,000 to be secured by the
custom receipts which were to be collected by a CollectorGeneral, whom the bankers had nominated and the State Department approved.

In December, 1911, Colonel Clifford D. Ham,

who had served in the Philippines custom service, was appointed
to collect the custom revenues.
144

Ibi'd.

I

pp. 192 - 95 •

Hence, in part the customs
Cox,

~·

cit., pp. 711-13.
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receivership plan was partially put into operation.

In March,

1912, the bankers extended further financial assistance to the
Nicaraguan Government.

This time to secure the loan, the
I

bankers acquired a controlling interest in the government
owned railroad and asswned direction of the railroad until the
loan was paid.

Later in the year, when the revolutionary

forces under the command of Mena seized a lake steamer belonging to the railroad, the United States intervened militarily
/

at the request of Diaz in order to protect the lives and property of United States citizens in Nicaragua. 145 The revolution collapsed but the marines were not removed until 1925.
In summary, Dawson clearly supported the policy of
dollar diplomacy as applied to the countries of Central .America.

In a letter to Senator Albert Cummins urging the Senator

to support ratification of the treaties with Honduras and
Nicaragua, Dawson wrote:
You know already how deeply I feel that we owe to
our southern neighbors some aid in putting them on the
road to good government, and that this aid should be
purely benevolent and not officious or by way of application of force. In fact, if my work for the last seven
years has been worth anything, it has been in this direction, and I feel it my duty to do the little I can to
see that the decision whether my favorite policy shall
be followed or not is reached only after mature consideration .146
At first sight the sentiments expressed in this passage seem to
145Munro, ~·cit., p. 205.
146 oawson to Cummins, June 22, 1911, Decimal File
815.51/270A, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29, roll 35.
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be contrary to some of the measures which Dawson actually
recommended while Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs.

However, it is likely that to Dawson there was a

clear distinction between using diplomatic pressure to force
Nicaragua and Honduras to adopt a policy which the State Department believed would produce the beneficial results of
sound finance and good government and forceably imposing this
policy.

In those instances where he had recommended the use

of force, for example, the seizure of Nicaraguan customhouses, the purpose was not to secure adoption of a loan agreement and treaty but rather to secure compensation for what was
considered a just claim.

Moreover, he saw a clear distinction

between the methods of dollar diplomacy to be used in Central
America and the Caribbean, an area which he considered to be a
legitimate United States sphere of influence, and the methods
to be used in the rest of Latin America.
Dawson's missions to both Nicaragua and Honduras were
only momentarily successful.

In both instances, he was able to

bring the dissident factions to the point of agreement with
one another.

While this surely attests to his ability as a

mediator, the ultimate objectives of his missions, stable government and financial reform with a customs receivership were
either not realized at all or at least were not realized in
the form envisioned.

The arrangements which Dawson was able

to secure were frustrated primarily because they depended on
the continuing good will of those involved and because the
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United States really had no effective way of enforcing them.
This is not to say that either the Dawson Agreements or the
settlement provided for by the Honduran peace conference were
necessarily unrealistic.

To the contrary, in regard to Nica-

ragua, the decisions to arrange for Estrada's continuance as
provisiona~

president and to arrange for the elections were

based on what was considered to be the realistic assumption
that to do otherwise would result in revolution.

Likewise, in

the case of Honduras the fact was accepted that Bonilla would
ultimately be the victor.

Consequently, Dawson pushed for a

compromise favoring the Bonillasts.

Lack of realism, however,

was apparent in the belief that North American interference in
the financial affairs would be readily accepted and implemented.

Although this last point was not a fault

sole~y

of

Dawson, it again illustrates his inability to understand, or
his disregard for, a national sentiment among the Latin
Americans.
Following the completion of his mission in Honduras,
Dawson returned to Washington.

However, he first stopped off

in Guatemala City in order to ascertain whether or not Estrada
Cabrera would accept the Honduran settlement and not lend his
. 1 revo 1 u t 'ionaries.
.
147
support to potentia

While there, he and

Estrada Cabrera discussed the possibility of a loan agreement
147 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Decimal File 815.00/1284, Internal Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29,
roll 6.
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to be made with an United States banking firm. 148

He finally

arrived in Washington in late March and began the preparation
of his official report.

At the same time he kept in close
I

i

touch with developments in Honduras.

~49

In May, 1911, the leaders of the Republican Party in
Iowa made an effort to have Dawson promoted to the Embassy in
Brazil.

Ernest E. Hart, Chairman of the Republican State Com-

mittee of Iowa, wrote to President Taft requesting an interview
to plead Dawson's case. 150 In addition, Hart and Senator
Cummins of Iowa both called upon Knox to urge the promotion. 151
The entire, Iowa congressional delegation also supported the
appointment. 152 Charles Dawes too attempted to help Dawson,
this time by asking Horace D. Taft, the President's brother
and a classmate of Dawson and Dawes at the Cincinnati Law
148Manuel Estrada Cabrera to Dawson, April 5, 1911,
Decimal File 814.51/140, Records of the Department of State
Relating To Internal Affairs of Guatemala, 1910-29, Microcopy
No. 655, (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1966), roll 21.
149 Dawson to Secretary of State, April 30, 1911, Decimal File 815.00/1284, Internal Aff~irs of Honduras, 1910-29,
roll 6.
150 Hart to Taft, May 11, 1911, Taft Papers, Presidential Series No. 2, File 1415.
151Assistant Secretary of State to Appointment Bureau,
June 26, 1911, Dawson's Application and Recommendation File.
152 E. H. Hubbard (Congressman from Iowa) to the
President, December 2, 1911, ibid.
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School, to write in Dawson's behalf. 153
Despite this apparently impressive support, Dawson did
not receive the promotion.

Perhaps the most likely explanation

of this is to be found in United States domestic politics. ·
Although Dawson clearly supported the foreign policy pursued
by the Taft Administration, and not withstanding the fact that
his talents were apparently appreciated, as indicated by his
appointment to Nicaragua and Honduras, his political support
was based largely on men who did not have the favor of President Taft.

Dawson's patrons included senator Albert Cununins,

a leading member of the group of Republican senators known as
insurgents because of their opposition to Taft's domestic policies.

By 1910, Cununins, with several other of the progressive

and insurgent senators, was already on record as opposing
Taft's renomination in 1912. 154 To make matters worse for Dawson, the Taft Administration failed to receive the endorsement
of the progressive controlled Iowa State Republican Convention
153 nawes to Horace D. Taft, May 16, 1911, telegram,
Dawes Collection, 1906-1914 Name File, Dawson-Fai, Thomas A.
[sic] Dawson File. Horace Taft refused to write to his
brother. He argued that he did not remember Dawson, and
furthermore, he had made it a practice never to write to his
brother on behalf of any candidate for any position. Horace
D. Taft to Dawes, May 17, 1911, ibid.
154 George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and
the Birth of Modern America 1900-1912, The New American Nation
Series, eds. Henry Steele Commanger and Richard B. Morris
(Harper Torchbooks edition; New York: Harper and Row, 1962),
p. 268.
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in 1910. 155

In an attempt to defeat his congressional oppo-

nents, President Taft cut-off their patronage shortly before
the 1910 primary elections. 156 Following the mid-term elec1

tions, which were disastrous for the Republicans, an attempt
was made by the President to bring about a reconciliation
with the insurgents and

progressives~

The reconciliation,

however, failed to materialize and the insurgents continued
to exert little influence on Taft.

Furthermore, as late as
January, 1911, their patronage was still suffering. 157 Therefore, while Dawson's ability was acknowledged and his talents
utilized, it is possible that the post of Ambassador to Brazil,
with a salary of $17,500, 158 was reserved as a patronage position for a senator who enjoyed more favor in the eyes of the
President than did Senator Cummins.

Whatever the specific

reason that his candidacy failed to receive a favorable hearing, Dawson himself apparently did not wish that it be pressed
on the President by the Iowa congressional delegation. 159
155 James Holt, Congressional Insurgents and the Party
System 1909-1916 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1967), p. 41.
156 Ibid., p. 37.
157 Ibid., p. 44, 46.
158 Register of the Department of State, September 20,
1911 (Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1911),
p. 21.
159E. H. Hubbard to the President, December 2, 1911,
Dawson's Application and RecommendatiQn File.
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The failure to receive Brazil did not mean that Dawson's
career was at an end.

In June, 1911, he was appointed Ambas-

sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission
to attend the Venezuelan Centennial celebration in Caracas. 160
Upon his return to the United States in July, 1911, he again
assumed the post of Resident Diplomatic Officer of the Department of State. 161 In this position, he continued to devote his
162
.
.
'ly t o Lt'
'
'
primari
a in American
a ff airs.
t ime
In late November, 1911, Irving Dudley the United States
Ambassador to Brazil died.

Dawson once again beqame an active

candidate for this post in Rio de Janeiro.

He appealed to his

friend Dawes to cable the President and administration officials
in his behalf. 163 Numerous letters from businessmen with
financial or conunercial interest in Brazil were sent to the
White House in support of Dawson's appointment. 164 Again he
16 °Knox to Dawson, June 19, 1911, Decimal File 831.414A/
23E, Records of the Department of State relating to Internal
Affairs of Venezuela, 1910-29, Microcopy No. 366 (Washington,
D. C.: National Archives), roll 17.
161 Re ister of the De artment of State,
20,
1911 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing O
I
p:-63.
162 For examples, see Knox Papers, General Correspondence, Box 29, File 1912, and Correspondence vol. 16, 19111912, November 16-March 1. Also Department of State Decimal
Files 033.1100K77 and 711.21 passim, National Archives, Washington, D. c.
163 Dawson to Dawes, December 5, 1911, telegram,
Dawes Collection, 1906-1914, Name File, Dawson-Fai, Thomas A.
[sic] Dawson File.
164 Dawson's Application and Reconunendation File,
passim.
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failed to receive the Ambassadorship.
In March, 1912, while still serving as Resident Diplomatic Officer, Dawson became seriously ill.

Shortly thereafter,

he was moved to Fort Monroe, Virginia in the hope that the
change of climate and scenery might prove beneficial.

However,

his health continued to decline and he was returned to his
home at 1816 Nineteenth Street in Washington, where he died in
the early morning of May 1.

The obituary in The Washington

Post attributed the cause of death to heart and liver trouble.
In addition, the long periods he had spent in the tropics
certainly must have served to weaken his health. 165
Announcement of Dawson's death was followed by the
usual eulogistic statements in his honor by those who had
worked with him.

Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson

noted that by Dawson's death the diplomatic service had lost
a man with "a distinguished record of long and efficient service • • • • " and that he would be greatly missed by his col16 6
'
Service.
·
. th e St a t e De par t men t an d the Foreign
l eagues in
On May 2, the day of the funeral, the State Department closed
at 2:30 in order that Dawson's associates could attend the
services at the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church at 3:0o.

167

165The Washington Post, May 2, 1912, p. 4. The Washington Star, May 1, 1912, p. 3.
166 ouoted in The Washington Post, May 2, 1912, p. 4.
167 Purport Sheet for Department of State Decimal File
123.D321, sub. no. 119. This file is Dawson's personnel file
and it was not available.
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The honorary pallbearers at the funeral included the Brazilian
and Japanese Ambassadors, Secretary of the Interior Walter
Fisher, who had known Dawson at Hanover College, Assistant
Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, John Barrett the Director
General of the Pan-American Union, Senator Cummins and Representative James Good of Iowa. 168
When word of his death reached the off ices of the
Pan-American Union, Director General Barrett had ordered the
flag over the building lowered to half-mast.

This tribute

was described by the Bulletin of the Pan-American Union "not
as a perfunctory compliment, but as a real expression of the
great loss which Pan-American relations had suffered by his
demise."

Furthermore, the article noted that Dawson could

probably be considered one of the best authorities "on the
Latin American countries and their relations with the United
States."

The experience which he had acquired while serving

in Latin America and in the Department of State were useful
to him "in promoting friendship, good understanding and commerce among all the American nations."

Finally the Bulletin

asserted that, "in addition to the remarkable ability and reputation he enjoyed, he had a personal charm and an affability
which made him loved by all who knew him well. 11169
Perhaps the importance of Dawson's career and the un168The Washington Post, May 2, 1912, p. 4.
169 Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, XXXIV (June,
1912), 720-721.
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timeliness of his death were best summed up by Charles G.
Dawes, his longtime friend and patron.

In a letter to James

Hume, Dawson's cousin, Dawes wrote:
It is hard to become reconciled to the thought of
Tom's death at a point in his career when it was commencing to receive that general appreciation which in
time would have crystalized into enduring fame. The
public service which he performed, fortunately for his
memory, are of such a nature that their importance to
the people involved will be cumulative. In the histories of some governments Tom's name will have its
fixed place as it would have ha~ in this country to a
greater degree had he lived.
70
170
.
Dawes to Hume, May 17, 1912, Dawes Collection,
Letter Press Book, personal letters, January 22, 1912November 16, 1912.

c.

CHAPTER XII
I
CONCLUSIONS
Dawson's entry into the diplomatic service in 1897
came, like the majority of similar appointments, as a result
of political patrongage.

Initially, he may have considered

his appointment as Secretary of the Legation in Brazil as
merely a stepping stone to further political preferment.

The

six years in Brazil served as an adequate apprenticeship, and,
as time passed, he began to look upon the diplomatic service
as his chosen career.

Following the Brazilian assignment, the

posts that he held progressively grew in importance.

Finally,

he reached the point where he was among the chief advisers on
Latin American affairs in the State Department.
There is no indication that Dawson in any significant
way disagreed with the policies which Washington pursued during the fourteen years he was in the diplomatic service.

He

accepted unquestioningly the concepts that Latin America should
serve as a market for the expanding United States industrial
economy and that claims of United States citizens against Latin
American governments should be pushed by the State Department
to a successful conclusion.

Furthermore, he fully approved of

the interference of the United States in the turbulent political and economic affairs of the
445

Caribb~an

and Central American
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nations.

In view of his acceptance of the prevailing policies

within the State Department, his influence on these policies
was confined to advising on certain specific aspects concerning implementation, rather than in urging any complete change
of policy.

This does not mean that he had no impact on United

States-Latin American relations.

To the contrary, he had a

considerable impact in Central America and the Caribbean by
skillfully negotiating the agreements which implemented the
policy of dollar diplomacy formulated in Washington.

Perhaps

his most significant contribution occurred during his assignment to the Dominican Republic.

The customs receivership,

which he helped to establish, later served as a model when
the State Department recommended intervention to bring about
financial reforms in Central America.

As Chief of the Latin

American Division and Resident Diplomatic Officer, he had
further opportunity to work for the implementation of this
policy.
Dawson appears to have had a genuine liking and sympathy for the Latin Americans.

In dealing with the revolu-

tionary governments of Santo Domingo, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
at times he could become exasperated with their factionalism
and apparent unreasonableness.

Nevertheless, he never seems

to have treated the members of these governments with an arrogance which would convey a feeling of political or racial
superiority.

Undoubtedly, his ability to understand these

men and to treat them with respect helped him to win their

447
confidence, and, thus, enabled him to achieve success, albeit
only temporary, in mediation.

His sympathy towards the Latin

Americans is further evidenced in his two volume history of
South America, where he foresaw an optimistic future for the
countries of that continent.
Dawson's acceptance of the policies of the State Department and his role in implementing them and his favorable
disposition towards the Latin Americans, at first sight,
appears to form something of a paradox.

It is highly un-

likely that this problem ever presented itself to him; however, if it had, it would probably have seemed more apparent
than real.

In the first place, to find new markets for North

American products and capital was considered a completely
legitimate goal of diplomacy.

The United States was merely

seeking what would have been considered an equitable share-that is, an equity based on the closeness and special interest
in Latin America--of the market

a~ready

pean manufacturers and investors.

dominated by Euro-

The protection of the

legitimate commercial enterprises and financial investments
of United States citizens was also considered a perfectly
legitimate objective of United States diplomacy.

Taking a

rigidly legalistic view of the property rights of United States
citizens in foreign countries, the officials in Washington
were determined that strict justice was to be rendered.

Once

the foreign government involved accepted this principle, the
State Department was normally willing to make the resolution
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of the controversy as painless as possible.

There appears to

have been little worry that the protection of one claim might
injure more important policy considerations.

During Dawson's

I

career, there are two illustrations of this point.

The first

occurred with regard to the San Domingo Improvement Company.
Dawson assiduously defended the Company's rights under the
Award of July 14, 1904 until it became overwhelmingly clear
that fear and dislike of the Company was hindering the furtherance of Washington's policy in Santo Domingo.

The second

example is that of the Alsop claim against the Government of
Chile.

The anti-Yankee sentiment which this case generated

and the effects it could have on Chilean-United States relations or upon other North American investments in Chile were
disregarded.

Dawson could perhaps justify the course his

Government had taken in that a lingering source of controversy
between Washington and Santiago had, at long last, been removed.

However, he simply overlooked the fact that the resi-

dual effect of bad feelings could remain.
Interference in the affairs of the Central American
and Caribbean nations also was not incompatible with Dawson's
friendly disposition towards the Latin Americans.

In the

first place, he accepted the argument that the Caribbean and
Central America were a special sphere of United States influence.

Secondly, as indicated in his history of the South

American nations and in various

repor~s

he sent to Washington,

he believed that political stability was contingent upon eco-
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nomic stability and prosperity.

There.fore, he could logically

conclude that it was the-United States' place to offer a helping hand.

Finally, certain benefits did seem to flow from

United States interference.

In the Dominican Republic, at

least, endemic revolution ceased, the international financial
morass was untangled, and an economic revival appeared to be
under way.

Hence, he had some altruistic and optimistic argu-

ments to bolster an interventionist policy.
Dawson's most glaring deficiency was his inability to
recognize and understand the depth and sincerity of those who
opposed United States interference in the affairs of the various countries.

In the Dominican Republic OP.position was

rli~ ..

missed as coming from professional revolutionaries or from
easily aroused lower classes.

d11S

In Colombia, the anti-Yankee

sentiment still lingering from the Panamanian revolution of
1903, was not even taken into account when Dawson discussed
the possibility of ratification of the United States-ColombianPanamanian treaties in 1909.

Later, in helping to shape the

United States' policy in Nicaragua and Honduras, Dawson again
rejected the sincerity of the opposition and chose to assume
that once the provisional governments of these countries had
officially accepted United States interference in their economic affairs, they would readily implement this interference.
Where the United States offered "moral support," as in the case
of the Dominican Republic, indifference to the opposition made
no difference.

However, in Colombia where there was no way of
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supporting the government favorable to the United States policy,
or in Nicaragua and Honduras, where no effective pressures
could be brought to bear upon the governments which had supposedly accepted the United States' viewpoint, the policy itself
failed.
In view of the partisan nature of the newspaper reports, it is difficult to arrive at any adequate conclusions
regarding Latin American sentiment towards Dawson and his
work.

From the available evidence, Dawson always remained on

the most cordial personal and official terms with the Government to which he was accredited.

Socially, he and his wife

were apparently readily accepted into the polite society of
the

va.i:J.;;'""·'

.;..:ctph,d..1.S.

Since frequently the policies he

sup·-

ported were also accepted in the capitals where he was assigned, it is not surprising that he and his work would receive governmental approval.

However, if he failed to under-

stand those who opposed his policies, the opposition obtained
its revenge by attacking Dawson as the symbol of policies they
opposed and as being too closely connected with the governments
they were trying to displace.
Although it is futile to speculate, one still wonders
whether Dawson might not have attained higher honors had he
lived.

His friend Charles Dawes seems to have implied this

in the quote which concludes the last chapter.

Indeed, Daw-

son's prominence in Latin American affairs would seem to have
pointed in that direction.

Nevertheless, any immediate advance-
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ment would have been at best probably only temporary.

Even if

he had obtained an ambassadorship under the Taft Administration, his career would pro,bably have. gone into eclipse with
!

I

the advent of the new Democratic administration in 1913.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS
James S. Clarkson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. c.
Charles G. Dawes Collection, Deering Library, Northwestern
University, Evanston, Illinois.
John Hay Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C.
Philander c. Knox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D. c.
William McKinley Papers, Microfilm, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D. c.
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D. C•
. Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D. c.
John Coit Spooner Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D. c.
William H. Taft Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D. c.
ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS
National Archives
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59:
Thomas
File.

c.

Dawson's Application and Recommendation

Numerical File Cases 27, 180, 468, 570, 874, 944,
1070, 1154, 1199, 1502, 1927, 2078, 2086, 2502, 2765,
3987, 5025, 5775, 6369, 7804, 9271, 10717, 19007,
24173.
452

453
Decimal Files 033.llOOK77, 321.114B63, 425.11A78,
711.21, 822.0l4G, 822.124.
Purport Sheet for Decimal File 123.D321.
Microfilm:
Despatches From United States Consuls in Santo Domingo,
1837-1906, Vol. 19. Microcopy No. T-56, roll 19.
Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1962.
Despatches from United States Ministers to Brazil,
Vols. 61-69. Microcopy No. 121, rollS63-71. Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1947.
From United States Minister to the Dominican
Republic, Vols. 11-15. Microcopy 93, rolls 11-15.
Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1966.
De~patches

Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State:
Brazil, Vols. 18-19. Microcopy No. 77, roll 26.
Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1947.
Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State:
Haiti and Santo Domingo. Haiti, Vol. 4. Dominican
Republic, Vol. 1. Microcopy No. 77, roll 98. Washington, O. C.: National Archives, 1946.
Miscellaneous Letters of the Department of State.
Microcopy No. 179, rolls 1215, 1219, 1221, 1222,
1227, 1229, 1233, 1238, 1278, 1288. Washington, D. C.:
National Archives, 1964.
Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal
Affairs of Argentina, 1910-29. Microcopy No. 514,
roll 17. Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1963.
Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal
Affairs of Guatemala, 1910-29. Microcopy No. 655,
roll 21. Washington, D. c.: National Archives, 1966.
Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal
Affairs of Honduras, 1910-29. Microcopy No. 647,
rolls 3-6, 34-35. Washington, D. c.: National Archives,
1966.
Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal
Affairs of Nicaragua, 1910-29. Microcopy No. 632,
rolls 4, 7-9, 11, 70. Washington, D. c.: National
Archives, 1966.

454
Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal
Affairs of Venezuela, 1910-29. Microcopy No. 366,
roll 17. Washington, D. c.: National Archives, 1961.
Harvard University Archives
Thomas

c.

Dawson's Record of Absences from and tardiness at
Recitations and Lectures, 1884-1885.

Class of 1887, Record of T.

c.

Dawson.

PUBLISHED WORKS
Books and Articles by Thomas C. Dawson
"A Hanover Boy in Brazil," The Journal of Hanover College,
V (October, 1898), 98-104.
South American Republics.
Sons, 1903-1904.

2 vols.

New York: G. P. Putnam's

"The Caucasian in Brazil," The Popular Science Monthly, LXIV
(April, 1904), 550-56.
Government Publications
U.S. Congressional Record.

Vol. XXXIX.

U.S. Department of State. Register of the Department of State,
Seetember 20, 1911. Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, 1911.
~~~~~·

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, With the Annual Message of the President. 1904-1907, 1909-1911. Washington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1905-1918.
Letters, Memoirs, and Papers

Dawes, Charles G. A Journal of the McKinley Years. Edited
and with a forward by Bascom N. Timmons. Chicago:
The Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1950.
Huntington Wilson, F. M. Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat.
Bruce Hwnphries, Inc., 1945.

Boston:

Moore, John Bassett. The Collected Papers of John Bassett
Moore. 7 vols. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1944.

455
Roosevelt, Theodore. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. 8.
vols. Edited by Elting E. Morison. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951-54.
Directories and College Catalogues
Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the Law School of
The Cincinnati College for the Fifty-Fourth Academical
Year, 1886-87, With a Statement of the Course of
Instruction. Cincinnati: n.p., 1887.
Circular of Hanover College, 1880.

n.p. n.d.

Harvard University.
College Directory 1884-85: A Full List
of the Names and Addresses of the Students of Harvard
University. Cambridge, Massachusetts: n.p., 1884.
Law Dept. of the University of Cincinnati. A List of Graduates
of the Cincinnati Law School Law Department of the
University of Cincinnati From the Time of its Establishment 1833 to 1904. n.p., n.d.
William's Cincinnati Directory Embracing a Full Alphabetical
Record of the Names of the Inhabitants of Cincinnati,
A Business Directory, Street Directory, Municipal
Record, United States Post Office Directory, Etc.
June 1886. Cincinnati: Cincinnati Directory Office,
1886.
SECONDARY SOURCES
BOOKS
Bailey, Thomas A. Theodore Roosevelt and the JapaneseAmerican Crises: An Account of the International Comllications Arising from the Race Problem on the Paciic Coast. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964.
Beal, Howard K. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to
World Power. New York: Collier Books, 1967.
Bemis, Samuel Flagg. The Latin American Policy of the United
States: An Historical Interpretation. New York:
W.W. Norton and co., Inc., 1967.
Burns, E. Bradford. The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and
Brazilian-American Relations. New York: ColUiribia
University Press, l966.

456
Burton, David H. Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Im erialist.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 968.
Callcott, Wilfrid H. The Caribbean Policy of the United States
1890-1920. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942.
I

Cox, Isaac J. Nicaragua and the United States 1909-1927.
Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1927.
Dennet, Tyler. John Hay: From Poetry to Politics.
Dodd, Mead and Co., l934.

New York:

Denny, Harold N. Dollars for Bullets: The Story of American
Rule in Nicaragua. New York: The Dial Press, 1929.
Esthus, Raymond A. Theodore Roosevelt and Japan. Seattle,
Washington: University of Washington Press, 1966.
Evans, Henry Clay. Chile and Its Relations With the United
States. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University
Press, 1927.
Gue, B. F. and Shambaugh, Benjamin F. Biographies and Portraits of the Progressive Men of Iowa Leaders in
Business, Politics and the Professions. Vol. II:
A Western Commonwealth. Des Moines: Conaway and
Shaw, Publishers, 1899.
Herring, Hubert. A History of Latin America From the Beginnings to the Present. 2nd ed. revised. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.
Hill, H. C. Roosevelt and the Caribbean.
and Russell, 1965.

New York: Russell

Hill, Lawrence F. (ed.) Brazil. Berkely, California: University of California Press, 1947.
Holt, James. Congressional Insurgents and the Party System
1909-1916. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967.
Jessup, Philip c. Elihu Root,
Mead and Co., 1938.

2 vols.

New York: Dodd,

Knight, M. Melvin. The Americans in Santo Domingo.
York: The Vanguard Press, 1928.

New

Mecham, J. Lloyd. A Survey of United.States Latin American
Relations. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.

457
Mowry, George E. The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth
of Modern America 1900-1912. The New American Nation
Series. Edited by Henry Steele Cormnanger and Richard
B. Morris. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962.
Munro, Dana G. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1964.
The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography Being the History of the United States: As Illustrated in the Lives
of the Founders, Builders, and Defenders of the Republic, and of the Men and Women who are Doing the Work
and Moulding the Thought of the Present. Vol. XIII.
New York: James T. White and Company, 1906.
Parks, E. Taylor. Colombia and the United States 1765-1934.
Durham, North Carolina: Duke university Press, l935.
Perkins, Dexterp The Monroe Doctrine 1867-1907.
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1937.

Baltimore:

Pike, Fredrick B. Chile and the United States, 1880-1962:
The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963.
Pringle, Henry F. Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography.
Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1931.

New York:

The Life and Times of William Howard Taft. 2
vols. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., l939.
Rippy, J. Fred. The Caribbean Danger Zone.
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940.

New York:

Schoenrich, Otto. Santo Domingo A Country with a Future.
York: The Macmillan Company, 1918.
Scott, James Brown. Robert Bacon Life and Letters.
William Heineman Ltd., l924.

New

London:

Singletary, Otis A. and Newman, Jane P. {eds.) American Universities And Colleges. 10th ed. Washington, D. C.:
American Council on Education, 1968.
Welles, Sumner. Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic
1844-1924. 2 vols. New York: Payson & Clarke Ltd.,
1928.

458
Who Was Who in America: A Companion Volume to Who's Who in
America. Vol. I: 1897-1942. Chicago: The A. N. Marquis Co., 1943.
Who Was Who In America: A Companion Biographical Reference
Work To Who's Who in America. Vol. II: 1943-1950.
Chicago: The A. N. Marquis Co., 1950.
ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS
Briggs, John E. "Iowa and the Diplomatic Service," Iowa
Journal of History and Politics, XIX (July, 1921),
321-65.
Ganzert, Frederic. "The Baron Do Rio Branco, Joaquin Nabuco
and the Growth of Brazilian-American Friendship 19001911," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXII
(August, 1942), 432-451.
Hanover College Triangle, May 9. 1912.
The Hanoverian, II (May, 1882), 177.
La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 1909.
The New York Times, 1904-1906.
Bulletin of the Pan-American Union, XXXIV (June, 1912), 720-21.
Parks, Lois F. and Nuermberger, Gustave A. "The Sanitation of
Guayaquil," The Hislanic American Historical Review,
XXIII (May, 1943), 97-221.
Rippy, J. Fred. "The Initiation of the Customs Receivership
in the Dominican Republic," The Hispanic American
Historical Review, XVII (November, 1937), 419-457.
The Washington Post, 1905, 1912, 1949.
The Washington Star, 1912.
UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS
Dissertations
Billman, Calvin James. "Backgrounds and Policies of Selected
United States Diplomats To Latin America, 1898-1938."
Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Tulane University,
1954.

459
Duin, Edgar Charles. "Dominican-American Diplomatic Relations
1895-1907." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1955.
Lane, George B., Jr. "The Role of John Barrett in the Development of the Pan-American Union 1907-1920." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, American University, 1962.
McDevitt, John Richard. "American-Nicaraguan Relations From
1909 to 1916." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
Georgetown University, 1954.
MacMichael, David Charles. "The United States and the Dominican Republic 1871-1940: A cycle in Caribbean Diplomacy." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University
of Oregon, 1964.
Personal Letters
Letter from Mrs. Barbara E. Amidon, Permissions Department,
Houghton Mifflin Company, October 17, 1969.
Letter from Robert W. McClew, Registrar of Hanover College,
September 30, 1969.
Letter from Peter R. Thoms, University Legal Officer, University of Cincinnati, October 28, 1969.
Letters from Samuel s. Wilson, Acting Dean of the College of
Law, University of Cincinnati, September 3, 1969,
September 9, 1969, September 13, 1969.
Letter to the Office of the Registrar, College of Law, University of Cincinnati, August 28, 1969.
Letter to Peter R. Thoms, University Legal Officer, University of Cincinnati, September 19, 1969.

APPROVAL SHEET
This dissertation submitted by Glenn J. Kist has been
read and approved by members of the Department of History.
The final copies have been examined by the director of
the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval with
reference to content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

Date

460

